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In his master's thesis, Fredrik Liland explores the transmission and influence of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' in China and Mongolia. He examines the Chinese translation of the text during the Sòng dynasty and highlights the related political context and translation processes. His study analyzes the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''<i>'</i>s limited impact in China due to various factors ranging from a lack of interest in new Buddhist ideas to linguistic challenges. Liland then shifts his focus to Mongolia, where the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' became highly influential, detailing its introduction through Tibetan influence and discussing Čosgi Odser's Mongolian translation in 1305 CE.
Liland's short comparative study offers valuable insights into the transmission of Buddhist texts across cultures and the varied reception of important works. It shows how political, cultural, and linguistic factors can influence the adoption and impact of religious texts. The detailed presentation of the Chinese translation process illustrates the complexities involved in the cross-cultural transmission of Buddhist ideas. By contrasting the text's limited influence in China with its significant impact in Mongolia, the article demonstrates the complex interplay between religious texts and their cultural contexts, making it a valuable resource for scholars of Buddhist studies, comparative religion, and cultural history, as well as for Buddhist practitioners interested in the history of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
One finds in Mahāyāna Buddhist ''sūtra'' literature occasional reference to rituals performed by those who followed the bodhisattva path. One of the most interesting and important of these is that known as ''Triskandha'' or ''Triskandhaka'', the practice in three parts, which is described in the ''Ugraparipṛccha Sūtra'' and the ''Vinayaviniścaya-upāliparipṛcchā'', two early texts belonging to the ''Mahāratnakūṭa'' collection of sūtras in the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist canons.[1]<br> The "three-part rite" is mentioned twice by Śāntideva in his ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'',[2] and it is primarily through this well-known work that the ritual has come to the attention of Western scholars of Buddhism. Śāntideva names the ritual at the end of his long quotation from the ''Upāliparipṛcchā'' (Bendall, 169-171; Bendall and Rouse, 165-167). The quotation contains the Upāli's version of the ritual, and the Upāli itself refers to the ritual by name, the ''Triskandha'' (Python, 107). Śāntideva refers to the ritual again in his chapter on increasing good conduct, citing the ''Ugraparipṛcchā'' as the source (Bendall, 290; Bendall and Rouse, 263-264). Śāntideva reports that the UPP says the ''Triskandha'' is to be performed three times a day and three times a night. The three practices to be performed are confession of sin (''pāpadeśanā''), rejoicing at merit produced (''puṇyānumodanā'') and invitation to the Buddhas (''buddhādhyeṣaṇā''). Śāntideva adds that praise (''vandanā'') and solicitation (''yācana'') of the Buddhas are understood to be included in these practices, but that worship (''pūjā'') is not. He also points out that the ''Triskandha'' practices are called by that name because of the accumulation of merit (''puṇyarāśi'') they imply; thus Śāntideva takes ''skandha'' in this compound as a synonym for ''rāśi'', with the meaning of "accumulation."[3] It is possible that Śāntideva preferred this interpretation of the name of the ritual because it had metamorphosed by his time into a longer, more complex rite with six, seven or more parts rather than the original three—as mentioned, Śāntideva names three extra practices (''vandanā'', ''yācana'', ''pūjā'') which were normally included in the rite as he knew it. (Barnes, preliminary remarks, 1)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#''Ugraparipṛcchasūtra'' (hereafter referred to as UPP)<br> Chinese translations:<br> Taishō (T) 310, section 19, translated Dharmamitra, ca. 424-440.<br> T 322, translated An Xuan and Yan Fo-tiao, ca. 180-190.<br> T 323, translated Fa Hu, ca. 266-308<br> Tibetan translation:<br> Peking Edition, 760, section 19<br> ''Vinayaviniścaya-upāliparipṛcchāsūtra'' (hereafter referred to as Upāi)<br> Taishō 325, translated between 265-420<br> T 310, section 24, translated Bodhiruci, 706-713<br> ''Vinayaviniścaya-upāliparipṛcchāsūtra, Enquête d'Upāli pour un Exigèse de la Discipline'', par Pierre Python (Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve: 1973).
#Śāntideva, ''Śikshāsamuccaya'', edited by C. Bendall. (St. Petersburg: 1897-1902; reprint Osnabrück, 1970), 169-171, 290. Translated C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse (Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass: 1971; reprint), 165-167, 263-264.
#The Chinese texts of the UPP itself understand skandha in the sense of"part" or "class." The Tibetan UPP, p. 265.2.6 has: ''phuṅ-po gsum-pai chos-kyi rnam-graṅs kha-ton-du byao'', recite the enumeration of dharma in three groups.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In order to make this collection of Mahâyâna works more complete and useful to students in Japan I have added a translation of the Vajrakkhedikâ, which is much studied in Japan, and the Sanskrit text of which was published by me in an editio princeps—in the Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881.<br> The Vajrakkhedikâ, or the Diamond-cutter, is one of the most widely read and most highly valued metaphysical treatises in Buddhist literature. In Japan the Vajrakkhedikâ and the Pragñâpâramitâhṛdaya are read chiefly by the followers of the Shin-gon sect, founded by Kô-Bô, the great disciple of the famous Hiouen-thsang, in 816 A. D. The temples of this sect in Japan amount to 12,943. Written originally in Sanskrit, it has been translated into Chinese, Tibetan, Mongol, and Mandshu. Its full title is Vajrakkhedikâ Pragñâ-pâramitâ, i.e. the Diamond-cutter, the perfection of wisdom, or, as it has sometimes been rendered, 'the Transcendent Wisdom.' Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio in his Catalogue of the Tripiṭaka, p. I, has shown that it forms the ninth section of the Mahapragñâ-pâramitâ-sûtra, and that it agrees with the Tibetan translation of the text in 300 ślokas.<br> An account of the Tibetan translation was given as far back as 1836 by Csoma Körösi in his Analysis of the Sherchiu, the second division of the Kanjur, published in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xx, p. 393 seq. Our text is there described as the Diamond-cutter or the Sutra of wonderful effects, in which Sâkya in a colloquial manner instructs Subhûti, one of his principal disciples, in the true meaning of the Pragñâ-pâramitâ. The Tibetans., we are told, pay great respect to this Sûtra, and copies of it are found in consequence in great abundance[1].<br> The first Chinese translation[2] is ascribed to Kumâragîva of the latter Tsin dynasty (A.D. 384-417). An English translation of this Chinese translation was published by the Rev. S. Beal in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1864-5.<br> There are several more Chinese translations, one by Bodhiruki (A. D. 509), one by Paramârtha (A. D. 562), one by Hiouen-thsang (A. D. 648), one by I-tsing (A. D. 703), one by Dharmagupta of the Sui dynasty (A. D. 589-618).<br> The text and German translation of the Tibetan translation were published in 1837 by M. Schmidt in the Mémoires de I'Académie de St. Petersbourg, tom. iv, p. 186.<br> The Mongolian translation was presented by the Baron Schiling de Canstadt to the Library of the Institut de France.<br> The Mandshu translation is in the possession of M, de Harlez, who with the help of the Tibetan, Mandshu, and Chinese versions has published a valuable French translation of the Sanskrit text of the Vagrakkhedikâ in the Journal Asiatique, 1893. (Müller, [https://archive.org/details/buddhistmahy01asvauoft/page/n241/mode/2up introduction to the Vagrakkhedikâ], xii–xiii)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See also L. Feer in Annales du Musée Guimet, vol. ii, p. 201.
