1. Contextualizing the Debates
The polemics in nineteenth-century Tibet between Mipham Rinpoche, on one side, and Drakar Tulku (Brag dkar sprul sku) and Pari Lobsang Rabsel (Dpa' ris blo bzang rab gsal), on the other side,[1] produced a vibrant discourse spanning more than thirty years centered around Mipham's Ketaka Jewel.[2] This work, completed in 1878, is a commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of Śāntideva's Way of the Bodhisattva (Bodhicaryāvatāra), revealing Mipham's interpretation of Śāntideva's thought through the lens of his own understanding of Madhyamaka that was inspired by his master Patrul Rinpoche (Dpal sprul rin po che).
The ensuing polemics unfolded through written exchanges between Mipham, representing the Nyingma tradition, and his critics from the Geluk school: Drakar Tulku, a scholar from Loseling College of Drepung Monastery ('Bras spungs blo gsal gling); Pari Lobsang Rabsel from Kumbum (Sku 'bum) in Amdo; and Denma Lobsang Chöying (Ldan ma blo bzang chos dbyings), also from Drepung Loseling. Their works include critiques of the opponent's view as well as defenses of their own. The chronology of texts exchanged spans thirty years of intense debate about the correct understanding of the two truths, the relationship between the perfections, and the realization of arhats. The first polemical exchanges started in 1888 between Mipham and Drakar Tulku, when the latter composed A Discourse that Pleases Scholars (Blo gsal dga' ba'i gtam).[3] They were followed a decade later by another debate with Pari Rabsel, who wrote in 1897 a refutation of Mipham's Ketaka Jewel entitled The Cuckoo[4] of Magical Reasoning (Rigs 'phrul dpyid kyi pho nya). This discussion continued through a series of works including critiques and defenses.
Mipham and Drakar Tulku's Main Points of Contention
Taken as a whole, the polemical exchanges between Mipham and these Gelukpa scholars represent a corpus of sophisticated philosophical discussions about doctrinal ideas and interpretations of Madhyamaka. This dialogue not only illustrates the depth of Tibetan scholastic debates but also the systematic nature of the positions defended by the various protagonists. In The Light of the Day Star, his reply to Drakar Tulku's refutation of the Ketaka Jewel, Mipham identifies eight main topics:[5]
1. Conventional phenomena as mental imputations: The discussion covers central ideas at the core of the Madhyamaka tradition regarding the nature of phenomena and what in relation to this should be negated to put an end to delusion—namely, what is the "object of negation" (dgag bya). Mipham begins by interpreting the statement that phenomena are imputations of thought, leading into a deep analysis of the object of negation and the two truths. This question elaborates on the differences between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika approaches, highlighting confusions in their improper distinction.
2. Self-clinging and phenomenal existence: This topic deals with the problem of self-clinging in relation to the aggregates, addressing how personal and phenomenal clinging affect the realization of emptiness.
3 & 4. Realization of the Hīnayāna arhats: Mipham discusses how Hīnayāna arhats realize the four noble truths and whether this realization leads to true liberation or a partial understanding of emptiness. In his view, this question is crucial, as he takes BCA 9.40–48 as demonstrating the superiority of bodhisattvas over arhats with regard to their respective realization of emptiness, whereas his Geluk opponents understand this verse as admonishing śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas to realize emptiness as the absence of inherent existence.
5. Obscuration through defilement: This topic examines how the apprehension of real existence is classified as an afflictive obscuration. This doctrinal point is included in the eight difficult points of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka philosophy according to the Geluk school.
6. The two truths: The sixth topic is focused on the two truths, emphasizing the need for a correct understanding of the two truths to clear doubts about whether conventional phenomena are established by valid cognition.
7. The reflexive awareness: In agreement with the position he expressed in his Ketaka Jewel, Mipham rejects the Gelukpa view that the self-cognizing mind does not exist even on the conventional level, an issue of great doctrinal importance that is part of the "eight great difficult points" of Prāsaṅgika.
8. The eight difficult points of Prāsaṅgika: This final topic wraps up the discussion by briefly reviewing the eight difficult points of Prāsaṅgika in the Geluk tradition, summarizing through this lens the core issues debated throughout the text.[6] This list of difficult points and their related interpretation sets apart the Geluk doctrinal system from those of the other Tibetan schools.
Mipham and Pari Rabsel’s Main Points of Contention
Some of these doctrinal issues are also discussed in the debate between Mipham and Pari Rabsel. The structure of their discussion follows Pari Rabsel's initial critique of Mipham's Ketaka Jewel, in which he structures his criticisms against Mipham's positions into two broad categories. The first category, labeled "faults of great impudence" (spyi brtol che ba'i nyes pa), includes two topics: the relationship between the six perfections and the cause leading to the cessation of the fixation on a self. The second category, entitled "faults that are raised after investigation" (brtag zin bslang ba'i nyes pa), also comprises two topics, dealing with issues he considers to be doctrinally more significant: the two truths and the realization of arhats and bodhisattvas.[7] Each topic pertains to specific verses of Śantideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA), highlighting their interpretative differences:
1. The relationship between the six perfections (BCA 9.1): The opening verse of the ninth chapter, BCA 9.1 discusses the role of wisdom (prajñā, shes rab) on the bodhisattva path. Mipham stresses the importance of the perfection of wisdom, which he sees as central to attain awakening. In his view, although other perfections such as ethical discipline and patience are foundational, their purpose is to develop wisdom, the true realization of the nature of reality. Pari Rabsel, for his part, in line with earlier Gelukpa commentaries, defends the position that wisdom must be supported by a strong foundation in all other perfections, a necessary requirement to eliminate the most subtle obscurations on the path toward buddhahood. These perfections therefore collectively contribute to the realization of ultimate truth through the vast accumulation of merit performed by bodhisattvas. His understanding of the relationship between the six perfections stresses the importance of the bodhisattva's inconceivable accumulation of merit, which is not necessarily a prerequisite for the complete realization of emptiness according to the Geluk tradition.
2. The cause leading to the cessation of the fixation on a self (BCA 9.78): BCA 9.78 addresses the cultivation of selflessness as a means to counteract the fixation on the notion of a self. The debate about this verse stems from Mipham's idiosyncratic grammatical reading of BCA 9.78, which results in an original interpretation that differs from that of authoritative Indian sources such as Prajñākaramati.[8] In the Ketaka Jewel and the ensuing discussions, Mipham offers explanations of his position according to which the concept of a self itself is thematized as the main problem, not that of a truly established self, a qualifier that is added by Geluk scholars when reading this verse. He also criticizes the idea that the grasping of a self with regard to phenomena is causally leading to grasping a self in persons. Conversely, in Pari Rabsel's view, the conceptualization of things as truly established is seen as the cause of suffering. As a consequence, Pari Rabsel understands delusion (rmongs pa) as the grasping of a self with regard to phenomena—the cause, and egotism or pride (nga rgyal) as the grasping of a self with regard to persons—the effect.
