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The Place of Wisdom in the Buddhist Path
While it is through practicing all of the other perfections that we can accumulate great merit, it is only the perfection of wisdom that allows us to cut through the root of the cycle of existence. The earlier chapters of the Bodhicaryāvatāra present practices which can act as temporary antidotes to their opposing factors. Patience can temporarily reduce our anger, and contemplating the uncleanliness of the body can temporarily reduce our attachment. But when these positive factors wane for a moment, the afflictions will swiftly arise again. There is only one way to finally put an end to the whole range of negative states of mind, and that is to develop the wisdom which understands the lack of any inherent self, both of persons and of all other phenomena.
As this is the case, Śāntideva sets the stage for chapter 9 by explaining how all of the other branches of the doctrine and paths of practice were spoken of in order to prepare for the development of the wisdom which understands the ultimate reality of all.
All these branches of the Doctrine The Enlightened Sage expounded for the sake of wisdom.106As already stated in the introduction, the ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyāvatāra is an extremely concise exposition of the Madhyamaka view, recapitulating its various stages of development and polemical interaction with other schools, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. It is worth bearing in mind that on that famous occasion when Shāntideva recited his text from the lofty throne at Nālandā, he did so to a public already deeply versed in both the content and history of Madhyamaka. And his ninth chapter was no doubt intended as a brilliant and perhaps even lighthearted exposition of a highly recondite subject to a specialist audience of philosophers and academics. As it stands, the ninth chapter is scarcely comprehensible to the unassisted reader, and an extensive commentary is indispensable. Those of Kunzang Pelden and Minyak Kunzang Sönam are already available in translation, and the interested student will also derive much assistance from the other commentaries listed in the Bibliography. In an attempt to render the root text at least intelligible, almost all translators have resorted to the expedient of indicating in parentheses the different points of view (Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaisheshika, Ābhidharmika, and so on) referred to as the chapter progresses. But it is doubtful whether, in the absence of an extensive commentary, these additions do any more than complicate the issue and increase the dismay of the bewildered reader. In any case, they tend to obscure the fact that the ninth chapter, like the rest of the book, is composed in seamless verse, and is in fact a fast-moving, scintillating tour de force. With regard to the present translation, the aim has been to facilitate comprehension as much as possible, and a certain latitude of expression seemed justifiable, mainly in the way of explanatory paraphrase where possible and appropriate. The interpretation given in the commentary of Kunzang Pelden, and by implication that of his teachers Patrul Rinpoche and Mipham Rinpoche, has been consistently followed. See also Crosby and Skilton, p. in, for a helpful breakdown of the subject matter of this chapter. Therefore they must cultivate this wisdom Who wish to have an end of suffering.
Page(s) 137
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
༈ ཡན་ལག་འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི། །
ཐུབ་པས་ཤེས་རབ་དོན་དུ་གསུངས། ། དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར་ན་སྡུག་བསྔལ་དག །
ཞི་བར་འདོད་པས་ཤེས་རབ་བསྐྱེད། །yan lag 'di dag thams cad ni/_/
thub pas shes rab don du gsungs/_/ de yi phyir na sdug bsngal dag_/
zhi bar 'dod pas shes rab bskyed/_/The Two Truths
In verses 2 to 4ab, Śāntideva gives a summarized presentation of the two truths—the conventional and the ultimate truth.
The first two lines of verse 2 present us with the division of all phenomena, the division into the conventional and ultimate truths.
Relative and ultimate, These the two truths are declared to be. (9.2ab)[1]
These verses, and particularly the second two lines of verse 2, have been interpreted in a wide variety of ways and form part of a larger debate involving the different philosophical traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism.
The ultimate is not within the reach of intellect, For intellect is said to be the relative. (9.2cd)[2]
There is a much more detailed essay on this topic available on this website entitled "Debates on the Wisdom Chapter between Mipham, Drakar, and Pari Rabsel," but the main argument within the debate is whether or not the ultimate truth is beyond the scope of the intellectual or dualistic conventional mind. Masters such as Lama Tsongkhapa, through his disciple Gyaltsap Je, argue that it is possible to access emptiness, the ultimate reality of phenomena, with the conceptual mind. They also assert that this emptiness is exactly the same entity that is perceived directly by the exalted wisdom consciousness on the path of seeing.
Other masters, such as Mipham Rinpoche, assert that there are two kinds of ultimate truth—the actual ultimate truth (རྣམས་གྲངས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་
) and a similitude of the ultimate (རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་). They argue that the similitude of the ultimate can be accessed by the conceptual mind but that the actual ultimate truth cannot be accessed by the ordinary, dualistic mind; it can only be accessed by the exalted wisdom gained in meditative equipoise on the path of seeing and above. Therefore, for this philosophical position, these two categories are not the same entity, and the actual ultimate is more subtle than the similitude and can only be realized by a directly perceiving nonconceptual consciousness devoid of any dualistic factors.
Different Individuals Perceive Different Levels of Truth
Having explained the different natures of the two truths, in verses 3 and 4 Śāntideva then moves on to explain what kind of individuals are able to access these different levels of the truth. And here he describes two types of individuals, the ordinary being and the yogi.
In light of this, within the world, two kinds of people are observed: Those with yogic insight and the common run of people. In this regard, the views of ordinary folk Are undermined by yogis who themselves are in the world108This refers to Buddhist thinkers and practitioners who with varying degrees of success have acquired an understanding of the true status of phenomena. In terms of the five paths, which in Buddhism are used to map out the progress of the mind toward the attainment of omniscience or complete enlightenment, the yogis in question are on the first and the second, namely, ‟accumulation” and ‟joining.” They have not yet attained the path of seeing, where the mind enjoys a direct experience of the emptiness of phenomena, at which point it is said to pass beyond the world, that is, samsara. For although the yogis on the path of seeing have yet to achieve Buddhahood, they can never fall back into samsaric existence.
Page(s) 137
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་རྣམ་གཉིས་མཐོང་། །
རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ་དང་ཕལ་པའོ། ། དེ་ལ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕལ་པ་ནི། །
རྣལ་འབྱོར་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱིས་གནོད་ཅིང་། །de la 'jig rten rnam gnyis mthong /_/
rnal 'byor pa dang phal pa'o/_/ de la 'jig rten phal pa ni/_/
rnal 'byor 'jig rten gyis gnod cing /_/According to Śāntideva, the understanding of yogic practitioners, who engage in philosophical analysis and meditative practice, undermines the views of ordinary people not engaged in these practices.
In verse 4 he explains how among the individuals considered to be practitioners, there are many levels of understanding. For instance, the understanding of followers of the lower Buddhist tenets, such as the Vaibhāṣikas, undermine the existence of a permanent, unitary, and autonomous self, the understanding of reality held by non-Buddhist schools. Then, increasingly more refined presentations of reality from Mahāyāna tenet systems such as Yogācāra and Madhyamaka outshine the philosophy of systems below them, until what is considered by all the Tibetan schools of Buddhism to be the highest, the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, is reached.
Refuting This Presentation of the Two Truths
Throughout the ninth chapter, Śāntideva engages in debates with other philosophical positions about the nature of the self and other phenomena. These opponents are from the Buddhist world but also from non-Buddhist philosophical schools whose roots lie in the ancient Indian religious traditions.
From verse 4cd until verse 56, Śāntideva deals with objections to the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school's presentation of the two truths from various other Buddhist schools.
Refuting Objections from the Buddhist Realist/Śrāvaka Position
Beginning from verse 6, Śantideva begins a series of debates with both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. The debates flow back and forth between Śantideva himself, here as a representative of the Madhyamaka tradition in general and specifically the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school, and the holders of these other philosophical traditions.
In verses 6 to 15, Śāntideva answers a series of doubts about the Madhyamaka presentation of all phenomena being empty of intrinsic existence and therefore not existing in the way they ordinarily appear. This presentation of an illusory-like nature draws criticism from many philosophical schools, particularly from the Śrāvaka tradition, who in the well-known presentation of the four schools of Indian Buddhism would be included as the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautāntrikas.
The main core of the objections they raise is that if the ultimate nature of things is unreal, then there is no meaning to practices of virtue and of accumulating merit, since those who commit the acts and the objects of those acts don't really exist. As an extension of that, they argue that if one commits a terrible negative act, such as murder, then, following the Prāsaṅgika presentation of illusion, that act would not lead to any negative karma because the person killed was an illusion.
Śrāvaka (9.9): If all phenomena are unreal and mere illusions, then the Buddha himself is an illusion too. Merit can only be accrued by making offerings to a real Buddha, so how can merit be accumulated by making offerings to an illusory Buddha? And how could beings take rebirth after they die if they are themselves illusions?
"Through a Buddha, who is but illusion, how does merit spring?” As if the Buddha were existing truly. "But,” you ask, "if beings are like illusions, How, when dying, can they take rebirth?”
Page(s) 138
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྒྱུ་འདྲའི་རྒྱལ་ལས་བསོད་ནམས་ནི། །
ཇི་ལྟར་དངོས་ཡོད་ལ་ཇི་བཞིན། ། གལ་ཏེ་སེམས་ཅན་སྒྱུ་འདྲ་ན། །
ཤི་ནས་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་ཞེ་ན། །sgyu 'dra'i rgyal las bsod nams ni/_/
ji ltar dngos yod la ji bzhin/_/ gal te sems can sgyu 'dra na/_/
shi nas ji ltar skye zhe na/_/Śāntideva's response (9.10): Illusory offerings made to the illusory Buddha give rise to illusory merit, just as you Śrāvakas believe that truly existent merit is accumulated by making truly existent offerings to a truly existent Buddha. The only difference between our systems lies in the respective reality or nonreality of the merit (and of the Buddha); it does not lie in the arising or nonarising of such merit.
As long as the conditions are assembled, Illusions, likewise, will persist and manifest. Why, through simply being more protracted, Should sentient beings be regarded as more real?
Page(s) 138
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཇི་སྲིད་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ཚོགས་གྱུར་པ། །
དེ་སྲིད་སྒྱུ་མའང་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར། ། རྒྱུན་རིང་ཙམ་གྱིས་ཇི་ལྟར་ན། །
སེམས་ཅན་བདེན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན། །ji srid rkyen rnams tshogs gyur pa/_/
de srid sgyu ma'ang 'byung bar 'gyur/_/ rgyun ring tsam gyis ji ltar na/_/
sems can bden par yod pa yin/_/All phenomena, whether an illusion or what we call a real phenomena, arise on the basis of causes and conditions. As long as the complete conditions of an illusion are assembled, the illusion will manifest. And as long as the complete conditions of karma and afflictions are present, beings will continue to experience death and rebirth.
This is the measure of their reality, and we cannot say beings have true existence because they exist for a longer time. An illusion could exist for a long time and a being for a shorter time, but the duration of the phenomena has no bearing on their ontological status.
Here, Śāntideva is saying that illusions and "real" beings are similar in that they appear but do not exist intrinsically.
Śāntideva's continued response (9.11): But with regard to the killing of a real person and the "killing" of an illusory person, there is a difference in the karma accrued, as one has a mind to experience suffering and one does not.
If one kills or harms the magical illusion of a man,
There is no mind in such a thing and therefore there’s no sin.
But beings do indeed have mirage-like minds;
Sin and merit will, in consequence, arise.[p.139]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 138
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྒྱུ་མའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་བསད་ལ་སོགས་། །
སེམས་མེད་ཕྱིར་ན་སྡིག་མེད་དེ། ། སྒྱུ་མའི་སེམས་དང་ལྡན་པ་ལ། །
བསོད་ནམས་དང་ནི་སྡིག་པ་འབྱུང་། །sgyu ma'i skyes bu bsad la sogs /_/
sems med phyir na sdig med de/_/ sgyu ma'i sems dang ldan pa la/_/
bsod nams dang ni sdig pa 'byung /_/Śāntideva's response (9.11): The intention to kill the illusory person that in reality is not a person still carries with it the fault of intending great harm on someone. But even if we were able to "kill" that illusory person, because they do not have a mind, no fault of murder would actually be committed.
On the other hand, what we call real beings are illusory-like, but although they are illusory-like they are not illusions. There is a difference between a person and the magical apparition of a person, and this division lies in whether they possess a mind or not. Because an actual person has a mind, they can therefore experience happiness and sorrow. The beneficial or harmful acts committed in relation to an actual person create virtuous or nonvirtuous karma.
In terms of their ontological status, there is not a single difference—both lack any intrinsic existence but still do conventionally exist.
Here, Śāntideva is highlighting an extremely important but commonly misunderstood point of the Middle Way view. He argues that just because things are illusory-like it doesn't mean that they are a complete fabrication, and it does not mean that they do not exist. An illusory-like person does not have any intrinsic nature, but they are still conventionally existent, they have minds and feelings, and if we commit terrible acts in relation to them, they will suffer, and we will accumulate negative karma. Śāntideva is at pains to point out that being empty of inherent existence does not invalidate the conventional and dependently related reality.
Refuting Objections from the Mind-Only School
In verses 15 to 29, Śāntideva answers questions raised by the Mind-Only (Cittamātra) Buddhist school and also debates with them regarding some of their central philosophical assertions.
The Mind-Only school does not accept the existence of any external phenomena and describes all that we encounter as being of the nature of mind. Objects such as trees and mountains are manifestations of the mind, but they do not exist externally in the way that they appear to do. Instead, when a karmic seed ripens to experience a particular object, like a tree, one part of that seed ripens as the mind experiencing that object, and one part ripens as an appearance of that external object. So the Mind-Only school's presentation of the emptiness of phenomena relies on understanding the lack of a separate entity of the mind and its objects, which leads us to realize that external phenomena have no independent existence "out there” on their own. They are actually only constructions of the mind. According to the Mind-Only school, when we see this ultimate reality of phenomena, our grasping at phenomena ceases and we can attain enlightenment.
The Mind-Only school's presentation of the empty nature of all phenomena relies heavily on what are known as the three natures—the dependent nature (paratantra), the imputed nature (parikalpita), and the thoroughly established or ultimate nature (pariniṣpanna).
Of particular interest to Śāntideva in relation to the Mind-Only school is their presentation of a self-cognizing mind (svasaṃvedana, rang rig). The Mind-Only school asserts the existence of this kind of mind that has the ability to be aware of and to ratify its own existence. For the Mind-Only school, if we do not accept the existence of this self-cognizing mind, we will not be able to establish the validity, and therefore the existence, of consciousness through valid cognition (pramāṇa).
But since they accept no external objects, when mind perceives what appears to be external phenomena, it is really only perceiving a projection of that very mind itself, and so it is essentially like mind just perceiving mind.
Śāntideva argues through analogies that this kind of mind that perceives its very own self cannot exist, just as a candle flame does not illuminate itself, and just as a sword is not able to cut itself. This refutation is also intimately tied in with the explanation of memory and the need for a valid cognizing mind in order to validate or establish the existence of any particular phenomena.
The Nature of Illusion
Verses 30 to 34 contain debates between the Middle Way school and the other lower systems of Buddhist thought—the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, and the Mind-Only school. The main topic of discussion is the nature of illusion. The Sarvāstivāda school inquires of Śāntideva, "What use is this understanding of emptiness? Even with that understanding, we still fall prey to our desires, just as a magician can still fall to desire for an illusory woman that he has conjured up himself." Śāntideva counters this argument by saying that it is because of not being fully trained in the understanding of the lack of true existence that it is still possible for desire and the other afflictions to arise.
Refuting the View That If Everything Is Empty There Is No Point Seeking Enlightenment
In verses 35 to 39, Śāntideva fields further questions about the consequences of accepting the emptiness of the intrinsic reality of all phenomena. His opponents ask, "The doctrine of emptiness cannot be correct, because when the Buddha finally attains the fruit of the path—complete enlightenment—all discursive thought will cease and they will no longer have any mind. So how will they then be of any benefit to other sentient beings who are stuck in samsara since they have no thought to help others?"
Śāntideva counters this claim by saying that although there are neither conceptual thoughts nor any clinging to the true existence of self or phenomena, that does not mean that the buddhas will be unable to benefit others. Previously, when they were on the bodhisattva path, the buddhas made aspirational prayers to help others. It is these prayers that now come to fruition once the buddhas attain full enlightenment. With the appearance of the form body of the buddha (rūpakāya), the buddhas are able to spontaneously and effortlessly appear for the greatest welfare of all.
Proofs of the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna
Verses 40 to 43 provide a fascinating debate that questions the grounds on which a tradition can be considered to be authentically Buddhist.
The Śrāvaka tradition believes that directly understanding the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, such as impermanence, is sufficient to achieve the complete state of arhatship. So, they inquire of the Madhaymaka tradition, "What is the use of understanding emptiness?"
Śāntideva's first response is to quote from the Sūtras. He points out that this need for the understanding of emptiness, in order to completely uproot the afflictions, is mentioned directly in the words of the Buddha, particularly in the perfection of wisdom sūtras.
Some śrāvakas then question whether this kind of scriptural source is a valid teaching of the Buddha, and therefore there remains doubt as to whether a practitioner needs to realize emptiness to attain enlightenment.
Śāntideva then turns to logic, inquiring as to the reasons that the śrāvakas validate their own scriptures. If the śrāvakas reply that their sūtras are accepted by both parties, then, Śāntideva responds, the Vedas would also have to be accepted as valid scriptures teaching the truth because there are at least two parties who accept them to be valid.
And finally, Śāntideva reasons, if the śrāvakas follow with the argument that the teachings of the Mahāyāna are disputed by others so therefore they are not valid, that exact same argument can easily be turned back on them: since the śrāvaka’s own position is disputed by others, therefore the teachings of the śrāvaka vehicle cannot be considered valid.
The Importance of Emptiness according to the Middle Way School
In verses 44 to 56, the debate continues between the śrāvakas and the Middle Way school, but the argument shifts away from the scriptural validity of the two schools to the subject of why emptiness is so important.
At this juncture in the chapter, there is another big divergence within the commentarial tradition. The divergence of views rests on the previous discussion of whether the śrāvaka arhats need to realize the lack of intrinsic nature of self and phenomena in order to attain liberation from samsara (mokṣa).
The great Nyingma master Khenpo Kunpal argues that this section of the text does not assert the need for realizing emptiness in order to attain liberation but instead asserts the supremacy of the Mahāyāna. The great Gelukpa master Gyaltsap Darma Rinchen interprets this section as presenting the need for all practitioners to directly perceive emptiness, whether that is the hearers and solitary realizers of the Hīnayāna or the bodhisattvas of the Mahāyāna. This is one interpretation of the cornerstones of Lama Tsongkhapa's eight great points of Madhyamaka.
Selflessness
In the next section of the text, from verses 57 to 110, Śāntideva gives an extensive explanation of how to meditate on the two different kinds of selflessness: the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.
1. Selflessness of Persons
Śāntideva devotes the next major section of chapter 9 (verses 57 to 77) to the refutation of the self of persons (pudgalātman). This section is divided into (a) the general refutation of the self of persons and (b) the specific refutations of other school's presentations of the self of persons.
A. General Refutation in Regard to the Self of Persons
Verses 57 to 59 present a general refutation of an inherent self, a self which is truly and intrinsically existent and which exists from its own side. Śāntideva does this by analyzing the components of a person—the body and mind. He argues that the self always appears in relation to the five component psychophysical aggregates of the person—the aggregates of form, feeling, formations, discrimination, and consciousness. Therefore, if a person exists in exactly the way that they appear, which is an independent self coming from the side of the aggregates, then that kind of self should be findable within those aggregates when we search for it. These three verses detail that analysis and come to the conclusion that there is nothing called "self" that we find within any of these parts.
The flesh and skin are not the "I,” And neither are the body’s warmth and breath. The cavities within the frame are not the "I,” And "I” is not accounted for in sixfold consciousness.
Page(s) 145
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
B. Specific Refutations of Other Schools' Presentations of the Self of Persons
In verses 60 to 69, Śāntideva raises arguments against the non-Buddhist Indian traditions of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Nyāya. This section of the ninth chapter is a discussion of the self of persons and in particular is a refutation of the self of a person posited by these non-Buddhist schools.
i. Śāntideva's Refutation of the Sāṃkhya School's Belief in a Permanent Self That Is Conscious
In this section of the ninth chapter, Śāntideva refutes the self of persons as presented in the Sāṃkhya school.
Sāṃkhya (also spelled Sāṅkhya) is one of the six major orthodox (āstika) schools of Vedic philosophy (the other five are the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta).
Sāṃkhya is an atheistic system, and its adherents are known as the Enumerators, for it is said that the truth they teach is known by means of enumerating a series of up to twenty-five categories of phenomena. The two central factors of these twenty-five are the primal substance (prakṛti) and the person (puruṣa).
The Sāṃkhya school maintains that as long as we are ignorant of the fact that all categories are created by the interaction between the primal substance and the person, we therefore remain in a world of multiplicity and duality and remain unenlightened. Escape from this endless circle of samsaric existence is possible only through the realization of the fundamental difference between the primal substance and persons. This realization loosens the bond between them, and an individual person loses interest in the primal substance and is thereby liberated forever from all bodies, both subtle and gross.
For further information regarding the Nyāya school, see the following page [Link to NYĀYA COMMONS PAGE].
9.60 to 9.67: If something causes change to another phenomena or is changed by another phenomena, it cannot also be permanent.
In the middle section of chapter 9, Śāntideva presents his refutations of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist presentations of the self, or the person. In verses 60 to 67, he challenges the central Sāṃkhya assertion that a self can be consciousness and yet still permanent.
If the hearing consciousness is permanent,
It follows that it’s hearing all the time.
And if there is no object, what does it cognize?
On what grounds do you call it consciousness?[p.146]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 145
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་སྒྲ་ཡི་ཤེས་རྟག་ན། །
ཐམས་ཅད་ཚེ་ན་སྒྲ་འཛིན་འགྱུར། ། ཤེས་བྱ་མེད་ན་ཅི་ཞིག་རིག །
གང་གིས་ཤེས་པ་ཞེས་རྗོད་བྱེད། །gal te sgra yi shes rtag na/_/
thams cad tshe na sgra 'dzin 'gyur/_/ shes bya med na ci zhig rig_/
gang gis shes pa zhes rjod byed/_/If something that’s unconscious knows, It follows that a stick has knowledge also. Therefore in the absence of a thing to know, It’s clear that consciousness will not arise.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་ཤེས་[p.111]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990. 
ཤིང་ཡང་ཤེས་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར། ། དེས་ན་ཤེས་བྱ་ཉེར་གནས་པ། །
མེད་པར་ཤེས་པ་མེད་ཅེས་ངེས། །gal te shes [p.111]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
shing yang shes par thal bar 'gyur/_/ des na shes bya nyer gnas pa/_/
med par shes pa med ces nges/_/"How can you attribute the quality of knowing to the self?" Śāntideva asks. "You would be implying that if the self is the consciousness of sound, then sound will be perceived at all times. On the other hand, if you assert that cognitions exist even in the absence of their objects—such as sound or physical form—then it follows that a piece of wood could be conscious, since cognitions do not require objects. Since this is not tenable, you would have to agree that without objects of cognition, there can be no cognitions.”
If a particular object is not present, then there cannot be any consciousness which apprehends that phenomena. Consciousness has to depend upon the objects that it is aware of, and it is not possible for something to be a consciousness without its being a consciousness of something.
In the next verse Śāntideva continues his analysis of the philosophical problems inherent in accepting the person to be a permanent consciousness. He asks, "Why does the consciousness apprehending form not also apprehend sound?"