#See preface to my edition of the Vagrakkhedikâ, Anecd. Oxon., 1881.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This edition of the Vajracchedikā is based on a complete manuscript which belongs to the treasures brought back by Sir Aurel Stein from the cave temples at the 'Halls of the Thousand Buddhas' to the south-east of Tunhuang.[1]<br> The manuscript was first brought to notice by Dr. Hoernle, who describes it as follows:[2]
: 'The manuscript of the Vajracchedikā consists of forty-four leaves, measuring about 26.0 x 7.3 cm. (or 10 x 2 7/8 inches), with four lines of large writing in the upright Gupta type of Eastern Turkestani characters. It is, however, not quite complete: only thirty-three leaves survive; fols. 11–14, 16–19, 39, 41 and 43, altogether eleven, are missing. The folio numbers are on the obverse sides. The text commences, on the reverse of the first folio, with a circlet in the upper right corner, followed by ''saddham''. The centre of the page is occupied by a large figure of the seated Buddha within two concentric circles. The obverse of the first folio is filled with a disorderly mass of writing in cursive characters of varying sizes, among which the words ''Kalpa-rāja-sūtra'' and ''Vajara-chaidaki-prajñāpārā-saddham'' are legible. The reverse of the last folio has three lines, and in the centre another large figure of the seated Buddha within concentric circles. The first line gives the colophon ''haḍi Vajrrachedaka ttṛśayä Prajñāpārāṁma samāsye'' II . . . Then, after a broad intervening blank space, follow the other two lines, which read ''saddham Vajrrachidakyi hīya ttādi'', &e.[1] The manuscript commences with a long introduction in the "unknown language", of which there is no Sanskrit equivalent in Max Müller's edition.[2] The text itself of the Vajracchedikā begins only with the second line of the reverse of the third folio, where its beginning is indicated by a circlet followed by ''saddham'', exactly like that at the commencement of the whole manuscript.'
To this description I have only to add that fol. 38 is not in the same handwriting as the rest, and that the missing leaves, 11-14, 16-19, 39, 41 and 43 have subsequently turned up. After my edition of the text and my translation and vocabulary had been ready in proof for some time, I received from Dr. Hoernle eleven manuscript leaves, which had likewise been found in the Tunhuang caves, but not in the same place as the Vajracchedikā manuscript. Dr. Hoernle thought that they might belong to another manuscript of the same text. When examining them, however, I soon realized that they were the missing leaves of the old manuscript, and I am accordingly in a position to publish the first complete text in the old Iranian language of Eastern Turkestan. (Konow, introduction, 214–15) [https://archive.org/details/cu31924023185584/page/214/mode/2up Read more here]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See M. Aurel Stein, Explorations in Central Asia, 1906-8. Reprinted from the Geographical Journal for July and September, 1909, pp. 39 and ff. Also, his Ruins of Desert Cathay, Vol. ii, pp. 24 and ff. It appears to have been found separated into two portions, which were placed by Sir Aurel Stein in two bundles, one marked Ch. 00275 and containing fols. 1-10, 15, 20-38, 40, 42, 44, the other marked Ch. xlvi. 0012 A, and comprising fol. 11-14, 16-19, 39, 1, 43. The fact that the two bundles contained portions of the same text was recognized by Dr. Hoernle only in the course of a lengthy examination of the manusripts recovered by Sir Aurel Stein. When this took place, the contents of the first bundle had already been reproduced in Plates V-XI. Consequently the folios of the second bundle could not be made to appear in their proper places, but are shown in Plates XII-XIV.
#Journal of the Koyal Asiatic Society, 1910, pp. 836 and f. I have introduced my own reading of the text words.
#In the left-hand margin is another small seated Buddha within two concentric circles.
#Anecdota Oxoniensia. Aryan Series, Vol. i, Part 1. Buddhist Texts from Japan, edited by F. Max Muller, M.A., Oxford, 1881.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Almost ten years ago, while writing up some research on Tibetan Prajñāpāramitā manuscripts in the possession of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art for a contribution to the Festschrift of another esteemed colleague,[1] I became aware for the first time of the existence of the ''Vajradhvajapariṇāmanā''. Some verses from its Tibetan translation appearing on the last folio of one of the copies of the ''Śatasāhasrikā'' in this collection looked intriguing, although the loss of the penultimate folio left me in the dark as to what the beginning of the poem was like. Later I became aware that this text was to be found in the Kanjurs of the Them spangs ma lineage (but not the Tshal pa), and subsequent correspondence with Helmut Tauscher of the University of Vienna revealed that many copies were also available in the various Kanjur and proto-Kanjur collections of West Tibet and elsewhere. I also discovered that two copies were to be found among the Dunhuang manuscripts. This ''embarras de richesses'' seemed to me an excellent basis on which to investigate the wording of this short work, to supplement the partial record of the LACMA ''Yum 'bum'' which had first attracted my interest, and at the same time to make a contribution to the further exploration of the Kanjur tradition in Tibet. The project, put to one side for a time, was subsequently pushed in a new direction when I learned that there was a Sanskrit manuscript containing the ''Vajradhvajapariṇāmanā'' (henceforth VdhP) in the Cambridge University Library.[2] A full edition and translation of that manuscript will be undertaken by Dr Camillo Formigatti,[3] whose thunder I certainly do not wish to steal here: for the purposes of this article I think it will be sufficient to present (finally!) my edition of the Tibetan translation (or translations) of these verses, accompanied by a preliminary English rendition of the same, with occasional references to the Sanskrit version where appropriate. This seems to me a fitting tribute to Jens-Uwe Hartmann, who has devoted much of his scholarly career to the study of Buddhist poetry and Buddhist manuscripts, since, whatever else it is, this text is undoubtedly a poetic work, and the wide diffusion in Tibet of manuscript copies of it indicates a certain degree of popularity.<br> What exactly is this poem? The VdhP has been characterized as a summary of the similarly titled sūtra, the chapter or, better, component text of the ''Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra'' which is quoted at such length in Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''.[4] This lengthy sūtra does in fact seem to have been an important source for Śāntideva. Whether the 12 (Sanskrit) or 16 (Tibetan) verses of the VdhP, however, can be accurately characterized as a summary of it is somewhat doubtful, although they clearly reference the sūtra's main character, the bodhisattva Vajradhvaja, and recapitulate a number of its themes, including its leitmotif of the dedication of merit and its invocation of Samantabhadra and his practice. This immediately suggests a connection with the well-known ''Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna'' or (''Samanta'')''bhadracarīpraṇidhāna''—the text goes by various names—a connection explicitly acknowledged by Śāntideva, who refers to it as the ''Bhadracaryāgāthā''.[5] Like that longer, more popular verse text, which closes the Gaṇḍavyūha and thus the ''Buddhāvataṃsaka'' as a whole, the VdhP, i. e. the short poem, offers much more than its title might suggest, but contains in a condensed form most of the basic elements of the ritual sequence known as the Supreme Worship (''anuttarapūjā''): praise or paying of homage (''vandanā''), confession of misdeeds (''pāpadeśanā''), rejoicing in merit (''modanā'', ''anumodanā''), requesting or exhortation to teach (''adhyeṣanā''), entreaty to the Buddhas to remain for the benefit of the world (''yācanā''), and aspiration to awakening (''bodhicittotpāda''), as well as dedication of merit (''puṇyapariṇāmanā''). We can understand it, therefore, as a conveniently short but nevertheless comprehensive expression of a key Mahāyāna Buddhist ritual programme. (Harrison, preliminary remarks, 157–59)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See Paul Harrison (2007), "Notes on some West Tibetan manuscript folios in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art," in B. Kellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, M. T. Much, H. Tauscher, eds., ''Pramāṇakīrtiḥ: Papers dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday'', Part 1, Wien: 229-245.