3. The two truths (BCA 9.2): Bodhicaryāvatāra 9.2 plays a pivotal role in how the ultimate and conventional truths are conceived. Mipham advocates a strongly nondualistic approach to the two truths in which they are considered to be, on the ultimate level, inseparable (Tib. dbyer med) or in complete union (zung 'jug). According to Mipham, the ultimate is beyond dualistic cognition. In line with the Geluk standard position on this topic, Pari Rabsel emphasizes a somewhat stronger demarcation between the two truths. He argues that a distinction is necessary to prevent confusion between the ultimate emptiness of phenomena and their conventional existence. This distinction is crucial for avoiding nihilistic misinterpretations of emptiness and ensuring that ethical conduct, grounded in the conventional truth, is maintained.
4. The realization of arhats and bodhisattvas (BCA 9.41–49): A series of verses from BCA 9.41 to 9.49 discuss the necessity of realizing emptiness for achieving liberation. Mipham interprets these verses as teaching the superiority of the Mahāyāna path, since, in his view, only bodhisattvas attain a complete realization of emptiness as they realize the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. For Mipham, since arhats do not attain this level of realization, they are not completely liberated. Pari Rabsel's interpretation is rooted in the Gelukpa understanding of this topic. He contends that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas must necessarily have a complete realization of emptiness since they attain liberation.
Mapping and Reorganizing the Main Issues in Both Debates
Unraveling Mipham's and Pari Rabsel's net of arguments is a daunting task, as their polemical exchanges can be extremely technical.[9] Moreover, their exchanges do not follow the logical flow of thought upon which their respective doctrinal systems are built. To illustrate this point, Mipham follows in his Ketaka Jewel the order of the verses found in the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra. As a consequence, his refutation of the Geluk views is not a systematic critique based on a clear logical structure as found, for example, in Gorampa's Distinguishing the View (Lta ba'i shan 'byed). For example, the topic of verse 9.1 is about the relationship between the six perfections, while verse 9.2 is about the two truths. However, the divergence of views among commentators regarding verse 9.1 only becomes clear when one reads their interpretations of subsequent verses related to the two truths, the object of negation, and the realization of arhats and bodhisattvas. To further complicate the matter, points of contention are listed across the polemical texts exchanged between the debate participants, often without clarifying how they are related to one another, which makes it difficult to understand why some points are even made.
Drakar Tulku's refutation of Mipham's Ketaka Jewel, entitled A Pleasurable Discourse, is helpful to better understand the relationships between the various debate topics.[10] He divides his critique into two parts. The first part is focused on the negation object, and the second part is focused on the nonexistence of the self in which he gives his own interpretation of the two truths. These two topics are the main issues debated by Mipham and the Gelukpa scholars. They include subtopics such as the four extremes, the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, and the existence on the conventional level of the reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana, rang rig) and the ground consciousness (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam shes). All other points under discussion can be considered as subsidiary since their resolution is directly derived from the participants' views on the main topics. For the sake of clarity, the various points of contention mentioned in the debaters' writings can therefore be rearranged in the following way:
1. Main topics related to the interpretation of Madhyamaka
- 1.1. The object of negation (BCA 9.2)
- 1.2. The two truths (BCA 9.2)
2. Subsidiary topics related to specific doctrinal points
- 2.1. The relationship between the six perfections (BCA 9.1)
- 2.2. The realization of arhats and bodhisattvas (BCA 9.41–49)
Understanding the systemic nature of the debaters' respective interpretations of Madhyamaka—and how they directly impact their comprehension of specific doctrinal points—is key to making sense of the debates and their relation to the source text, Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra.
2. The Geluk Interpretation of Madhyamaka Criticized by Mipham in the Ketaka Jewel
The starting point of the exchanges between the debate participants is Mipham's Ketaka Jewel in which he criticizes the Geluk view of Madhyamaka while commenting on BCA 9.2:
Relative and ultimate,
These the two truths are declared to be.
The ultimate is not within the reach of intellect,
For intellect is said to be the relative.107Tibetan habitually uses two expressions to refer to the relative truth: kun rdzob and tha snyad. Although they are often employed interchangeably as synonyms, these terms have slightly different connotations. Kun rdzob kyi bden pa literally means the ‟all-concealing truth.” It refers to phenomena as they are encountered in everyday life, and to the fact that their appearance (as independently existing entities) conceals their true nature (i.e., their emptiness of such independent and intrinsic being). In so far as the things and situations encountered in life are accepted as genuine in the common consensus (as contrasted with magical illusions, mirages, etc.), they are ‟true,” but only relatively so, since the way they appear does not correspond with their actual status. We have therefore systematically translated kun rdzob kyi bden pa as ‟relative truth.” Tha snyad, on the other hand, means ‟name,” ‟conventional expression.” Tha snyad kyi bden pa (which we have translated as ‟conventional truth”) refers to phenomena insofar as they can be conceived by the ordinary mind and spoken of within the limits of conventional discourse.
[ src citation ]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Page(s) 137
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
[ toggle Tib. ]
[ tib / wyl ]
ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་ནི་དོན་དམ་སྟེ། །
འདི་ནི་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདོད། །
དོན་དམ་བློ་ཡི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མིན། །
བློ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད། །
kun rdzob dang ni don dam ste/_/
'di ni bden pa gnyis su 'dod/_/
don dam blo yi spyod yul min/_/
blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod/_/
The positions defended by Drakar Tulku and Pari Rabsel in their debates with Mipham are based on the standard Geluk interpretation of BCA 9.2. In his commentary on this verse, Mipham criticizes the very foundation of Tsongkhapa's approach to Madhyamaka with regard to the object of negation, the two truths, and the four extremes. These three central points of doctrine are not isolated elements in Tsongkhapa's philosophy but are deeply interrelated, as they complement one another. In this way, each concept builds upon the others, creating a cohesive framework that supports Tsongkhapa's systematic presentation of Madhyamaka.[11]
2.1. Tsongkhapa's Definition of the Object of Negation
In Tsongkhapa's view, the correct understanding of the central Madhyamaka concept of emptiness hinges on a correct identification and comprehension of the object of negation (dgag bya)—namely, the true existence of phenomena (bden par yod pa).[12] Tsongkhapa identifies the object of negation as the inherent existence or intrinsic nature of phenomena as a truly established entity (bden grub kyi ngo bo). This inherent existence implies that things exist independently, from their own side, without any dependence on causes, conditions, conceptual labeling, or perception. Inherent existence suggests that phenomena have a self-contained, self-sustaining existence that does not depend on anything external. What is being negated is therefore that phenomena exist independently and autonomously in the way of having an intrinsic nature that defines their essence and existence.[13]
Tsongkhapa uses the following terms to refer to the object of negation:
- Intrinsic existence or existence by means of intrinsic nature (rang bzhin gyis yod pa)
- Existing by means of self-defining characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa)
- Existing in-and-of-itself (rang ngos nas yod pa)
- Existing in an absolute sense (don dam par yod pa)
- Existing as truly existent (bden par yod pa)
- Existing with thoroughly [definable] nature (yang dag par yod pa)
This concept of intrinsic nature encompasses a notion of permanence and singularity that contradicts the fundamental Buddhist principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). This principle asserting that all phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions negates inherent existence while affirming the causal arising and ceasing of all phenomena. This approach is characteristic of all Buddhist traditions for which the two extremes of nihilism and eternalism must be avoided at all cost. Nihilism denies the conventional existence and efficacy of any phenomena, leading to a vision of reality devoid of any meaningful interaction with the world. According to all Buddhist traditions, this vision of reality undermines the basis for ethical conduct and causality. If nothing exists, then actions would have no consequences, and moral imperatives would have no grounding. There would be no path toward awakening. Eternalism, on the other hand, affirms that some phenomena (e.g., god, basic elements, etc.) exist from their own side, having a permanent essence that is not causally dependent on other phenomena. This reification of phenomena, attributing to them a solidity and permanence they do not possess, contradicts the fundamental Buddhist principle of dependent origination according to which everything is impermanent, causally arising, and therefore unreliable, being devoid of any permanent self.