If the selfsame consciousness detects a form, At that time, why does it not hear? Perhaps you say the sound’s no longer there. Then neither is there consciousness of sound.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་གཟུགས་ཤེས་ན། །
དེ་ཚེ་ཐོས་པའང་ཅི་སྟེ་མིན། ། གལ་ཏེ་སྒྲ་མི་ཉེ་ཕྱིར་ན། །
དེས་ན་དེ་ཡི་ཤེས་པའང་མེད། །de nyid kyis ni gzugs shes na/_/
de tshe thos pa'ang ci ste min/_/ gal te sgra mi nye phyir na/_/
des na de yi shes pa'ang med/_/Since the consciousness is the person, and since that is accepted as a permanent phenomena, then if it apprehends sound, it has to continually apprehend sound, and therefore it cannot apprehend visible objects, such as forms.
How could that which has the nature of a soundperceiver Ever be transformed into a form-perceiver? "A single man,” you say, "can be both son and father.” But these are merely names; his nature is not so.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྒྲ་འཛིན་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ། །
དེ་གཟུགས་འཛིན་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར། ། གཅིག་ནི་ཕ་དང་བུ་ཉིད་དུ། །
བཏགས་ཡིན་ཡང་དག་ཉིད་མིན་ཏེ། །sgra 'dzin rang bzhin gang yin pa/_/
de gzugs 'dzin par ji ltar 'gyur/_/ gcig ni pha dang bu nyid du/_/
btags yin yang dag nyid min te/_/And likewise "pain,” "neutrality,” and "pleasure” Are neither fatherhood nor sonship; And we indeed have never yet observed A consciousness of form perceiving sound.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འདི་ལྟར་སྙིང་སྟོབས་རྡུལ་དང་ནི། །
མུན་པ་བུ་མིན་ཕ་ཡང་མིན། ། དེ་ནི་སྒྲ་འཛིན་དང་ལྡན་པའི། །
རང་བཞིན་དུ་ནི་མཐོང་མ་ཡིན། །di ltar snying stobs rdul dang ni/_/
mun pa bu min pha yang min/_/ de ni sgra 'dzin dang ldan pa'i/_/
rang bzhin du ni mthong ma yin/_/Adherents of the Sāṃkhya school respond: The consciousness is like an actor that performs many parts in a play, so they may put on one costume and act out one role earlier in the play and then don a different costume and play a completely different character later in the same play. Likewise, they say, an earlier consciousness of sound can appear later as the consciousness of form, which then sees visible objects.
Śāntideva: But if the consciousness is like an actor and plays many different roles by perceiving a variety of different objects, then that consciousness cannot be a constant and unchanging thing, and therefore it cannot be permanent. Change and permanence are mutually exclusive.
"But like an actor,” you reply, "it takes a different role and sees.” If so, this consciousness is not a constant thing. And if its later mode is still the first, That’s identity indeed and never seen before!
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གར་མཁན་ལྟ་བུར་ཚུལ་གཞན་གྱིས། །
དེ་ཉིད་མཐོང་ན་དེ་རྟག་མིན། ། གལ་ཏེ་ཚུལ་གཞན་དེ་ཉིད་ན། །
གཅིག་ཉིད་དེ་ནི་སྔོན་མེད་གཅིག །gar mkhan lta bur tshul gzhan gyis/_/
de nyid mthong na de rtag min/_/ gal te tshul gzhan de nyid na/_/
gcig nyid de ni sngon med gcig_/Śāntideva continues: Asserting that the latter consciousness of form is of the same nature as the prior consciousness of sound is not tenable. The two statements—(1) that the consciousness has assumed a new aspect that appears quite separately and that is not the same as before, but (2) is nevertheless thought of as being one with the previous and therefore not different in any way—are an incoherent expression of something that is unknown anywhere in the world and which has never before been seen.
Sāṃkhyas: These variously appearing consciousnesses are not real—they are deceptive forms of appearance which are dependent on temporary conditions.
Śāntideva: If these consciousnesses are not truly existent, then the Sāṃkhyas must explain what the nature of this truly existent consciousness is.
"But its different modes,” you say, "are quite unreal.” Its essence therefore you must now describe. You say that this is simply knowing. It follows that all beings are a single thing.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་ཚུལ་གཞན་བདེན་མིན་ན། །
དེ་ཡི་རང་གི་རང་བཞིན་སྨྲོས། ། ཤེས་ཉིད་ཅེ་ན་དེ་ལྟ་ན། །
སྐྱེས་ཀུན་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར། །gal te tshul gzhan bden min na/_/
de yi rang gi rang bzhin smros/_/ shes nyid ce na de lta na/_/
skyes kun gcig tu thal bar 'gyur/_/The Sāṃkhyas respond (9.66cd): It is pure consciousness, which is not qualified by any object. It is a single entity of consciousness that is present in all conscious experiences, past or future.[3]
Śāntideva's response: If all consciousness is singular and truly existent, then it must follow that all beings are one since their individual mindstreams are all one with this nature. Since this unqualified consciousness is inherently present in the mindstreams of all beings, they must all be identically one.
In the last verse of the refutation of the Sāṃkhya presentation of the self as permanent consciousness, Śāntideva argues (9.67ab): even animate consciousness (puruṣa) and the twenty-four categories of inanimate matter, such as prakṛti, would become identical since they are all alike in that they exist as permanent, partless entities.
What has mind and what does not have mind
Are thus identical, for both are equal in existing.
If the different kinds of mind are all unreal,
What common basis can there be for them?[p.147]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 146
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སེམས་པ་སེམས་མེད་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་། །
གཅིག་འགྱུར་གང་ཕྱིར་ཡོད་ཉིད་མཚུངས། ། གང་ཚེ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག །
དེ་ཚེ་འདྲ་བའི་རྟེན་གང་ཡིན། །sems pa sems med de dag kyang /_/
gcig 'gyur gang phyir yod nyid mtshungs/_/ gang tshe bye brag phyin ci log_/
de tshe 'dra ba'i rten gang yin/_/Śāntideva continues: If we take away all these different kinds of minds, such as the mind which sees visual objects and hears audible sounds, minds which are all false and deceptive, then although the Sāṃkhya school speaks of this basic consciousness as true, unitary, and universal, it is hard to see what is left of it.
This concludes the section on Śāntideva's refutation of the Sāṃkhya view of the self as a permanent, partless, yet unitary consciousness.
ii. Śāntideva's Refutation of the Self of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Schools' Belief in a Self That Is Material and Unconscious
Verses 68 and 69 contain Śāntideva's refutation of the presentation of self from the non-Buddhist schools of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.
The Vaiśeṣika school is one of the six major orthodox schools of Vedic philosophy and is based on Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣikasūtra, composed around the second century BCE. Kaṇāda was more interested in the nature of reality, which he saw as being the dharma. He was not an orthodox follower of the Vedas, but he respected them because they revealed the dharma (here, in the general sense of the law or the truth).
Vaiśeṣika philosophy is a form of realism that believes in the pluralistic reality of things in the world around us, things that are outside and separate from us. His text attempts to investigate the diversity of existent phenomena and to categorize these phenomena into different types of entities.
The Vaiśeṣikasūtra explains to us the futility of life in the illusory world of māyā and how an understanding of god can liberate us from samsara.
For further information regarding the Vaiśeṣika school, see the following page [Link to VAIŚEṢIKA COMMONS PAGE].
The Nyāya school is also one of the six major orthodox schools of Vedic philosophy. It was founded by Ṛiṣhi Akṣhipāda and is in some sense a continuation of the early Indian philosophical tradition of the Vaiśeṣika. The followers of the Nyāya refer mainly to Gautama Akṣapāda's Nyāyasūtra, from around the end of the first century CE. This text deals mainly with philosophical debate and logical and epistemological ideas.
The followers of the Nyāya (called Naiyāyikas) accept the self to be a permanent, partless, material phenomenon which, although unconscious, is considered to be the experiencer of things. It is the thing that transmigrates from life to life.
The two traditions of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya were maintained separately until around the eleventh century, when they eventually merged to form a tradition known as the Navya-Nyāya, combining the metaphysical basis of Vaiśeṣika with the epistemological developments of Nyāya.
For further information regarding the Nyāya school, see the following page [Link to NYĀYA COMMONS PAGE].
Śāntideva begins by refuting the main Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya view that the self is unconscious. His main argument here is that a self, or person, must be conscious. This seems to be directly validated by our everyday experience, where we are aware and have knowledge and understanding of the world around us.
The following verses present the basic debate between Śāntideva and the Vaiśeṣika/Nyāya position, interspersed with the relevant verses from the Bodhicaryāvatāra:
Śāntideva: If you hold the self to be an unconscious material substance, then the self cannot experience anything. If that is so, there would be no difference between that form of consciousness and ordinary matter, such as a clay pot.
Something destitute of mind, we hold, is not a self. For mindlessness means matter, like a vase. (9.68ab)[4]
Vaiśeṣika/Nyāya: It is true that since the self is unconscious, it cannot know objects or experience feelings directly. But when the self becomes associated with consciousness, then due to the mind's power, it can then become conscious of objects.
Śāntideva: Accepting this will destroy your central belief that the fundamental nature of the self is to be unconscious and unaware of phenomena. Now you are saying that it can become aware of objects, which is a contradiction:
"But," you say, "the self has consciousness when joined to mind." Then this refutes its nature of unconsciousness. (9.68cd)[5]
Śāntideva: Accepting an immutable, permanent self which is also affected by mind, such that it becomes cognizant of objects, is untenable.
If the self, moreover, is immutable, What change in it could mingling with the mind produce? And selfhood we might equally affirm Of empty space, inert and destitute of mind.
Page(s) 147
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཅི་སྟེ་བདག་ལ་འགྱུར་མེད་ན། །
སེམས་པས་དེ་ལ་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱས། ། དེ་ལྟར་ཤེས་མེད་བྱ་བྲལ་བ། །
ནམ་མཁའ་བདག་ཏུ་བྱས་པར་འགྱུར། །ci ste bdag la 'gyur med na/_/
sems pas de la ci zhig byas/_/ de ltar shes med bya bral ba/_/
nam mkha' bdag tu byas par 'gyur/_/Śāntideva: The self that you assert cannot be permanent, since the self comes to acquire the awareness of objects, an awareness that it did not previously have when it was unassociated with mind. How can something that is permanent, which never undergoes any kind of change, be affected by something else? How can something else cause this self to change its state, from the state of not knowing or experiencing objects to knowing them? It is not possible to act upon something which is permanent.
And it also follows that if this is how the self is, why would we not call empty space the self? Space, too, is inert and unable to act either negatively or positively, and it is similarly devoid of mind and not able to cognize anything.
Dispelling Objections to Selflessness
In the next short section of the text, from verse 70 to 77, Śāntideva fields doubts about the validity of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka explanation of the selflessness of persons, particularly the doubts that if the self does not exist, then the Buddhist presentation of the law of karma would be untenable, and the doubt that cultivating compassion for those that do not exist would be meaningless.
The Emptiness of the Self Is Not Compatible with the Principle of Karma In verses 70 to 74, Śāntideva responds to the argument that accepting a self which lacks any intrinsic nature and also accepting the law of karma such that actions in the past determine the positive or negative results we experience in the future are logically incompatible.
The opponent (who some ascribe to be the Nyāya and some as Vaiśeṣika): How is it possible for you, the Prāsaṅgika school, to believe in both the law of karma, where actions in the past determine the results we experience in the future, and at the same time to not believe in the existence of a self? Once the karmic action is done, there is no longer the doer. Therefore, who would receive the results of that action? Since the one who experiences the result of a previous action is someone else, the result of the action goes completely to waste.
"If self does not exist,” you say, "There is no link connecting actions with results. If when the deed is done, the doer is no more, Who is there to reap the karmic fruit?”
Page(s) 147
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་བདག་ནི་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །
ལས་འབྲས་འབྲེལ་པ་རིགས་མིན་ཏེ། ། ལས་བྱས་ནས་ནི་ཞིག་པས་ན། །
སུ་ཡི་ལས་སུ་འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན། །gal te bdag ni yod min na/_/
las 'bras 'brel pa rigs min te/_/ las byas nas ni zhig pas na/_/
su yi las su 'gyur zhe na/_/This is a very important philosophical point that touches on the subject of how the existence of the continuity of individual mindstreams for different beings can be compatible with the Buddhist presentation of selflessness.
9.70 to 9.72: Answering objections that a self which does not exist inherently can still create karmic actions and receive the karmic results of those, showing that karma and lack of true existence are not incompatible.
Śāntideva (9.72ab): It is impossible to find a result that still has its substantial cause present at the time that the result arises. At the time of the result, the cause must necessarily have ceased. It is only possible to draw the relationship of these causes to their results when we look at the perspective of the continuity of the mindstream of a particular being.
"A cause coterminous with its result” Is something quite impossible to see. And only in the context of a single mental stream Can it be said that one who acts will later reap the fruit.
Page(s) 147
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རྒྱུ་ལྡན་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་ཞེས། །
མཐོང་བ་འདི་ནི་སྲིད་མ་ཡིན། ། རྒྱུད་གཅིག་ལ་ནི་བརྟེན་ནས་སུ། །
བྱེད་པོ་སྤྱོད་པོ་ཞེས་བྱར་བསྟན། །rgyu ldan 'bras bu dang bcas zhes/_/
mthong ba 'di ni srid ma yin/_/ rgyud gcig la ni brten nas su/_/
byed po spyod po zhes byar bstan/_/Śāntideva (9.72cd): In dependence on a single continuum of the aggregates, we can refer to the one who creates the karma and the experiencer of the result of that karma. When talking in reference to a continuum, it is valid to say this person creates karma as well as experiences karma.
Connected to this verse, Khenpo Kunpal quotes from a Pāli sutta, where it states:
"The result, O monks, of an action once performed does not affect inanimate elements such as earth and so forth. It ripens on the aggregates, elements, and sense powers that are assumed by a consciousness." The result that ripens on the doer of an action is thus posited in terms of a single mental continuum.[6]
The Buddha himself has stated that the results of karmic actions do not ripen on immaterial and inanimate objects, such as rocks and mountains.[7] They ripen on the aggregates included within the basis of a person, such as the elements or the sense powers. The effects of actions performed by a living being always ripen in relation to aggregates which are associated with consciousness.
So there is continuity between the one who did the act and the one who receives the result. Despite there being no inherently existent self, it is still reasonable to accept that the continuum experiences the result. However, this is not the same person, as is commonly held by the view of ordinary people. The earlier person who commits the act is a different person from the one who experiences it. But then the question arises: what then is this self?
Opponent: It is the continuum that is the self.
Śāntideva (9.73ab): But accepting that this continuum is the continuum of mind and that the continuum of mind is the self is not tenable. If the self is mind, then it must be either the past, present, or future mind. But the past mind is gone and the future mind has not yet been produced, so they are not existent right now and therefore cannot be the self.
The thoughts now passed, and those to come, are not the self; They are no more, or are not yet. Is then the self the thought which now is born? If so, it sinks to nothing when the latter fades.
Page(s) 147
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འདས་དང་མ་འོངས་པ་ཡི་སེམས། །
བདག་མིན་དེ་ནི་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ། འོན་ཏེ་སྐྱེས་སེམས་བདག་ཡིན་ན། །
དེ་ཞིག་ན་ཡང་བདག་མེད་དོ། །das dang ma 'ongs pa yi sems/_/
bdag min de ni med pa'i phyir/_/ 'on te skyes sems bdag yin na/_/
de zhig na yang bdag med do/_/Opponent (9.73c): It is the current mind right now that is the self.
9.73: If the mind is the self, or indeed any one of the aggregates, then since the aggregates change from moment to moment, the self would become nonexistent in the next moment.
Śāntideva (9.73d): If the present mind is asserted to be the self, then a permanent self could not be accepted because this present mind perishes in the next moment and a new mind arises (an argument against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika). For anyone who believes the self to inherently exist, that self must pass from the past into the present and the present into the future. If this is so, the self cannot be identified as the present moment. These arguments refute the theory of the self being the mental continuum.
In relation to verse 73, the commentaries contain an interesting discussion of what it means to be a continuum.
It says in verse 61 of Candrakīrti's Entering the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra):
Qualities ascribed to Upagupta and Maitreya Are distinct and cannot be assigned to one continuum. Phenomena that differ by their varying particulars, Do not compose a single continuity.[8]
So there are different continuums for different beings. The continuum of Maitreya is not the continuum of Upagupta.
But the question may arise: Does one specific continuum constitute a single self? The answer is that it does not. We can easily see that a person when they are young is completely different from the same person when they are older, and we can also see that the person in an earlier birth is different from the person in a later birth. We can say that they are of the same continuum but that they are not the same person. The continuum is useful as a label, but it does not inherently exist.
9.74: The mind cannot be found when searched for among its parts, which are the individual moments of mind. It is neither the past mind, the present mind, or the future mind. However, there must still be some connection between past and future moments to allow for the existence of individual continuities of mind for each person.
Although the Madhyamaka school says that the continuum exists conventionally, they also point out that when we search for its ultimate nature under analysis, we cannot find anything that we can posit as the continuum, and therefore the continuum lacks any true existence.
Śāntideva (9.74ab): If we take the example of a plantain tree, and if we mentally analyze it or physically dissect it so that we look through all of its leaves, the trunk, or any of its parts, searching for the essence of this tree, we will find nothing that we can point to that is what we call a plantain tree.
For instance, we may take banana trees—
Cutting through the fibers, finding nothing.
Likewise analytical investigation
Will find no "I,” no underlying self.[p.148]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 147
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དཔེར་ན་ཆུ་ཤིང་སྡོང་པོ་དག །
ཆ་ཤས་ཕྱེ་ན་འགའ་མེད་པ། ། དེ་བཞིན་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ཡིས། །
བཙལ་ན་བདག་ཀྱང་ཡང་དག་མིན། །dper na chu shing sdong po dag_/
cha shas phye na 'ga' med pa/_/ de bzhin rnam par dpyad pa yis/_/
btsal na bdag kyang yang dag min/_/Śāntideva continues (9.74cd): Likewise, when we analyze the self or phenomena to see whether they exist inherently and concretely in the way that they appear, we find nothing. Searching through the basis of designation of a phenomena, we are unable to uncover anything that we could call an "I" or essence. Therefore, the self cannot exist in any kind of absolute manner. This kind of ultimate analysis harms any kind of assertion of an intrinsically existing independent self.
The Emptiness of the Self Is Not Compatible with Compassion In verses 75 to 77, Śāntideva answers further questions about the Madhyamaka school's presentation of emptiness.
Opponent (9.75): Since, for the Madhyamaka, the self does not exist, then living beings cannot exist. And if living beings do not exist, there is no one to be the object of compassion, which is one of the foundations of the Mahāyāna:
"If beings,” you will say, "have no existence, Who will be the object of compassion?” Those whom ignorance imputes, For whose sake we have pledged ourselves.
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་སེམས་ཅན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །
སུ་ལ་སྙིང་རྗེ་བྱ་ཞེ་ན། ། འབྲས་བུའི་དོན་དུ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི། །
རྨོངས་པས་བཏགས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པའོ། །gal te sems can yod min na/_/
su la snying rje bya zhe na/_/ 'bras bu'i don du khas blangs pa'i/_/
rmongs pas btags pa gang yin pa'o/_/Śāntideva responds (9.75cd): While there is no inherently or independently existing self, it is still possible to posit the existence of beings from a conventional perspective.
The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, in his commentary to the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra entitled Practicing Wisdom, brings out an interesting understanding of what Śāntideva means here by ignorance.
By "ignorance" here, Shantideva is not referring to the grasping at intrinsic existence, the fundamental ignorance that is at the root of our unenlightened existence. What he is saying is similar to the statement found in Chandrakirti's Supplement to the Middle Way, where the universe is said to be the product of the ignorant mind. Shantideva says that within the framework of relative truth—that is, within the validity of the conventional world of everyday experience—self does exist. Therefore, sentient beings exist for whom we can generate compassion, and these sentient beings have real suffering.[9]
Beings are thrown into the world of samsaric birth through the ignorant mind, and through ignorance they engage in contaminated actions that, while bringing positive or negative results, still keep us bound to the wheel of cyclic existence. Within the world of relative truth, beings do exist, and trapped as they are in this endless cycle of suffering, they are a suitable object for our compassion and bodhicitta.
Opponent (9.76ab): If there are no sentient beings, then there can be no practitioners of the path and no one who can attain the resultant state. Therefore, why would you take a vow to attain the state of buddhahood?
"If,” you ask, "there are no beings, who will gain the fruit?” It’s true! It is through ignorance that they are said to be! But for the total vanquishing of sorrow, The goal, which ignorance conceives, should not be spurned.
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སེམས་ཅན་མེད་འབྲས་སུ་ཡི་ཡིན། །
བདེན་ཏེ་འོན་ཀྱང་རྨོངས་ལས་འདོད། །
སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཉེ་[p.113]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
sems can med 'bras su yi yin/_/
bden te 'on kyang rmongs las 'dod/_/
sdug bsngal nye [p.113]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
Śāntideva responds (9.76cd): It is true that when subjected to ultimate analysis we cannot find anyone who attains the result, no one for whom the result is attained, nor any result. Ultimately, there is no difference between samsara or nirvana—neither of them have any true existence. But to the perception of those enmeshed in ignorance, these things seem very real. This is an essential point of the Middle Way philosophy—at an unanalyzed level, we can accept the existence of the conventional, dependently related world. But under analysis into their deepest nature, nothing of either samsara or nirvana can be found.
Khenpo Kunpal explains this very nicely by using an analogy of someone who is possessed by a harmful spirit, causing them to experience things that are not really there.
For one who, through ignorance, is enmeshed in dualistic mental patterns, samsara incontestably appears. And because of this, nirvana, the reverse of samsara, also exists. It is rather like a man oppressed by malignant spirits. He lives in the same kind of place as ordinary people, but he suffers because he sees demonic shapes and things that others do not perceive—and yet all the while he is in a perfectly wholesome and pleasant environment. In an ultimate sense, neither samsara nor the peace of nirvana has true existence. It is for this very reason that such things as bondage in samsara and liberation from it are possible; if they had real existence, neither could actually occur. This is a key point, which should be fully assimilated.[10]
Here, Khenpo Kunpal is pointing out a very important point—by not understanding that samsara and nirvana have not a single atom of true existence, there is bondage in cyclic existence. But there is also the possibility of liberation from that.
Opponents may raise the doubt: If what we hope to gain is actually unreal and unattainable, why should we make so much effort to train on the path?
Madhaymaka response: Although, on the ultimate level, there is actually nothing to obtain, on the level of appearance, there is still something to work toward. Until we attain buddhahood, when the ultimate reality of all phenomena appears directly to us, we should neither throw away the idea of trying to destroy the afflictions nor throw away the relative idea that liberation can be attained. This is the path we will have to walk to overcome suffering.
Once we have drawn back all the obscurations, including the obscurations to omniscience, and once all dualistic structures are dismantled, when for us the two truths are in union, only then will we be able to overcome the discrepancy between the appearance of phenomena and their deepest nature. Only then, in the sphere of ultimate reality, will we fully realize that the goal never fundamentally existed and be able to drop all hopes and expectations for conventional phenomena, even for enlightenment itself. Candrakīrti captures this in two verses from his classical work on the Madhyamaka view, Entering the Middle Way:
Conventional reality therefore becomes the means; And by this means, the ultimate is reached. Those who do not know how these two differ Err in thought and take mistaken paths. (6.80)
Unlike you, who think dependent nature is a true existent, Even for the all-concealing relative we make no claims. And yet, to gain the fruit, we speak in harmony with worldly folk And grant that things exist, though they do not. (6.81)[11]
Opponent's objection: If the reality of the conventional world is not to be completely negated, isn’t it possible that we might give these conventional phenomena some sort of objective status that they do not actually possess? And if this is so, it seems that although the afflictions and ignorance can be temporarily halted, it will not be possible to stop them completely.
The source of sorrow is the pride of saying "I,” It’s fostered and increased by false belief in self. To this you may believe that there is no redress, But meditation on no-self will be the supreme way.