#Add. 1643 is a richly illustrated 11th-century manuscript of the ''Aṣṭasāhasrikā'' which also contains the ''Prajñāpāramitāstotra'' at the beginning. That it ends with the VdhP (on fols. 223r7–223v5), just as the Tibetan ''Śatasāhasrikā'' manuscript from Tholing does, provides further evidence of the use of the text during this period.
#I thank Dr Formigatti for sending me a copy of the manuscript and generously sharing his preliminary transliteration of it with me. High-definition images of the entire manuscript can be accessed on the Cambridge University website, at http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-ADD-01643/1.
#See Cecil Bendall, ed. (1897-1902), ''Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching (Bibliotheca Buddhica I)'', St. Petersburg (reprint Delhi: 1971): 22.5-33.10 (cited as ''Āryavajradhvajasūtra''); 213.3-216.5 (cited as ''Vajradhvajapariṇāmanā''); 278.14-283.2 (cited as ''Āryavajradhvajasūtra''); 291.10 (reference only, under the title ''Vajradhvajapariṇāmanā''). An English translation of the full text from the Chinese can be found in Thomas Cleary, trans. (1984), ''The Flower Ornament Scripture'', Vol. I. Boulder: 530-693 (Book 25: Ten Dedications).
#See Bendall's edition, 291.8-10. It is quite possible that in this passage Śāntideva is contrasting the ''Bhadracaryāgāthā'' with the short poem, rather than with the longer sūtra: "As for the dedication of merit, however, it is done in its complete form with the ''Ārya-Bhadracaryā'', or one should read the ''Vajradhvajapariṇāmanā''" (''pariṇāmanā tu sakalasamāptāryabhadracaryayaiva'' / ''vajradhvajapariṇāmanāṃ vā paśyet'').
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
One of the great French Buddhologists Louis de la Vallée Poussin, has said:
"The entire career of a Bodhisattva is to think about ''bodhi''."
The structure of this "thought of ''bodhi''" is twofold:
firstly the wish to attain ''bodhi'' (''saṃbodhi-kāmanā-sahagatā''), secondly there is the motivation to aspire ''bodhi'' for the benefit of all sentient beings (''parārthālambanā'') alone. However, I do not wish to discuss the altruistic motivation for aspiring ''bodhi'' but should rather confine the topic of my paper to ''bodhicitta'' in the sense of being the mind directed towards ''bodhi''.
The phenomenology of ''bodhicitta'' has been the topic of discussion of many Indian Buddhist scholars. Within philosophical traditions such as the Mādhyamika, different theories are expounded. When the Tibetan scholars, from the seventh century onward, became acquainted with Buddhism, they confronted various diverse theories and had to come to a conclusion for themselves as to how they were to interpret ''bodhicitta'' and ''cittotpāda'' that were formulated by the Indian masters.
The approach of a Tibetan scholar differs widely from the approach of a Western scholar who wants to know exactly what a single Indian or Tibetan master has said and what induced him to utter his thoughts and ideas just in the way he did.
In this paper, I wish to demonstrate the Tibetan discussion of ''bodhicitta'' and how the Tibetans strived to harmonize the divergent views on ''bodhicitta''. +
This devotional hymn has long been revered by the Mahāyāna Buddhists of China, Korea, and Japan regardless of sect, and is perhaps one of the most popular pieces of Buddhist literature. As there is repeated mention of Amitābha's Pure Land in the hymn, it has also won special favor with the followers of that sect. Thus in the beginning it was not exclusively identified with the Hua-yen school but later became incorporated in the last section of the Hua-yen Sūtra, with characteristic overtones of its philosophy and abundant use of its symbolism.<br> Samanta-bhadra, often abbreviated to Bhadra, is the embodiment of the Mahāyāna ideal in action and devotion, as Avalokiteshvara is the symbol of compassion, and Manjushrī of wisdom. He is represented in painting and sculpture as riding on a white elephant. (Hurvitz, preliminary remarks, 172-73) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This is a beautiful and competent English translation of the standard Tibetan version of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' of the renowned Indian Buddhist master Śāntideva. This short inspirational exposition of the bodhisattva path has had a central place in all the Tibetan Buddhist traditions and some sections are widely used in regular recitation practices. For example, verses from Chapter 2 are used in making offering and confession, while the verses expressing the bodhisattva aspiration in Chapter 3 are universally used in recitations of the bodhisattva vow.<br> However, the first question which the Buddhist studies student will inevitably ask of this new translation is whether its publication was necessary at all. Given the number of translations already available in European languages, both from Sanskrit and Tibetan, and furthermore, considering how many important Tibetan Buddhist works have yet to be rendered in English at all, what justification is there for another English version? The principal translator, Wulstan Fletcher, is acutely aware of this issue and directly tackles it at the outset with a rather impassioned and vigorous defence. In a spirit which is likely to evoke some sympathy from ''Tibet Journal'' readers, Fletcher (p. 27) argues that the Tibetan rather than the Sanskrit text deserves to be treated as "''the'' original" [my italics!] for translation purposes since, along with its commentaries, it represents mainstream Mahāyāna scholarship and practice, kept alive in an unbroken tradition down to the present day. Having justified the principle of a translation based on the Tibetan, Fletcher (p. 28) then points out that the Padmakara Translation Group's work is of the particularly vibrant and widely influential Eastern Tibetan tradition stemming from the 19th century Dza Patrul Rinpoche, which has been extremely dynamic and productive in the last century, responsible for a number of important commentaries. The translation especially draws from the commentary of Khenpo Kunzang Palden, the oral teachings of Jigme Khyentse Rinpoche and other contemporary lamas of rNying ma pa and bKa' brgyud pa affiliations, while other translations (such as the English translation of Stephen Batchelor and the German translation of Georges Driessens) have mainly drawn on dGe lugs pa sources. (Cantwell, "Review," 144–45) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/43302401 Read more here]
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
::It is possible that translation is like the<br>flight of the bumblebee: unlikely in principle<br>but a fact nonetheless. (Hensey, 1982).[1]
'''1.0. Introductory'''<br>
