The celebrated ninth chapter on wisdom is of course daunting in its complexity. It is not easy to follow, and it is understandable perhaps that by
the majority of readers it will be passed over in silence. But sooner or later,
the question of wisdom and what Shāntideva means by this must be considered—as the culmination of, and also the key to, the entire Bodhisattva path. Shāntideva begins by pointing out that the whole of the Bodhicharyāvatāra so far—all the methods for purifying the mind and generating the virtues of vigilant introspection, patience, courage, and so on—is geared toward wisdom, the direct realization of emptiness, ultimate
bodhichitta, without which the true practice of compassion is impossible.
From the philosophical point of view, Shāntideva belonged to the
Madhyamaka or Middle Way school of Buddhist tenets. This tradition,
founded by Nāgārjuna in the second century and counting among its
adherents a series of incomparable masters (Āryadeva, Buddhapālita,
Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti, Shāntarakshita, Atīsha, and others) flowered
in India uninterruptedly for over a thousand years. Transmitted to Tibet
in the eighth century, it has been upheld to this day as the supreme expression of the Buddha's wisdom teachings. There is obviously no question
here of giving an adequate survey of Madhyamaka thought, but perhaps
the following remarks will help readers gain an idea of its main lines and
basic import.[1]
In the centuries that followed the Buddha's death, various attempts
were made to organize and formulate his teachings. Different systems appeared, basing themselves on the recorded scriptures, each purporting to
express the Buddha's intended meaning. Four, or rather three, great syntheses emerged: that of the Vaibhāshika and Sautrāntika (which for practical purposes may be taken together), that of the Madhyamaka, and that of Vijnānaväda (also referred to as Yogāchāra or Chittamātra, the Mind Only school). That there should be a multiplicity of systems is not in itself surprising. From the time of his enlightenment until his death fifty years later,
the Buddha bestowed his teachings for the benefit of many different audiences. The purpose of his doctrine was always the same: to liberate beings
from the round of suffering. The expression of this purpose, however,
differed according to the capacity of his hearers. It is therefore to be expected that the body of teachings remaining after his departure from the
world should be rich and varied, containing elements that sometimes even
contradict each other. The Mahāyāna deals with this state of affairs by saying that statements made by the Buddha are of two kinds: definitive (Skt. nītārtha), corresponding to his true meaning, as understood by himself; and expedient (Skt. neyārtha), corresponding to a partial expression of his meaning, geared to the understanding of his hearers, intended to lead them along the path to perfect comprehension and being therefore of provisional validity. Parallel with this division is the doctrine of the two truths: ultimate truth (Skt. paramārtha), corresponding to the actual nature of things; and relative truth (Skt. saṃvṛiti), corresponding to the way they appear. The Buddha skillfully graduated his teaching according to pedagogical necessity. For example, he spoke in terms of a self in the context of
karma and ethical responsibility—as against the "nihilist" who disbelieves in survival after death. By contrast, he denied the existence of the ātman, as against the "eternalist" (who takes the self to be a changeless essence). He also said that there is neither self nor no-self.
What conclusion is to be drawn from this? What was Buddha's real
position? We may take as our starting point Shāntideva's own words:
Relative and ultimate,
These the two truths are declared to be.
The ultimate is not within the reach of intellect,
For intellect is said to be the relative.107Tibetan habitually uses two expressions to refer to the relative truth: kun rdzob and tha snyad. Although they are often employed interchangeably as synonyms, these terms have slightly different connotations. Kun rdzob kyi bden pa literally means the ‟all-concealing truth.” It refers to phenomena as they are encountered in everyday life, and to the fact that their appearance (as independently existing entities) conceals their true nature (i.e., their emptiness of such independent and intrinsic being). In so far as the things and situations encountered in life are accepted as genuine in the common consensus (as contrasted with magical illusions, mirages, etc.), they are ‟true,” but only relatively so, since the way they appear does not correspond with their actual status. We have therefore systematically translated kun rdzob kyi bden pa as ‟relative truth.” Tha snyad, on the other hand, means ‟name,” ‟conventional expression.” Tha snyad kyi bden pa (which we have translated as ‟conventional truth”) refers to phenomena insofar as they can be conceived by the ordinary mind and spoken of within the limits of conventional discourse.
[ src citation ]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Page(s) 137
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
[ toggle Tib. ]
[ tib / wyl ]
ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་ནི་དོན་དམ་སྟེ། །
འདི་ནི་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདོད། །
དོན་དམ་བློ་ཡི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མིན། །
བློ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད། །
kun rdzob dang ni don dam ste/_/
'di ni bden pa gnyis su 'dod/_/
don dam blo yi spyod yul min/_/
blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod/_/
The meaning of this is that all statements, all theories, anything
emerging from the operations of the rational intelligence, have the nature
of relative truth. Theories may be of practical utility and may concur with
empirical experience, but as expressions of the ultimate truth, the "nature
of things," they are inadequate. The ultimate is suprarational and cannot
be expressed in conceptual terms. Thus, in the Pāli scriptures, the Buddha
is recorded as saying that "the Tathāgata is free from all theories."[2] And
again, "The view that everything exists is, Kachchāyana, one extreme; that
it does not exist is another. Not accepting the two extremes, the Tathāgata
proclaims the truth from the middle position."[3] The second passage is
referred to explicitly by Nāgārjuna in his great work, The Stanzas on the Middle Way, with the remark that "the Lord has rejected both views: that
of 'is' and that of 'is not.'"[4] In other words, he has rejected all views. This
means that any statement claiming to encapsulate the ultimate truth, any
formulation that points to "this" or "that" as being ultimately real, is
false—false for the simple reason that it is a formulation, emanating from
the conceptual intelligence.