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྡུག་བསྔལ་རྒྱུ་ཡི་ང་རྒྱལ་ནི། །
བདག་ཏུ་རྨོངས་པས་འཕེལ་བར་འགྱུར། ། དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་བཟློག་མེད་ཅེ་ན། །
བདག་མེད་བསྒོམ་པ་མཆོག་ཡིན་ནོ། །sdug bsngal rgyu yi nga rgyal ni/_/
bdag tu rmongs pas 'phel bar 'gyur/_/ de las kyang bzlog med ce na/_/
bdag med bsgom pa mchog yin no/_/Śāntideva responds (9.77): Clinging to the conventional self to be inherently existent creates a false sense of "I," leading us to give rise to anger, attachment, and the whole range of afflictions, and this in turn leads us to suffering.
This may seem like an endless cycle, but it is not. This ignorance can be overcome. This is possible if we cultivate the mind that lies in direct opposition to this false view of the self—the wisdom realizing the emptiness of the self. This insight, based on valid reasoning, perceives the ultimate reality of the self, the lack of any inherently existent nature, and dismantles the ignorance that has kept us bound in samsara.
Khenpo Kunpal neatly sums up this section of the text by encouraging those of us with good fortune to strive to develop the wisdom that sees the ultimate reality.
To sum up therefore, belief in selfhood is the root of samsaric existence. As long as this is not eliminated, no matter what practices one undertakes, whether austerities or meditation, one cannot get beyond samsara. Consequently, it has been said that those graced with good fortune who wish for liberation should constantly make their practice a remedy to self-clinging.[12]
2. Selflessness of Phenomena
Having refuted the positions of other doctrinal systems on the self of the person and implicitly presented the Madhyamaka view of how the person is empty of an inherent nature, Śāntideva then moves on to the selflessness of all other phenomena which are not the person.
The Four Foundations of Mindfulness
In the classical Buddhist tradition, there are many ways to analyze phenomena in order to reveal their deeper nature. Here, in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva chooses to focus mainly on some of the component aggregates of a person, the basis of designation of the person, which are considered to be included in the category of phenomena and therefore phenomena that are other than the person.
The system of contemplation that Śāntideva presents here is called the four foundations of mindfulness (catuḥsmṛtyupasthāna), also translated as the four close placements of mindfulness.
These four mindfulnesses observe four different aggregates within the continuum of a living being. These four are (1) mindfulness of body (kāyāsmṛtyupasthāna); (2) mindfulness of feelings (vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna); (3) mindfulness of mind (cittasmṛtyupasthāna); and (4) mindfulness of phenomena (dharmasmṛtyupasthāna).
These four mindfulnesses are a subset of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (saptatriṃśadbodhipakśyadharma), the noble eightfold path (āryaṣṭāṇgamārga), as well as the five faculties (pañcabalāni), and the five powers (pañcendriya). These factors are common both to the non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna traditions, although the reach and focus of these factors has developed along with the traditions.
The Theravāda tradition takes the source for these four mindfulnesses from The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness (Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta), which is found in the Dīgha Nikāya of the Pāli Canon.[13]
But what is the general characteristic of these four mindfulnesses? Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains the etymology of the word satipaṭṭhāna in his introduction to the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta as follows:
Satipaṭṭhāna—the establishing (upaṭṭhāna) of mindfulness (sati)—is a meditative technique for training the mind to keep mindfulness firmly established in a particular frame of reference in all its activities. The term sati is related to the verb sarati, to remember or to keep in mind.[14]
Most commentaries on this ninth chapter include this section of the text under the outline on the selflessness of phenomena. However, there are some commentators, such as the Sakya master Sonam Tsemo, who explain this section as a refutation of each of these four categories of body etc. as not being the self. From that perspective, this section would then still be under the outline of the selflessness of persons.
In his commentary, Sonam Tsemo goes on to compare the Mahāyāna tradition's approach to these four close placements of mindfulness with the earlier, non-Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition's approach.
This section is not a teaching on the four foundations of mindfulness taught elsewhere as the impurity of the body, the suffering of sensations, the impermanence of mind and the non-self of dharmas. However, one need not think there is any contradiction here to that teaching, only a different purpose. In our bodhisattva tradition, the purpose is to analyse the individual self for which grasping arises under the power of wrong views, by developing the characteristics of non-self in the meditative objects [i.e. the four foundations] to purify defilements. In the other tradition, since conduct degenerates under the influence of defilements such as attachment, one develops in one’s stream of being the characteristics of abandonment of the four wrong views as meditative objects to purify conduct.[15]
The earlier tradition focuses much more on factors such as the impurity of the body, the changeable and suffering nature of feelings, or the impermanence of the mind. It is only in the fourth category of phenomena that the tradition looks into the aspect of nonself. In the Madhyamaka tradition, there is a much greater emphasis on the ultimate nature of these categories of phenomena.
In our ordinary daily experience, things seem to exist out there and independently, to exist from their own side, as though unconnected to anything else. But instead of just looking into the conventional characteristics of these aggregates, such as the body, Śāntideva follows the Madhyamaka approach of analyzing the final nature of these phenomena, searching to see if they exist inherently and from their own side, which is the way that they seem to appear in ordinary experience.
In regard to the way in which the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions emphasize these meditations differently, His Holiness the Dalai Lama states the following in his Practicing Wisdom commentary:
Generally speaking, meditating on the mindfulness of body, reflecting upon the nature of our own body, is the approach explained in the Hinayana scriptures. However, we can extend this contemplation to the nature of the body, feelings, mind, and phenomena of all beings, who are limitless like space. Then it becomes a training of the mind according to the Mahayana path. When we contemplate the emptiness of these four factors—body, feelings, mind, and phenomena—we are practicing a mindfulness meditation focused on the ultimate truth.[16]
This form of analysis seeks to determine whether phenomena are really "true" and "undeceptive." And one of the primary ways in which we can determine whether something is true or deceptive is to look at whether it actually exists the way that it appears. If we find a discrepancy between how it exists and how it appears to us, we would recognize that as something deceptive.
Thus, in order to examine whether phenomena really do exist out there without dependence on anything else, we use these kinds of analyses, those that look past the surface level appearance to the underlying deepest status of existence.
The arguments in this section are less specifically focused on refuting a particular school. Instead, the principal opponent is more general and encompasses anyone who believes in the inherent existence of phenomena. This includes all the non-Buddhist schools but also the lower systems of Buddhist tenet holders, such as the Cittamātrins.
Mindfulness of the Body
Verses 78 to 87 cover the first of the four foundations of mindfulness, the close placement of mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna), and here, specifically, the mindfulness that analyzes the awareness of the empty nature of the body.
Attachment to our bodies, whether that is as an essential part of maintaining our health and well-being or is for the purposes of making ourselves attractive, is a primary feature of our lives. So much of our experience as human beings occurs in relation to our own physical body, but a very strong component of our experience of attachment is connected also with the physical forms of others. To help release us from this grasping to the physical body, Śāntideva provides us with a variety of reasons to prove that the body has no inherent existence.
In his commentary, Pema Karpo divides mindfulness of the body into three sections: (1) showing that each of the individual parts are not the body; (2) showing that there is no single body that pervades all of its individual parts; and (3) refuting forms of confusion, such as taking the collection of the parts to be the body.[17]
1. Showing That Each of the Individual Parts Are Not the Body:
In terms of this first section, in verses 78 and 79 Śāntideva searches within the constituent parts of the body, such as the arms and legs, for what we call the body.
What we call the body is not feet or shins; The body, likewise, is not thighs or loins. It’s not the belly nor indeed the back, And from the chest and arms the body is not formed.
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ལུས་ནི་རྐང་པ་བྱིན་པ་མིན། །
བརླ་དང་རྐེད་པའང་ལུས་མ་ཡིན། ། ལྟོ་དང་རྒྱབ་ཀྱང་ལུས་མིན་ཏེ། །
བྲང་དང་དཔུང་པའང་ལུས་མ་ཡིན། །lus ni rkang pa byin pa min/_/
brla dang rked pa'ang lus ma yin/_/ lto dang rgyab kyang lus min te/_/
brang dang dpung pa'ang lus ma yin/_/In his commentary to this verse, Khenpo Kunpal points out one of the crucial points in the Madhyamaka analysis of whether a phenomena has any trace of true existence or not. The argument is that if the phenomena in question exists inherently from its own side, then it must necessarily be found somewhere within its parts. If it cannot be found in its parts, then it must be a mere imputation.
What we call "the body" is a mere imputation; it does not exist inherently. Our reason for saying this is that if a body, which is apprehended as a single (partless) whole complete with all its sense faculties, existed as such, it would have to be present in its members, for example the hand. But the various body parts, the foot, the shins and calves, are not the body. The thighs and hips, the waist and loins, the belly, back, chest and arms, and so on and so forth—none of these is the body.[18]
Taking the example here of the body, Śāntideva asks us to search through all the parts of the body to see whether any one of them is the body. If we can find something within those parts that we can call the body, then the body could be said to exist inherently, or from its own side.
The analysis continues to examine each of the individual parts to see whether any of these components of the body can fit the definition of what the body is.
The body is not ribs or hands, Armpits, shoulders, bowels, or entrails. It is not the head, and it is not the throat. What is the "body,” then, in all of this?
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རྩིབ་ལོགས་ལག་པའང་ལུས་མིན་ཏེ། །
མཆན་ཁུང་ཕྲག་པའང་ལུས་མ་ཡིན། ། ནང་ཁྲོལ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་དེ་མིན་ལ། ། མགོ་དང་མགྲིན་པའང་ལུས་མིན་ན། །
འདི་ལ་ལུས་ནི་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། །rtsib logs lag pa'ang lus min te/_/
mchan khung phrag pa'ang lus ma yin/_/ nang khrol rnams kyang de min la/_/ mgo dang mgrin pa'ang lus min na/_/
'di la lus ni gang zhig yin/_/In the end, the conclusion is that there is nothing within the parts of the body that we can find to call the body. No single part can be considered the body. "So what then is this body?" Śāntideva inquires.
Since we cannot find it under search on the basis on which it appears, it must therefore lack intrinsic existence. It must be a mere imputation.
2. Showing That There Is No Single Body That Pervades All of Its Individual Parts:
The next argument, seen in verses 80–82, revolves around the way we experience our body. In ordinary life, when thinking about or experiencing the body, it seems to be a singular entity. But Śāntideva points out that there cannot be a singular and inherently existent body that pervades all of its parts.
The opponent's position (some commentators attribute to the Sāṃkhyas): It is true that each of the individual parts are not the body. But is there something that pervades all the parts? Is there a singular thing that enters all the parts?
Śāntideva's critique: If the body does indeed pervade all the parts, then that would suggest that the body itself is not actually composed of parts.
If the "body” spreads itself And with the members coincides, Its parts indeed are present in those parts. But where does "body,” in itself, abide?
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་ལུས་འདི་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ། །
ཕྱོགས་རེ་ཡིས་ནི་གནས་གྱུར་ན། ། ཆ་རྣམས་ཆ་ལ་གནས་འགྱུར་མོད། །
དེ་རང་ཉིད་ནི་གང་ན་གནས། །gal te lus 'di thams cad la/_/
phyogs re yis ni gnas gyur na/_/ cha rnams cha la gnas 'gyur mod/_/
de rang nyid ni gang na gnas/_/Śāntideva continues: Where then does this singular partless body exist? And if this singular and complete whole body exists separately and equally in all of the parts of the body, there would be the fallacy that there would be as many whole bodies as there are parts of the body.
But if the "body,” single and entire
Is present in the hands and other members,
However many parts there are, the hands and all the rest,
You’ll find an equal quantity of "bodies.”[p.149]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 148
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་བདག་ཉིད་ཀུན་གྱི་ལུས། །
ལག་སོགས་རྣམས་ལ་གནས་ན་ནི། ། ལག་སོགས་དེ་དག་ཇི་སྙེད་པ། །
དེ་སྙེད་* དེ་སྲིད་ in the source text. ཀྱི་ནི་ལུས་སུ་འགྱུར། །gal te bdag nyid kun gyi lus/_/
lag sogs rnams la gnas na ni/_/ lag sogs de dag ji snyed pa/_/
de snyed * de srid [ in the source text. ] kyi ni lus su 'gyur/_/Śāntideva concludes: Since the body is neither found to exist as identical to its individual parts nor found to exist separately and independently of these parts, the body must therefore lack any form of intrinsic existence, and its deepest nature must be that of emptiness.
3. Refuting Forms of Confusion, Such as Taking the Collection of the Parts to Be the Body:
In verses 83 to 86, Śāntideva presents arguments against the complete collection of the parts being the body, using the analogy of a pile of stones formed into a cairn appearing to be a person, while actually never being a human being.
Thus there is no "body.” It is through illusion, With regard to hands and other parts, that "body” as a notion is conceived— Just as on account of its specific shape A pile of stones is taken for a man.
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེས་ན་ལུས་མེད་ལག་སོགས་ལ། །
རྨོངས་པ་ཡིས་ནི་ལུས་བློར་འགྱུར། ། དབྱིབས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས། །
ཐོ་ཡོར་ལ་ནི་མི་བློ་བཞིན། །des na lus med lag sogs la/_/
rmongs pa yis ni lus blor 'gyur/_/ dbyibs su bkod pa'i khyad par gyis/_/
tho yor la ni mi blo bzhin/_/As long as the conditions are assembled, The body will appear to be a man. As long as all the parts are likewise present, A body will appear therein.
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཇི་[p.114]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
ལུས་ནི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ། ། དེ་བཞིན་ཇི་སྲིད་ལག་སོགས་ལ། །
དེ་ཡོད་དེ་སྲིད་དེར་ལུས་སྣང་། །ji [p.114]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
lus ni skyes bu ltar snang ba/_/ de bzhin ji srid lag sogs la/_/
de yod de srid der lus snang /_/Śāntideva concludes: Śāntideva uses an analogy of how, when particular conditions arise, a group of stones which have been piled up, can be mistaken for a person. Similarly, there is no possibility for this body to be self-existent, intrinsically real, and truly existent, without any relation to other phenomena, such as its parts. When conditions arise such that all those parts come together, we can conventionally talk of the body appearing. But since the appearance of the body to an apprehending consciousness relies on the aggregation of many conditions, and since it lacks any autonomous status of its own, the body is actually a mere imputation or designation posited upon the assembled collection of its parts. Aside from being a mere label, this body, in fact, has no other existential status.
Śāntideva extends this mode of analysis of checking whether a phenomena exists in its parts or not, but he turns his focus instead to the individual parts of the body, such as the hands, to see whether they themselves are to be found in their parts. Taking a hand, he looks at all the individual parts that make up a hand and asks, "Where within the parts of the hand can we find what we call the hand?"
Likewise, since it is a group of fingers, The hand itself does not exist as such. And so it is with fingers, made of joints— And joints themselves consist of many parts.
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་བཞིན་སོར་མོའི་ཚོགས་ཡིན་ཕྱིར། །
ལག་པའང་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར། ། དེ་ཡང་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་ཡིན་ཕྱིར། །
ཚིགས་ཀྱང་རང་གི་ཆ་ཕྱེ་བས། །de bzhin sor mo'i tshogs yin phyir/_/
lag pa'ang gang zhig yin par 'gyur/_/ de yang tshigs kyi tshogs yin phyir/_/
tshigs kyang rang gi cha phye bas/_/Śāntideva: Taking a hand, we mentally dissect it to see where the subject we call hand is to be found. But, just as in the example of the body, when we look for it in its parts, it cannot be found. And if we keep on searching into the parts of the parts and dividing them down into smaller and smaller particles, even the smallest particles lack any form of inherent existence.
These parts themselves will break down into particles, And particles divide according to direction. These fragments, too, lack partless parts; they are like space. Thus even particles have no existence.
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཆ་ཡང་རྡུལ་དུ་ཕྱེ་བས་ཏེ། །
རྡུལ་དེའང་ཕྱོགས་ཆའི་དབྱེ་བ་ཡིས། ། ཕྱོགས་དབྱེའང་ཆ་ཤས་དང་བྲལ་ཕྱིར། །
མཁའ་བཞིན་དེས་ན་རྡུལ་ཡང་མེད། །cha yang rdul du phye bas te/_/
rdul de'ang phyogs cha'i dbye ba yis/_/ phyogs dbye'ang cha shas dang bral phyir/_/
mkha' bzhin des na rdul yang med/_/This process is similar to the scientific search for the fundamental building blocks of the universe. Many scientists are beginning to conclude that it will never be possible to find independent and fundamental particles that cannot be further reduced to their parts.
This verse also contains a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika position that the whole world is formed from the permanent and indivisible atoms, which are the foundations, or creators, of the physical universe. This school accepts space to be permanent and omnipresent, but the atoms of the elements of earth, water, fire, and air are not accepted to be omnipresent but are asserted to be permanent. In contrast, the grosser, more manifest things which are made of these atoms are believed to be impermanent.
This refutation is also very relevant to the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā belief that the smallest particles can be no smaller than what is visible to the naked eye, and therefore, at that level, must be partless.
This refutation is also mentioned in verse 126ab, in the refutation of production from a permanent creator.[19]
All Form Is an Illusion
From all this analysis, Śāntideva determines that there can be nothing physical that can have any intrinsic nature, out there and independent, existing from their own side, without being in some way dependent on other phenomena.
In the concluding section on the close placement of mindfulness on the body, Śāntideva reminds us that all physical forms are like illusions—they appear in one way but in reality exist in another way. If our own bodies and those of others are actually like a dream, then what reason is there for anyone who has the wisdom that comes from this kind of analysis to be attached?
All form, therefore, is like a dream, And who will be attached to it, who thus investigates? The body, in this way, has no existence; What, therefore, is male and what is female?
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་རྨི་ལམ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡི། །
གཟུགས་ལ་དཔྱོད་ལྡན་སུ་ཞིག་ཆགས། ། གང་ཚེ་དེ་ལྟར་ལུས་མེད་པ། །
དེ་ཚེ་སྐྱེས་གང་བུད་མེད་གང་། །de ltar rmi lam lta bu yi/_/
gzugs la dpyod ldan su zhig chags/_/ gang tshe de ltar lus med pa/_/
de tshe skyes gang bud med gang /_/Śāntideva: Since the terms male and female are designated on the basis of the difference between male and female bodies, and since the intrinsic nature of those bodies is not found on search, then male and female cannot have any inherent existence.
Mindfulness of Feeling
For verses 88 to 101, Śāntideva applies similar logical arguments to the subject of feelings. This close application of mindfulness of feelings (vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna) looks into the three primary feelings—pleasure, pain, and neutral feelings—to see if they have any intrinsic existence.
Just as with the body, our feelings play a primary role in our lives, and our attachment to pleasure and aversion to pain are some of the primary drivers of our lives. Underlying this strong clinging is the grasping at the feelings to be true and objectively existent.
However, Thrangu Rinpoche explains how feelings are just mental projections and have no substantial nature of their own.
Feelings themselves are really just mental projections, with no truth or reality in themselves. The feeling we mainly experience is what we think of as pleasure or pain. For example, when we are happy, we enjoy eating nutritious food. But when we are depressed or disappointed, the same delicious food does not give us joy at all. So the feeling of pain or pleasure is not the real substantial event, but a mental projection.[20]
In relation to this section of the text, Gyalse Thokme Zangpo quotes from Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way to show that if something has an inherent nature, it cannot transform into something else.
If a thing exists by way of its intrinsic being, It can never cease to be. Intrinsic being never can admit A change into another state. (15.8)[21]
Thokme Zangpo goes on to say the following in relation to this verse:
If the feeling of suffering itself were truly existent, that could never be discarded. There is no way that it could not harm its direct opposite, great joy and happiness. And because of that they (joy and happiness) would never arise.[22]
The important point being made in Nāgārjuna's treatise is that if something inherently exists, it would have to exist forever and could never cease to be. Further consequences would be that they would not be affected by any other conditions, and they would not be able to change into anything else. These arguments lie at the heart of how Śāntideva approaches the refutation of a self of phenomena that exists from its own side. The first verse of this section follows that line of reasoning.
Śāntideva (9.88ab): If the feeling of suffering were truly real, then it would have to always be present, and therefore pleasurable feelings could never arise. A person who experienced suffering could never feel happy.
If suffering itself is truly real,
Why is joy not altogether quenched thereby?
If pleasure’s real, then why will pleasant tastes
Not comfort and amuse a man in agony?[p.150]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 149
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྡུག་བསྔལ་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་ན། །
ཅི་སྟེ་རབ་དགའ་ལ་མི་གནོད། ། བདེ་ན་མྱ་ངན་གདུངས་སོགས་ལ། །
ཞིམ་སོགས་ཅི་སྟེ་དགའ་མི་བྱེད། །sdug bsngal de nyid du yod na/_/
ci ste rab dga' la mi gnod/_/ bde na mya ngan gdungs sogs la/_/
zhim sogs ci ste dga' mi byed/_/Śāntideva continues (9.88cd): And if the feelings of pleasure and happiness were inherently real, then why would things such as pleasant tastes not provide some solace for those in intense moments of grief.
This argument relies on the understanding that feelings of pleasure and pain cannot exist simultaneously and that existing independently means that no external factors can operate to induce change.
Counterargument (9.89ab): Happiness may still arise at the time that we are overcome with the suffering of grief, but because the feeling of suffering is very strong, it is able to suppress the happiness so that we do not experience it.
If the feeling fails to be experienced, Through being overwhelmed by something stronger, How can "feeling” rightly be ascribed To that which lacks the character of being felt?
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པས་ཟིལ་མནན་ཕྱིར། །
གལ་ཏེ་དེ་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན་ན། ། གང་ཞིག་ཉམས་མྱོང་བདག་ཉིད་མིན། །
དེ་ནི་ཚོར་བ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིན། །stobs dang ldan pas zil mnan phyir/_/
gal te de myong ma yin na/_/ gang zhig nyams myong bdag nyid min/_/
de ni tshor ba ji ltar yin/_/Śāntideva counters (9.89cd): The argument that the feeling of suffering overpowers the feeling of happiness, although happiness is still present, makes no sense at all. What is a feeling if it is not actually felt in experience? Feeling is by necessity something that has to be experienced. So if it is not experienced, then it cannot exist.
Further objection (9.90ab): But when a powerful feeling of happiness is present, it does not mean that no feeling of suffering at all is present. It just means that the painful sensation is a very subtle state, and therefore it is not recognized.
Perhaps you say that only subtle pain remains, Its grosser form has now been overmastered— Or rather it is felt as "mere pleasure.” But what is subtle still remains itself.
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཕྲ་མོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད། །
འདི་ཡི་རགས་པ་བསལ་མིན་ནམ། ། དེ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དགའ་ཙམ། །
ཞེ་ན་ཕྲ་ཉིད་དེ་ཡང་དེའི། །sdug bsngal phra mo nyid du yod/_/
'di yi rags pa bsal min nam/_/ de ni de las gzhan dga' tsam/_/
zhe na phra nyid de yang de'i/_/Śāntideva again counters (9.90cd): It is impossible for feelings of suffering and happiness to coexist at the same time in one person's mindstream. If they could coexist, they should both be experienced at the same time, which is not how it ever appears to us.
Potential objection (9.90c): Perhaps there is subtle pain at the time of great pleasure, but it could be prevented from acting as subtle pain. The powerful sense of bliss could transform that subtle pain into a mere pleasurable sensation such that it is experienced as a kind of subtle pleasure. To represent this objection, Khenpo Kunpal uses the analogy of a clear crystal stained with vermilion, which appears red but is actually a clear crystal underneath.[23]
Śāntideva responds: If you call subtle pain to be mere pleasure, then it is no longer pain. You have classified it as pleasure, and therefore it is no longer any kind of pain, gross or subtle. And if it were mere pleasure experienced as subtle pleasure, what difference would there be between that and the subtler form of pleasure? So none of these invalid distinctions make any sense.