As in other bodies of literature, a few Buddhist works have gained special favor among modern scholars and readers. Some have achieved the exalted status of membership in the modem canon of Buddhist texts. Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' can claim to be among these select few.[2] Without question it is the most translated among Indian Buddhist works of the ''śāstra'' genre. Although it is difficult to keep up to date with, or keep an accurate census of, the many modern language renderings of classical Buddhist texts that appear in contemporary libraries and bookstores, I would venture to say that the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' most likely now occupies the third position among the most frequently translated Indian Buddhist texts, after the ''Dhammapada'' and the "Heart Sutra."[3]<br> It held a privileged position in Tibetan territory, where it seems to have been translated at least twice.[4] The ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' most likely was greatly esteemed in the Indian subcontinent, and perhaps for a short time among the elites of Buddhist Indonesia.[5] In other parts of Asia it failed to make much of an impression. It was clumsily translated into Chinese only once and it was virtually unknown in East Asia until Western Buddhist Studies brought the text to the attention of scholars in China and Japan.[6] A good portion of the text is preserved in fragmentary manuscripts from Dunhuang in a Tibetan translation that differs significantly from both the Tanjur version and the extant Nepalese Sanskrit version).[7] But among contemporary believers in the West and among scholars in contemporary Japan, Europe, and North America, the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' continues to hold a special
fascination.[8] It has seen a number of translations, mostly from the Sanskrit, but some from the Tibetan text in the Tanjur.[9] We have three translations into French. It has been available, until recently, in two complete and one partial English renditions (not counting assorted fragments in anthologies). It has been translated into several other European languages: Danish, Dutch, German, and Spanish and Japanese—and into a number of modern Asian languages: Chinese, Hindi, Japanese, and Newari. It is also available in one partial translation into Italian.<br> Three English renditions have appeared in the last two years, bringing the number of complete English translations to five. First, a version from the Sanskrit by Crosby and Skilton was published by Oxford University Press in 1996 (abbreviated CS).[10] This was followed in 1997 by a translation from the canonical Tibetan version by Wulstan Fletcher of the Padmakara Translation Group (abbreviated PG).[11] Soon thereafter, we saw the publication of still another English rendering, this time by Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace, based on the edited Sanskrit versions, with copious extracts translated from the canonical Tibetan version (abbreviated WW). These three most recent English translations bring the total of contemporary translations to at least twenty-seven.[12]
'''1.1. Indian Document or World Classic?'''<br>
Although the translation of Buddhist śāstras presents special problems, the difficulties, methods, and assumptions we find in translations of Buddhist scholastic treatises have much in common with those encountered in any other body of translated literature. This is especially true of a text like the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', which combines elements of several genres in a manner that must be characterized as unique in Indian literature.[13] Furthermore, śāstras are sometimes read as if they had some sort of universal or timeless appeal, yet they are also assumed to be highly technical, if not scientific treatises. Modern interpreters seldom acknowledge the tension between these two characterizations.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#All references within the main body of the text and in the notes are to the last name of the author or translator as listed in the Bibliography at the end of this review; the date of publication is added only when necessary to distinguish two works by the same author or authors. Abbreviations are noted on their first occurrence and are also listed at the end of the article.
#The common title, ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', is abbreviated as Bca. in the footnotes and in textual references in the main body of the paper, and in the comments that follow some of the entries in the Bibliography. The alternative title ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' is not used in this essay, essentially in order to avoid the entering into a discussion of its sources.
#In the case of the latter, it is hard to tell what should count as a separate or distinct translation—furthermore, its Indian origin has been called into question (see Nattier, 1992). I will not attempt a comparison with Buddhist texts composed or preserved in Chinese or Tibetan, or works in Japanese, several of which also have sometimes a semi-canonical status. They include the Lotus Sutra, the Platform Sutra, the ''Shōbōgenzō'', and the ''Bodhipathapradīpa''.
#This is counting the two extant and clearly distinct versions: the Tanjur (or "canonical") version and the Dunhuang version. But the canonical version was most likely revised extensively from an earlier prototype of the 9th century. This version is listed in the Bibliography under the name of Sarvajñadeva as main translator. The Dunhuang version has been studied extensively by Saitō.
#This statement is, of course, primarily impressionistic. There is no basis for a stronger statement, like that of Wallace and Wallace (p. 7) claiming that the Bca. "has been the most widely read, cited, and practiced text in the whole of the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition." The suggested connection with Indonesia is only based on the existence of two compendia or abridgements of Bca. by Atiśa's teacher Dharmakīrti (Eimer, 1981), who was known by the name of his land of origin, Gser-gling-pa, that is, Suvarṇadvīpa (Chattgpadhyaya & Lama Chimpa).
#The Chinese text has never been translated into a Westem language. It was "translated" once into Japanese in the style of paraphrase known as ''kokuyaku'' (Byōdō, 1931).
#The Dunhuang text, moreover, is attributed to a different author by the name of Akṣayamati. It is preserved in four manuscripts: Stein 628, 629, 630, and Pelliot 729. Henceforth references and allusions to "the Tibetan" or "Tib." will be to the Tanjur version of Bca., unless it is specified otherwise. This version is among the earliest texts translated into Tibetan (ca. first half of the 9th century C.E.). The translators were Sarvajñadeva and Dpal-brtsegs—it is No. 5272 (vol. 99, pp. 243-262) in the Peking edition (Otani Reprint). It was revised by three scholars generally dated in the 9th century (Dharmaśrībhadra, Rin-chen-bzang-po, and Sakya-blo-gros), but was then revised much later by scholars dated in the early and late 11th century (Sumatikīrti and Blo-ldan shes-rab—1059–1109 C.E.). The Mongolian versions, including the late translation of Chos-kyi 'od-zer also have some interesting variants (see Poppe, 1954, Ruegg, 1967, Lokesh Chandra, 1976, and Rachewiltz, 1996).