Tsongkhapa's definition of the object of negation takes place in this context. By defining the object of negation as inherent existence alone, Tsongkhapa ensures that practitioners do not negate phenomena as perceived by ordinary beings. Thus, although a pot is not empty of being a pot, it is empty of true existence.[14] This approach aims at accepting that things are possible in a world of causal interactions while being fundamentally empty of inherent existence.
Understanding causality and dependence without adhering to the notion of intrinsic existence is, in Tsongkhapa's view, essential for maintaining ethical conduct within the framework of conventional truth while still aspiring for the deeper realization of ultimate truth.
In his interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy, the correct understanding and identification of the object of negation is therefore foundational because it directly informs how other central concepts are understood as a doctrinal system and applied on the path toward awakening. Thus, Tsongkhapa interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy is characterized by the following:
- The four extremes (existence, nonexistence, both, and neither) are employed by Tsongkhapa to systematically negate any conceptualization of inherent existence. Thus Tsongkhapa's logical interpretation of the negation of the four extremes hinges on his definition of the object of negation.
- His distinction between the conventional and ultimate truths also depends on how he defines the object of negation. The negation of inherent existence is emptiness, the ultimate truth, while conventional truth remains valid in terms of dependently originated and functional phenomena as accepted by ordinary beings. Emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid) is often misunderstood either as nihilism (i.e., "nothing exists") or as a kind of absolute existence (i.e., "something transcendental exists beyond the conventional"). By defining the object of negation as he does, Tsongkhapa defines emptiness as the absence of inherent existence in things, not as sheer nonexistence.
- Tsongkhapa argues that the notion of inherent existence is deeply ingrained in ordinary human cognition and is the root of all delusion. Negating this inherent existence involves detailed analytical meditation where one examines whether phenomena could exist independently. Through rigorous analysis, one finds that no phenomenon can withstand such scrutiny—they all depend on other factors to exist. Correctly understanding what must be negated therefore provides a basis for analytical meditation, which is central to realizing emptiness.
2.2. Tsongkhapa's Interpretation of the Four Extremes (i.e., the Tetralemma)
In the Madhyamaka tradition, the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) occupies a pivotal role, serving as a crucial methodological tool for elucidating the doctrine of emptiness and challenging our view of inherent existence. The four extremes can be summed up through the following short statements: (1) Phenomena exist. (2) Phenomena do not exist. (3) They both exist and do not exist. (4) They neither exist nor do not exist. This intricate argumentative framework is employed by Tsongkhapa to demonstrate the nonexistence of intrinsic nature in phenomena according to the principles of conventional logic. Tsongkhapa does not agree with interpretations suggesting that the tetralemma transcends fundamental logical rules such as the principles of the excluded middle and of contradiction.[15] Instead, he argues that these fundamental reasoning principles are fully operational and essential to preserve the truth value of Madhyamaka. His stance is that the tetralemma is not used to point out an ontological reality transcending these principles. Instead, it represents a framework of logic employed to demonstrate the absence of intrinsic existence through a series of rational statements made on the conventional level. The logical principle of the excluded middle posits that for any proposition, either that proposition is true, or its negation is true. This means that there must be a definitive truth value without overlap for any statement—a statement is either true or false with no middle ground between the two. The principle of noncontradiction means that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time.
On the basis of these two principles, Tsongkhapa suggests that none of the four possibilities can coherently apply to the notion of intrinsic existence without leading to logical contradictions or untenable conclusions. In The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam rim chen mo), he analyzes the tetralemma in detail and makes a case for qualifying with adverbs the original formulation of the tetralemma to avoid violating any logical principle.[16] Instead of refuting the two first extremes through the statement "not existent, not nonexistent," Tsongkhapa's interpretation is formulated as "ultimately not existent, conventionally not nonexistent," which can be simplified as "ultimately not existent, conventionally existent."[17] As explained by Guy Newland, Tsongkhapa's refutation of the tetralemma can be read in two ways:
We refute the reifying view that things exist ultimately; we refute the nihilistic view that things do not exist even conventionally; we refute that there is any single sense in which things both exist and do not exist; we refute that there is any single sense in which things neither exist nor do not exist. Or we can say: We refute the view that things are intrinsically existent. We refute the view that things are intrinsically nonexistent. We refute the view that things are intrinsically both existent and nonexistent. We refute the view that things are intrinsically neither existent nor nonexistent. It is not in the essence of things to be or not to be, for things have no essential nature of their own. They are dependent arisings.[18]
In both cases, the statements to be refuted are qualified with adverbs to preserve the logical validity of the refutation of the four extremes under the provision that the principles of the excluded middle and of noncontradiction should be preserved. To sum up, the statement "not existent, not nonexistent" (yod min med min) is on the most basic level of the tetralemma understood as "ultimately nonexistent, conventionally existent" (don dam par med la kun rdzob yod), which leads us to Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the two truths.
2.3. Tsongkhapa's Interpretation of the Two Truths
The two truths in Madhyamaka philosophy consist of conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa) and ultimate truth (don dam bden pa). In Tsongkhapa's view, conventional truth encompasses the everyday world as perceived by ordinary beings.[19] This level of truth is characterized by the way phenomena appear to us: possessing qualities such as form, solidity, and distinct identities. However, Tsongkhapa argues that these appearances are deceptive because they suggest that phenomena exist independently and inherently, which they do not. Conventional truth is thus crucial for practical engagement with the world but is ultimately misleading if not understood in the context of ultimate truth. Conventional reality facilitates social interactions, ethical behavior, and mundane activities, making it indispensable for daily living and spiritual practice. Yet, it is called "deceptive" because it veils the deeper truth of how things actually exist. With regard to conventional reality, Tsongkhapa follows Candrakīrti who, he understands, does not accept the ground consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) as conventional truths.
Ultimate truth, according to Tsongkhapa, refers to the deeper reality that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence. Phenomena that are perceived or conceptualized are devoid of the independent essence that their conventional appearances suggest. Understanding ultimate truth involves seeing through the apparent independence of phenomena to recognize their emptiness—meaning, their lack of an independent, unchanging essence, the negation object defined above. With regard to the ultimate truth, Tsongkhapa distinguishes between implicative/affirming and nonimplicative (or nonaffirming) negations. A nonimplicative negation negates an entity without implying the existence of another. This form of negation is pivotal in ensuring that the negation of intrinsic existence does not inadvertently affirm an alternative intrinsic existence, thereby maintaining the integrity of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka view that rejects all forms of reification. In his system, emptiness as the negation of intrinsic or true existence is a "nonimplicative negation" (bden med med dgag) which leaves no room for any subsequent affirmations that could imply the existence of another inherent quality.