With this analysis revealing the lack of inherent existence of the feelings such as pleasure and pain, Śāntideva advises us to abide in that realization as an antidote to clinging to the true existence of feelings.
Since so it is, the antidote Is meditation and analysis. Absorption grown in fields of their investigation Is indeed the food and sustenance of yogis.
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ཉིད་ཕྱིར་ན་འདི་ཡི་ནི། །
གཉེན་པོ་རྣམ་དཔྱོད་འདི་བསྒོམ་སྟེ། ། རྣམ་བརྟགས་ཞིང་ལས་བྱུང་བ་ཡི། །
བསམ་གཏན་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ་ཡི་ཟས། །de nyid phyir na 'di yi ni/_/
gnyen po rnam dpyod 'di bsgom ste/_/ rnam brtags zhing las byung ba yi/_/
bsam gtan rnal 'byor pa yi zas/_/Since feelings play such a fundamental role in our lives, it is vital that we are able to see through their true existence and understand how they are like illusions. We must release ourselves from believing everything we feel to be real. In the last lines of the verse, Śāntideva encourages us to cultivate the deep meditative absorption on the empty nature of feelings, an absorption which is grown within a fertile field of analysis. This, he says, is the true sustenance of yogis.
Refuting Contact–The Cause of Feelings
The next section covers verses 93 to 101 and expresses further arguments as to why the feelings we experience have no intrinsic reality. It is based on the idea that feelings arise from contact. For instance, in teachings on the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaṡāṅga pratītyasamutpāda), the chain starting with ignorance leads to a new rebirth and the emergence of the physical sense powers. The next links are contact, feeling, and then craving and grasping. And the link of contact here, which acts as the direct cause for the arising of feeling, is the contact between the sense powers, the sense object, and an immediately preceding consciousness. Therefore, Śāntideva looks into the lack of inherent status of contact. He determines that if the cause of contact lacks inherent existence, then the effect of feeling must lack inherent existence.
This section is divided into three main outlines: (1) refuting the inherent meeting of sense powers and object; (2) refuting the inherent meeting with the consciousness; (3) refuting inherent contact arising from the meeting of these three.
1. Refuting the Inherent Meeting of Sense Powers and Their Objects
In verses 93 and 95, Śāntideva presents the impossibility of there being contact between inherently existent sense powers, such as the eye, and their sense objects, such as visible form. Firstly, he analyzes this on the coarser level before going later into the argument at the level of particles.
Feeling happens when its cause, contact, occurs. It comes from the meeting of the three things—the sense faculty, the object, and consciousness. If that meeting is logically examined, it does not exist, and hence there is no arising of feeling due to that condition.
If between the sense power and a thing There is a space, how will the two terms meet? And if there is no space, they form a unity, And therefore what is it that meets with what?
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་དབང་དོན་བར་བཅས་ན། །
དེ་དག་གང་དུ་འཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར། ། བར་མེད་ན་ཡང་གཅིག་ཉིད་དེ། །
གང་ཞིག་གང་དང་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར། །gal te dbang don bar bcas na/_/
de dag gang du 'phrad par 'gyur/_/ bar med na yang gcig nyid de/_/
gang zhig gang dang phrad par 'gyur/_/Śāntideva questions: If there is space between the sense power and its object, then how will it be possible for these two to meet? And if there is no space between them, they would become one, and then what would there be to meet what?
Opponent's response: This meeting of the sense power goes on at a much subtler level. It is not at the gross, directly observable level. Rather, it takes place at the level of particles.
Śāntideva responds: (This argument is particularly directed to opponents, such as the Vaibhāṣikas school as well as other Indian non-Buddhist schools, who accept forms of matter that have no parts, such as partless particles) Contact between the sense organ and the sense object, even at the level of particles, appears to happen, but in reality it does not. The sense organs and the sense objects are physical forms and are therefore made up of particles. But the sense organs and physical objects are not omnidirectional, and therefore all the particles of each cannot fully meet. Only the closest particles in one direction will meet the other, and therefore there will be some particles in the center of each that prevent the far sides from touching each other.
No penetration can there be of particle by particle, For they are both the same in lacking volume. But if they do not penetrate, they do not merge; And if they do not merge, there’s no encounter.
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རྡུལ་ཕྲན་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ལ་འཇུག་མེད། །
དེ་ནི་སྐབས་མེད་མཉམ་པ་ཡིན། ། མ་ཞུགས་པ་ལ་འདྲེས་མེད་ཅིང་། །
མ་འདྲེས་པ་ལ་ཕྲད་པ་མེད། །rdul phran rdul phran la 'jug med/_/
de ni skabs med mnyam pa yin/_/ ma zhugs pa la 'dres med cing /_/
ma 'dres pa la phrad pa med/_/This argument relies on the acceptance of the idea that for two material objects to meet, all of the particles of each object would have to meet and therefore merge.
Opponent: The particles of the sense faculties and the sense objects meet, but at this level the particles are partless.
Śāntideva's response: It is not possible for two partless physical things to meet. If they are partless, they must lack any kind of direction with which to then meet another physical object and so would have to fully interpenetrate each other, which would essentially mean fusing together.
For how could anyone accept
That what is partless could be said to meet?
And you must show me, if you ever saw,
A contact taking place between two partless things.[p.151]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 150
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཆ་མེད་པ་ལའང་ཕྲད་པ་ཞེས། །
བྱ་བ་ཇི་ལྟར་འཐད་པར་འགྱུར། ། ཕྲད་པ་དང་ནི་ཆ་མེད་པ* ཆ་མེད་པར་ in the source text. ། །
གལ་ཏེ་མཐོང་ན་བསྟན་པར་གྱིས། །cha med pa la'ang phrad pa zhes/_/
bya ba ji ltar 'thad par 'gyur/_/ phrad pa dang ni cha med pa* cha med par [ in the source text. ] /_/
gal te mthong na bstan par gyis/_/If, on the other hand, there is contact between two physical objects, and their particles touch on one side but do not have contact throughout their entirety, then they cannot be partless. They would then have to possess directional parts, as some would meet another object and some would not.
2. Refuting the Inherent Meeting with the Consciousness
Having refuted the inherent meeting of the sense power and the sense object, Śāntideva moves on to refute the inherent meeting between consciousness and objects themselves. Here, the consciousness being referred to is the consciousness which acts as the immediately preceding condition, one of the three conditions necessary for sense consciousnesses to arise.
Consciousness is immaterial, And so one cannot speak of contact with it. (9.96ab)[24]
Śāntideva: It is unacceptable to talk of an immaterial consciousness meeting with a material, physical object. There is no possibility for something that has no form to meet something that has form.
The refutation of meeting with the coarse: Also, the meeting with a coarse object that is a collection of many atoms does not exist inherently because no truly existent object exists on that. Similarly, inherent existence had already been refuted earlier through the analysis of the collection of digits.
3. Refuting Inherent Contact Arising from the Meeting of These Three
In the second two lines of verse 96 and in verses 97 and 98, Śāntideva turns his attention to refuting any kind of contact arising from the meeting of the sense object, the sense faculty, and a consciousness.
Opponent: Even though it is not coherent to talk of the sense power or the consciousness meeting the sense object, there must be some kind of convergence of these three factors which then causes contact to occur, followed by feeling.
Śāntideva's response: It may appear that there is some kind of convergence between these three factors, but in reality no substantial inherent existence of that contact can be found under ultimate analysis.
A combination, too, has no reality, Just as we have previously shown. (9.96cd)[25]
The last line refers back to the analysis of the hand and searching for it in its basis of designation, the individual fingers. Just as in that example, here also no trace of inherent existence of this contact can be found.
Śāntideva's conclusion: Feeling itself has been analyzed and found to have no trace of intrinsic existence. Contact, the direct cause of feeling, has also been shown to have no inherent existence, and if a cause lacks inherent existence, that cause's effect must also lack any intrinsic nature, unrelated to its causes.
If therefore there’s no touch or contact, Whence is it that feeling takes its rise? What purpose is there, then, in all our toil, For what is it, indeed, that torments what?
Page(s) 151
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་རེག་པ་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །
ཚོར་བ་གང་ལས་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར། ། ངལ་འདི་ཅི་ཡི་དོན་དུ་ཡིན། །
གང་གིས་གང་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར། །de ltar reg pa yod min na/_/
tshor ba gang las 'byung bar 'gyur/_/ ngal 'di ci yi don du yin/_/
gang gis gang la gnod par 'gyur/_/"What purpose," Śāntideva questions, "is there in expending all our energy in chasing pleasure and trying to avoid pain?"
If we contemplate these points and come to a clear understanding that there is no inherent object of feeling and that feeling itself lacks any inherent existence, how could this not stop our craving?
Since there is no subject for sensation, And sensation, too, lacks all existence, How is craving not arrested When all this is clearly understood?
Page(s) 151
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གང་ཚེ་ཚོར་པོ་འགའ་* ཚོར་བ་འགའ་ in the source text. མེད་ཅིང་། །
ཚོར་བའང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ། ། དེ་ཚེ་གནས་སྐབས་འདི་མཐོང་ནས། །
སྲེད་པ་ཅི་ཕྱིར་ལྡོག་མི་འགྱུར། །gang tshe tshor po 'ga' * tshor ba 'ga' [ in the source text. ] med cing /_/
tshor ba'ang yod pa ma yin pa/_/ de tshe gnas skabs 'di mthong nas/_/
sred pa ci phyir ldog mi 'gyur/_/The flow of the argument again relies on the sequence of the twelve links of dependent origination. From the development of name and form in a new rebirth, the sense powers develop. They come into contact with their relevant objects, and from that feelings arise. Following on from feelings, there comes the arising of craving to maintain pleasant sensations and craving to avoid unpleasant sensations. Thus, Śāntideva asks, if we understand the inherent existence of each of these prior links, then how is it that we do not cause our craving to cease?
Having refuted the true existence of contact, the cause of feeling, Śāntideva now turns his analysis to the focal object of feeling. In the first two lines of verse 99, he mentions the object of feeling and specifically mentions visual and tactile objects, but he is referring to any object of feeling.
Śāntideva: Feeling cannot exist inherently because the objects of feeling are not inherently existent. These objects are conditions for the feeling to arise, but since they themselves are unfindable on search, they are like illusions, mere appearances lacking any true existence.
What we see and what we touch Is stuff of dreams and mirages. (9.99ab)[26]
In all these arguments, Śāntideva is clear to express that while the person, the feelings they experience, and the objects they experience lack any kind of substantial existence, they are not utterly nonexistent. They do exist, but they exist in an unreal way, like dreams.
Refuting That Their Object-Possessor Exists Inherently
Having refuted the inherent existence of the objects of feeling, Śāntideva turns his attention to the consciousness that perceives the feeling. Feelings arise in conjunction with the mind. In verses 99cd to 101, he asks whether that consciousness occurs at the same time as the feeling, before it, or after it.
If feeling is coincident with consciousness, It follows that it is not seen thereby. (9.99cd)[27]
Śāntideva: If feeling is accepted to be inherently existent but also simultaneous with feeling, then there would be no way for that consciousness to perceive the feeling. Two things which are both inherently existent and yet simultaneous cannot be connected causally or by being of the same nature. They cannot rely on or interact with one another in any way.
Here, Śāntideva is also arguing the more general point that any two mental events that arise at the same time can never apprehend one another. This relates back to the refutation of self-cognition of the Cittamātra school contained in verses 15 to 29.
Question: What if feeling and its perceiving consciousness arise sequentially, with one before the other?
If the one arises first, the other after, Memory occurs and not direct sensation. Sensation is without perception of itself And likewise, by another it is not perceived.
Page(s) 151
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྔར་དང་ཕྱི་མར་སྐྱེས་པས་ཀྱང་། །
དྲན་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན། ། རང་གིས་བདག་ཉིད་མྱོང་མིན་ལ། །
གཞན་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན། །sngar dang phyi mar skyes pas kyang /_/
dran par 'gyur gyi myong ma yin/_/ rang gis bdag nyid myong min la/_/
gzhan dag gis kyang myong ma yin/_/Śāntideva (9.100ab): This is not tenable, because if the sense consciousness existed prior to its object—in this case feelings—then it would arise without referencing its own object. It would have no referential object when it was produced. No consciousness can be produced without an object.
And if the consciousness occurs after its object, the feeling, then the same argument applies. Since the object is already nonexistent at the time that consciousness arises, from what referential object is the consciousness produced? This would be a case of remembering a sensation rather than directly experiencing it.
Śāntideva concludes (9.100cd): Since the feeling cannot experience itself, and there is no other consciousness present at the time that it exists to experience it, then we must conclude that there is no feeling that has any independent, intrinsic nature of any kind.
This concludes the analysis of the nature of feeling, which is done through the close placement of mindfulness of feeling.
Mindfulness of Mind
Verses 102 to 105 present the close placement of mindfulness of mind (cittasmṛtyupasthāna).
Śāntideva continues his examination of the aggregates of a person, this time directing the analysis toward the mind. The first context in which the analysis takes place is a search for the location of the mind. Here, he takes mental awareness, and he looks to see where the mind is. He asks, "Is the mind within the sense organs, or does it exist externally within the object of the mind, or is it somewhere in between?"
Showing That the Mental Consciousness Does Not Exist Inherently
The mind within the senses does not dwell,
It has no place in outer things like form.
And in between, the mind does not abide:
Not out, not in, not elsewhere, can the mind be found.[p.152]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 151
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཡིད་ནི་དབང་རྣམས་ལ་མི་གནས། །
གཟུགས་སོགས་ལ་མིན་བར་ནའང་མིན། ། ནང་ནའང་སེམས་མིན་ཕྱི་མིན་ཞིང་། །
གཞན་དུ་ཡང་ནི་རྙེད་མ་ཡིན། །yid ni dbang rnams la mi gnas/_/
gzugs sogs la min bar na'ang min/_/ nang na'ang sems min phyi min zhing /_/
gzhan du yang ni rnyed ma yin/_/This argument was originally in reference to certain non-Buddhist schools that believed that the mind had to be located within the interior of the body, while others believed that it existed at the extremities of the body. We can see a modern correlation of this belief in the scientific tradition, which often presents the mind as located in the brain.
The implication of this argument is that if the mind were to be inherently existent, then it would have to inherently exist in one of these places. But Śāntideva points out that the mind cannot be found in any of these locations. It does not exist in any of the six sense powers—the seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, the tactical sense, or the mental sense power. It also does not exist in any of the six objects–visible forms, sounds, smells, sights, tactical objects, and mental objects. And since it also does not exist anywhere in between the sense powers and sense objects, there is no basis for the mind.
Having established that there is no physical location for the mind, Śāntideva then turns to an analysis of the deeper nature of the mind.
It is not in the body, yet is nowhere else. It does not merge with it nor stand apart— Something such as this does not exist, not even slightly. Beings by their nature are beyond the reach of suffering.
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གང་ཞིག་ལུས་མིན་གཞན་དུའང་མིན། །
འདྲེས་མིན་ལོགས་སུའང་འགར་མེད་པ། ། དེ་ནི་ཅུང་ཟད་མིན་དེའི་ཕྱིར། །
སེམས་ཅན་རང་བཞིན་མྱ་ངན་འདས། །gang zhig lus min gzhan du'ang min/_/
'dres min logs su'ang 'gar med pa/_/ de ni cung zad min de'i phyir/_/
sems can rang bzhin mya ngan 'das/_/In the Mind-Only (Cittamātra) school, they accept eight different main categories of consciousness. However, in the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school they accept only six main categories of mind—the five sense consciousnesses, and then a sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness. In verses 103 and 104, Śāntideva is specifically referring to this sixth consciousness, which is a mental consciousness.
He runs through all the possibilities of how the sixth mental consciousness could exist if they were to have an inherent nature: it should be located in the body, or outside of it, or in some way mixed with the body. But under analysis it can be found in none of these places, and the conclusion is therefore that it cannot exist inherently.
The last line of this verse has several interpretations. From the perspective of the Gelukpa scholar Gyaltsap Je, the meaning of "beings are by their nature beyond the reach of suffering" is that because the mind does not exist inherently, the emptiness of the mind of sentient beings is beyond sorrow. In contrast, the great Drukpa Kagyu master Pema Karpo explains this last line as meaning that all beings are primordially pure by nature.
Showing That the Sense Consciousnesses Do Not Exist Inherently
Śāntideva now switches his attention to the sense consciousnesses and searches into their deeper nature to see if he can find any traces of an intrinsic identity. He does this through analysis of them in relation to their sense objects.
If consciousness precedes the cognized object, With regard to what does it arise? If consciousness arises at the same time as its object, Again, regarding what does it arise?
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྔར་ཤེས་ཡོད་ན། །
དེ་ནི་ཅི་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་སྐྱེ། ། ཤེས་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལྷན་ཅིག་ན། །
དེ་ནི་ཅི་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་སྐྱེ། །shes bya las sngar shes yod na/_/
de ni ci la dmigs nas skye/_/ shes dang shes bya lhan cig na/_/
de ni ci la dmigs nas skye/_/Geshe Yeshe Tobden explains the essential conditions needed for a sense consciousness to be produced as follows:
Perceiving consciousness arises from three factors—an object of perception, the sense faculty, and the immediately preceding moment of consciousness.[28]
Out of these three conditions, the objective condition (dmigs rkyen) is the external referential object. An example would be a physical form for eye consciousness. That external objective condition must either exist before, after, or at the same time as the consciousness. There are no other possibilities.
If the sense consciousness exists before its focal object, then in connection with which referential object does it arise? If it existed at the same time as the object, then that object could not act as a cause, since causes necessarily need to precede their effects. The same question would then arise: In relation to which object does the sense consciousness arise?
Verse 105 deals with the analysis of whether a consciousness could occur after its referential object. This is a slightly more complex argument, as in normal life effects are actually observed to occur after their causes.
If consciousness comes later than its object, Once again, from what does it arise? (9.105ab)[29]
Here, the argument relies more heavily on refuting the consciousness and object as both having an independent and intrinsic nature. If cause and effect are both believed to have inherent existence, then since that means they must be independent of anything else, if a cause is not present at the time of the effect, then it cannot have any influence on it.
Śāntideva's questions (9.105ab): If the sense consciousness arises after its object, from what does it arise, since the object of its perception has ceased to be? And if the object has ceased, then does it still continue to exist or not?
Śāntideva's logical consequences: If the object still exists but has not yet ceased at the time of the consciousness, then it must be simultaneous with the perceiving consciousness, and the fault above applies.
If it ceases before the consciousness arises, then it must be accepted that something arises from something that no longer exists. If this is so, then why couldn't plants arise from burned or damaged seeds? If the mind and its objects were inherently existent, and the objects had ceased before the mind arose, then there would be the logical fallacy that anything could come from anything.
An essential point to note here is that while these arguments from the Madhyamaka philosophy refute the inherent existence of the different kinds of mind, they do not in any way refute the conventional existence of the mind.
Mindfulness of Phenomena
So far, Śāntideva has covered the lack of inherent nature of the body, feelings, and mind. From the second lines of verse 105 until the verse 150, Śāntideva turns his attention to the last of the four mindfulnesses: the mindfulness of phenomena (dharmasmṛtyupasthāna).
In the first verse of this section, he explains how all phenomena, whether impermanent or permanent, are said to be beyond the scope of knowledge.
Thus the origin of all phenomena Exceeds the reach of understanding. (9.105cd)[30]
Here, Śāntideva is clear to point out that all phenomena are beyond the reach of understanding.
This is an important point in the argument, because if, through the reasons employed by the Madhyamaka school, Śāntideva is successful in refuting the inherent existence of impermanent things, then—as Nāgārjuna put it clearly in his Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)—it will be much easier to refute the inherent existence of more abstract entities, such as space and time.
Since arising, ceasing, and abiding Are not established, there are no compounded things. If all compounded things are unestablished, How could the uncompounded be established? 7.33[31]
But in the last line of verse 105, what does it mean to say that all phenomena are beyond the reach of understanding? Does that mean that there is no phenomena that can be known? In answer to this question, different scholars provide us with different explanations. For instance, the Drukpa Kagyu master Pema Karpo, in asking us what the mindfulness of phenomena is, also connects this meaning with the analysis in previous sections where the production of a phenomena from inherently existent causes which occur before, at the same time as, or after the result are all analyzed.
What is the mindfulness of phenomena? Likewise (as analyzed above), because it is not reasonable for something to be produced from something else prior to, at the same time as, or after, the production of all phenomena is something that cannot be realized.[32]
Khenpo Kunpal follows up on this and explains that the mindfulness of phenomena is approached in the same way as the explanations of the lack of inherent nature in the previous forms of mindfulness. There, we also come to understand through analysis that nothing arises from itself or from something else, nor both, nor neither.
As we have just explained, the way in which phenomena, whether compounded or uncompounded, arise is beyond our conceptual grasp. Phenomena do not come into being before, after, or simultaneously with their cause; they do not arise from themselves nor from something else nor from both nor from neither. They are without origin; and what is without origin can have no abiding or cessation.[33]
There is also another, more simple presentation from Gyaltsap Je where he says that since we have established all phenomena to lack inherent existence, there can be no inherent production of phenomena, and for that reason they are beyond the scope of understanding.[34]
Refuting Objections Śāntideva now turns his attention to countering the objections that opponents raise about the Madhyamaka presentation that all phenomena lack inherent existence but are still nominally existent and are able to perform functions.
This section has two parts: (1) refuting the objection that there is no conventional truth and (2) refuting the objection that this ascertainment entails an infinite regress.
1. Refuting the Objection That There Is No Conventional Truth
The first objection from the opponent is that the results of the previous method of analysis result in the consequence that no conventional phenomena can exist.
Opponent (9.106ab): If nothing can be found that is produced from something prior to it, at the same time as it, or after it, then production of conventional phenomena would not be possible. Indeed, if all phenomena lack any inherent existence, then all conventional phenomena must be devoid of identity. If that is so, then conventional phenomena do not exist, and therefore there would be only one truth, the ultimate truth, and there could not be two truths as you assert.
"If this is so,” you say, "there is no relative, And then the two truths—what becomes of them? Moreover, if the relative derives from beings’ minds, How can they pass beyond their sorrows?”
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མེད། །
དེ་ལ་བདེན་གཉིས་ག་ལ་ཡོད། ། དེ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་གཞན་གྱིས་ན། །
སེམས་ཅན་མྱ་ངན་ག་ལ་འདའ། །gal te de ltar kun rdzob med/_/
de la bden gnyis ga la yod/_/ de yang kun rdzob gzhan gyis na/_/
sems can mya ngan ga la 'da'/_/Someone may respond: The relative does exist but only in the worldly people’s deluded thoughts.
In response to that question, the opponent raises a second objection (9.106cd): If all conventional realities lack any inherent existence and are mere appearances to the confused minds of ordinary beings, then for as long as beings exist their confused minds will also exist. If conventional phenomena are merely attributed by an erroneous mind in the same way as the mistaken mind that attributes a snake to a coiled piece of rope, then how can the conventional phenomena have any reality?
Worldly beings' minds would always be filled with these confused dualistic appearances, and they would never attain nirvana because nirvana is the exhaustion of all of these confused, dualistic conceptions.
Śāntideva's reply (9.107): If those things were true, there would not be two truths, and beings could never remove their mistaken dualistic appearances. But that is not what I mean by the conventional.
But that is just the thought of others; It is not what I mean by the relative. If subsequently there are thoughts, the relative’s still there; If not, the relative has ceased indeed.
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འདི་ནི་གཞན་སེམས་རྣམ་རྟོག་སྟེ། །
དེ་ནི་རང་གི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མིན། །
ཕྱིས་དེ་ངེས་ན་དེ་ཡོད་དེ། །[p.117]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
di ni gzhan sems rnam rtog ste/_/
de ni rang gi kun rdzob min/_/
phyis de nges na de yod de/_/[p.117]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
In answer to the first doubt: It is important to note that the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school does not talk of two truths at the ultimate level. At the ultimate level, there is only one truth, pure suchness which is the ultimate mode of being. The two truths are spoken of at a relative level, where we see a disparity between the way things appear and the way things actually are. This disparity corresponds to the conventional and ultimate truths.