#An exploration of the reasons for this fascination would yield interesting insights into the Orientalist frame of mind. One of our graduate students at the University of Michigan, Mr. Kaoru Ohnishi, is at present engaged in such an investigation. I myself am of two views. As a hold-out in the "canon wars," I would argue that the work is a classic and deserves the attention it has received; but as a child of post-modernity, I also recognize that much of the attraction is the result of a mirror effect that seems to allow the Westem scholar and practitioner to recognize in Bca. a Western ascetic subconscious. This mirror allows us the fantasy of a "spirituality" with all the glory, but none of the gore, of classical ascetic traditions. Needless to say, the Bca. satisfies neither the requirement of a pure spirituality nor the expectation of tame asceticism.
#Full references for all of the translations mentioned in the following paragraphs will be found in the Bibliography.
#When the abbreviations used for the new Bca. translations are used to mean the book or the work, the abbreviation is construed as the singular (e.g., CS = Crosby and Skilton's translation). When the abbreviation stands for the translators, it is construed as a plural (e.g., CS =Crosby and Skilton).
#In a self-effacing gesture, the book is published as the work of the Padmakara Translation Group, but the introduction strongly suggests to me that the translation is primarily the work of Fletcher. Nevertheless, in deference to their wish, I refer to this version as "the Padmakara translation."
#My count is based on the translations I have been able to examine, or for which I have found reliable references. I am not always comfortable listing as more or less independent translations some of these texts, even some of the ones I have examined. I also have little confidence in my list of the translations into contemporary Indian languages. Pezzali, for instance, lists others, but her references are at times obscure, and often unreliable. I have also not attempted to count fragmentary or partial translations in anthologies (some of which are slightly edited excerpts from the complete translations-see, e.g., Conze, Nyanaponika). A good example of an anthologized excerpt, translated with care, is Winternitz, 1930. In all, I have been able to obtain and examine 19 complete or close to complete translations into modern languages (counting LVP's efforts as only one translation), another 8 have not been accessible to me. Versions in modern languages that are known to me are listed in the Bibliography. Those I have been able to examine are listed under "Modern Translations Examined by the Reviewer" the others under "Modern Translations Not Examined by the Reviewer."
#This does not imply necessarily the originality of a single author. I am not sure we can confidently eliminate the possibility that Bca. is a composite text formed by agglutination. The existence of the Dunhuang recension at the very least suggests this alternative hypothesis.
Atiśa Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna's (982–1054) ''The Wheel-Like Path'' is a hermeneutical commentary interpreting Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' through a complete graduated awakening path. The text systematically correlates the ten chapters with ten mental attitudes and maps them onto bodhisattva grounds using an extended wheel metaphor. It elaborates nineteen "turns" covering progression from path accumulation to buddhahood, addressing misconceptions about path-result separation, ground demarcation, and affliction antidotes. Historically significant for Atiśa's systematization of Indian Mahāyāna teachings during Tibet's later diffusion period, the text demonstrates his synthesis of scholastic precision with contemplative instruction. Its layered nature, including editorial interpolations, illustrates Tibetan textual transmission practices where commentaries become objects of subsequent annotation by scholar-practitioners preserving foundational teachings. +
The following excerpt from the introduction to the Padmakara Translation Committee's translation of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', ''The Way of the Bodhisattva'', provides an overview of the ninth chapter, commonly referred to as the "Wisdom Chapter." This chapter is crucial for understanding the bodhisattva path and its direct realization of emptiness. Although Śāntideva states that ultimate truth transcends intellectual comprehension, with all conceptual formulations being inherently flawed, he explains through dialectical criticism why all philosophical positions are in fact inconsistent. Śāntideva's work demonstrates how the wisdom of emptiness is both a theoretical concept and an essential, practical aspect of the bodhisattva path, ultimately illustrating its profound impact on alleviating suffering.
For those delving into Buddhist philosophy, particularly the Madhyamaka school and Śāntideva's teachings, this overview bridges the gap between abstract philosophy and lived experience. It offers insights into the historical development of Buddhist ideas and their continued relevance, serving as an excellent starting point for further inquiry into the concepts of emptiness and ultimate truth. +
The passages from the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA) on "exchanging self and other" have been a center of debate in the study of Buddhist ethics; they play a major role in this volume, and are read very differently by different Cowherds. In this chapter, we consider these passages, their role in the BCA, three ways in which they might reasonably be interpreted, and what hangs on their interpretation. We direct the reader, in particular, to Chapters 7 and 8 of this volume for alternative readings, and we encourage the reader to consult the translation of Prajñākaramati's commentary on these verses, included as an Appendix to his volume. First, we offer some comments on the composition of the whole text and on its author or authors. Next, we consider the central passage at issue. We then turn to a discussion of the three possible interpretations. We close with a few comments on what is at stake. +
The current integrative review aims to do the following: first, examine the Chinese and English topical studies on the Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra published from 1900 to 2011; second, analyze the characteristics of those works; third, investigate related study trends through a statistical analysis; and finally, identify research gaps. This review not only offers a comprehensive overview of the available literature on the Sutra retrieved from 25 English and Chinese electronic databases, but also categorizes the 256 selected publications (n=34 English; n=222 Chinese) into eight sub-themes: art (n=36; 14%), book reviews (n=11; 4%), philological studies (n=11; 4%), literature (n=24; 10%), philosophy (n=77; 30%), textual criticism (n=22; 9%), translation (n=56; 22%), and miscellaneous topics (n=19; 7%); thus illuminating different research foci and features between English and Chinese scholars, and also among Chinese researchers in various territories. This project illustrates how an integrative review can be employed in Buddhist studies; it reveals challenges and opportunities related to Buddhist studies, stemming from technology; it suggests collaborative research in Buddhism; and it proposes the application of the philosophy of the Sutra to practical disciplines. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Comparisons, and by that I mean the hunt for essential similarities or at least serious family resemblances, between the ethical views of Western and non-Western thinkers have been a staple of comparative philosophy for quite some time now. Some of these comparisons, such as between the views of Aristotle and Confucius, seem especially apt and revealing. However, I've often wondered whether Western "ethical theory" - virtue ethics, deontology, or consequentialism - is always the best lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought. Particularly when the discussion has turned to Buddhism and Buddhist ethics, theories of this sort at best seem to have an uncertain application.<br> This is not to say that individual philosophers have not tried and such comparisons have not been made. Although I am unaware of a serious comparison between Buddhism and Kantian-style deontological ethics, there have been some notable attempts to portray the tradition as either a variant of virtue ethics on the one hand or some kind of utilitarianism on the other. Damien Keown is a good example in his attempt to apply natural law theory and a teleological virtue ethic to the Theravāda tradition in Buddhism as an explanation of its ethics.