Selfhood and the Metaphysics of Altruism

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Descriptionངོ་སྤྲོད།

Abstract

Altruistic and greater-good considerations are not only fundamental aspects of ethical maturity, but also a basic means for coming to know each other. Rational egoism (the view that practical rationality requires some form of personal pay-off for the goal-driven agent) is not so easily snubbed, nor has it fallen terribly out of fashion in the social sciences and economics. I argue that it is not a truism that altruism is less natural than egocentrism for an ordinary self. It is false. I aim to reconceive the problem that altruistic considerations seem less rational than justified, egocentric considerations. I conclude that the self can identify with subjectivity as such, and thereby advance the interests of a "we-self." While epistemically distant, the "we-self" is ontologically prior to the ego.
I conceive the problem in terms of a central distinction in Indian philosophy; the distinction between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and either a bundle of property tropes (as we find in schools of Buddhist philosophy), or a persisting synthesizer of experiences that is not solely identified as "this body" (as we find in Monistic-Śaivism). For Mādhyamika-Buddhist thinkers like Śāntideva (c. 8th century C.E.), an error-theory of self provides good reasons for altruism. I argue that this is logically unconvincing. In chapter 3, I appropriate Levinas’s discussion of the Other/other to develop a Buddhist-inspired, Emptiness Ethics. However, I dismantle this in chapter 4, where I appeal to aspectual metaphysics, particularly, the notion of composition as identity (CAI), to clarify not only the rational status of other-centric considerations, but the very possibility of acting on such considerations.
In chapter 4, I offer a Śaivist-inspired solution to the problem of other minds. Borrowing from Abhinavagupta (c. 10th-11th century C.E.), I contend that the possibility of identifying with and acting for a larger whole lies in recognizing ourselves as both individuals and others (bhedābheda). I develop this by showing how normativity and a concept of selfhood go hand in hand; and, furthermore, the reflexivity of consciousness allows us to recognize a self that is not limited to only practical and narrative identities, but to self as such.

Citation

Maroufkhani, Kevin Perry. "Selfhood and the Metaphysics of Altruism." PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, Manoa, 2017.

Table of contents

ABSTRACTiii
INTRODUCTION:
AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITYiv-xxiv

CHAPTER 1 SELFHOOD AND ETHICAL AGENCY: OWNING MORAL SELFLESSNESS

1.1 Introduction1-7
1.2 Self-talk and Practical Deliberations: The Gap Between Self and Other8-20
1.3.1 Conceiving Moral Selflessness: Unselfish Egocentricity20-33
1.3.2 Non-egocentricity, Unselfishness, and Other-regarding Considerations34-37

CHAPTER 2 SELFLESSNESS AND NORMATIVITY: ŚĀNTIDEVA AND EMPTINESS ETHICS

2.1 Introduction38-47
2.2 Ownership and No-Self Views47-55
2.3 Ownership and Individuation: Varieties of Selflessness55-62
2.4 Bodhicaryāvatāra: Altruism, Egoism, and Utility62-67
2.5 Bodhicaryāvatāra: Altruism and the Anātman Dilemma67-89
2.6 Toward Ownership and Other-centricity89-92

CHAPTER 3 BEING OTHER THAN MYSELF: DEFENDING AN ETHICS OF SELFLESSNESS

3.1 Introduction93-98
3.2.1 Anticipating My Future: How to Treat Myself as Other98-101
3.2.2 The Continuant Other: Good Reasons to Care About My Surrogate (Non)-Self102-107
3.3.1 Ego-Tunnels and Madhyamaka: The Ethics and Consolation of Simulated (Non)-Selves108-120
3.3.2 Madhyamaka, Ego-Tunnels, and Altruism:
- Seeing the World as a Spectrum of Graded Concerns for the Other120-132
3.4 Does the Existence of a Self Make Any Practical Difference?132-147
3.5 Madhyamaka as Borderless and Constructed Care for the (Non)-Self147-155

CHAPTER 4 EXALTED ALTRUISM AND MEREOLOGICAL HOLISM

4.1 Introduction156-162
4.2 The Normative Self162-168
4.3 Selves as "Ownerless" Owners: Revisiting Sidgwick's Ethical Dilemma168-181
4.4 Two Chief Claims to Defend182-190
4.5.1 The Practical Inadequacies of the Anātman Thesis: Critique of Chapter 3190-192
4.5.2 Numerical Distinction and the Egoist’s Strategy193-196
4.5.3 Motivating Ethical Egoism197-208
4.5.4 A Rationally Reconstructed Buddhist Response209-220
4.6 Momentariness and the Problem of Other Persons in Dharmakīrti: An Advaita-Śaivite Response220-229
4.7.1 The Problem of Inferring Other Minds, And the Possibility of Sharing a World229-232
4.7.2 Mereological Holism and Other Minds:
- A Metaphysical Solution to the Problem of Unity in Diversity (Bhedābheda)232-242
4.8.1 Self and Other Minds…a Bridge to Motivated Altruism242-248
4.8.2 "Guessing" the Existence of Other Minds: A Śaivite Account of Reaching Common Ground248-256

CONCLUSION257-265

BIBLIOGRAPHY266-269

Interconnections

Works related to this item

1 Contains chapter or part

Maroufkhani, Kevin Perry. "Selflessness and Normativity: Śāntideva and Emptiness Ethics." Chap. 2 in Selfhood and the Metaphysics of Altruism, PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, Manoa, 2017.

Articles2017About this item

Kevin Maroufkhani examines Śāntideva's claim that we can become altruists, arguing that metaphysical selflessness is consistent with some forms of practical selfishness.