In answer to the second doubt: The Prāsaṅgika Madhyamikas do not assert that conventional phenomena exist only as a mere designation of mistaken minds, leading them to be a false type of existence. Instead, they assert that conventional truths are designations made by a valid mind upon a valid basis. There are not randomly attributed fictions of an ignorant mind. While conventional phenomena do not have any inherent existence, they can perform functions, and therefore there are valid agents, actions, and the results of actions.
The analyzing mind and what is analyzed Are linked together, mutually dependent. It is on the basis of conventional consensus That all investigation is expressed.
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རྟོག་དང་བརྟག་པར་བྱ་བ་དག །
གཉིས་པོ་ཕན་ཚུན་བརྟེན་པ་ཡིན། ། ཇི་ལྟར་གྲགས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས། །
རྣམ་པར་དཔྱོད་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་བརྗོད། །rtog dang brtag par bya ba dag_/
gnyis po phan tshun brten pa yin/_/ ji ltar grags pa la brten nas/_/
rnam par dpyod pa thams cad brjod/_/2. Refuting the Objection That This Ascertainment Entails an Infinite Regress
In response to this analysis of phenomena and the presentation that there is not a single atom of true existence in phenomena, the other schools raise an objection related to the analyzing consciousness.
Opponent's objection (9.109): You say that when any phenomena is analyzed, that analytical mind itself, which is a valid cognition, does not find any trace of inherent existence. But that analytical mind is not included in the analysis. So, does that analytical mind require another separate analytical mind to investigate its own lack of inherent nature? And if so, then there would follow an infinite regress of analyzing consciousnesses, each subsequent one needed to verify the preceding one. And if that first analyzing mind does not require another analyzing consciousness to investigate its nature, then why do other nonmental phenomena require it? There would be no need for any valid cognizer of the lack of inherent existence.
"But when,” you say, "the process of analysis
Is made, in turn, the object of our scrutiny,
This investigation likewise may be analyzed,
And thus we find an infinite regress.”[p.153]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 152
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གང་ཚེ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ཡི། །
རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཀྱིས་ནི་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ན། ། དེ་ཚེ་རྣམ་དཔྱོད་དེ་ཡང་ནི། །
རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཕྱིར་ན་ཐུག་པ་མེད། །gang tshe rnam par dpyad pa yi/_/
rnam dpyod kyis ni dpyod byed na/_/ de tshe rnam dpyod de yang ni/_/
rnam dpyod phyir na thug pa med/_/Śāntideva's reply (9.110): The valid cognition which ascertains that all phenomena lack inherent existence does not need other valid cognitions to ascertain it.
If phenomena are truly analyzed, No basis for analysis remains. And when the object is removed, the subject too subsides. That indeed is said to be nirvāṇa.
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དཔྱད་བྱ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་བྱས་ན། །
རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ལ་ནི་རྟེན་ཡོད་མིན། ། རྟེན་མེད་ཕྱིར་ན་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། །
དེ་ཡང་མྱ་ངན་འདས་པར་བརྗོད། །dpyad bya rnam par dpyad byas na/_/
rnam dpyod la ni rten yod min/_/ rten med phyir na mi skye ste/_/
de yang mya ngan 'das par brjod/_/Śāntideva continues his reply (9.110): Why is that? Because when that initial valid cognition ascertains the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, which is the understanding of their emptiness, then as long as that mind does not wander and decline, then it is not possible for that mind to perceive any phenomena as truly existent.
Here, there are two slightly different interpretations of the meaning of the last two lines of verse 11.
The Nyingma master Khenpo Kunpal interprets this verse as meaning that through the process of analysis, when there is no longer any inherent object as a focal point, the subjective consciousness then subsides, and a state of natural nirvana is reached.
Shantideva says that when phenomena are investigated and are found to be without true existence, and when it is ascertained with certainty that they cannot be characterized as produced or unproduced, analysis itself ceases to have an identifiable object or basis. When there is no longer any object or basis to act as a target, no analyzing subject will arise to focus on it. All concepts are stilled, and the analysis itself subsides like ripples on the water. This is called the "natural nirvana in the state of dharmata."[35]
In his commentary to the ninth chapter entitled The Brilliant Torch, the great scholar Minyak Kunzang Sönam presents a slightly different perspective on the meaning of this verse. He explains how no further cognitions are required to validate the mind which realizes emptiness.
Because when, through logical analytical reasoning, one finds certainty in the irreality of all phenomena, then as long as the mind does not wander from that apprehension, no seemingly true phenomenon which could be the object or basis of that analysis can appear to that mind. Also, the unimpaired strength of the mind which realises validly the absence of true existence of phenomena will know them to be not truly existent as soon as there arises the question in the mind as to whether any observed phenomenon is truly existent. Thus our manifest conceptual belief in the reality of the mind which investigates phenomena will no longer occur because it has been eliminated through the former valid reasoning.[36]
Because no truly existent phenomena, which could be the basis of analysis, can appear to the mind that has ascertained the lack of true existence, no further cognitions are required, so there is no fault of an infinite regress.
Another reason is that the mind that understands emptiness will break down our conceptual belief in phenomena to be truly existent, and so the belief in an inherently existent mind that realizes emptiness will not arise.
Kunzang Sönam goes on to explain the meaning of "natural nirvana" in this verse as follows:
As there is no longer any truly existent object for such a mind, neither true existence which is to be refuted nor the result of the refutation, absence of true existence—or again, neither true existence which is to be refuted nor the mind which refutes it—can come into being in reality. The reason for this has just been explained.
Their not coming into being in reality is natural nirvana, and if one becomes used to the realisation of this, this is called attaining the nirvana free of adventitious stains. We can also explain 'not coming into being' as the fact that the assumption that the analysing mind itself is truly existent does not arise.[37]
In this explanation, the natural nirvana means that there is no true existence of anything to take as the object of mind. Neither true existence of the object nor lack of true existence nor even the mind that refutes that true existence—none of these—truly exist, and this realization is the nirvana free from adventitious stains.
There Is No Proof That Consciousness and Its Objects Truly Exist
In verses 111 to 115, Śāntideva turns his attention to the position of the Buddhist realists, such as the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools. In particular, he refutes the position that sensory consciousnesses and their sensory objects are inherently existent. He argues that there are no valid reasons to prove that these phenomena have any true or substantial existence.
Śāntideva's question (9.112ab): If the true existence of an object is validated by the consciousness apprehending it, then what is it that validates the consciousness? And if an object validates the true existence of the consciousness that apprehends it, then what is it that validates the consciousness itself?
If knowledge objects show that consciousness exists, What is it that shows that they exist? If both subsist through mutual dependence, Both will thereby lose their true existence.
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འོན་ཏེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་ཤེས་གྲུབ། །
ཤེས་བྱ་ཡོད་ལའང་རྟེན་ཅི་ཡོད། ། དེ་སྟེ་ཕན་ཚུན་དབང་གིས་ཡོད། །
གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་ནི་མེད་པར་འགྱུར། །on te shes bya las shes grub/_/
shes bya yod la'ang rten ci yod/_/ de ste phan tshun dbang gis yod/_/
gnyis ka yang ni med par 'gyur/_/Opponent’s reply: The subjective consciousness and its object both mutually certify each other's true existence.
Śāntideva's response (9.112cd): It is not possible for the subjective consciousness and its object to mutually validate each other's intrinsic existence. If they are both intrinsically existent, they would have to be completely independent and unrelated to any other phenomena. And if they are mutually validating, they would have to lose any trace of true existence.
Śāntideva goes on to use an analogy of a parent and their son to explain how the consciousness and its object are mutually dependent and therefore can have no intrinsic existence of their own.
If, without a son, a man cannot be father, Whence, indeed, will such a son arise? There is no father in the absence of a son. Just so, the mind and object have no true existence.
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་བུ་མེད་ཕ་མིན་ན། །
བུ་ཉིད་གང་ལས་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན། ། བུ་མེད་པར་ནི་ཕ་མེད་པ། །
དེ་བཞིན་དེ་གཉིས་མེད་པ་ཉིད། །gal te bu med pha min na/_/
bu nyid gang las byung ba yin/_/ bu med par ni pha med pa/_/
de bzhin de gnyis med pa nyid/_/Śāntideva's argument (9.113): Before any child is conceived, a person cannot be said to be a parent. A person can only be said to be a parent once their child has been born. There can be no parent without a child and no child without a parent. The two are established in mutual dependence upon each other.
Likewise, there can be no consciousness without an object and no object without a consciousness to apprehend it. Consciousness and its object are mutually dependent, and therefore it is not valid to say that they are inherently existent.
This point is clearly made in Nāgārjuna's Commentary on Bodhicitta (Bodhicittavivaraṇa):
The cognizer perceives the cognizable; Without the cognizable there is no cognition; Therefore why do you not admit That neither object nor subject exists [at all]? (verse 39)[38]
And in one of his other texts from the five great texts on reasoning, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Nāgārjuna explains the point that being dependently related and also being inherently existent are contradictory.
And how can it be right to speak Of an intrinsic being that's contrived? Intrinsic being is not fabricated, Is not contingent upon something else. (1.2)[39]
Anything which is inherently existent cannot come about through relying on causes and conditions and cannot be dependent on anything else. Anything which is created or dependent on something else must be an interdependent phenomena. Something that is dependent and something fabricated are mutually exclusive, just as there can never be anything that is both dependent and independent or fabricated and unfabricated—these categories are mutually exclusive.
Opponent's objection (9.114): An inherently existent seed can produce an inherently existent shoot. And the existence of that inherently existent seed can be established from the very presence of its effect, the shoot itself. The existence of consciousness which arises from the object of its cognition must necessarily imply the existence of its object.
"The plant arises from the seed,” you say, "And through it is the seed deduced. It’s just the same with consciousness arising from its object. How can it fail to show the thing’s existence?”
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
མྱུ་གུ་ས་བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་ཞིང་། །
ས་བོན་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་བཞིན། ། ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས། །
དེ་ཡོད་པ་ནི་ཅིས་མི་རྟོགས། །myu gu sa bon las skye zhing /_/
sa bon de nyid kyis rtogs bzhin/_/ shes bya las skyes shes pa yis/_/
de yod pa ni cis mi rtogs/_/Śāntideva's response (9.115ab): Your example is untenable because it is not simply through the mere presence of the result, in this case the shoot, that the existence of the seed is established. In order to infer the existence of the seed, a separate consciousness is required that ascertains the causal relationship between the seed and the shoot. If this relationship has not already been ascertained, then the mere presence of the shoot alone will not prove the existence of the seed.
A consciousness that’s different from the plant itself Deduces the existence of the seed. But what will show that consciousness exists, Whereby the object is itself established?
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
མྱུ་གུ་ལས་གཞན་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས། །
ས་བོན་ཡོད་ཅེས་རྟོགས་འགྱུར་ན། །
གང་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་རྟོགས་[p.118]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
myu gu las gzhan shes pa yis/_/
sa bon yod ces rtogs 'gyur na/_/
gang phyir shes bya de rtogs [p.118]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
Śāntideva continues (9.115cd): If you accept the true existence of both object and the subjective mind which apprehends that object, then what is it that ascertains the existence of the mind realizing the object? It cannot be the mind itself, as self-cognition has already been refuted in the earlier section dedicated to refuting the Mind-Only school. And if another separate mind were needed to ratify it, there would be an infinite regress of one mind being ratified by another and then another.
Khenpo Kunpal concludes this section by presenting to the opponents the consequence that the belief in the inherent existence of phenomena is philosophically untenable.
It may be seen from this that it is extremely difficult to render conventional reality tenable from the point of view of those who hold to real existence. On the other hand, this is highly acceptable for those who say that [true existence] is just an imputation.[40]
Key Arguments Refuting Intrinsic Existence
In verses 116 to 150, Śāntideva presents many of the most important arguments that prove that all phenomena lack any inherent existence, arguments that are presented in the sūtras and the śāstras. They are used to prove that all phenomena lack an inherent nature and therefore that all phenomena are empty.
In the classical presentation, there are five main logical arguments given for the proof of emptiness, but here in the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra three of those arguments are explicitly presented:
- 1. the diamond-splinters argument, which analyzes the cause of things (verses 116 to 140)
- 2. the great reasoning of dependent origination: the king of reasons, which analyzes self essence (verses 141 to 144)
- 3. the reasoning of existence and nonexistence, which analyzes the effect (verses 145 to 150)
The other two arguments not explicitly mentioned by Śāntideva are the argument of identity and difference, which investigates the essential identity of phenomena, and the refutation of production related to the four possibilities, which is an investigation into both cause and effect. According to Mipham Rinpoche, this fifth reason can be included within the first category—the investigation of the cause.[41]
1. The Diamond-Splinters Argument (རྡོ་རྗེ་གཟེགས་མའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་)
The diamond-splinters argument looks into the production of phenomena and particularly into the causes of phenomena.
The main syllogism is:
The subject: mere appearances (all phenomena)
The predicate: are without true inherent nature
Reason: because they do not arise from self, nor from other, nor from both self and other, nor without cause.
Example: like a dream
In the flow of Śāntideva's text, the different aspects of the diamond-splinters argument are dealt with in a slightly different order to that contained in the main syllogism. Here, the basic outline of this section is as follows:
a. Refutation of causeless production (verses 116 to 117)
b. Refutation of production from other (verses 118 to 126)
c. Refutation of production from self (verses 127 to 140)
a. Refutation of Causeless Production
In the flow of Śāntideva's text, he begins with the last limb of the above four limbs of the main syllogism—the refutation of phenomena being produced without causes.
In verses 116 and 117, he particularly aims his argument at the philosophy of the ancient Indian philosophical school known as Cārvāka.
Cārvāka (རྒྱང་འཕེན་), also known as Lokāyata (lit. the philosophy of the worldly), is an Indian philosophical school originating in the first millennium BCE, after the development of Buddhism in India. This school is considered one of the five major non-Vedic or heterodox (nāstika) Indian schools (the other schools being the Jains, Buddhists, Ajivikas, and Ajñanas).
The Cārvāka school is an atheist and materialist school, and they reject concepts such as an immaterial soul and supernatural entities such as god. They are the only tradition among these ancient Indian philosophical systems that does not accept the law of karma, past and future lives, or the possibility of liberation from our conditioned existence. They believe that only direct perception can be considered a valid form of knowledge with which to establish the truth. For more detailed information regarding the Cārvāka school, see the following page [Link to CĀRVĀKA COMMONS PAGE].
The following famous verse attributed to the Cārvākas conveys their argument against there being any creator of the universe. The verse remarks on how it is impossible for there to be a creator for the myriad of phenomena, such as the eyes on a peacock feather or the flow of water. These things, they say, can only arise as part of a natural process and were not created by anyone.
The roundness of a pea, the sharpness of a thorn, The rising of the sun, the movement of water downstream, The pattern of a peacock's feather and so on, whatever it may be, It was not created by anyone. Its cause is its own nature.[42]
The Cārvāka argument is that no one, whether human or creator, is ever observed making such natural details of the world as the roundness of peas or the shape of each individual thorn. Therefore, they conclude, all these things must arise spontaneously and without cause.
Śāntideva's refutation through direct experience (9.116): There are many logical arguments against causeless production, but it also goes against what we directly observe in our daily experience. In everyday perception, we see in every instance that effects are produced from causes and that we can find nothing that does not originate from a cause.
In everyday perception
There’s a cause for everything.
The different segments of the lotus flower
Arise from a variety of causes.[p.154]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 153
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རེ་ཞིག་འཇིག་རྟེན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས། །
རྒྱུ་རྣམས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན། ། པདྨའི་སྡོང་བུ་སོགས་དབྱེ་ནི། །
རྒྱུ་ཡི་དབྱེ་བས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན། །re zhig 'jig rten mngon sum gyis/_/
rgyu rnams thams cad mthong ba yin/_/ pad+ma'i sdong bu sogs dbye ni/_/
rgyu yi dbye bas bskyed pa yin/_/It is evident that, for example, a lotus grows from lotus seed. Without the cause of the lotus seed, the lotus will not arise. The farmer knows that a particular harvest results from having sown a particular seed, and they then plant seeds for that purpose.
What we observe is that all the various types of different effects come about from a whole variety of causes, and therefore nothing can be said to be causeless. For instance, the different parts of a lotus, such as the stem and petals, all come about from different causes.
Cārvākas' objection (9.117a): The whole range of parts that make up a phenomena, such as a lotus, are not found in the lotus's cause. Therefore, it cannot be said that each part has its own cause.
"But what gives rise," you ask, "to such variety of causes?" An even earlier variety of causes, we declare. (9.117ab)[43]
Śāntideva's response (9.117b): It is a multiplicity of causes that precede the effect that account for the whole variety of phenomena of the external universe and the beings living within that universe. Things arise from the various different potentials of the preceding causes which produced them.
Cārvākas' further objection (9.117c): But how is this whole variety of causes able to produce their effects? What is it that allows certain causes to produce certain kinds of effect? What arranged these causes in this way?
"And how," you ask, "do causes give their fruits?" Through power, we answer, of preceding causes. (9.117cd)[44]
Śāntideva's further response (9.117d): These causes were not created or arranged by anyone. There is no external agency causing this. Nor can it be that the results are present in their causes, otherwise no causal relationship could exist between them. It is through the power of different kinds of potential within the cause that produces a variety of different results. This can be said simply to be the nature of things.
b. Refutation of Production from Other
Having refuted the notion, in the first part of the diamond-splinters argument, that things can come about without causes, Śāntideva then moves on to the refutation of production from something which is of a different nature to the effect. The argument here carries the implication that the cause would be inherently different from the effect, since on a conventional level the Madhyamaka school accepts causes being able to produce effects which are different in nature to them. In this argument Śāntideva indirectly refutes inherent production from an impermanent other, but the main thrust of his argument aims to refute the notion of production from a permanent cause.
Śāntideva attempts to do this using two types of refutation:
i. Refutation of production from a permanent creator (verses 118 to 125)
ii. Specific refutation of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā belief in production from permanent atomic particles (verse 126ab)
i. Refutation of Production from a Permanent Creator (verses 118 to 125)
In verses 118 to 125, Śāntideva refutes production from a permanent cause. He takes as his main opponents those who believe the idea of a permanent cause to the universe and all the beings in that universe, such as is propounded by non-Buddhist schools that believe in a primal substance or in a creator being such as Śiva. These schools include the non-Buddhist schools of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.
Śāntideva (9.118ab): If you say Īśvara is the cause of everything in the universe, then you must define what the nature of that creator being is.
If Īshvara is held to be the cause of beings, You must now define for us his nature. If, by this, you simply mean the elements, No need to tire ourselves disputing names!
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དབང་ཕྱུག་འགྲོ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ན། །
རེ་ཞིག་དབང་ཕྱུག་གང་ཡིན་སྨྲོས། ། འབྱུང་རྣམས་ཤེ་ན་དེ་ལྟ་མོད། །
མིང་ཙམ་ལ་ཡང་ཅི་ཞིག་ངལ། །dbang phyug 'gro ba'i rgyu yin na/_/
re zhig dbang phyug gang yin smros/_/ 'byung rnams she na de lta mod/_/
ming tsam la yang ci zhig ngal/_/If the opponent answers: The elements of the universe are what we call "God."
Śāntideva's response (9.118cd): If you say that the basic elemental building blocks of the universe are the creator, then the Madhyamikas agree that these are the causes and conditions of events. But if that is so, what is the need to label that process with an exotic name like Īśvara?
Śāntideva's further consequence (9.119ab): If you accept that Īśvara is essentially all the different elements, then that kind of Īśvara could not be either permanent or unitary. Instead, it would have to be impermanent, multiple, and could not be inactive, just as is the nature of the elements.
Yet earth and other elements are many, Impermanent, inert, without divinity. Trampled underfoot, they are impure, And thus they cannot be a God Omnipotent.
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འོན་ཀྱང་ས་སོགས་དུ་མ་དང་། །
མི་རྟག་གཡོ་མེད་ལྷ་མིན་ཞིང་། ། འགོམ་བྱ་ཉིད་དང་མི་གཙང་བས། །
དེ་ནི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན། །on kyang sa sogs du ma dang /_/
mi rtag g.yo med lha min zhing /_/ 'gom bya nyid dang mi gtsang bas/_/
de ni dbang phyug nyid ma yin/_/Śāntideva's further argument against divine elements (9.119cd): If this divine creator were the elements, then it could not be completely pure as it is believed to be in those philosophies. We see that the elements are easily trampled underfoot. This creator could also be easily trampled underfoot, and therefore how can you consider them to be divine? What kind of God would that be? And further, if the creator can be trampled underfoot, how can they be spoken of as omnipotent?
In his commentary to the ninth chapter entitled The Brilliant Torch, Minyak Kunzang Sönam clearly shows the qualities that these schools attribute to gods such as Īśvara and how it is illogical for them to be the elements.
How do you describe the essential features of Ishvara? You claim that as he is indivisible he is single; as he is not born and does not perish, he is eternal; he has a thinking mind; he is divine; an object of reverence; and that he is pure. On the other hand, the elements are quite the opposite: they are multiple; they arise and perish and are therefore impermanent; they have no mind; they are not divine; they are trodden on by feet and so forth; and they are impure. These elements are not Ishvara—their defining characteristics are completely unalike and plainly contradictory. [45]
Śāntideva's argument against the creator being the element of space (9.120a): If you hold this divine creator to be space, that also is not tenable. Space is inert, unable to move or create anything, and lifeless. These are not qualities that are compatible with a creator god.
Śāntideva's argument against the creator being the self (9.120b): The idea that space is the self has also been refuted early, in the section on refuting the Sāṃkhya school's presentation of the self (puruṣa) (in verses 68 and 69) [Link to Verses 68 and 69].
The Deity cannot be space—inert and unproductive. He cannot be the self, for this we have refuted. He’s inconceivable, they say—then likewise his creatorship. Is there any point, therefore, to such a claim?
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དབང་ཕྱུག་མཁའ་མིན་གཡོ་མེད་ཕྱིར། །
བདག་མིན་སྔར་ནས་བཀག་ཟིན་ཕྱིར། ། བསམ་མིན་པ་ཡི་བྱེད་པོ་ཡང་། །
བསམ་མིན་བརྗོད་པས་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ། །dbang phyug mkha' min g.yo med phyir/_/
bdag min sngar nas bkag zin phyir/_/ bsam min pa yi byed po yang /_/
bsam min brjod pas ci zhig bya/_/Opponent's response (9.120c): Īśvara, the creator, is inconceivable, so none of the contradictions that you have stated apply.
Śāntideva's argument against the creator being inconceivable (9.120cd): If you state that the deity is inconceivable, it is illogical to call them inconceivable because that in itself is to describe them. If something is inconceivable, nothing can be said about it, and it would also be of no use to ordinary people. Furthermore, if this creator were to be inconceivable, then anyone who tried to describe them would be describing the inconceivable.
Śāntideva's question as to what Īśvara creates (9.121ab): What exactly is it that a creator such as Īśvara creates? What is it that the creator wishes to create? Did he create the self of all beings? And did he create all the physical elements in the universe?
What is it that he wishes to create? Has he made the self and all the elements? But are not self and elements and he himself eternal? And consciousness, we know, arises from its object.