[1] And recently, Charles Goodman has suggested that at least the Mahāyāna tradition of Sāntideva or Asaṅga suggests a consequentialist approach.[2] There have no doubt been many others.<br> Of course, the theory approach sits side by side with less reductionist approaches. For example, William LaFleur's book on Japanese Buddhism's take on abortion represents another kind of view.[3] In that book, drawing on Jeffrey Stouťs ideas, he argues that Buddhism adopts what can be called "moral ''bricolage''" that is, a strategy of piecing together one's ethical perspective out of the bits and pieces, the "folk ethics," of one's culture and its history of defusing moral dilemmas.[4] A number of other scholars, such as David Kalupahana or Christopher Ives, tend to focus on what they regard as unique to the Buddhist tradition, and although they make comparisons, they are rather limited ones for limited illustrative purposes - usually to show a contrast rather than a similarity.[5]<br> Naturally, the question as to which approach is correct arises in one's mind. Do we side with the theory approach or what I will call the "indigenous" approach? Does Buddhism bring something unique to the table, perhaps stretching the way in which we think about ethics generally? Or does Buddhism represent a variant, perhaps a unique and informative one, of a cluster of approaches? Does it stand alone or in a theoretical family?<br> This essay is an attempt to answer these questions, but not exactly by directly tackling Buddhist ethics and offering another comprehensive account of its ethics. I will speak about what I consider to be its unique elements, but that alone does not settle the theory-versus-indigenous question. For that, one has to examine the nature of the various theories to see whether they at least exhibit the same spirit of approach endemic to Buddhism. I will argue that, by and large, they do not. However, I will also argue that Buddhism is not necessarily unique, either in terms of its theoretical aspirations or in terms of the question that it primarily aims to answer. Both of these areas have able representatives in the arena of analytic ethics today, although that is probably as far as any comparison goes. I leave it an open question whether the Buddhist or the contemporary analytic views that I will reference offer the more contemporaneously illuminating approach. (Barnhart, introduction, 16–17)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See Damien Keown, ''The Nature of Buddhist Ethics'' (London: Macmillan, 1992). However, for much of my actual discussions of Keown's views, I rely on his book ''Buddhism and Bioethics'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), where he both distills and applies his earlier work.
#Charles Goodman, "Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahãyãna Ethics," ''Philosophy East and West'' 58 (1 ) (2008): 1 7-35.
#William R. LaFleur, ''Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan'' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
#See ibid., pp. 12-13.
#See specifically Christopher Ives, ''Zen Awakening and Society'' (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), and David J. Kalupahana, ''Ethics in Early Buddhism'' (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995).
Buddhism, as a religion arose in ancient India and developed in various parts of the world, aims at the unique goal that is providing welfare and happiness for human beings. The real happiness brought to mankind by Buddhism is not a satisfaction of self-requirement, but a spiritual benefit coming from enlightenment of the absolute truth, emancipation of the ego of things and persons, and free from the hindrances of passion and ignorance. Buddhism that is mainly based on teachings of the Buddha delivered at different places on different occasions continues to develop and adapt to the new challenges in the form of thought, different cultures, religions, customs and tradition of the people wherever it went. However, all the Buddha’s teachings originate in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
All traditions of Buddhism accept that the Buddha attained enlightenment through stages of meditation that led to the Buddhahood endowed with transcendent wisdom and compassion. According to some Mahāyāna scriptures, the Buddhahood is nothing other than the Buddhanature which is the inherent essence within all beings. The doctrine of the Buddha-nature presented in several Mahāyāna scriptures of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha literature was formed in about the third century CE. There is no evidence that the doctrine of Buddha-nature formed a school in India like the ''Śūnyatā'' (Emptiness) of the Mādhyamika or the ''Vijñaptimātratā'' (Consciousness-only) of the Yogācāra School, but the Buddha-nature plays an important role in the religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the East and Southeast Asian countries because it provides a faith of the permanence and immortality due to a declaration that all sentient beings possess the innate Buddha-nature and have a potentiality of becoming the Buddhas.
Although most of the followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism believe the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and constantly try their best endeavor to attain the goal of Buddhahood, there were a lot of opinions that criticize the doctrine of the Buddha-nature by asserting that it is not Buddhist because this idea of the Buddha-nature seems to be akin to the permanent Self (''ātman''/''brahman'') presented in the Vedānta of Brahmanism. Conversely, according to some other scholars, the Buddha nature or ''Tathāgatagarbha'' referred in some Mahāyāna Sūtras does not represent a substantial self or ego; it is rather a positive language to express the thought of ''śūnyatā'' and to represent the potentiality of realizing the Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. Modern scholars today fall into an unending discussion about the similarity or difference between the Buddha-nature and ''Brahman'' but no one compares the date of these doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to clarify the Buddhist orthodoxy of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature through chronological comparison of the date of Buddha-nature with that of ''Brahman''. Based on the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' and other scriptures, the work attempt to elucidate that the Buddhist thought of the Buddha-nature had existed prior the Vedāntic thought of ''Brahman''. Indeed, the thesis shows that while the doctrine of the Buddha-nature had come into existence in the third century CE in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the Vedāntic doctrine of ''Brahman'' appeared for the first time in the sixth century CE. Consequently, although the Buddha-nature is closely akin to ''Brahman''/''ātman'' of the Vedānta, the doctrine of the Buddha-nature is originally a thought of Buddhism. For this reason, the writer chose the topic
entitled “''Thought of Buddha-nature as Depicted in the LaṅkāvatāraSūtra''” for the Ph.D. thesis.
Study on the Buddha-nature is a task which cannot be carried out without the important texts, teachings, practices and historical movements of Buddhism. This study is mainly based upon the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', a Buddhist text of the later period of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, in which the thought of the Buddha-nature is depicted in relationship with most of the Mahāyāna concepts such as the ''Buddhatā'', ''Tathāgatagarbha'', ''Ālayavijñāna'', ''Dharmakāya'', Mind-only, etc. Especially, the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' emphasizes the practice of self-realization and sudden enlightenment of the Buddha-nature. It is also said that the Sūtra was handed down by Bodhidharma to his heir disciple Hui-ke 慧可 as the proof of enlightenment in Chan (Zen) Buddhism.
This thesis is an attempt to investigate and criticize the philosophical and religious thought of the Buddha-nature as depicted in the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra''. In so doing, we have taken into consideration the following principle themes:<br>
:1. Evolution of the Buddha-nature Concept<br>
:2. The Buddha-nature in the Tathāgatagarbha Literature<br>
:3. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Hindu Philosophy<br>
:4. The Thought of Buddha-nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra<br>
:5. The Practice of Buddha-Nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra<br>
:6. Further Development of the Concept of Buddha-nature in China
Structurally, therefore, excluding the introduction and conclusion, the thesis consists of six major chapters in accordance with the above six main themes respectively.
