Emptiness and Moral Perfection

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Descriptionངོ་སྤྲོད།

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Buddhism not only offers a system of ethics, it is fundamentally concerned with human conduct in the most ample meaning of the word. Buddhism did face the basic problems of moral axiology, both in its early and late speculations, although its method and vocabulary are different from that of the Western philosopher. Moreover, it is in this fact that we find one of the distinctive characteristics of Buddhism among the Indian systems of salvation. Specially in contrast to the Vedantins, with whom the Buddhists share many common traits in the order of metaphysics, Buddhism places value above being, existence above essence, function above structure.
      It is in the realm of ethics that we find Buddhism's great contribution to Indian thought. The Four Noble Truths, for instance, formulated in clear opposition to the amoralistic speculations of the age, do not represent a mere statement of dogma or metaphysics, rather, they constitute one of the first expressions of ethical theory in the history of philosophy.
      Yet, in spite of the evident fact that Buddhism taught a positive moral and ethical doctrine, the accusation of nihilism has been cast against Buddhism ever since its beginnings. More than once Gautama had to reaffirm his position of a middle way between nihilism and realism, moral and metaphysical.[1] In fact, avoiding these two extremes was the main philosophical problem of Buddhism. The question was always "how can we deny 'own-existence' (svabhāva)[2] without falling into nihilism."
      Perhaps the latter schools were more often led by dogmatical considerations than by any sincere interest in safeguarding ethical values; the main issue was, then, not how to insure salvation, but rather how to secure orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the problem of the metaphysical justification of the path would always remain the avowed purpose of all philosophical speculation; thus, beyond the complicated question of orthodoxy, and at a more immediate and fundamental level, would lie the problem of ethics and salvation.
      Although ethics is often identified with morality, it would not be pertinent to the purpose of this article to clarify the doctrine of morality (śīla), that is, particular problems regarding rules of conduct. The issue is the foundation for the necessity of ethics, or, rather, of human perfection (pāramitā). The problem may be stated summarily as follows: how can perfection be necessary, or at all possible, without a substance and essence of the human subject (ātman)? There seems to be a radical contradiction between the doctrine of nonself, or, even more, that of emptiness, and any possible moral obligation.[3] (Gomez, preliminary remarks, 361–2)

Notes

1 Cf., for example, Aṅguttara-Nikāya IV.174, 180, 182 ff.
svabhāva, "own-becoming" or ("self-existence," the term's extension includes the supposed referents of our terms substance, essence, nature, character. I have translated it literally rather than using an inappropriate equivalent. For a discussion of this term and ample references, see Jacques May, Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti: douze chapitres. (Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1959), p. 324, note 328. For the Aristotelian concept of ousía (ovoia), which is probably closer to svabhāva than the medieval substance, cf. Metaphysics, V.8, VII.1-6, 16-17.
The paradox involved in the simultaneous assertion of nairātmya and karmaphala was first pointed out in the West by Hendrik Kern in his Manual of Indian Buddhism (1896) (Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1968), pp. 49-50, the problem has been discussed in detail by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his papers "La negation de l'ame et la doctrine de l'acte" (JA, Sept.-Oct., no. 20 (1902): 237-306) and "Nouvelles recherches sur la doctrine de l'acte" (JA, Nov.-Dec., no. 2 (1903): pp. 357–450.

Citation

Gómez, Luis O. "Emptiness and Moral Perfection." Philosophy East and West 23, no. 3 (1973): 361-73.

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