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེས་བསྐྱེད་འདོད་པའང་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། །
བདག་ནི་དེ་དང་ས་སོགས་དང་། ། དབང་ཕྱུག་ངོ་བོའང་རྟག་མིན་ནམ། །
ཤེས་པ་ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྐྱེས་དང་། །des bskyed 'dod pa'ang gang zhig yin/_/
bdag ni de dang sa sogs dang /_/ dbang phyug ngo bo'ang rtag min nam/_/
shes pa shes bya las skyes dang /_/Śāntideva's further argument against Īśvara as a creator (9.121cd): You cannot accept the self and the elements as being created by Īśvara because the elements and the self would then have to be eternal, just as Īśvara is.
Verse 121d states the Madhyamaka school's own position—that is, consciousness arises from the objects that it apprehends and not from any kind of creator god. And since those objects appear only temporarily, both they and their apprehending consciousnesses are not eternal.
Śāntideva states the Madhyamikas’ own position (9.122ab): Pleasure and pain come about due to our own past karmic actions. They occur as a result of the actions we commit with a positive or negative motivation. So what is the need for a divine creator in this process?
Pain and pleasure have, from all time, sprung from karma, So tell us, what has his Divinity produced? And if there’s no beginning in the cause, How can there be beginnings in its fruits?
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཐོག་མེད་བདེ་སྡུག་ལས་ལས་ཡིན། །
དེ་ཡིས་གང་ཞིག་བསྐྱེད་པ་སྨྲོས། ། རྒྱུ་ལ་ཐོག་མ་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །
འབྲས་བུའི་ཐོག་མ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། །thog med bde sdug las las yin/_/
de yis gang zhig bskyed pa smros/_/ rgyu la thog ma yod min na/_/
'bras bu'i thog ma ga la yod/_/Śāntideva continues the argument against production from an eternal creator (9.122cd): If you believe a creator god, such as Īśvara, to be beginningless, immutable, and an eternal cause for everything, then it is not possible for them to have a beginning. If the cause which is this creator god has no beginning, then how could the effects produced by that cause have any beginning? They would have to be beginningless, but this is not what we observe in the manifest world.
Śāntideva then presents the logical consequences of a permanent and eternal creator that brings forth all phenomena, whether material or immaterial.
Why are creatures not created constantly,
For Īshvara relies on nothing but himself?
And if there’s nothing that he has not made,
What remains on which he might depend?[p.155]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 154
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རྟག་ཏུ་ཅི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད་མིན་ཏེ། །[p.119]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
དེ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མིན། ། དེས་བྱས་མིན་གཞན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །
དེས་འདི་གང་ལ་ལྟོས་པར་འགྱུར། །rtag tu ci phyir byed min te/_/[p.119]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
de ni gzhan la ltos pa min/_/ des byas min gzhan yod min na/_/
des 'di gang la ltos par 'gyur/_/Śāntideva's question to the theists (9.123): If the creator god is the singular cause for all things and all beings in existence, does not rely on any other cause, and is present in every moment, then why are not all beings constantly created?
Possible response from the theists: The creator god does not bring everything forth in one moment but creates the universe in stages.
Śāntideva's response (9.118cd): If the sole cause of creation is the divine god, and if that god does not rely on any other condition or factor to create, then the complete cause for creation of every single phenomena is present in every moment. Therefore, all phenomena should be produced simultaneously. And if there is nothing that is not made by the creator, then how could they possibly rely on separate causes in order to produce something, since those very separate causes would be created by them. If it is accepted that this creator god does actually rely on a variety of other various conditions to create the universe in the way that we see it gradually unfolding, then those necessary secondary conditions would have to be present all the time. And this would destroy the thesis that all things and events are singularly created by that god, because the god would rely on some cause other than themselves.
In verse 124 Śāntideva turns his attention to the aggregation of causes and conditions that bring about events and phenomena.
If Īshvara depends, the cause of all Is but the meeting of conditions and not Īshvara. When these obtain, he cannot but create; When these are absent, he is powerless to make.
Page(s) 155
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་ལྟོས་ན་ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད། །
རྒྱུ་ཡིན་འགྱུར་གྱི་དབང་ཕྱུག་མིན། ། ཚོགས་ན་མི་སྐྱེ་དབང་མེད་ཅིང་། །
དེ་མེད་པར་ནི་སྐྱེ་དབང་མེད། །gal te ltos na tshogs pa nyid/_/
rgyu yin 'gyur gyi dbang phyug min/_/ tshogs na mi skye dbang med cing /_/
de med par ni skye dbang med/_/Śāntideva's argument (9.124): If it is accepted that the mere coming together of the specific causes and conditions of a phenomena is enough to bring that phenomena into being, then what need is there for the added intervention of a creator god? When the complete causes and conditions are present, nothing can stop the phenomena from arising, and when those causes are not complete, the phenomena does not arise, despite the best efforts of the creator. The creator would have to rely on the aggregation of causes in order to create phenomena. Therefore, what real power does the creator god have?
Śāntideva's argument that the creator is forced to create unintended phenomena (9.125ab): If it is accepted that the creator god is constrained by the aggregation of causes and conditions but is still involved in the production of phenomena, then they must also be involved in creating things, such as the suffering of living beings, that no benevolent god would intend to create.
If Almighty God does not intend, But yet creates, another thing has forced him. If he wishes to create, he’s swayed by his desire. So even though Creator, what of his omnipotence?
Page(s) 155
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་དབང་ཕྱུག་མི་འདོད་བཞིན། །
བྱེད་ན་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དུ་ཐལ། ། འདོད་ནའང་འདོད་ལ་རག་ལས་འགྱུར། །
བྱེད་ནའང་དབང་ཕྱུག་ག་ལ་ཡིན། །gal te dbang phyug mi 'dod bzhin/_/
byed na gzhan gyi dbang du thal/_/ 'dod na'ang 'dod la rag las 'gyur/_/
byed na'ang dbang phyug ga la yin/_/Śāntideva's argument that the creator cannot be omnipotent (9.125cd): Even if it is argued that the divine creator creates according to their wish, then again they cannot be considered omnipotent because they would not be spontaneous and under their control. This divine god would be under the sway of their desire or intention, which would then have to arise before any phenomena was created, and would mean the intention itself would be the driving force of creation.
As a round up of this section of the text, most of the commentaries then conclude that, whether through the force of their desire or through their own power, if the creator is counted to be the maker of all things, then they must be impermanent. If they are permanent, then they could not have any effect on the causal process of phenomena.
ii. Specific Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Belief in Production from Permanent Atomic Particles
Within the section of the text which explains the reasons to refute production from a permanent cause, Śāntideva also refutes production from permanent particles, which is a tenet of some of the non-Buddhist Indian schools, such as the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā.
The tenets of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya school have been mentioned earlier, and most commentators just refer to the opponent in this verse as being these two schools. But Khenpo Kunpal also indicates that the Mīmāṃsā school is also one of the main opponents for Śāntideva in this verse.[46]
The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy is also one of the six major orthodox schools of Vedic philosophy. The core belief of the Mīmāṃsā school is that the Veda is self-existent, an uncreated and unauthored (apauruṣeya) revelation (śruti) of the truth, that is the incontrovertible and infallible dharma. The Mīmāṃsā school believes that the main role of the Vedas is to ensure that the Vedic rituals are correctly performed. The correct performance of Vedic rituals is believed to be the sole way to practice the dharma.
The Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsāka, and Nyāya schools all believe that the world has not been created by a deity such as Īśvara. They believe that matter can be broken down to irreducible atomic particles that are permanent, and that it is these permanent particles that are the material cause of the animate and inanimate worlds.
The Vaiśeṣika tradition believes that the smallest particles are not visible to the naked eye and exist in a much more subtle form in which their existence can only be inferred, whereas the Mīmāṃsākas give great value to what can be manifestly perceived. They believe that the smallest particles can be no smaller than that which is visible to the naked eye.
In refuting this position at this point in the text, Śāntideva refers back to an earlier verse where he argues that since the particles can be directionally divided, there can never be a particle that is considered permanent or partless.
Those who hold the permanence of particles Were indeed refuted earlier. (9.126ab)[47]
The second line of the above verse refers back to verse 86, in the section on the mindfulness of the body, where it refutes the existence of permanent and partless particles by the analysis which further reduces them to further smaller particles.[48]
Specific Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā Belief in Production from Permanent Atomic Particles
Verse 9.126ab: A further part of the diamond-splinters argument refutes production from a permanent cause. In connection with this, Śāntideva refutes production from permanent particles. This refutation of the existence of permanent and partless particles is done by the analysis which further reduces them to further smaller particles. It is also refuted in verse 9.86 in the section on the mindfulness of the body.
c. Refutation of Production from Self (9.126cd to 9.140)
The second main refutation of the Sāṃkhya school in the Bodhicaryāvatāra is contained in the second half of the chapter, in the section on Śāntideva's refutation of the self of phenomena. In this section of the text, he presents methods to understand the empty nature of all phenomena, the lack of any kind of intrinsic existence.
In his systematic refutation of the belief in production, through the classical Buddhist model of refutation of production from self, other, self and other, and neither self and other, Śāntideva first critiques production from self. In relation to this production from self, Śāntideva focuses in particular on the primal substance (prakṛti).
This section contains two main refutations:
i. The Refutation of the Primal Substance (126cd to 134)
ii. The Main Refutation of Self-Production: Something Cannot Arise from Nothing (135–140)
i. Refuting the Primal Substance
9.126–9.129 (a) The primal substance cannot be a unitary, partless entity if it has the three guṇas as its constituent characters.
9.132 to 9.134 (b) Refuting the belief that the guṇas can be permanent if they are involved in any kind of agentive action.
a. Refuting the Primal Substance to Be Unitary
The Sāṃkhyas are the ones who hold That permanent prakṛiti is the cause of the evolving world. (9.126cd)[49]
"Pleasure,” "pain,” "neutrality,” so-called, Are qualities which, when they rest In equilibrium are termed "prakṛiti.” The universe arises when this balance is disturbed.
Page(s) 155
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྙིང་སྟོབས་རྡུལ་དང་མུན་པ་ཞེས། །
བྱ་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན་མཉམ་གནས་ནི། ། གཙོ་བོ་ཞེས་བྱར་རབ་བརྗོད་དེ། །
མི་མཉམ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད། །snying stobs rdul dang mun pa zhes/_/
bya ba'i yon tan mnyam gnas ni/_/ gtso bo zhes byar rab brjod de/_/
mi mnyam 'gro ba yin par brjod/_/From verse 128 to the first half of verse 131, Śāntideva refutes the Sāṃkhya belief that the primal substance is unitary. If the primal substance is the balanced state of the three guṇas, he argues, then it cannot be unitary because it is composed of three parts or characteristics. We cannot talk of something being just one thing and at the same time accept that phenomena is composed of three elements. He argues that a single thing with no parts and a single thing with three or more parts are mutually exclusive. Therefore, he concludes, the primal substance cannot exist as it is posited in the Sāṃkhya philosophy.
Three natures in a unity are disallowed, And thus prakṛiti is without existence. These qualities likewise do not exist, For each of them indeed is three.
Page(s) 155
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གཅིག་ལ་རང་བཞིན་གསུམ་ཉིད་ནི། །
རིགས་མིན་དེས་ན་དེ་ཡོད་མིན། ། དེ་བཞིན་ཡོན་ཏན་ཡོད་མིན་ཏེ། །
དེ་ཡང་སོ་སོར་རྣམ་གསུམ་ཕྱིར། །gcig la rang bzhin gsum nyid ni/_/
rigs min des na de yod min/_/ de bzhin yon tan yod min te/_/
de yang so sor rnam gsum phyir/_/Continuing the argument about something being unitary but being comprised of multiple factors, Śāntideva argues: Since the Sāṃkhya school accepts that each of the guṇas in turn also have the other two guṇas as their nature, then each of the guṇas themselves cannot have a unitary nature, as they are made up of at least three different parts. Therefore, they cannot exist as presented by adherents of the Sāṃkhya school.
Śāntideva continues: If these guṇas cannot actually be existent, then the modulations or manifestations of those guṇas, such as sound and form, can also not have any existence.
If these qualities have no existence, A thing like sound is very far from plausible! And cloth and other mindless objects Cannot be the seat of feelings such as pleasure.
Page(s) 155
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཡོན་ཏན་མེད་ན་སྒྲ་སོགས་ཀྱང་། །
ཡོད་ཉིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱང་རིང་འགྱུར། ། སེམས་མེད་གོས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ། །
བདེ་སོགས་ཡོད་པ་སྲིད་པའང་མིན། །yon tan med na sgra sogs kyang /_/
yod nyid shin tu rgyang ring 'gyur/_/ sems med gos la sogs pa la/_/
bde sogs yod pa srid pa'ang min/_/Related to the second two lines of verse 129, Śāntideva goes on to argue: Manifestations such as woolen cloth cannot exist as the nature of the primal substance, because they are inanimate and therefore cannot possess the qualities of pain, pleasure, or neutral feeling. Pleasure, pain, and neutral feelings are the natures of the three guṇas, which then must also be the nature of the primal substance. But since they are states of feeling, how can they be permanent? And how can something permanent be described in terms of feelings when it is easy to observe that feelings are fleeting?
b. Refuting the guṇas to be Permanent
A further argument that Śāntideva makes here, in verses 132 to 134, is that there is no visible proof of the permanence of the feelings associated with the guṇas. Explicitly, he is refuting the permanent nature associated with the guṇas, but implicitly he is refuting the true existence of them.
The Sāṃkhya position: There is a distinction between different states of the guṇas. The gross forms of these states that are manifestly visible, such as pleasure, can become more subtle, and then they exist in an unmanifest latent state of potentiality. In this state they cannot be perceived.
Śāntideva: But if the guṇas, which have been defined as being of the same nature as the primal substance, a unitary and permanent nature, are able to switch from manifest to latent states, then both the subtle and gross states must lack any quality of permanence. Therefore, all these phenomena which you claim to be permanent cannot exist the way you believe them to, because they must possess a transient nature. And if that is the case, why is this impermanent nature not ascribed to all the twenty-five categories of phenomena?
If coarseness is abandoned, subtlety assumed, Subtlety and grossness both lack permanence. So why not grant that, in this way, All things possess the character of transience?
Page(s) 156
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རགས་པ་དོར་ནས་ཕྲ་གྱུར་བས། །
ཕྲ་རགས་དེ་དག་མི་རྟག་ཉིད། ། དེ་བཞིན་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི། །
མི་རྟག་ཉིད་དུ་ཅིས་མི་འདོད། །rags pa dor nas phra gyur bas/_/
phra rags de dag mi rtag nyid/_/ de bzhin dngos po thams cad ni/_/
mi rtag nyid du cis mi 'dod/_/The Sāṃkhyas: Whether in a gross or a subtle state, the actual nature of pleasure is never lost, so its permanent essence is never impaired.
Śāntideva (9.134ab): This doesn’t make any sense. The characteristics of being manifest or subtle must either be the same as pleasure itself or they must be different. If, say, the manifest nature is different from pleasure, then when the manifest character subsides, the pleasure would not subside and it should still be experienced.
If the coarser aspect is none other than the pleasure, It’s clear that pleasure is itself impermanent. If you claim that what does not exist in any sense (Because it has no being) cannot manifest,
Page(s) 156
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རགས་པ་བདེ་ལས་གཞན་མིན་ན། །
བདེ་བ་གསལ་བ་མི་རྟག་ཉིད། ། གལ་ཏེ་མེད་པ་འགའ་ཡང་ནི། །
སྐྱེ་མིན་མེད་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་འདོད་ན། །rags pa bde las gzhan min na/_/
bde ba gsal ba mi rtag nyid/_/ gal te med pa 'ga' yang ni/_/
skye min med phyir zhes 'dod na/_/Śāntideva (9.134ab): And if, instead, the manifest aspect is not different from the pleasure and is actually one with it, then it is easy to see that pleasure must be impermanent because it can be directly seen to not always be manifest.
ii. The Main Refutation of Self-Production: Something Cannot Arise from Nothing [135–140]
9.135 to 9.140: Refutation of the Sāṃkhya position that things that manifest must already be present in some latent state prior to their coming into being. This includes the master refutation of the simultaneity of causes and their effects.
The next verses, from 135 to 140, offer a refutation of the Sāṃkhya position that things that manifest must already be present in some latent state prior to their coming into being.
The Sāṃkhya position: When the guṇa of pleasure ceases to manifest, it then remains hidden in a subtle state of potentiality within the primal substance. Later on, when it reappears, it is merely the manifestation of what was already there. If things did not preexist in some sense before they became manifest, then it would be like them arising completely causelessly, out of the blue. Therefore, before manifesting, things must exist in a subtle state within the primal substance.
Śāntideva's critique: If the results are present at the same time of the cause, why are they never perceived?
The Sāṃkhyas' reply: Even though the results are present at the time of the cause, at that time the results are not apparent to consciousness. Later, just as an object in a darkened room will be made visible by turning on the light, the results will be perceived at a later time when they become manifest.
Śāntideva's critique: While the Sāṃkhyas try to maintain that things cannot arise that were not previously there, they end up actually positing that themselves. This is because they have to say that the manifestation is absent at the time of the cause and only later arises newly, thus contradicting their own tenet. If the manifestation were present at the time of the cause, then they would not be able to differentiate between manifest and unmanifest.
Although you have denied the birth of things That did not previously exist, it’s this that you’re now saying! But if results exist within their cause, Those who eat their food consume their excrement.
Page(s) 156
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གསལ་བར་མེད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི། །
ཁྱོད་མི་འདོད་ཀྱང་གནས་པ་ཉིད། ། གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་ལ་འབྲས་གནས་ན། །
ཟན་ཟ་མི་གཙང་ཟ་བར་འགྱུར། །gsal bar med par skye ba ni/_/
khyod mi 'dod kyang gnas pa nyid/_/ gal te rgyu la 'bras gnas na/_/
zan za mi gtsang za bar 'gyur/_/And likewise with the money they would spend on clothing, Let them rather buy the cotton grains to wear! (9.136ab)[50]
Śāntideva: It is incoherent to talk of results existing within the causes. If that were so, Śāntideva teases, then those who eat their tasty food would at the same time be consuming the result of that food, their own excrement. And why would those who wish to wear smooth cotton clothing not instead go out and buy the cotton seeds to wear, since the result is within and contemporaneous with the cause. But we don’t see people in the world following this way of acting.
The Sāṃkhyas respond: It is because of delusion that ordinary people cannot see these subtle states, for example, the subtle state of cloth in the cotton seeds.
"But," you say, "the world is ignorant and blind. For this is taught by 'those who know the truth.'" (9.136cd)[51]
Śāntideva: If the Sāṃkhya school says that the perceptions of the worldly are invalid due to ignorance, then since they are able to perceive the resultant manifestations, those manifestations must be false, and therefore it is meaningless to talk about them existing at the time of the cause. Also, if the Sāṃkhya school followers have this knowledge, that the result exists at the time of the cause, then they would be aware of eating their own excrement at the time that they ate a meal. Or it could be said that since the founders of the Sāṃkhya school are seen to insist on wearing cotton clothes and not cotton seeds, this makes it clear that the result does not exist at the time of the cause.
Śāntideva: Worldly people also have this knowledge, such as not to wear cotton seeds, thinking there is cloth present, so why do they not see the truth that results are present at the time of the cause?
This knowledge must be present in the worldly too! And if they have it, why do they not see? (9.137ab)[52]
The Sāṃkhyas: They do not realize it because the perception of worldly beings is not a prime cognition.
Śāntideva: In that case, the perceptions of the manifestations of the world must also be false because they are not prime cognitions.
If now you say that what the worldly see has no validity, This means that what they clearly see is false. (9.137cd)[53]
Leading on from this topic of what is valid consciousness, in the last section of this refutation of production from self, the Sāṃkhyas raise a doubt about the Buddhist presentation of valid cognition.
The Sāṃkhyas: The Madhyamaka school asserts different types of valid cognitions, such as direct perception and inferential cognition. They maintain that in some way nearly all these types of knowing are deceptive and are therefore not ultimately valid. How is it possible that these deceptive cognitions could in any way validate their objects? Doesn’t it mean that the objects must also be deceptive and unreal? And if that is the case, then even the cognition realizing emptiness and the object of emptiness itself as an object of that would have to be deceptive.
"If,” you ask, "there’s no validity in valid knowledge, Is not all that it assesses false? And therefore it becomes untenable To meditate on voidness, ultimate reality.”
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གལ་ཏེ་ཚད་མ་ཚད་མིན་ན། །
དེས་གཞལ་བརྫུན་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རམ། ། དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ན་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད། །
སྒོམ་[p.121]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
gal te tshad ma tshad min na/_/
des gzhal brdzun par mi 'gyur ram/_/ de nyid du na stong pa nyid/_/
sgom [p.121]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
Śāntideva responds: You are generally right in saying that objects established by deceptive consciousness must be in some way false. And yes, even in relation to emptiness, since the inferential cognition that apprehends emptiness is deceptive, emptiness, too, is also devoid of any inherent existence. The Madhyamaka system can still posit a direct prime cognizing consciousness that is deceptive but able to verify things.
If there is no object for analysis, There can be no grasping of its nonexistence. And so deceptive objects of whatever kind Will also have a nonexistence equally deceptive.
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
བརྟགས་པའི་དངོས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར། །
དེ་ཡི་དངོས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན། ། དེ་ཕྱིར་བརྫུན་པའི་དངོས་གང་ཡིན། །
དེ་ཡི་དངོས་མེད་གསལ་བར་བརྫུན། །brtags pa'i dngos la ma reg par/_/
de yi dngos med 'dzin ma yin/_/ de phyir brdzun pa'i dngos gang yin/_/
de yi dngos med gsal bar brdzun/_/Śāntideva continues: However, the Madhyamaka school has never asserted any kind of truly existent emptiness that is out there and independent on its own, without dependence upon a basis or without reference to things such as a pot, that has been independently established by valid cognition. Rather, emptiness is in a relationship of mutual dependence with the object of which it is the absence of inherent existence.
Śāntideva gives an example: It is like being in a dream within which we dream a child has died. Within the dream, the thought that the child has died is able to overcome the thought that the child is alive. But throughout this time we are still in the world of the dream, so both thoughts are actually deceptive.
When therefore in one’s dream a child has died, The state of mind that thinks it is no more Supplants the thought that it is living still. And yet both thoughts are equally deceptive.
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེས་ན་རྨི་ལམ་བུ་ཤི་ལ། །
དེ་མེད་སྙམ་པའི་རྣམ་རྟོག་ནི། ། དེ་ཡོད་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཡི། །
གེགས་ཡིན་དེ་ཡང་བརྫུན་པ་ཡིན། །des na rmi lam bu shi la/_/
de med snyam pa'i rnam rtog ni/_/ de yod rnam par rtog pa yi/_/
gegs yin de yang brdzun pa yin/_/Likewise, a false antidote of wisdom is still able to overcome a false ignorance. There is still functionality even though things are deceptive and illusory-like.
From verse 126cd until verse 140, Śāntideva presents a series of arguments aimed mainly at the Sāṃkhya school's explanation of the primal substance (prakṛti). These arguments are focused on refuting the notion of an underlying substrate of reality, a substrate of reality that has parts and characteristics but is also unitary and unchanging. Śāntideva primarily uses one branch of the diamond-splinters argument, the argument against production from self, to refute his opponents' assertions.
Conclusion of the Diamond-Splinters Argument
In verses 141 and 142, Śāntideva wraps up this section of the text on the diamond-splinters, concluding that nothing can be produced without causes, nothing can be produced from itself, and nothing can be produced from a combination of both itself and something other than itself.
Therefore, as we see through such investigation, Nothing is that does not have a cause; And nothing is existent in its causes Taken one by one or in the aggregate.