Tsongkhapa posits that objects of knowledge (shes bya) encompass all phenomena that can be cognized, ranging from ordinary to enlightened beings' perceptions. This broad definition is crucial because it underscores the necessity of understanding both truths to fully grasp the nature of reality, to realize emptiness, and to achieve liberation. From this standpoint, it is not correct to assert that the ultimate cannot be the object of some type of mind since (1) this would be the ultimate taught by Hwa shang in the sense of a blank voidness, or (2) it would be unknowable, and religious practice aiming at the realization of the ultimate would be useless and nonsensical.[20]
The two truths, according to Tsongkhapa, are not separate but are two aspects of a single entity viewed from different cognitive perspectives (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). This standpoint allows for a unified yet distinct conceptualization of reality, avoiding the pitfalls of nihilism and eternalism. In Geluk thought, the relationship between the two truths mirrors the relationship between being conditioned and being impermanent. The two truths are not two separate realms (gcig pa dkag pa'i tha dad) or utterly inseparable (zung 'jug). Just as conditioned phenomena are impermanent, so too are all phenomena empty of inherent existence yet arise dependently. This explains why the two truths are conceptually distinct, although they are one entity. Conventional truth pertains to the world as it is experienced daily, governed by causality and interaction. Ultimate truth, however, involves a direct perception of emptiness, free from the constructs and imputations typically overlaying conventional reality. This distinction is critical for avoiding philosophical extremes and for maintaining a balanced view that acknowledges both the functionality of the conventional world and the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena as the nonimplicative negation of inherent existence. On this basis, Tsongkhapa stresses that emptiness and dependent origination are two aspects of the same reality.
The ultimate goal of understanding the two truths is soteriological—aiming for liberation from suffering. By comprehending that phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature yet appear in various forms, practitioners can overcome attachment and aversion linked to misperceptions of reality. However, according to Tsongkhapa, the ultimate truth is not immediately accessible to beginners, which is why rigorous inquiry and deep analytical meditation are required to progress on the path toward awakening.
3. Mipham's Criticisms against the Geluk Interpretation of Madhyamaka
3.1. Mipham's Critique of Tsongkhapa's Definition of the Object of Negation
Mipham challenges the adequacy of Tsongkhapa's definition of the object of negation, which he perceives as stopping at the nominal ultimate with its focus on nonimplicative negation that fails to transcend the four extremes. Mipham pushes for a radically nondual approach where the ultimate realization involves a direct experience of emptiness free from all forms of mental elaboration and conceptual graspings.[21] This interpretation of Madhyamaka is compatible with the view of Dzogchen, the highest teaching in Mipham's Nyingma tradition.
The Negation of Inherent Existence as a Nonimplicative Negation Is Not about the Actual Ultimate
With regard to the ultimate reality, Mipham Rinpoche makes a distinction between the "nominal ultimate" (rnam grangs pa'i don dam) and the "actual ultimate" (rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam). The nominal ultimate refers to the conceptual understanding of emptiness. It is associated with the negation of inherent existence in the sense of a mere nonimplicative negation (bden med med dgag).[22] It is therefore merely the negation of the first extreme of the tetralemma. While important as a step toward a full realization of emptiness, it is just a doorway that leads to the profound realization of the great emptiness beyond conceptual elaborations or mental proliferations (spros pa) represented by the four extremes: existence, nonexistence, both, and neither. According to Mipham, the concept of the ultimate beyond conceptual elaborations is emphasized in the texts of both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika traditions. The difference between those two is that the idea of liberation from conceptual elaborations is described either directly (Prāsaṅgika) or progressively (Svātantrika). Mipham sees this as a difference in methods, not in the understanding of the ultimate per se.
The Negation of Inherent Existence Is Only a Partial Negation of the Four Extremes
Mipham specifically critiques the notion that merely negating inherent existence (bden grub)—as in the idea that the negation of true existence is a nonimplicative negation (bden med med dgag)—sufficiently addresses the full spectrum of the four extremes. According to Mipham, this approach reflects only a provisional understanding of emptiness. It focuses too narrowly on negating just one of the four extremes (i.e., true existence) and therefore falls short of a comprehensive elimination of all speculative extremes regarding the nature of phenomena. Mipham notes that this limitation is recognized within the Svātantrika tradition, which does not accept a mere negation of true existence as the ultimate mode of understanding emptiness. This form of negation as the ultimate, he argues, is also rejected by Prāsaṅgika school.
The Negation of True Existence Alone Is Not a Synonym for Emptiness
As a direct consequence of the previous argument, Mipham explains that eliminating one's clinging to true existence (bden 'dzin) cannot suffice for a complete realization of emptiness. He points out that understanding emptiness merely as the negation of true existence (bden grub med dgag) addresses only the extreme of existence (yod mtha') and fails to encompass the full spectrum of the four extremes. For Mipham, the realization of the actual ultimate entails a nondual understanding of emptiness that is free from all conceptual elaborations. Mipham's critique underlines a profound philosophical division within Tibetan Buddhism regarding the depth and comprehensiveness of negating conceptual extremes in the pursuit of understanding emptiness. From the Prāsaṅgika viewpoint, as interpreted by Mipham, true realization of emptiness involves a complete transcendence of all dualistic extremes and principles of logic, not just the negation of existence. The actual ultimate realization, therefore, depends on the full realization of the nondual nature of reality, free from all conceptual elaborations (spros bral).
To sum up, for Mipham, the identification of the object of negation as true existence, while empirical phenomena are left unscathed, has very limited soteriological efficacy. He therefore advocates for a deeper engagement with the ultimate nature of reality, urging a move beyond the conceptual ultimate to a state where ultimate truth is realized as completely nondual and free from any extremes. By emphasizing the distinction between the nominal and actual ultimates, and by advocating for a realization of emptiness that transcends all conceptual limits, Mipham challenges practitioners to not only negate inherent existence but to also transcend all mental constructs, thereby realizing the true nature of reality in its fullest, most profound form.
3.2. Mipham's Critique of Tsongkhapa's Understanding of the Four Extremes
Mipham Rinpoche's philosophical engagement with Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhyamaka, particularly regarding the use of the tetralemma and the understanding of the four extremes, offers an alternative perspective rooted in his own interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika view. His critique addresses how fundamental logical principles are applied in Madhyamaka reasoning and how the four extremes are conceptualized as a result of this.
Mipham's Critique of the Use of Logical Principles to Interpret the Tetralemma
Tsongkhapa, representing the Geluk tradition, asserts that the principles of the excluded middle and of noncontradiction are integral to Madhyamaka philosophical reasoning. He contends that these principles do not need to be abandoned to understand the tetralemma in the Madhyamaka tradition. Contrary to some interpretations suggesting that Madhyamaka transcends ordinary logical operations, Tsongkhapa argues that these classical logical principles are necessary for maintaining rigorous philosophical discourse. Mipham challenges this interpretation by emphasizing that the true Madhyamaka perspective, particularly from a Prāsaṅgika standpoint, goes beyond the conventional constraints of logic. Mipham understands the actual ultimate as completely eluding the dualistic character of conventional reality and the limitations of logic. As a consequence, he stresses the idea that conventional logical structures such as the principles of the excluded middle and of noncontradiction fail at making sense of the actual ultimate that is both nondual and nonconceptual. This is a crucial point in Mipham's interpretation of Madhyamaka. According to him, the actual (or nonconceptual) ultimate is utterly beyond the grasp of logic, which operates within the realm of assumptions, conceptions, imputations, and conventions.