Tibetan Identity and Tibetan Buddhism in Trans-Regional Connection: The Contemporary Vegetarian Movement in Pastoral Areas of Tibet (China) +
This article examines the religious teachings of the influential Tibetan Buddhist master Tsultrim Lodroe on the tradition of refraining from eating meat. It considers these teachings in light of the social and religious meanings of the current vegetarianism movement, the processes through which it has taken place, the complexity and particularity of its manifestation, and the implications of the movement in transforming Tibetan society and its cultural landscape. It argues that the vegetarian movement is associated with interactions between leading Tibetan Buddhist teachers and Chinese Buddhist communities, particularly in the response of Tibetan Buddhist teachers to critiques by Chinese Buddhists regarding the Tibetan tradition of widespread meat consumption.
Read this article [https://journals.openedition.org/emscat/2755 here]. +
Today's Lamrim Teachings: The Twelvefold Method of Generating Bodhicitta in Wensapa Lineage (Oleksandr 2012) +
The paper presents a unique composite method for generating bodhicitta, derived from the Wensapa lineage within the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. This method synthesizes two classical approaches—the "Seven Reasons and Consequences" and the "Exchanging Oneself with Others"—and outlines a twelve-stage process of developing equanimity towards all sentient beings. The teachings, particularly those of Geshe Jampa Thinley, emphasize the importance of cultivating an unbiased attitude in fostering compassion and motivation for the bodhisattva path. ([https://www.academia.edu/38537666/Todays_Lamrim_Teachings_The_Twelvefold_Method_of_Generating_Bodhicitta_in_Wensapa_Lineage Source Accessed Jan 17, 2025]) +
This study, as well as the initial pilot study, are the first known, stand-alone,
empirical studies of the Tibetan Buddhist ''tonglen'' meditation practice, which is intended to increase levels of compassion (and the benefits that come with that), in addition to reducing less helpful mind-states such as fear and egotism. The premise of this larger proof-of-concept study was to investigate whether tonglen meditation can 1) increase self-compassion and compassion for others, 2) in novice meditators 3) with very little instruction, and 4) short amounts of practice time. This study examined changes in self-compassion and compassion for others through a pre/post intervention study design (α = .05). Subjects (n = 53), who were novice meditators, were given only ten minutes of introduction and instruction; after which, they were asked to participate in an 18-minute guided tonglen meditation, practice on-the-spot tonglen for 30-seconds twice a day for six days, then do one additional 18-minute guided tonglen practice. Results showed a statistically significantly increase in the total scale score of self-compassion (p < .01) and statistically significant beneficial changes in each of the six subscales as measured by Neff's self-report questionnaire, the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS). An increase in compassion for others, though trending up, could not be determined through Pommier's self-report questionnaire, the Compassion Scale (CS), due to a ceiling effect. In addition to the study results, this dissertation includes a detailed discussion of the findings and of the results from the qualitative feedback, which offers insight into the perceived benefits subjects reported, including a reduction in pain, increased communication skills, and the ability for greater perspective taking. The dissertation also contains an introduction to tonglen meditation, a tonglen “troubleshooting guide,” a chart of tonglen commentaries in English organized by century, and an extended literature review of a "cousin" compassion meditation practice, loving-kindness meditation (LKM).
Tonglen is a Tibetan Buddhist practice that aims at developing the practitioner’s bodhicitta. In this article, I argue that it not only finds expression in Alice Walker’s The Color Purple through the protagonist Celie, but adds more complexity to the womanist philosophy for which Walker has been ensconced in positions of influence. More specifically, Celie follows an implied Buddhist practice of tonglen; in the process of “taking in and sending out”, her bodhicitta has been generated and cultivated. Underlying her tonglen practice is Buddhist womanism demonstrating how African American women can survive the social oppression and injustice by way of acknowledging their own terrible afflictions, empathizing with those enduring intense suffering, male and female, extending their loving kindness, comprehending the absence of intrinsic entity and the principle of dependent origination, etc. In addition, the article suggests that the fight for the survival of the oppressed is a type of Buddhist practice in Walker’s Buddhist womanism. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is difficult to generalize about ethical values in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, let alone in Buddhist philosophy more generally. One author identifies seventeen distinct ethical approaches in the Mahāyāna scholarly traditions alone (i.e., not including various folk traditions).[1] Nonetheless, in comparative studies in the history of ethics, there is increasing recognition that several different Buddhist traditions have stressed a foundational role for universalist altruism that was largely absent from ancient Greek eudaimonism and perhaps even absent - qua ''foundational'' - from most other premodern traditions of moral reflection in the West, including much of the Christian tradition.[2] In particular, ancient and medieval Indian works on what Barbra Clayton has called "bodhisattva ethics" may now be seen as collectively constituting a unique achievement of moral reflection prior to the modern period, at least as regards moral reasoning that is focused on ideals of impartiality and a universalist concern for sentient beings. In recent work, Clayton and Charles Goodman have independently stressed the depth and scope of this achievement. More controversially, however, they have also advanced the more specific claim that the mature Mahāyāna conception of morality is either straightforwardly consequentialist or a hybrid form of perfectionist consequentialism.[3]<br> Clayton and Goodman have succeeded in highlighting some consequentialist aspects of Mahāyāna ethics, while also reminding us of the inherent theoretical strengths of universalist act-consequentialism as a moral theory.[4] In the present article I will not be casting any doubt on those strengths ''per se'', which are indeed formidable from a theoretical standpoint. However, when we scrutinize a range of Mahāyāna discussions of bodhisattva vows, we notice some pervasive non-consequentialist reasoning that seems to have been overlooked by these authors and others (and not merely at the level of practical deliberation, but also at the foundational level of what is ultimately thought to justify vows, precepts, and other moral norms). Most commentators admit that there are at least signs and symptoms of consequentialism in Mahāyāna ethical writings - even those who deny any definitive evidence of a unified underlying consequentialist foundation. But there appear to be grounds for a stronger counterclaim, namely that there is ''also'' evidence of a commitment to foundational non-consequentialism in some of the key texts.<br> Like most ethical theorists, I use the terms 'consequentialism' and 'non-consequentialism' in such a way that the claims they denote cannot be combined into a unified or hybrid view (I offer definitions of these terms in the next section).[5] Even a 'trace' of each in the same work may thus indicate an inconsistency, unless one of the claims can be interpreted as strictly theoretical and the other as a theoretically noncommittal expression of a practical mindset. However, in light of my title, I should clarify at the outset that I am not charging any particular vision of the bodhisattva ideal with inconsistency. The traces that Clayton and Goodman cite in support of a consequentialist interpretation, and those I see as indications of non-consequentialist thinking, are scattered enough that the issue is not necessarily one of consistency or inconsistency, at least as regards any particular text or any particular school of thought. Ironically, though, it may be that it is contemporary systematizers who come closest to risking inconsistency, in attempting to distill and refine the putatively consequentialist insights of mature Mahāyāna ethical theory.