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་བས་དེ་ལྟར་རྣམ་དཔྱད་པས། །
འགའ་ཡང་རྒྱུ་མེད་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ། སོ་སོ་བའམ་འདུས་པ་ཡི། །
རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་གནས་མ་ཡིན། །de bas de ltar rnam dpyad pas/_/
'ga' yang rgyu med yod ma yin/_/ so so ba'am 'dus pa yi/_/
rkyen rnams la yang gnas ma yin/_/It does not come from somewhere else, Neither does it stay nor yet depart. (9.142ab)[54]
Nothing is without causes, and no effect can be found in either one or all of its causes. Once produced, things do not intrinsically remain, and on cessation they do not go anywhere. They do not have any intrinsic production, abiding, or cessation. Production, abiding, and cessation exist but only at a nominal level.
2. The Great Reasoning of Dependent Origination (རིགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་)
The second reason proving the lack of inherent existence is the great reasoning of dependent origination. Out of all the reasons establishing emptiness, this reason is often referred to as the king or chief of all reasons. It is said to be the king of all reasons to establish the ultimate nature of phenomena because of its unique ability to refute both the extreme of nihilism and the extreme of permanence, or absolutism, at the same time.
The main syllogism is:
The subject: mere appearances (all phenomena)
The predicate: are without true inherent nature
Reason: because they are dependently originated
Example: like the reflection of a form in a mirror
In the second half of verse 142, Śāntideva explains how all phenomena are illusory-like. The mind that grasps at true existence falsely imputes onto its objects a false reality which they do not have.
Śāntideva: What difference is there between something which is taken to be the truth by a deluded consciousness, on the one hand, and illusions, dreams, or mirages, on the other hand? They both appear to be true while not existing in the way that they appear.
How will what confusion takes for truth In any sense be different from a mirage? (9.142cd)[55]
To a deluded mind, things appear to exist from their own side, while they are actually empty of inherent existence. That deluded mind assents to that appearance and takes the truth to be that things possess an intrinsic nature, a nature which in reality they do not possess.
Things, then, bodied forth by magic spells, And that which is displayed by dint of causes— Whence have these arisen? we should ask; And where they go to, that we should examine!
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྒྱུ་མས་སྤྲུལ་པ་གང་ཡིན་དང་། །
རྒྱུ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་གང་སྤྲུལ་པ། ། དེ་ནི་གང་ནས་འོངས་གྱུར་ཅིང་། །
གང་དུ་འགྲོ་བའང་བརྟག་པར་གྱིས། །sgyu mas sprul pa gang yin dang /_/
rgyu rnams kyis ni gang sprul pa/_/ de ni gang nas 'ongs gyur cing /_/
gang du 'gro ba'ang brtag par gyis/_/Śāntideva: Nothing is real. Things do not exist in the way that they appear, intrinsically and from their own side. Instead, they arise and exist in reliance on other phenomena. They are like the reflection of a form in a mirror.
What is seen when circumstances meet
And is not seen in absence of the same
Is not real; it is like an image in a mirror.
How can true existence be ascribed to it?[p.158]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 157
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
གང་ཞིག་གང་ནི་ཉེ་བ་ཡིས། །
མཐོང་འགྱུར་དེ་མེད་ན་མིན་པ། ། བཅོས་བུ་གཟུགས་བརྙན་དང་མཚུངས་ལ། །
དེ་ལ་བདེན་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད། །gang zhig gang ni nye ba yis/_/
mthong 'gyur de med na min pa/_/ bcos bu gzugs brnyan dang mtshungs la/_/
de la bden nyid ji ltar yod/_/Anything that comes into being and any event that occurs happens in dependence on something else. This can be their causes and conditions, their parts, or even conceptual designations of them. Everything is like a mirage or a magical illusion, which is in some sense fabricated.
The example of a reflection of a form in a mirror is used as a concordant example in the great syllogism of dependent origination. This reflection is considered to be an easy and straightforward example that helps us begin to understand that things do not exist as they appear.
A reflection of, for instance, a face in a mirror, appears to exist from the side of the mirror, almost in the mirror itself, and the reflection of the face can appear to those who have no experience of mirrors to be the very face itself. But actually the reflection of the face is not the face itself and is empty of being the face. The reflection of the face only appears in the mirror when conditions such as the presence of the mirror and a person's face placed in front of it are present.
How does this relate to the way things actually exist? Although phenomena lack any form of true or intrinsic existence, they do still exist as dependent originations. Indeed, the very fact that they arise in dependence on other factors means that they cannot have even an atom of independent and inherent existence. All things arise only as a result of an aggregation of a wide variety of conditions. When the conditions are not present, the phenomena cannot come into being.
To illustrate this point, we can take the example of the self or the person. The person does not exist inherently and from the side of its basis of designation, which is the four or five aggregates. But when the condition of the aggregates all come together, then we can say there is a conventional person that does not truly exist but that exists as a mere designation upon the basis of its aggregates.
3. The Reasoning of Existence and Nonexistence (ཡོད་མེད་སྐྱེ་འགོག་གི་གཏན་ཚིགས་)
In verses 145 to 150, Śāntideva uses the reasoning of existence and nonexistence to prove that merely dependently originated phenomena cannot have any form of inherent existence. This reason specifically analyzes the effects of causes. It analyzes the status of the effect at the time of their cause, whether those effects are existent, nonexistent, both existent and nonexistent, or neither.
The main syllogism is:
The subject: mere appearances (all phenomena)
The predicate: are without true inherent nature
Reason: because at the time of their cause they are neither existent, nonexistent, both, or neither,
Example: like the child of a barren woman
Śāntideva examines how an effect is produced from its cause, particularly how it is not possible for inherently existent results to come from inherently existent causes.
What need is there for cause In something that’s already real? But then, what need is there for cause In something that does not exist?
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་གྱུར་པ་ལ། །
རྒྱུ་ཡིས་དགོས་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད། ། འོན་ཏེ་དེ་ནི་མེད་ན་ཡང་། །
རྒྱུ་ཡིས་དགོས་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད། །dngos po yod par gyur pa la/_/
rgyu yis dgos pa ci zhig yod/_/ 'on te de ni med na yang /_/
rgyu yis dgos pa ci zhig yod/_/Śāntideva: Taking an object such as a vase, it is incorrect to think of it arising while it was existing. This would be illogical, because if it already existed, there would be no need for it to be produced. If it were thought to arise while not existing, that would entail an existent thing arising from a nonexistent thing, which is not tenable.
Another approach to this is to look at the consequences if we believed things to have their own independent identity. If that were the case, then what need would there be for them to have a cause? If things existed inherently and truly, then they would have no need to rely on causes, and causes would have no role. If phenomena were autonomous, causes would not be able to have any influence in giving rise to effects. And, since the purpose of a cause is to produce an effect, there can be no meaning to saying there are effects which exist without any relation to causes.
Doubt: While it is understandable that something inherently existent does not need to be created, wouldn't something nonexistent need a cause to produce it?
Even through a hundred million causes, No change takes place in nonexistent things, For in that state of "non-thing,” how could "things” occur? And into what could nonexistent things transform?
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
བྱེ་བ་བརྒྱ་ཕྲག་རྒྱུ་ཡིས་ཀྱང་། །
དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་བསྒྱུར་དུ་མེད། །
གནས་སྐབས་[p.122]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
bye ba brgya phrag rgyu yis kyang /_/
dngos po med pa bsgyur du med/_/
gnas skabs [p.122]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
Minyak Kunzang Sönam explains in detail this point about how if things are nonexistent they can never become existent.
One might think that while it is true that something inherently existent does not need to be created, why would something non-existent not need a cause to produce it?
Even with a billion causes, a thing which does not exist at all can never become a something. Such a non-existent thing is like the horn of a rabbit, it cannot possibly be produced by causes and conditions, and therefore cannot be turned into anything by anyone.[56]
Śāntideva's explanation: Even with millions of causes, nonexistent phenomena cannot transform into existent phenomena. Something which is nonfunctional can never become something which has a function. These categories are mutually exclusive. If a nonfunctioning thing were able to turn into a functioning thing, then it would not be nonfunctioning. The very ability to be able to transform into something else would mean that it already had functionality.
The production of an effect, such as a shoot which did not exist at the time of its cause, the seed, is not being refuted. All things that come into being do not themselves exist at the time of their causes. What is being refuted is the production from an inherently existent thing, the production of an inherently existent thing, as well as the belief of the Sāṃkhya school that the effect exists at the time of the cause.
Śāntideva (9.147): Something nonexistent thing cannot change into an existent thing. If it did, then we would need to examine whether it became something by abandoning its state of nonexistence or it became something after it had abandoned its state of nonexistence.
Since things cannot become when they are nonexistent, When could such existent things occur? For insofar as entities do not arise, Nonentities themselves will not depart.
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
མེད་ཚེ་དངོས་ཡོད་སྲིད་མིན་ན། །
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ནམ་ཞིག་འགྱུར། ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱེས་པར་མ་གྱུར་པར། །
དངོས་མེད་དང་ནི་འབྲལ་མི་འགྱུར། །med tshe dngos yod srid min na/_/
dngos po yod par nam zhig 'gyur/_/ dngos po skyes par ma gyur par/_/
dngos med dang ni 'bral mi 'gyur/_/And if nonentity is not dispersed, No chance is there for entity to manifest. And entity cannot be changed into nonentity, For otherwise it has a double nature.
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དངོས་མེད་དང་ནི་མ་བྲལ་ན། །
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་སྐབས་མི་སྲིད། ། དངོས་པོའང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་མིན་ཏེ། །
རང་བཞིན་གཉིས་སུ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་ཕྱིར། །dngos med dang ni ma bral na/_/
dngos po yod pa'i skabs mi srid/_/ dngos po'ang med par 'gyur min te/_/
rang bzhin gnyis su thal 'gyur phyir/_/Śāntideva's explanation (9.148ab): If a nonexistent thing is to become something, it must abandon the condition of nonexistence. It cannot exist as something at the time that it is nonexistent, as existence and nonexistence are contradictory. And at the time when something is nonexistent, the phenomena which would be its result would not have come into being, and therefore a nonexistent thing can never change from being nothing.
Also, if a nonexistent became an existent by abandoning the state of nonexistence, at the moment that it abandoned the nonexistent state it would then no longer be nonexistent but instead existent. And if the nonexistent had not yet left behind the state of nonexistence, then it would not be able to transform into anything.
So, even if it were possible for something to inherently exist, or if something inherently nonexistent were possible, they could never change their nature from one state to another. They would have to forever remain existent or nonexistent.
In his Brilliant Torch, Minyak Kunzang Sönam draws upon Nāgārjuna's summary of this point in his Seventy Verses on Emptiness (Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā) as follows:
An existent thing does not come into being because it is existent; A non-existent thing does not come into being because it is non-existent; Things are not existent and not non-existent because these are incompatible; And because there is no origination, there is no dwelling or cessation. (Verse 4)[57]
Śāntideva's explanation (9.148cd): And furthermore, even if there were an inherently existing thing, that could never transform into a nonexistent thing. Something cannot become nothing. If it could, there would be the unwanted consequence that phenomena would possess both existent and nonexistent natures.
Sonam Tsemo gives an interesting read on the last two lines of verse 148, where he compares the prasaṅga, the consequential argument, and the svātantra, the autonomous syllogisms, which are used to refute the belief that existent phenomena can transform into nonexistent phenomena.
The nonexistent object is the logical subject:
- The prasaṅga from the reason based on intrinsic nature:
[Contradiction: you claim that the object is non-dual but] it follows that it is dual because of its transformation [from existent to nonexistent].
- The svātantra from the pervader not being supported:
because of being non-dual, there is no transformation.[58]
There is a philosophical consequence of accepting that a nonexistent thing can also be nondual. The argument says that it cannot be nondual for the reason that it transforms from existent into nonexistent, which means that it has to have both existent and nonexistent natures.
The autonomous syllogism states that if something is nondual, then since it has both natures, there is actually no transformation from one state to another.
Gyaltsap Je summarizes this refutation of inherent existence through the reasoning of existence and nonexistence in this way:
Take the subject 'sprout' - it is not generated inherently - because it is not inherently generated as existent, and it is not inherently generated as non-existent, e.g., like the child of a barren woman. Although its generation is refuted if non-existent at the time of the cause, it is a refutation of its inherent generation at the time of generation, even though it is non-existent at the time of the cause. Therefore, one needs to relate it to the object of negation.[59]
To summarize this reasoning, a shoot cannot come into being on its own, because if it is inherently existent, it cannot come into being, and if it is inherently nonexistent, it cannot come into being either. The example used to prove this reason is that of the child of a barren woman.
In conclusion, as it is mentioned in The Questions of Sāgaramati (Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā), regarding anything which comes into being in relation to or in dependence on anything else, that thing cannot have even the slightest inherent nature.
Whatever is dependently originated Is without any inherent nature. What lacks an essential nature Never actually arises.[60]
Showing the Sameness of Samsara and Nirvana
In verses 149 and 150, Śāntideva focuses on the beings wandering in cyclic existence and explains that if they exist independently and intrinsically, then what need would there be for them to have a cause? If beings existed autonomously and from their own side, there would be no opportunity for causes to play a role in their production. The main function of causes is to produce effects, and if beings were autonomous and independent, then causes could not affect them.
Śāntideva (9.149): All phenomena lack the inherent existence they appear to have. There is no intrinsic production, abiding, and cessation of any phenomena. Therefore, at an ultimate level, beings neither come into being nor cease.
Thus there are no entities And likewise there’s no ceasing of the same. And therefore beings, each and every one, Are without origin and never cease.
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་འགག་པ་ཡོད་མིན་ཞིང་། །
དངོས་པོའང་ཡོད་མིན་དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར། ། འགྲོ་བ་འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི། །
རྟག་ཏུ་མ་སྐྱེས་མ་འགགས་ཉིད། །de ltar 'gag pa yod min zhing /_/
dngos po'ang yod min de yi phyir/_/ 'gro ba 'di dag thams cad ni/_/
rtag tu ma skyes ma 'gags nyid/_/Wandering beings, thus, resemble dreams, And also the banana tree, if you examine well. In ultimate reality there’s no distinguishing Between the states of sorrow and beyond all sorrow.
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
འགྲོ་བ་རྨི་ལམ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། །
རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་ན་ཆུ་ཤིང་འདྲ། ། མྱ་ངན་འདས་དང་མ་འདས་པའང་། །
དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད། །gro ba rmi lam lta bu ste/_/
rnam par dpyad na chu shing 'dra/_/ mya ngan 'das dang ma 'das pa'ang /_/
de nyid du ni khyad par med/_/Śāntideva (9.150): Intrinsic production and cessation have been refuted, but it does not make sense to say that beings, and indeed all phenomena, are completely nonexistent. That would mean that they had never had any form of existence. So when considering the aspects of origination and cessation of phenomena, they can only be accepted on a conditional level. Phenomena do exist, but not inherently, and only in dependent relation with other phenomena.
When we are able to understand this way that things exist, we can then understand that at the ultimate level there is no difference between samsara and nirvana. On a conventional level there is a difference, but at the ultimate level there is none. The reason is that from the perspective of their emptiness, the lack of intrinsic nature, samsara and nirvana are exactly the same. It can be said that from this perspective of emptiness, all phenomena from the very beginning have been in a state of natural peace, a natural nirvana.
This assertion that all things have never come into being and that they therefore are originally in a state of peace, a natural nirvana, is mentioned in The Jewel Cloud Sūtra (Ratnameghasūtra) in the following verse:
When turning the wheel of Dharma, O Protector, you taught that phenomena Are primordially peaceful, unarisen, And at ease by nature.[61]
And from The Questions of the Nāga King Anavatapta (Anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchā), it says:
That which arises from conditions is unborn— It has no intrinsic essence of arising. That which depends on conditions is taught to be empty. One who understands emptiness is heedful.[62]
Summarizing this point, that all phenomena exist interdependently and that everything is like a dream or illusion, Nāgārjuna says the following in his Commentary on Bodhicitta (Bodhicittavivāraṇa):
Just like the sounding of a drum, Likewise a shoot arises from a gathering of causes. All the things that in the outer world arise dependently Are, we say, like dreams and magical displays. (64)
That things arise from causes Never contradicts what we have just declared. Since causes are devoid of being causes, We understand phenomena to be unborn. (65)[63]
The Benefits of Meditation on Emptiness
In all the preceding verses, Śāntideva presented a wide variety of reasons to refute wrong conceptions about the way that phenomena exist. He addresses the views of opponents from the non-Buddhist traditions and he counters some of the assertions of the lower tenet schools of the Buddhist tradition. In the process of refuting these other systems, he also presents the highest view within the Buddhist tradition, that of the Madhyamaka school. In this tradition, phenomena are merely dependent designations and have no intrinsic reality of their own.
Taking this understanding of the way things exist according to the Madhyamaka tradition, in verses 151 to 167 Śāntideva moves on to explain the great benefits of cultivating this understanding of emptiness and meditating on it.
1. Realizing the Equality of the Eight Worldly Dharmas
In verses 151 to 153, Śāntideva explains that even seemingly opposed phenomena—such as gain or loss, or happiness and suffering—when viewed from the ultimate perspective, are all equal.
Śāntideva's question (9.151–52): If all phenomena exist merely imputed by conception and lacking any kind of existence from their own side, if they are empty in this way, then what is there that exists to gain or lose? Who is there to praise me or disparage me?
With things that in this way are empty
What is there to gain and what to lose?
Who is there to pay me court and honors,
And who is there to scorn and to revile me?[p.159]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 158
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་སྟོང་པའི་དངོས་རྣམས་ལ། །
ཐོབ་པ་ཅི་ཡོད་ཤོར་ཅི་ཡོད། ། གང་གིས་རིམ་གྲོ་བྱས་པའམ། །
ཡོངས་སུ་བརྙས་པའང་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད། །de ltar stong pa'i dngos rnams la/_/
thob pa ci yod shor ci yod/_/ gang gis rim gro byas pa'am/_/
yongs su brnyas pa'ang ci zhig yod/_/Pleasure, sorrow—whence do these arise? What is there to give me joy and pain? And if I search their very suchness, Who is craving? What is craved?
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
བདེ་བའམ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་གང་ལས་ཡིན། །
མི་དགར་ཅི་ཡོད་དགར་ཅི་ཡོད། ། དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་བཙལ་བྱས་ན། །
གང་ཞིག་སྲེད་ཅིང་གང་ལ་སྲེད། །bde ba'am sdug bsngal gang las yin/_/
mi dgar ci yod dgar ci yod/_/ de nyid du ni btsal byas na/_/
gang zhig sred cing gang la sred/_/We crave happiness and wish to gain the objects of our desire. We feel happiness when we gain them and then suffer and often get angry when we lose these objects of our desire. But neither this happiness nor unhappiness, nor the objects that those feelings arise in relation to, none of them are truly existent. Since nothing truly exists, there is nothing to truly gain and nothing to truly lose, and so at this level attachment to the objects of our desire and aversion to those things we dislike makes absolutely no sense.
Śāntideva continues (9.152cd): Furthermore, if we look deeply into the nature of phenomena, searching for any kind of intrinsic and independent nature, we cannot find anything. Since all phenomena lack this kind of existence from their own side, who is the person craving, and what is it that is craved for?
Sonam Tsemo explains in his commentary that the two verses above discuss the eight worldly concerns—of gain and loss, praise and blame, pleasure and pain, and fame and infamy—taking a look at them from the perspective of their ultimate nature.
He relates how, in the root verses, gain and loss and happiness and suffering are mentioned explicitly, whereas being paid honor and being reviled refer to praise and blame, and joy and pain refer to the joy of fame and the pain of infamy.[64]
In verse 153 Śāntideva continues his ultimate analysis of the fundamental way in which phenomena exist by looking at the world of living beings.
Śāntideva's question (9.153): Who is there in this world who lives and then passes away? Who is there that has been born in the past, and who is there that will be born into another future life? Who are our friends and who are our relatives?
Examine now this world of living beings: Who is there therein to pass away? What is there to come, and what has been? And who, indeed, are relatives and friends?
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དཔྱད་ན་གསོན་པོའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི། །
གང་ཞིག་འདིར་ནི་འཆི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ། འབྱུང་འགྱུར་གང་ཡིན་བྱུང་གྱུར་གང་། །
གཉེན་དང་བཤེས་ཀྱང་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། །dpyad na gson po'i 'jig rten 'di/_/
gang zhig 'dir ni 'chi 'gyur te/_/ 'byung 'gyur gang yin byung gyur gang /_/
gnyen dang bshes kyang gang zhig yin/_/It is important to understand that Śāntideva is not saying that there is no cessation and that beings do not pass away. He is not saying that we have not been born in the past nor that we will not die and be reborn in the future. And he is certainly not saying that we have no relatives or friends to benefit us. All of these statements are being made at the level of ultimate analysis where nothing can be found on search. At a conventional level, he accepts these things as existing in some nominal way, but from the ultimate perspective they have no existence.
In the last two lines of verse 154, Śāntideva makes a prayer that all beings like himself develop the crucial discernment that all phenomena lack intrinsic existence and are like space, beyond all categories of existent or nonexistent, and that all beings regard as equal the eight mundane concerns.
May beings like myself discern and grasp That all things have the character of space! (9.154ab)[65]
2. Teaching Great Compassion by Highlighting the Defects of Samsara
In the last main section of the text, from verses 154cd to 165, Śāntideva explains the explicit need for the realization of emptiness if we wish to turn away from all our suffering. This insistence on the central importance of wisdom comes from a place of deep compassion, compassion that understands the way that the root cause of all our suffering is the ignorance of how things ultimately exist.
i. The Sufferings That Arise from Ignorance
Lacking the understanding of the role ignorance plays, and not working to understand the ultimate nature of ourselves and all other phenomena, we will be trapped in a samsaric life that is characterized by suffering and dissatisfaction.
Śāntideva details both the obvious sufferings that we face in this life, but he also goes on to point out the less obvious forms of suffering that come from being trapped in samsara and how we will have to continually be born in lives that are characterized by suffering.
a. The Manifest Sufferings of This Life
Śāntideva (9.154cd/155): Those seeking peace and happiness will never find what they desire if the means through which they strive to attain that involves confrontations or disputes with others or through purely looking for personal enjoyment.
But those who seek their happiness and ease, Through disputes or enjoyments, (9.154cd)[66]
All are deeply troubled, or else thrilled with joy. They suffer, strive, contend among themselves, Slashing, stabbing, injuring each other: They live their lives engulfed in evil and travail.
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
རབ་ཏུ་འཁྲུག་དང་དགའ་བར་བྱེད། །
མྱ་ངན་འབད་རྩོལ་རྩོད་པ་དང་། ། ཕན་ཚུན་གཅོད་དང་འབིགས་པ་དང་། །
སྡིག་དག་གིས་ནི་ཚེགས་ཆེན་འཚོ། །rab tu 'khrug dang dga' bar byed/_/
mya ngan 'bad rtsol rtsod pa dang /_/ phan tshun gcod dang 'bigs pa dang /_/
sdig dag gis ni tshegs chen 'tsho/_/Within this very life there can be no long-term, stable peace and happiness if we are constantly controlled by our reactions to temporary conditions. Ecstatically happy when fortunate things happen to us, or depressed and morose when misfortune comes our way, we are at the whim of our emotions. Our minds are not in balance, and in these fluctuating states we suffer. We can easily be drawn into severe negative actions in relation to others, and in extreme cases this can lead us to cause grievous mental and physical harm to others.
b. The Invisible Sufferings of Past and Future Lives
In verse 156 Śāntideva covers the wider context of our samsaric life, spanning over countless lifetimes. From this longer perspective, temporary states of good fortune may very occasionally arise, but they can also end as quickly as they came about.
Śāntideva (9.156): It is so rare to find rebirth in a happy state, but occasionally we do surface from the depths of samsara and are born into such an opportune life. However, instead of taking that opportunity to seek liberation, we instead follow all kinds of temporary pleasure. When death comes, we will have wasted this precious chance and will now fall into the lower realms for an unimaginably long time.
From time to time they surface in the states of bliss, Abandoning themselves to many pleasures. But dying, down they fall to suffer torment, Long, unbearable, in realms of sorrow.
