Resentment and Reality: Buddhism on Moral Responsibility

Journal Article

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Descriptionངོ་སྤྲོད།

No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Buddhists have always been interested in freedom, but only recently have they begun to think about free will. Concepts closely related to freedom—spontaneity, independence, self-mastery—have been central to Buddhism since its beginnings. Serious Buddhist reflection on the problem of free will and determinism, however, is a product of dialogue between Asian and Western cultures. Unfortunately, this dialogue has barely begun, and very little is known about what a Buddhist position on free will might be like. Thus Galen Strawson has argued[1] that at least "certain schools of Buddhists" are committed to the non-existence of free will and the incoherence of moral responsibility. Mark Siderits, meanwhile, claims[2] that at least "early Buddhists" are, or should be, defenders of a particular kind of compatibilism. And Paul Griffiths asserts[3] that Buddhism involves a version of libertarianism. We can hardly expect to compare two traditions when one of them is as badly understood, from a philosophical point of view, as Buddhism still is.
Although Buddhist scriptures and philosophical texts never explicitly confront the issue of free will, at least in the form in which we know it, there are passages in various of these texts that deal with related issues. These passages, taken from a number of texts that differ greatly in other ways, can be used to construct a Buddhist position about the problem of free will. This view about free will stems from deep features of Buddhist thought that are largely held in common by different articulations of the tradition. Therefore, most or all philosophers in the highly diverse Buddhist tradition would probably have been prepared to agree with it. This position is importantly different from what most Western thinkers say, but it doesn't represent an entirely new answer to the problem. Rather, Buddhist writers describe a way to live with the practical consequences of the absence of free will. As Strawson repeatedly points out, Western thinkers who have denied the reality of free will have continued to apply notions of moral responsibility in their own lives. Their practice is thus inescapably inconsistent with their theory. By drawing on Buddhist ideas, however, it is possible to develop a view on which perfect people do not ascribe moral responsibility. (Goodman, introductory remarks, 359)

Notes

Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 117-120.
Mark Siderits, "Beyond Compatibilism: A Buddhist Approach to Freedom and Determinism," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (April 1987), pp. 149-159, at p. 149.
Paul J. Griffiths, "Notes Toward a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory," Religious Studies, vol. 18 (1982), pp. 277-291.

Citation

Goodman, Charles. "Resentment and Reality: Buddhism on Moral Responsibility." American Philosophical Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2002): 359-72.