Theory and Comparison in the Discussion of Buddhist Ethics

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Descriptionངོ་སྤྲོད།

No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Comparisons, and by that I mean the hunt for essential similarities or at least serious family resemblances, between the ethical views of Western and non-Western thinkers have been a staple of comparative philosophy for quite some time now. Some of these comparisons, such as between the views of Aristotle and Confucius, seem especially apt and revealing. However, I've often wondered whether Western "ethical theory" - virtue ethics, deontology, or consequentialism - is always the best lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought. Particularly when the discussion has turned to Buddhism and Buddhist ethics, theories of this sort at best seem to have an uncertain application.
       This is not to say that individual philosophers have not tried and such comparisons have not been made. Although I am unaware of a serious comparison between Buddhism and Kantian-style deontological ethics, there have been some notable attempts to portray the tradition as either a variant of virtue ethics on the one hand or some kind of utilitarianism on the other. Damien Keown is a good example in his attempt to apply natural law theory and a teleological virtue ethic to the Theravāda tradition in Buddhism as an explanation of its ethics.[1] And recently, Charles Goodman has suggested that at least the Mahāyāna tradition of Sāntideva or Asaṅga suggests a consequentialist approach.[2] There have no doubt been many others.
       Of course, the theory approach sits side by side with less reductionist approaches. For example, William LaFleur's book on Japanese Buddhism's take on abortion represents another kind of view.[3] In that book, drawing on Jeffrey Stouťs ideas, he argues that Buddhism adopts what can be called "moral bricolage" that is, a strategy of piecing together one's ethical perspective out of the bits and pieces, the "folk ethics," of one's culture and its history of defusing moral dilemmas.[4] A number of other scholars, such as David Kalupahana or Christopher Ives, tend to focus on what they regard as unique to the Buddhist tradition, and although they make comparisons, they are rather limited ones for limited illustrative purposes - usually to show a contrast rather than a similarity.[5]
       Naturally, the question as to which approach is correct arises in one's mind. Do we side with the theory approach or what I will call the "indigenous" approach? Does Buddhism bring something unique to the table, perhaps stretching the way in which we think about ethics generally? Or does Buddhism represent a variant, perhaps a unique and informative one, of a cluster of approaches? Does it stand alone or in a theoretical family?
       This essay is an attempt to answer these questions, but not exactly by directly tackling Buddhist ethics and offering another comprehensive account of its ethics. I will speak about what I consider to be its unique elements, but that alone does not settle the theory-versus-indigenous question. For that, one has to examine the nature of the various theories to see whether they at least exhibit the same spirit of approach endemic to Buddhism. I will argue that, by and large, they do not. However, I will also argue that Buddhism is not necessarily unique, either in terms of its theoretical aspirations or in terms of the question that it primarily aims to answer. Both of these areas have able representatives in the arena of analytic ethics today, although that is probably as far as any comparison goes. I leave it an open question whether the Buddhist or the contemporary analytic views that I will reference offer the more contemporaneously illuminating approach. (Barnhart, introduction, 16–17)

Notes

See Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1992). However, for much of my actual discussions of Keown's views, I rely on his book Buddhism and Bioethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), where he both distills and applies his earlier work.
Charles Goodman, "Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahãyãna Ethics," Philosophy East and West 58 (1 ) (2008): 1 7-35.
William R. LaFleur, Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
See ibid., pp. 12-13.
See specifically Christopher Ives, Zen Awakening and Society (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), and David J. Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995).

Citation

Barnhart, Michael G. "Theory and Comparison in the Discussion of Buddhist Ethics." Philosophy East and West 62 , no. 1 (2012): 16–43.