The Connection between Ontology and Ethics in Madhyamaka Thought
Description
Can we reach conclusions about how people should act from premises about how things are? Prima facie the Madhyamaka attempts to do just this in trying to move from the factual to the normative via the theory of emptiness. Scholars in the Madhyamaka tradition argue that because persons are insubstantial (pudgalanairātmya) and things other than persons are insubstantial as well (dharmanairātmya), unwholesome mental attitudes like attachment and aversion are without bases, since ultimately there is neither craver nor craved, nor a subject feeling aversion or a thing felt aversion toward, and for that reason actions motivated by such mental attitudes should not be performed.
Paul Williams has raised the point—using the conceptual framework of the two truths—that we would still want to assume that persons and things are conventionally real (even though ultimately unreal), rather than assuming that they do not exist at all (neither conventionally nor ultimately).[1] But this leaves unexplained why an insubstantial self cannot be the subject of attachment and aversion anymore—such attitudes do not seem to depend on holding some kind of ātman-like view of the self. Or, to rephrase the problem slightly: most neuroscientists nowadays agree that there is no "pearl" in the mind, neither an anatomical nor a functional locus of control in the brain, no Cartesian theater where it all comes together. Most people know that a Rolex watch is just a compound of atoms and some (depending on their interpretation of quantum mechanics) might even believe that all these atoms are ultimately mind-dependent. Yet belief in these facts is generally not deemed to be incompatible with attachment to one’s own self or to one's Rolex watch.
The discussion between Williams and the Mādhyamaka thus revolves around two senses of self of different strength. The first, which we are going to refer to as the Self, corresponds to the idea of an ātman in Classical Indian philosophy.[2] It is a permanent, unitary substance transmigrating from life to life that constitutes the foundation of our personal identity. The second sense of self, we will call this the person, is an altogether less demanding affair.[3] It is neither permanent (though it persists for some extended period of time) nor substantial, depending on a variety of physical and mental factors for its existence. The person is, in short, what our conventional sense of self refers to, a dependent and impermanent entity, yet something that is nevertheless real. Williams argues that Śāntideva's argument is exclusively directed against the Self, not against the person. Madhyamaka reasoning, Williams claims, leaves the person untouched, something which is, after all, a good thing, since the denial of the person would have disastrous consequences for the project of a bodhisattva ethics. Yet while a person is in place, it is unclear why our familiar set of selfish attitudes supposedly directed toward the Self cannot just be redirected toward the person.
Possible Connections Between No-Self Theory and Ethics
In order to assess this argument, it is necessary to provide a closer examination of the relation between ontological and ethical thought in Madhyamaka.[4] We will focus in particular on the question whether the conventional existence of a self is a necessary pre-condition for Mahäyäna ethical practice. (Westerhoff, introduction, 203–4)
Notes
- For further discussion of Williams's argument, see Chapters 6, 7, and 12 of this volume.
- For a comparative discussion of Śāntideva's ethics and a Classical Indian theory that incorporates such an ātman (Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta), see Todd (2013).
- For the sake of brevity we shall use the term self as shorthand for "Self or person."
- See also Chapters 2,7, 8, and 9 in this volume.