Mipham's Position on Adding Qualifiers to the Four Extremes to Elucidate Their Meaning
As a direct consequence of the argument above, it makes no sense for Mipham to qualify the four statements of the tetralemma to preserve its logical validity. In response to Tsongkhapa's qualification of the statement "not existent, not nonexistent" to mean "ultimately not existent, conventionally existent," Mipham argues that such a qualification is a form of reification since it is based on dualistic distinctions and conventions. Mipham suggests that any qualification fails to fully embrace the nondual nature of reality as proposed in the highest teachings of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. He advocates for a view where the four extremes are not merely qualified or redefined within different levels of truth but are fundamentally transcended. This transcendence implies a direct realization of the state where phenomena are not framed strictly within the confines of existence or nonexistence. Mipham's critique points toward a state of radical nonduality, where the very notions of existence and nonexistence are seen as conceptual superimpositions on conventional phenomena and their attributes, which ultimately come to an end as the nondual and nonconceptual unity of emptiness, luminosity, and appearance is realized.
3.3. Mipham's Critique of Tsongkhapa's Interpretation of the Two Truths
Mipham's critique of the Geluk understanding of the two truths can be summarized by examining a series of key issues related to the definitions of both truths as well as the doxographical categories determined by them.[23]
3.3.1. The Geluk Interpretation of the Two Truths Aligns with the Svātantrika Position Not with the Prāsaṅgika's View of Emptiness
Mipham's critique of the Geluk understanding of the statement "neither existent nor nonexistent" (yod min med min) in the sense of "ultimately nonexistent and conventionally existent" (don dam par med la kun rdzob yod) points out the similarity of this view with that of the Svātantrika school. In his debates with Geluk scholars, Mipham focuses on three critical aspects of this interpretation, each highlighting fundamental discrepancies in how the ultimate and conventional truths are approached in the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools.[24]
Mipham critiques the Geluk understanding of the conventional truth, which, he argues, aligns closely with the Svātantrika position that things are established at the conventional level through their "own defining characteristics" (rang mtshan) since only the inherent existence of phenomena is negated, and not phenomena themselves.[25] This traditional Svātantrika tenet holds that while phenomena may lack inherent existence at the ultimate level, they still possess distinct, identifiable characteristics at the conventional level that allow for functional and practical engagement with the world. Contrary to this, Mipham advocates, on the highest level of realization, for the Prāsaṅgika perspective, which asserts that even on the conventional level, phenomena do not establish themselves through any intrinsic characteristics.[26] From this viewpoint, asserting that a vase, for example, is not empty of being a vase at the conventional level still involves a subtle reification of characteristics that Prāsaṅgikas reject. According to Mipham, the Prāsaṅgika approach considers that phenomena are empty of inherent characteristics even if they are engaged with by means of conventions used by ordinary beings. In other words, there is no actuality to things, even on the level of relative truth. This understanding of conventional truth leads to a nondual understanding of the conventional and ultimate truths according to which both truths are inseparable (dbyer med), in full unity (zung 'jug).
The statement "ultimately nonexistent and conventionally existent" also brings into question the concept of the nominal ultimate in the Svātantrika school. Mipham points out that, for Svātantrikas, the nominal ultimate involves a negation of true existence, where phenomena are understood to be ultimately empty of inherent existence but are still conventionally valid on the basis of their own defining characteristics. This dichotomy allows for a provisional separation of the two truths—ultimate and conventional—where each is treated distinctly within their respective domains of discourse. Mipham criticizes this approach for its limited scope in addressing the true nature of emptiness. By maintaining a separation between how the ultimate and conventional truths are understood and engaged with, the Svātantrika approach, according to Mipham, must be distinguished from that of Prāsaṅgikas. For Mipham, Prāsaṅgikas advocate for a less gradual method where the distinction between the two truths is not rigidly maintained, promoting a more direct realization where ultimate and conventional truths are inseparably coalesced.
The heart of Mipham's critique, therefore, lies in the assertion that the Geluk interpretation of the statement "ultimately nonexistent and conventionally existent" reflects a misunderstanding of the Prāsaṅgika view of emptiness. For Mipham, the expression that defines emptiness as "nonestablishment on the absolute level" (don dam par ma grub pa) belongs to the Svātantrika tradition but not to Prāsaṅgika, in which any form of intrinsic existence or identity is rejected, even at a nominal or conventional level. Mipham argues that by understanding emptiness in terms that align with the Svātantrika's separation of the two truths and their approach to the nominal ultimate, the Geluk interpretation ends up referring through a conceptual approach to a level of realization that fundamentally escapes conceptualization. As a consequence, the Geluk approach, he suggests, fails to fully capture the Prāsaṅgika's emphasis on the absolute nonestablishment of all phenomena, free from any conceptual elaboration or dualistic distinction, that transcends conventional logical and conceptual limitations.
3.3.2. Mipham's Refutation of the Geluk Assertion on the Ultimate as an Object of the Mind
Mipham Rinpoche provides a detailed critique of the Geluk view that the ultimate truth can be an object of the mind (don dam as shes bya). His refutation is anchored in the Prāsaṅgika view formulated above, which, he argues, emphasizes the absence of all dualistic conceptions in the realization of the ultimate.[27]
The Realization of the Ultimate Is Beyond Dualistic Mind
Mipham challenges the idea that the ultimate can be grasped or conceptualized by the mind. According to him, the ultimate, or emptiness, is fundamentally beyond the scope of dualistic thought processes and intellectual categorization.[28] This assertion aligns with the core Mahāyāna teachings, particularly those found in the Prajñāpāramitā texts, which describe the absolute as inconceivable and inexpressible. In agreement with this, Mipham understands the true realization of the ultimate as fundamentally nondual and beyond the reach of any referential or conceptual mind operating within the realm of dualistic distinctions such as subject and object. According to Mipham, the ultimate is free from all conceptual elaborations (or mental proliferations) and cannot be captured through the dualistic language or thought processes that characterize ordinary cognitive functions. It is not an entity that exists in the way conventional objects do. Mipham emphasizes that any attempt to conceptualize or objectify the ultimate as something "real" or "existent," even in a subtle way, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of emptiness. He therefore asserts that any realization or experience of the ultimate that involves a dualistic framework cannot be the true realization of noble beings but is merely a conceptual approximation of their awakened state. The ultimate reality, or emptiness, transcends not only the conceptual dichotomies of existence and nonexistence but also the very structure of cognition Mipham challenges the idea that the ultimate can be grasped or conceptualized by the mind. According to him, the ultimate, or emptiness, is fundamentally beyond the scope of dualistic thought processes and intellectual categorization. This assertion aligns with the core Mahāyāna teachings, particularly those found in the Prajñāpāramitā texts, which describe the absolute as inconceivable and inexpressible. In agreement with this, Mipham understands the true realization of the ultimate as fundamentally nondual and beyond the reach of any referential or conceptual mind operating within the realm of dualistic distinctions such as subject and object. According to Mipham, the ultimate is free from all conceptual elaborations (or mental proliferations) and cannot be captured through the dualistic language or thought processes that characterize ordinary cognitive functions. It is not an entity that exists in the way conventional objects do. Mipham emphasizes that any attempt to conceptualize or objectify the ultimate as something "real" or "existent," even in a subtle way, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of emptiness. He therefore asserts that any realization or experience of the ultimate that involves a dualistic framework cannot be the true realization of noble beings but is merely a conceptual approximation of their awakened state. The ultimate reality, or emptiness, transcends not only the conceptual dichotomies of existence and nonexistence but also the very structure of cognition that divides experience into perceiver and perceived, subject and object. Mipham argues that while conventional teachings use terms and concepts to guide practitioners toward an understanding of emptiness, these teachings should not be mistaken for the direct realization of emptiness itself.