At first sight, this seems to be a form of nihilism. Apparently, it is the
assertion that in the ordinary run of things we can know nothing of the truth; reality seems to be totally beyond our grasp, and Madhyamaka has
not infrequently been misunderstood and criticized in this way.[5] But to
say that the "ultimate is not within the reach of intellect" does not mean
that it cannot be known; it means simply that it exceeds the powers of
ordinary thought and verbal expression. The knowledge of the ultimate
transcends thought. It is suprarational. It is nonconceptual and nondual—quite different, we may suppose, from anything that we have ever
experienced to date. It is prajñā: immediate, intuitive insight into "suchness," the wisdom of emptiness beyond subject and object.
How is one to attain or even approach this kind of knowledge?
Shāntideva gives the answer in a key stanza (the very point in his recitation at Nālandā when, according to the story, he and Mañjushrī began to
rise into the air):
When something and its nonexistence
Both are absent from before the mind,
No other option does the latter have:
It comes to perfect rest, from concepts free.
[ src citation ]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Page(s) 142
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
[ toggle Tib. ]
[ tib / wyl ]
གང་ཚེ་དངོས་དང་དངོས་མེད་དག །
བློ་ཡི་མདུན་ན་མི་གནས་པ། །
དེ་ཚེ་རྣམ་པ་གཞན་མེད་པས། །
དམིགས་པ་མེད་པ་རབ་ཏུ་ཞི། །
gang tshe dngos dang dngos med dag_/
blo yi mdun na mi gnas pa/_/
de tshe rnam pa gzhan med pas/_/
dmigs pa med pa rab tu zhi/_/
Śāntideva rises into the air
These lines indicate the task in hand: the mind is to be left as it is,
free and untrammeled, simply aware, no longer caught up and entangled
in thoughts and theories and the grasping reification of self and substance. On the level of philosophical discourse, this involves the demonstration of the inadequacy of theories and systems purporting to express the ultimate truth. The basic position of Madhyamaka is that reason is
insufficient. It is the recognition, in fact the discovery, that there is a radical lack in the structure of reason itself—something that prevents it from
attaining to true knowledge of the ultimate. In the final analysis, all rational formulations, however ingenious, contain within themselves paradox and inconsistency, the seed, in other words, of their own refutation. The task of Madhyamaka is to expose this inner incoherence. It proceeds
in the knowledge that, if pushed in debate to explain themselves, all
rationally constructed formulations will end in contradiction. Thus
Nāgārjuna does not advance a position of his own. Rather than a body of
doctrines, Madhyamaka is primarily a method, a system of philosophical
criticism. It is dialectic pure and simple. Its procedure is to take a dogmatic assertion (the doctrine of the self, the theory of causation, or the existence of a divine creator, and so on) and gradually refute it—not by
coming into head-on collision by positing a contrary view, but by gradually exposing, through a series of logical steps, the theory's own inner incoherence. The assertion is consequently reduced to absurdity and stands
revealed as unequal to its original claim. In the end, theories, all theories—Buddhist theories included—fall to the ground through sheer inanity. No intellectual construction can withstand such analysis; the purpose of Madhyamaka is to reduce to total silence the restless, questing
intellect, forever condemned to one-sidedness and a specific viewpoint.
A mental stillness supervenes, and conceptual elaboration is annihilated,
making possible an insight that lies beyond thought construction. This
prepares the ground for the experience of shūnyatā, emptiness itself.[6] The position of Madhyamaka thus resembles the Kantian critique in
modern Western philosophy, but as T. R. V. Murti suggests, it goes far beyond Kant in perceiving that criticism may itself yield wisdom and provide the ground for a spiritual path.[7]
In his account, Shāntideva surveys the range of Madhyamaka arguments as these had been played out from Nāgārjuna until his own time.
The ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyāvatāra thus presents an encyclopedic overview, which is extremely useful for the understanding of the system itself. It devotes considerable space to the refutation of the realism of
the Vaibhāshika and Sautrāntika schools, the belief in the ultimate existence of indivisible particles of matter and instants of consciousness. This
was the prime object of Nāgārjuna's polemic. Then there is a dismantling
of the theories of the early Hindu Sāṃkhya school, and a critique of the
Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaisheshika schools of Indian philosophy, to which
Nāgārjuna's great disciple Āryadeva devoted particular attention. This is complemented by a lengthy account of the (Buddhist) Vijñānavāda (in
the sense of a tenet system), which is presented and refuted in the spirit of
Chandrakīrti. Coming after Chandrakīrti, and apparently adopting his
position with regard to the Mind Only school, Shāntideva is usually considered to belong to the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka school.[8]
Even in the earlier chapters of the Bodhicharyāvatāra, well before
turning explicitly to metaphysical questions, it is evident that Shāntideva
is constantly preoccupied with the view of emptiness and the implications
of this in all aspects of the Bodhisattva path. The questions he asks about
the nature of mental defilements, at the end of chapter 4, and the sudden discussion of the self in chapter 6, to take just two examples, show that the
philosophical perspective is always very close to the surface. And the most
remarkable feature of the ninth chapter, taken within the context of the
Bodhicharyāvatāra as a whole, is that it shows that the wisdom of emptiness is not merely relevant to Bodhisattva training, it is actually indispensable. Shāntideva demonstrates that, far from being a matter of rarified metaphysics or academic discussion removed from the concerns of practical existence, Madhyamaka is fundamentally a vision and a way of life. It is the ultimate heart and soul of the Buddha's teaching. In the twenty or so stanzas at the end of the ninth chapter, Shāntideva shows how it is precisely the absence of this wisdom that lies at the root of saṃsāra and the sorrows of the world; and he poignantly concludes his message with verses of great beauty and pathos.