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
བདེ་འགྲོ་ཡང་དང་ཡང་འོངས་ཏེ། །
བདེ་བ་མང་པོ་སྤྱད་སྤྱད་ནས། ། ཤི་ནས་ངན་སོང་སྡུག་བསྔལ་ནི། །
ཡུན་རིང་མི་བཟད་རྣམས་སུ་ལྟུང་། །bde 'gro yang dang yang 'ongs te/_/
bde ba mang po spyad spyad nas/_/ shi nas ngan song sdug bsngal ni/_/
yun ring mi bzad rnams su ltung /_/In his commentary Sonam Tsemo explains how this last section of the ninth chapter, from verse 157 to verse 162, covers the five main causes for why we have to constantly experience the various sufferings of conditioned life in cyclic existence.
In dependence upon the five types of rebirth, one will constantly experience attachment to saṃsāra. Why? There are five main causes:
1. The roots of suffering have not been pacified 2. One does not have the means to dispel it 3. There are many obstacles 4. It is difficult to rely on the supports 5. It is difficult to abandon its causes[67]
1. The Roots of Suffering Have Not Been Pacified
In verse 157 Śāntideva encourages us to contemplate the vast multitudes of places of rebirth in cyclic existence, referring to them as chasms or abysses. Whether in the desire, form, or formless realms, there will be both the general sufferings of samsara and the specific sufferings of each realm.
We are dragged down into these deep chasms by the ignorance that actively clings to the inherent nature of ourselves and all things. In these dark places no wisdom can be found, and from our state of ignorance spring forth all the negative emotions, which cause us to engage in negative karmic actions.
If we have not pacified this ignorance of reality and have not developed the wisdom that cuts through the root of samsara, there can be no liberation. Therefore, we must strive in every moment to try to understand emptiness.
Many are the chasms and abysses of existence, Where the truth of suchness is not found. All is contradiction, all denial; Suchness in this world is not like this.
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
སྲིད་པ་ན་ནི་གཡང་ས་མང་། །
དེར་ནི་དེ་ཉིད་མིན་འདི་འདྲ། ། དེར་ཡང་ཕན་ཚུན་འགལ་བས་ན། །
སྲིད་ན་དེ་ཉིད་འདི་འདྲ་མེད། །srid pa na ni g.yang sa mang /_/
der ni de nyid min 'di 'dra/_/ der yang phan tshun 'gal bas na/_/
srid na de nyid 'di 'dra med/_/2. One Does Not Have the Means to Dispel It
The next reason that we must continue to cycle around in samsara is that we do not have the means to prevent ourselves from being propelled into conditioned states of existence.
In verses 158 to 160, Śāntideva reminds us of how little opportunity we get to pull ourselves out of samsara. If we are born in the lower realms, there will be absolutely no chance to engage in virtue, but even if we are born in a happy state of existence where we attain a precious human rebirth, the power to be able to create virtue is weak. Life passes very fast, and this precious opportunity, though gained, can disappear in a moment.
Here, exceeding all description,
Is the shoreless sea of pain unbearable.
Here it is that strength is low,
And lives are flickering and brief.[p.160]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 159
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེར་ཡང་དཔེ་མེད་མི་བཟད་པའི། །
སྡུག་བསྔལ་རྒྱ་མཚོ་མཐའ་ལས་འདས། ། དེར་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་སྟོབས་ཆུང་ཞིང་། །
དེར་ནི་ཚེ་ཡང་ཐུང་བ་ཉིད། །der yang dpe med mi bzad pa'i/_/
sdug bsngal rgya mtsho mtha' las 'das/_/ der ni de ltar stobs chung zhing /_/
der ni tshe yang thung ba nyid/_/Śāntideva also points out to us that however long we are able to stay in one of these fortunate states, there is actually no time to practice the Dharma. Our time is taken up with so many things. Many of these are essential activities to maintain our lives and health. We need to find food to satisfy our hunger, and many hours of the day are taken up with sleep to help rest our weary bodies. Sickness and injury take up much of our time but so do associations with childish beings that end up being meaningless.
All activities for sake of life and health, Relief of hunger and of weariness, Time consumed in sleep, all accident and injury, And sterile friendships with the childish—
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེར་ཡང་གསོན་དང་ནད་མེད་ཀྱི། །
བྱེད་དང་བཀྲེས་དང་ངལ་བ་དང་། ། གཉིད་དང་འཚེ་དང་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། །
བྱིས་དང་འགྲོགས་པ་དོན་མེད་ཀྱིས། །der yang gson dang nad med kyi/_/
byed dang bkres dang ngal ba dang /_/ gnyid dang 'tshe dang de bzhin du/_/
byis dang 'grogs pa don med kyis/_/Life passes quickly, and mostly without any deeper meaning. It is so hard to find any opportunity to investigate the deeper nature of reality, which is our only means to reverse the process of cyclic existence. Our efforts to contemplate and meditate on emptiness are weak, distraction draws away our attention from what is important, and our unstable lives can end at any moment.
Thus life passes quickly, meaningless. True discernment—hard it is to have! How therefore shall we ever find the means To curb the futile wanderings of the mind?
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ཚེ་ནི་དོན་མེད་མྱུར་འདའ་ཡི* འདའ་ཡིས་ in the source text. ། །
རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྙེད་པར་དཀའ། ། དེར་ཡང་རྣམ་གཡེང་གོམས་པ་ནི། །
བཟློག་པའི་ཐབས་ནི་ག་ལ་ཡོད། །tshe ni don med myur 'da' yi* 'da' yis [ in the source text. ] /_/
rnam dpyod shin tu rnyed par dka'/_/ der yang rnam g.yeng goms pa ni/_/
bzlog pa'i thabs ni ga la yod/_/3. There Are Many Obstacles
In verses 161 and 162, Śāntideva highlights the fact that because there are many obstacles, attaining liberation is extremely hard. Not only are there negative external forces that may try to work against us, especially when we choose the way of virtue, but there are also many false spiritual paths that may lead us astray. Most of these trails lead us to views of eternalism or nihilism, and we have to come to certainty that this path that Śāntideva is revealing to us is the pure and unmistaken one.
Further, evil forces work and strain To cast us down into the states of woe; Manifold are false, deceptive trails, And it is hard to dissipate our doubts.
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེར་ཡང་ངན་སོང་ཆེན་པོར་ནི། །
ལྷུང་ཕྱིར་བདུད་ནི་བརྩོན་པར་[p.124]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
der yang ngan song chen por ni/_/
lhung phyir bdud ni brtson par [p.124]Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa (1990)
Slob dpon zhi ba lha and Mkhan po kun dpal. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtsa ba dang 'grel pa. Khreng tu'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1990.
We may have many doubts about which is the right path, doubts about what needs to be done on the path and where it leads, and it is difficult to find the right conditions to remove these doubts.
In the following passage from his commentary, Khenpo Kunpal remarks on how people these days are taken with the novelty and excitement of modern spiritual paths and lack a respect and love for the ancient texts:
Nowadays, people love novelty and thus neglect the ancient texts, excellent and pure though they be, liking only what is new. But among the recent texts, there are some that are genuine and some false, and it is difficult to discern the goal and point of view of a genuine teaching from a false one—it is difficult to have certainty, unclouded by doubt. And even if a teaching is authentic, if it is practiced with doubt, it will be fruitless and without meaning. It is thus hard to have a true discernment.[68]
He agrees that there are genuine texts among those within the modern tradition, but it is very hard to discern which ones those are, and so it is easy to be beset with doubt. And with doubt we find it hard to get any concrete result, however sincerely we strive to engage in our Dharma practice.
4. It Is Difficult to Rely on the Supports
We also find it hard to gain liberation because the personal support of our precious human rebirth and the external support of the enlightened beings are so hard to find.
In the first two lines of verse 162, Śāntideva reminds us of how hard it is to find again such a state of freedom where we can practice, a state which is characterized by the eight freedoms and ten endowments. Even if we are blessed with this precious opportunity, he also explains the difficulty of finding one crucial external support that is necessary for us to be able to wholeheartedly follow the path—that is, genuinely enlightened teachers.
Hard it is to find again this state of freedom, Harder yet to come upon enlightened teachers, (9.162ab)[69]
5. It Is Difficult to Abandon Its Causes
The last two lines of verse 162 explain how difficult it is to escape from the raging torrent of our afflictions. The causes of our continued rebirth in samsara are the whole range of our negative emotions—craving and clinging, attachment, anger, lack of awareness, and underpinning them all, wrong views and ignorance. We are swept away by these states of mind, and Śāntideva remarks on how difficult it is to turn back this tide.
Hard, indeed, to turn aside the torrent of defilement! Alas, our sorrows fall in endless streams! (9.162.cd)[70]
In verses 163 and 164, Śāntideva explains how beings do not even realize what kind of sufferings they are going through. Afloat in the sea of cyclic existence, passing from one suffering state to another, beings are completely unaware of the reality of their situation. Indeed, they often feel the opposite way, looking on things which are contaminated by the afflictions and ignorance as though they are pleasant and a source of happiness. They have no understanding of what conduct to adopt and what to cast aside. "Alas," cries Śāntideva, "How terrible it is that beings do not understand the terrible condition they are in."
Alas indeed that living beings, Carried on the flood of bitter pain, However terrible their plight may be, Do not perceive they suffer so!
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཡང་། །
རང་སྡུག་མི་མཐོང་གང་ཡིན་པ། ། སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཆུ་བོར་གནས་འདི་དག །
ཀྱི་ཧུད་མྱ་ངན་བྱ་བར་འོས། །de ltar shin tu sdug bsngal yang /_/
rang sdug mi mthong gang yin pa/_/ sdug bsngal chu bor gnas 'di dag_/
kyi hud mya ngan bya bar 'os/_/Here, Śāntideva also critiques the followers of some religious traditions and their practices, those who believe that extreme ascetic practices such as prolonged exposure to excessive heat or cold or bathing in the sacred rivers are the path to liberation. Although these practices do not lead to the desired result, because of their attachment to them they are happy to endure them, and they even consider them pleasant.
They are like those who bathe themselves repeatedly And then proceed to scorch themselves with fire. They suffer greatly in this way, Yet there they stay, proclaiming loud their bliss.
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དཔེར་ན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡང་ཡང་ཁྲུས། །
བྱས་ཏེ་ཡང་ཡང་མེར་འཇུག་པ། ། དེ་ལྟར་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་བར། །
གནས་ཀྱང་བདག་ཉིད་བདེར་རློམ་བཞིན། །dper na 'ga' zhig yang yang khrus/_/
byas te yang yang mer 'jug pa/_/ de ltar shin tu sdug bsngal bar/_/
gnas kyang bdag nyid bder rlom bzhin/_/Most of us carry on our lives as though old age and death will never come to us. But it won't be long before we have to pass away and we have to face our future. If we have been too lazy to engage in virtue and counteract our negative emotions, we will easily be led after death to a rebirth in terrible states.
Likewise there are some who live and act
As though old age and death will never come to them.
But first they’re slain and then there comes
The dreadful fall into the states of loss.[p.161]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
Page(s) 160
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་རྒ་དང་འཆི་མེད་པ། །
བཞིན་དུ་སྤྱོད་པས་གནས་རྣམས་ལ། ། དང་པོ་ཉིད་དུ་བསད་བྱས་ནས། །
ངན་སོང་ལྟུང་བ་མི་བཟད་འོང་། །de ltar rga dang 'chi med pa/_/
bzhin du spyod pas gnas rnams la/_/ dang po nyid du bsad byas nas/_/
ngan song ltung ba mi bzad 'ong /_/Great Compassion in Relation to Benefiting Others
Having revealed to us the path of bodhicitta and wisdom, and having highlighted the terrible state that ordinary beings find themselves in, to conclude the ninth chapter on cultivating this priceless realization of suchness, verses 166 and 167 speak of the two main wings of the bodhisattva path, compassion and wisdom. Here, it references the two great accumulations—the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of wisdom.
In verse 166 Śāntideva is overcome by the wish to pacify the sufferings of all beings trapped in samsara. He asks himself, "When will the time come when I will be able to put out the fires of others' suffering?" In a form of dedication, he wishes from his heart that the rains of bliss which pour forth from the clouds of all his accumulated merit may rain down on the terrible flames of beings' suffering, extinguishing them forever. This verse specifically refers to the accumulation of merit from the method side of practice, through practices such as generosity and ethical discipline.
When shall I be able to allay and quench The dreadful heat of suffering’s blazing fires With plenteous rains of my own bliss That pour torrential from my clouds of merit?
Page(s) 161
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
དེ་ལྟར་སྡུག་བསྔལ་མེས་གདུངས་ལ། །
བསོད་ནམས་སྤྲིན་ལས་ལེགས་བྱུང་བའི། ། རང་གི་བདེ་བའི་ཚོགས་ཆར་གྱིས། །
ཞི་བྱེད་པར་བདག་ནམ་ཞིག་འགྱུར། །de ltar sdug bsngal mes gdungs la/_/
bsod nams sprin las legs byung ba'i/_/ rang gi bde ba'i tshogs char gyis/_/
zhi byed par bdag nam zhig 'gyur/_/Following Śāntideva's example, Gyaltsap Je explains how we must sincerely cultivate this great compassion from deep in our hearts.
When will I become someone that pacifies the sufferings of the lower realms with medicine, food and the like? That which are parts of my collection of happiness, built up from clouds of merits built up by generosity and so forth. How wonderful would it be if sentient beings were free from suffering? May they be free from suffering. May I bring about that freedom.[71]
In verse 86 of his Commentary on Bodhicitta, Nāgārjuna explains that this sense of compassion for beings should be so strong that we are willing to give up the most refined and blissful states of meditative concentration and to instead plunge headlong into the worst of the hellish states.
When through practice it becomes firm, Then alarmed by other's suffering, The [bodhisattvas] renounce the bliss of concentration And plunge even to the depths of relentless hells.[72]
In the last verse of the chapter, Śāntideva speaks of his continual wish to pacify the mistaken clinging that all living beings possess, the belief in an inherent self and inherent phenomena. He again asks himself, "When will I reveal this truth of emptiness to those beings who suffer in cyclic existence because of their belief in intrinsic existence?" This verse refers to the accumulation of wisdom, which comes from studying, contemplation, and meditation on the ultimate nature of phenomena.
My wealth of merit gathered in, With reverence but without conceptual target, When shall I reveal this truth of emptiness To those who go to ruin through belief in real existence?
Page(s) 161
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
ནམ་ཞིག་དམིགས་པ་མེད་ཚུལ་དུ། །
གུས་པས་བསོད་ནམས་ཚོགས་བསགས་ཏེ། ། དམིགས་པས་ཕུང་བར་འགྱུར་རྣམས་ལ། །
སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ནི་སྟོན་པར་འགྱུར། །nam zhig dmigs pa med tshul du/_/
gus pas bsod nams tshogs bsags te/_/ dmigs pas phung bar 'gyur rnams la/_/
stong pa nyid ni ston par 'gyur/_/Gyaltsap Je summarizes how we meditate on the union of calm abiding and special insight as follows:
In short, one should meditate on the mode of abiding in dependence on calm abiding. Further, because the 'I' of the thought 'I' is established as merely labeled in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently, it does not exist intrinsically, it is not established in the slightest in an independent mode. Therefore, the existent person is merely posited in name, it exists only as labeled and in a dependent mode. Hence, take to heart, 'It does not exist inherently'.[73]
Having understood the way things exist and how ignorance of the nature of reality traps beings in the continual cycle of suffering in samsara, we should then develop the strong wish to reveal this truth of emptiness to all beings, that they may cultivate that understanding and themselves attain the highest state of enlightenment.
The Results of Practice
At the very end of his commentary entitled A Step-by-Step Guide to Meditating on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Patrul Rinpoche discusses the result of practicing in the way outlined in Śāntideva's text.
By seeing the relative to be a mere display like a magical illusion or the experiences of a dream, we will train in vast enlightened activity in which the seven kinds of attachment are relinquished. And with the understanding that on the ultimate level all things and events lack even so much as an atom's worth of true existence, we will take this practice to heart without becoming attached to anything whatsoever.
May the Dharma, suffering's only cure, And the source of all real happiness, Always be valued and respected, And remain long into the future!
This was spoken by Ragged Abu. May all be virtuous and auspicious![74]
Understanding that all phenomena lack even an atom of intrinsic existence, knowing things to exist merely as a magical illusion, and dropping any kind of attachment, we head out onto the path of the Buddhadharma, which leads to the state of full enlightenment.
Notes
- ↑ Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra, by Śāntideva (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006), 137.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 137.
- ↑ Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech: A Detailed Commentary on Shantideva's Way of the Bodhisattva, by Kunzang Pelden (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2010), 351.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 147.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 147.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 353.
- ↑ There is a longer discussion of this in Khenpo Kunpal's commentary. See Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 353.
- ↑ Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Jamgön Mipham (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2002), 76.
- ↑ 14th Dalai Lama, Practicing Wisdom: The Perfection of Shantideva's Bodhisattva Way, trans. and ed. Geshe Thupten Jinpa (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2005), 106.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 355–56.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Introduction to the Middle Way, 79.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 357.
- ↑ See sūtra 22 in Maurice Walshe, trans., The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 335.
- ↑ Thānissaro Bhikkhu, The Establishing of Mindfulness Discourse, Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10), Dhammatalks.org, https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/MN/MN10.html.
- ↑ Adrian O'Sullivan, trans., Bodhicaryāvatāra with Commentary (Los Angeles: Dechen Foundation, 2019), 389.
- ↑ 14th Dalai Lama, Practicing Wisdom, 109.
- ↑ Pema Karpo, A Lamp for the Middle Way: A Commentary on the Bodhisattvacharyavatara, Spyod 'jug gi 'bru 'grel dbu ma'i lam gyi sgron ma (Kathmandu: Shree Gautam Buddha Vihara, 2017), 104 (e-book), https://dharmacloud.tsadra.org/library/?post_types=book,book_author&search-terms=A+Lamp+for+the+Middle+Way:+A+Commentary+on+the+Bodhisattvacharyavatara&subjects=any&view=list/.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 357.
- ↑ Verse 126ab reads:
Those who hold the permanence of particles
Were indeed refuted earlier.
See Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 155. - ↑ Thrangu Rinpoche, Shantideva's A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life: Commentary by Venerable Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, trans. Ken Holmes, Katia Holmes, and Thomas Doctor (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2016), 211.
- ↑ See Ngul Chu Thokme Zangpo, An Ocean of Excellent Explanation: A Commentary on Entering into the Conduct of the Bodhisattva, Byang chub sems spa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rtsa ba dang 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rya mtsho (Varanasi: Sakya Students Union, 2003), 343. The translation of Nāgārjuna's verse here is from the Padmakara Translation Group. See Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way: The Mulamadhyamakakarika, by Nagarjuna (Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2016), 48.
- ↑ Thokme Zangpo, Ocean of Excellent Explanation, 114.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 361.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 151.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 151.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 151.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 151.
- ↑ Geshe Yeshe Tobden, The Way of Awakening: A Commentary on Shantideva's Bodhicaryavatara, trans. Manu Bazzano and Sarita Doveton, ed. Fiorella Rizzi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2005), 327.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 152.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 152.
- ↑ Jay L. Garfield, trans., The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 22.
- ↑ Pema Karpo, Lamp for the Middle Way, 107 (e-book), https://dharmacloud.tsadra.org/library/?post_types=book,book_author&search-terms=A+Lamp+for+the+Middle+Way:+A+Commentary+on+the+Bodhisattvacharyavatara&subjects=any&view=list/.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 366.
- ↑ Fedor Stracke, trans., The Entrance for the Children of the Conquerors - A Commentary on the Introduction to the Actions of Bodhisattvas. Chapter Nine: The Way of Training in the Wisdom, by Gyaltsab Je (N.p.: Happy Monks Publication, 2016 ), 58. Note that the pagination starts over for every chapter in Stracke's translation.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 369.
- ↑ Helena Blankleder, Wulstan Fletcher, and Stephen Gethin (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries on the Ninth Chapter of Shantideva's Bodhicharyavatara, Khenchen Kunzang Palden's The Nectar of Mañjushri's Speech and Minyak Kunzang Sönam's The Brilliant Torch (Saint Léon sur Vézère, France: Editions Padmakara, 1999), 224.
- ↑ Blankleder, Fletcher, and Gethin, Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries, 224.
- ↑ Geshe Thupten Jinpa, trans., A Commentary on the Awakening Mind (Bodhicittavivaraṇa), by Nāgārjuna (Montreal: Institute of Tibetan Classics, 2007), 4–5, PDF, https://tibetanclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Awakening-Mind-Commentary.pdf
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, 47.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 371.
- ↑ See Adam Pearcey, trans., Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way (Lotsawa House, 2005), https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/mipham/four-great-logical-arguments.
- ↑ See O'Sullivan, Bodhicaryāvatāra with Commentary, 416. We have not been able to locate the original source of this verse.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 154.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 154.
- ↑ Blankleder, Fletcher, and Gethin, Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries, 229.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 374.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 155.
- ↑ Verse 86 reads:
These parts themselves will break down into particles,
And particles divide according to direction.
These fragments, too, lack partless parts; they are like space.
Thus even particles have no existence.
See Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 149. - ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 155.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 156.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 156.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 156.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 156.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 157.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 157.
- ↑ Blankleder, Fletcher, and Gethin, Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries, 243.
- ↑ Blankleder, Fletcher, and Gethin, Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries, 245. For the verse in Nāgārjuna, see Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā (Stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa zhes bya ba), in Derge Tengyur D3827, dbu ma, vol. 96, fol. 24b.1–2, purl.bdrc.io/resource/MW23703_3827.
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Bodhicaryāvatāra with Commentary, 444.
- ↑ Stracke, Entrance for the Children: Chapter Nine, 75, https://happymonkspublication.org/product/bodhisattvacharyavatara-chapter-1-10-commentary/.
- ↑ Timothy Hinkle (Dharmachakra Translation Committee), trans., The Questions of Sāgaramati, Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā, Toh 152 (84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha, 2023), https://read.84000.co/translation/UT22084-058-001.html#UT22084-058-001-1164.
- ↑ Thomas Doctor (Dharmachakra Translation Committee), trans., The Jewel Cloud, Ratnamegha, Toh 231 (84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha, 2024), https://read.84000.co/translation/UT22084-064-001.html#UT22084-064-001-97.
- ↑ Benjamin Ewing (Dharmachakra Translation Committee), trans., The Questions of the Nāga King Anavatapta, Anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchā, Toh 156 (84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha, 2024), https://84000.co/translation/toh156#UT22084-058-005-308.
- ↑ Jinpa, Commentary on the Awakening Mind, 4–5, https://tibetanclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Awakening-Mind-Commentary.pdf
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Bodhicaryāvatāra with Commentary, 447.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 159.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 159.
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Bodhicaryāvatāra with Commentary, 450.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, 387.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 160.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, Way of the Bodhisattva, 160.
- ↑ Stracke, Entrance for the Children: Chapter Nine, 82, https://research.tsadra.org/img_auth.php/9/9c/Stracke_Fedor_trans_2016_The_Entrance_for_the_Children_of_the_Conquerors_Happy_Monk_Publication.pdf.
- ↑ Jinpa, Commentary on the Awakening Mind, 9, https://tibetanclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Awakening-Mind-Commentary.pdf.
- ↑ Stracke, Entrance for the Children: Chapter Nine, 82, https://research.tsadra.org/img_auth.php/9/9c/Stracke_Fedor_trans_2016_The_Entrance_for_the_Children_of_the_Conquerors_Happy_Monk_Publication.pdf.
- ↑ Adam Pearcey, trans., The Brightly Shining Sun, by Patrul Rinpoche (Lotsawa House, 2019), https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/patrul-rinpoche/bodhicharyavatara-brightly-shining-sun.
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