Doctrinal Positions Correspond to Various Cognitive Perspectives
Mipham also addresses the need to contextualize the understanding of the ultimate based on different perspectives. From a conventional standpoint, it might appear that the ultimate is a knowable entity because ordinary language and conceptual thought allow for such a designation. However, Mipham emphasizes that this is merely a negative determination through elimination (rnam bcad) of inherent existence and not a positive determination (yongs gcod) establishing an actual thing. Since this approach is anchored in the realm of conceptualizations, it can only be meant to guide practitioners toward a deeper understanding of nonduality and nonconceptuality. It does not reflect the true nature of the ultimate, which cannot be objectified or known in the same way that phenomena within the realm of dualistic existence are known. In Mipham's interpretation of Madhyamaka, this implies that three forms of discourses on the two truths are valid to describe different epistemological and cognitive situations: ordinary beings' daily lives, the post-meditation state during which teachings are imparted, and the nonconceptual state of absorption of realized beings. However, from the last of these three ascending perspectives, the notion that the ultimate is an object of knowledge is untenable. From the highest viewpoint of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, positing the ultimate as an object of the mind implies a reification that contradicts the fundamental nature of emptiness, which is a total absence of inherent characteristics. Thus, while words and teachings can point toward the ultimate and facilitate a conceptual understanding, they do not convey the direct experience of it.
However, for beginners and ordinary beings in general, using language and conceptual frameworks as tools is necessary on the path to understand emptiness. Mipham points out that descriptions of the ultimate as a knowable thing or an object of the mind are acceptable only within the framework of a negative determination—a method used to eliminate wrong views without affirmatively establishing anything. This approach, he explains, is consistent with the Prāsaṅgika methodology, which seeks to deconstruct all philosophical positions without positing any definitive statements about the ultimate reality itself. Mipham criticizes other interpretations that suggest the ultimate can be positively established or directly known as an object would be, arguing that such views fall into the trap of reification and fail to transcend dualistic thinking.
The Nature of Reality Is Ineffable
Mipham's critique highlights an important aspect of Buddhist philosophy concerning the role of knowledge and cognition on the path toward enlightenment. By refuting the notion that the ultimate can be an object of the mind, he underscores the ineffable nature of true realization, which transcends the limits of conventional epistemology and cognitive processes. The path to understanding the ultimate involves, in his view, transcending the ordinary ways of knowing and experiencing. This perspective challenges practitioners to move beyond a mere intellectual understanding of emptiness, encouraging them to engage in practices such as Dzogchen that lead to a direct, nonconceptual realization of the ultimate. From this standpoint, Mipham recommends a profound engagement with the practice of nonconceptual meditation, where the dualistic distinctions between subject and object, knower and known, dissolve. This practice, he suggests, is the true path to realizing the ultimate, as it transcends the limitations imposed by language and conceptual thought.
3.3.3. Mipham's Refutation of the Geluk Understanding of the Relationship between the Two Truths
Mipham Rinpoche's critical analysis of the Geluk statement regarding the two truths—specifically, the claim that they are one in essence but distinct with regard to their aspect (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad)—underscores another fundamental doctrinal divergence between the Prāsaṅgika view he advocates and the Geluk interpretation led by Tsongkhapa.
The Two Truths Are in a State of Unity (zung 'jug)
Mipham argues that the two truths, conventional and ultimate, are not merely complementary but in a state of complete unity or inseparability. Contrary to the Geluk assertion that delineates a distinction of aspects between the two, Mipham's Prāsaṅgika view suggests that such a separation, while appropriate for beginners, is a conceptual fabrication that does not hold at the ultimate level of analysis. He contends that the ultimate reality, or emptiness, permeates all phenomena, thus there is no true distinction in their essence. On the conventional level, phenomena appear to exist independently and possess distinctive characteristics. However, these appearances are themselves empty of inherent existence. In fact, there is no actuality as to how things appear on this level of reality too. As a consequence, Mipham criticizes the notion that phenomena can be established on the basis of their own characteristics even conventionally. He argues that this stance subtly reaffirms the notion of intrinsic nature, which contradicts the core Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness. According to Mipham, even on the conventional level, phenomena cannot be established through any intrinsic characteristics but are designated merely through dependent origination and conceptual imputation by means of conventions. This lack of any actuality or essence on both the conventional and ultimate levels is the basis for the fundamental unity of the two truths as the one truth:
- The great sphere (thig le chen po) of reality, the one truth, is therefore none other than this nondual and nonconceptual cognitive state in which there are no ontological and cognitive distinctions in terms of existence and nonexistence, subject and object, and in which the primordially present Buddhahood is not distinct from one's own nature of mind.[29]
The Unity of the Two Truths Is Beyond Conceptual Extremes
Mipham's critique extends to the understanding of the unity of the two truths, which he describes as beyond the four conceptual extremes: existence, nonexistence, both, and neither. He emphasizes that the ultimate understanding of reality transcends these dualistic categorizations and is thus free from mental proliferations. This state of freedom from conceptual elaborations means that all extremes are equally negated—not just the extreme of eternalism (the belief in true existence) but also nihilism (the belief in true nonexistence), and any combination or negation thereof. This perspective posits that the ultimate truth, while it can be pointed to through conventional truth, cannot be fully captured or defined by it. In this light, the ultimate truth is not an object of the mind that can be comprehended or grasped through ordinary cognitive processes or even through sophisticated philosophical analysis. It can only be realized directly through nonconceptual wisdom that transcends dualistic distinctions between subject and object.
The Ultimate Is Free from Assertions and Conceptual Elaborations
As a direct consequence of the previous argument, a key aspect of Mipham's refutation is his insistence on the absence of assertions (khas len) in the ultimate realization of the two truths. By this, he means that the ultimate is not something that can be positively affirmed or negated through philosophical reasoning and other mental constructs. Mipham refers in his writings to the silence of the noble beings who have attained complete liberation and realization. This view challenges the conventional approach of treating the ultimate as an objective reference point that can be systematically analyzed, described, or investigated through intellectual or conceptual means. The true realization of the two truths, according to Mipham, involves a direct experience that is free from any kind of mental fabrication or discursive thought. The view based on this direct experience of reality transcending the limitations imposed by language and conceptual thought is the hallmark of the highest teachings expounded in the tradition of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka.