[6]<br> Since the first part of this article addresses these consequentialist interpretations on their own terms and deals with the possibility of Mahāyāna non-consequentialism only indirectly, it may be worth previewing the general shape of the non-consequentialism that we will ultimately find to be operative within the bodhisattva ideal. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not the sort of virtue-based non-consequentialism that Damien Keown has defended and that Goodman sees as the main rival to his interpretation.[7] While Goodman acknowledges that virtue is one of the goods worth promoting (along with happiness, wisdom, and other goods, thus allowing trade-offs between these in the interest of maximizing the overall good), Keown retains a more traditional understanding of virtue as something whose importance to the agent precludes impersonal calculations and the trade-offs they entail. In any case, both of their approaches highlight virtue as a central concept (generalizing from conceptions of ''kuśala-dharma'', ''kuśalamūlāni'', ''pāramitā'', and ''brahmavihāra''), and perhaps it is indeed one central concept. However, it may be that the most important form of non-consequentialism that surfaces in Mahāyāna ethics takes the very different form of a view based on deontological restrictions - restrictions that are grounded in distributive considerations.<br> In the last two sections of this article, I will compare this view to one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative. The deontological element that emerges in my analysis of bodhisattva ethics will turn out to be analogous to the one that is operative in Kant's ideal of a 'kingdom of ends,' in which every person contributes equally to a system that safeguards virtue and happiness. It is not the combination of virtue and happiness ''per se'', however, that indicates the key parallel with bodhisattva ethics, but rather the idea that eventually a status quo involving an unequal distribution of duties will be superseded by an equal distribution (when all are equally engaged in sustaining the highest good). It is understandable that some would treat Kantian deontology as a view that, compared to the other main positions in contemporary moral theory, seems to have the least affinity with Buddhist ethics in general.[8] Yet we will find that there are important aspects of the bodhisattva ideal that parallel the Kantian notion of a deontologically structured kingdom of ends. Goodman and others may be right that some Buddhist insights provide grounds for critiquing some aspects of Kantian ethics, and it may be understandable, in light of other theoretical considerations, that they would reject Kantian principles; but, for better or worse, we find analogous principles at the heart of many classic versions of the bodhisattva vows.<br> The most persuasive case that Clayton and Goodman make for the role of consequentialist reasoning in the Buddhist tradition is with respect to Śāntideva's writings. The realization that Śāntideva's moral philosophy may have at least the rudiments of a consequentialist structure is an insight of potentially enormous importance, not only for how we think about Buddhist philosophy but also for how we in the West account for the origins of major ethical ideas - considering that we may have to advance the date of birth of universalist consequentialism by at least one thousand years. For the present purposes, I do not wish to rule out the consequentialist interpretation of Śāntideva, which is in any case sufficiently persuasive that it deserves recognition of its potential importance, even if - as both Clayton and Goodman admit - the case cannot be airtight, and the theoretical orientation of Śāntideva cannot be made out with certainty. I will give only cursory indications that some of the same doubts I have about the alleged consequentialism of the whole Mahāyāna tradition also apply to some remarks by Śāntideva. Meanwhile, however we might qualify our conclusions about Śāntideva, we will see how strong indeed is the case for reconceiving the history of ethics in light of these new interpretations, insofar as there may be more than a few 'traces' of consequentialism in these Indian Mahāyāna writings on ethics.[9]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Ono, ''Daijo kaikyõ no kenkyû, whose analysis is summarized by Chappell, "Are there Seventeen Mahāyāna Ethics?"
#I define 'foundational' — in the sense, here intended, of ''fundamentally justificatory'' — in the first section. One might hesitate to say the same thing about the historical foundations of, for instance, Christianity. In relation to the latter sense of 'foundations,' one might argue that the founders of Christianity advocated a kind of universalist altruism, which, however, gradually developed justifications based partly or mainly on non-altruist considerations — already present in one form or another — such as personal salvation or the imitation of divine models (which then became major forms of motivation for moral engagement in various Christian traditions).
#Clayton, ''Moral Theory in Śāntideva's'' Śikṣāsamuccaya; Clayton, "Śāntideva, Virtue and Consequentialism"; Goodman, ''Consequences of Compassion''.
#Remarks comparing Theravāda ethics with consequentialism — arguably a much more problematic comparison — can be found in Premasiri, "Moral Evaluation in Early Buddhism"; Kalupahana, ''Buddhist Philosophy'', p. 61; and Dharmasiri, ''The Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics'', p. 27. In the case of Mahāyāna ethics, the possibility of a consequentialist interpretation is noted with some skepticism in Keown, ''The Nature of Buddhist Ethics'', but endorsed by Mark Siderits in "The Reality of Altruism" and in some of his other writings. Meanwhile, in the context of a particular area of applied ethics, comparisons with consequentialism have also been suggested by Wendy Donner in "The Bodhisattva Code and Compassion." There are deep and interesting questions, of course, about the extent to which these Western ethical concepts are commensurate with Buddhist ones. Though there is not room here to discuss these questions in detail, I do acknowledge some related methodological problems in note 24.
#Though this may sound obvious, it is not uncommon to hear of a theorist such as John Rawls being described as consequentialist in some respects (e.g., in his use of the maximin principle and the difference principle), but non-consequentialist in others (e.g., in the absolute priority given to human rights). As we shall see, proper consequentialism cannot allow any limitation on the maximization of value, so any appeal to a non-consequentialist standard will make a view (such as Rawls') fundamentally non-consequentialist. (See below for a definition of 'standard,' as I use the term here.)
#For reasons that will become apparent, Clayton is less vulnerable to this charge, though the closer she comes to agreeing with Goodman that an unqualified consequentialism is present in Śāntideva (and she is perhaps closer in "Śāntideva, Virtue and Consequentialism" than in her earlier book), the more vulnerable her interpretation may be as well.
#Keown, ''The Nature of Buddhist Ethics''.
#As Goodman argues, and as Peter Harvey suggests in ''An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics'', pp. 50-51 — and as is suggested by the relative paucity of comparisons with Kantian ethics in the archives of journals such as the ''Journal of Buddhist Ethics''.
#For some persuasive arguments to the effect that later Mahāyāna ideas — both consequentialist and non-consequentialist — have antecedents in the Pāli Canon (hence the term 'trace'), see Dharmasiri, ''The Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics''; Velez de Cea, "The Criteria of Goodness"; and chap. 3 of Goodman, ''Consequences of Compassion''.