3.3.4. Mipham's Refutation of the Geluk View on Ground-Consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and Reflexive Awareness (svasaṃvedana)
Mipham offers a detailed critique of the Geluk assertion concerning the status of ground consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana), challenging the claim that these aspects do not even exist at the conventional level. In other words, he argues against the Geluk stance that negates the conventional existence of ālayavijñāna and svasaṃvedana. To briefly sum up his argument, these elements are not outright denied at the conventional level from the Prāsaṅgika perspective. Instead, their negation occurs only when analyzed through the ultimate perspective, which aims at deconstructing the illusory notion of inherent existence. However, at the conventional level, such terms are accepted because they facilitate the functional operation of cognition and the continuity of experience without which conventional perception and experience could not be accounted for. Mipham therefore emphasizes that denying these elements at the conventional level would lead to philosophical and practical inconsistencies. For instance, without acknowledging the role of ālayavijñāna, one would struggle to explain the continuity of individual experience across different moments and states of consciousness. Similarly, denying svasaṃvedana would undermine the fact that we can be reflexively aware of our mental states, a fundamental aspect of consciousness that allows for self-awareness and introspective access to one's mental life even in the context of everyday life.
4. The Realization of Arhats: The Geluk Reinterpretation of BCA 9.41–49
The controversy surrounding the interpretation of verses 9.41–49 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra by Śāntideva highlights significant doctrinal differences between the Geluk tradition and Mipham, particularly concerning the nature of the realization of emptiness by Hīnayāna arhats. The original passage of the Bodhicaryāvatāra is understood by Indian commentators, such as Prajñākaramati, as a debate between a śrāvaka who adheres to traditional views on liberation through the direct perception of the Four Noble Truths, and Śāntideva, who argues from a Mahāyāna standpoint that true liberation requires the full realization of emptiness. According to Prajñākaramati, the passage means that those who do not engage with the Mahāyāna path and thus do not fully realize emptiness, even if they have realized the Four Noble Truths, do not achieve true liberation but remain at a lesser state of attainment, retaining cognitive obscurations that preclude full liberation.[30] In other words, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not fully realize emptiness in the sense that they do not realize both the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.
In the Geluk tradition, as represented by Tsongkhapa and Gyaltsap, these verses are interpreted in a completely different way. They are understood to assert the necessity, even for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, to fully realize emptiness in order to attain liberation from samsara, implying thereby that Hīnayāna arhats do attain a full realization of emptiness.[31] Geluk scholars argue that true liberation, or arhatship, could not be achieved without a comprehensive understanding of emptiness, challenging the notion that realizing the Four Noble Truths alone and the mere negation of the inherent existence of the person are sufficient to attain liberation from samsara. Geluk scholars therefore explain that arhats overcome afflictive obscurations through their realization of emptiness and thus attain liberation from samsara. In this approach, the clinging to inherent existence (bden 'dzin) is defined as an afflictive obscuration.[32] They do not accept that "śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack the realization of the selflessness of phenomena."[33] As a consequence, verses 9.41–49 are understood to be a refutation of a hypothetical śrāvaka who questions the Mahāyāna emphasis on emptiness, with Śāntideva asserting that without fully realizing emptiness, one cannot completely overcome the afflictive obscurations and achieve true liberation.[34]
Conversely, Mipham interprets the same verses as affirming the supremacy of the Mahāyāna path over the Hīnayāna, for the reason that the latter's realization of emptiness is incomplete. Mipham's commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, which is based on Dza Patrul's teachings on the text, considers the Mahāyāna approach to emptiness as more profound, highlighting thereby a fundamental divide between Mipham and the Geluk scholars involved in these debates regarding the depth of emptiness realized by arhats. Mipham essentially criticizes the Geluk interpretation as a deviation from traditional Indian understandings such as that of Prajñākaramati, accusing it to be a doctrinal innovation meant to protect the philosophical positions of the Geluk school.[35] Mipham's critique is therefore not only about the meaning of Śāntideva's original verses but also about the nature of the arhats' realization of emptiness expounded by Geluk scholars on the basis of their interpretation of Madhyamaka.
It is important to note that all debaters anchor their arguments in their respective traditions' interpretations of canonical texts, with each accusing the other of doctrinal inaccuracies and misinterpretations.
4.1. Tsongkhapa's Interpretation of Candrakīrti on the Realization of Emptiness by Arhats and Bodhisattvas
In Geluk thought, as articulated by Tsongkhapa, the realization of emptiness is pivotal not only for bodhisattvas but also for arhats.[36] Both arhats and bodhisattvas achieve the realization of emptiness of all phenomena, not just of the person. This realization is crucial for liberation from samsara, which Tsongkhapa argues is impossible without understanding the emptiness of both the person and phenomena. While it is difficult to explain how Tsongkhapa came to expound this specific doctrine, one can venture an explanation. If arhats realize emptiness as the negation of inherent existence with regard to persons in the sense of a nonimplicative negation, it would make sense that this negation of inherent existence and the related realization of emptiness, as an object of knowledge, could not only be applied to wholes (i.e., persons) but also to their parts (i.e., aggregates), and, by extension, to all phenomena as well.
Tsongkhapa uses Candrakīrti's views on the realization of emptiness by arhats and bodhisattvas to support his interpretation of this difficult point. Tsongkhapa's understanding centers around a key statement from Candrakīrti's Entering into the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra). In this treatise, Candrakīrti provides crucial insights into the progression through stages of realization that bodhisattvas experience. He mentions that bodhisattvas outshine arhats in terms of merit from the very first ground of their realization. However, in terms of wisdom, bodhisattvas only surpass arhats at the "far progressed" stage (duraṅgamabhūmi, ring du song ba), which corresponds to the seventh bodhisattva stage or ground (bhūmi, sa). This suggests that until the seventh ground, the wisdom realized by bodhisattvas in terms of their understanding of emptiness is comparable to that of arhats.[37] For Tsongkhapa, Candrakīrti's statement underscores the absolute necessity of realizing emptiness, not just as a Mahāyāna tenet but as a fundamental aspect of liberation itself. He argues that an equally profound realization of emptiness is necessary for both arhats and bodhisattvas, even if their motivations and the breadth of their compassionate activities differ. Tsongkhapa's understanding is that, while the realization of emptiness is essential and equivalent for both arhats and bodhisattvas, the latter engage in the path by developing their awakening mind (bodhicitta, byang chub sems) with the intention to achieve buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings, which is why they must increase their merit and their wisdom beyond the seventh stage.
4.2. The Two Types of Clinging
Tsongkhapa posits that when arhats realize emptiness they necessarily overcome both types of clinging, the clinging to the self of the person and the clinging to the self of phenomena.[38] This contrasts with the interpretations of other schools propounding the doctrine that arhats only need to overcome the clinging to the self of persons to attain liberation.[39] In Tsongkhapa's view, arhats have relinquished the grasping at true existence (bden 'dzin) of the self of persons, which is a requisite realization for achieving the state of an arhat as described in the Hīnayāna path. In addition, Tsongkhapa explains that arhats must have also relinquished the grasping at true existence with regard to all phenomena to be liberated from samsara. However, the path of the bodhisattva extends beyond the arhat's realization of emptiness. This is because bodhisattvas aim to purify not only afflictive obscurations but also cognitive ones for the sake of benefiting all beings, which is essentially achieved through their greater accumulation of merit.
4.3. The Two Obscurations
Tsongkhapa's teachings emphasize that two different kinds of primary obscurations are obstacles to the awakening of arhats and bodhisattvas:
1. Afflictive obscurations: These include emotional afflictions like anger and desire, but they also include the ignorance about the true nature of the self that hinders the realization of emptiness, which perpetuates the cycle of rebirth. Arhats have fully overcome these obscurations, which includes the realization of emptiness necessary to sever the roots of personal suffering. It is important to note that Tsongkhapa points out that the Prāsaṅgika system classifies grasping at true existence (bden 'dzin) as an afflictive obscuration, not a cognitive one, and he therefore posits that this kind of grasping, together with its seeds, is also abandoned by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.[40]
2. Cognitive obscurations: These refer to the subtler imprints of ignorance in the form of habitual tendencies that obscure the ability to see all phenomena simultaneously as they are (i.e., omniscience). At the end of their path, bodhisattvas eliminate these to achieve full buddhahood as they attain omniscience. In the Geluk approach, cognitive obscurations are said to dissipate only on the pure grounds (from the eighth through the tenth).[41]
For Tsongkhapa, the realization of emptiness by arhats is profound and indeed encompasses a full understanding of the nature of emptiness for the reason that arhats are liberated from samsara, which entails giving up the two kinds of clinging. Therefore, arhats as well as bodhisattvas who are up to the sixth to tenth bhumi have the full realization of emptiness, which means they also directly perceive the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena. Yet, the main difference between them lies in the scope and the application of this realization:
- The arhats' realization of emptiness is primarily oriented toward their individual liberation from suffering and the cycle of rebirth. They achieve the cessation of the afflictive obscurations that lead to suffering and samsaric existence. The realization of emptiness therefore serves the function of personal liberation. However, in Tsongkhapa's framework, although the arhats’ realization of emptiness is complete in terms of what is required for liberation, it does not encompass the additional realization required for full buddhahood, which includes the complete elimination of all cognitive obscurations and the attainment of omniscience.
- Bodhisattvas who are on the seventh to tenth ground realize emptiness fully but continue to deepen their understanding and application of this realization in different ways. As they progress from the seventh ground onward, their focus is not only on personal liberation but also on the complete eradication of all cognitive obscurations that obscure omniscience. This ongoing deepening of realization is aimed at benefiting all sentient beings through the eventual attainment of full buddhahood. For bodhisattvas, the realization of emptiness serves the broader function of preparing for full buddhahood, which includes developing the ability to perform activities for the sake of all sentient beings. This involves not only a personal liberation from samsara but also working toward the liberation of all beings. While arhats are considered to have relinquished personal afflictions, bodhisattvas actively engage in compassionate activities, continually applying and integrating their realization of emptiness in ways that directly alleviate the suffering of others. They cultivate additional qualities, such as increased powers of manifestation and the ability to teach Dharma effectively to diverse beings, reflecting a greater engagement with the world.
4.4. The Two Accumulations
In the Geluk view, as in all Buddhist traditions, the path to enlightenment of arhats and bodhisattvas involves accumulating both merit and wisdom. Merit is accumulated through virtuous activities and ethical conduct, while wisdom is primarily gained through the direct realization of emptiness:
1. Accumulation of merit: This is gained through virtuous activities like generosity, ethical conduct, and other practices that benefit others. It helps to purify the mind and develop qualities like compassion, which are necessary to progress on the bodhisattva path. In the present context, the accumulation of merit is associated with the first five perfections.
2. Accumulation of wisdom: This involves the direct understanding of emptiness through deep meditation and wisdom. This wisdom is necessary to overcome cognitive obscurations.
For Tsongkhapa, merit without wisdom can lead to beneficial rebirths but not to ultimate liberation, while wisdom without merit may not have the necessary support of compassionate activities and mental stability. Therefore, in the case of bodhisattvas, it can be said that both accumulations are necessary and support each other. Bodhisattvas have to produce a limitless accumulation of both merit and wisdom to fully overcome cognitive obscurations, as they vow to attain buddhahood and omniscience for the sake of all beings. However, in the Geluk tradition, to extinguish the seed of afflictive obscurations, it is not necessary to produce the twofold limitless accumulation which bodhisattvas must accomplish to eliminate cognitive obscurations, since arhats attain liberation by eliminating afflictive obscurations alone as they fully realize emptiness. In fact, the accumulation of merit is not a prerequisite for developing wisdom leading to personal liberation, but it is to attain omniscience.[42] Hence the importance of the accumulation of merit in distinguishing arhats from buddhas.
5. Mipham's Refutation of the Geluk Reinterpretation of BCA 9.41–49
Mipham's interpretation of BCA 9.41–49 rests on three elements: the root text itself, Indian commentaries, and inferences made on the basis of reasoning.[43]
In his Ketaka Jewel, Mipham engages in a detailed analysis of verses of the root text itself (BCA 9.41–49), demonstrating the following point:
. . . the general purpose of this passage of the BCA is to point out that the spiritual aim of the Hīnayāna tradition, attaining the state of an Arhat, is not ultimate in nature, but is surpassed by the state of a complete Buddha, the spiritual goal that is promoted in the Mahāyāna tradition.[44]
For Mipham, the difference between buddhas and arhats hinges on their complete realization of emptiness, in the case of buddhas, or lack thereof, in the case of arhats. In his view, a partial or superficial understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, as, he argues, is the case with arhats, means that emptiness has not been fully realized. Because arhats do not attain the complete realization of emptiness, they cannot be liberated from samsara. In his view, Śāntideva’s verses demonstrate that the realization of emptiness of bodhisattvas is vastly superior to that of arhats. Mipham therefore challenges the Geluk assertion that the verses in question apply to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who have not yet achieved arhatship.[45] To the contrary, he argues that these verses apply to Hīnayāna arhats insofar as their path and its result do not entail their realization of emptiness.
In addition to this text analysis, Mipham draws on the insights of traditional Indian commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatāra to support his interpretation. He cites authoritative texts and interpretations from masters of various Buddhist schools to show that his understanding aligns with the established exegetical tradition. By grounding his argument in these commentaries, Mipham seeks to establish the validity and authenticity of his own interpretation within the broader Indian Buddhist scholarly tradition, which is that arhats must realize emptiness fully to attain liberation.
Finally, to complement his textual analysis and his reading of Indian commentaries, Mipham employs logical reasoning to critique the Geluk interpretation. According to him, the Geluk interpretation deviates not only from these traditional sources but also from logic itself, as it fails to recognize the integral role of emptiness in the cessation of all forms of clinging and ignorance. In his refutations, Mipham therefore accuses the Geluk tradition of misinterpreting these verses to suit their doctrinal stances, diverging from traditional Indian interpretations and logical reasoning.[46] His main critique targets the Geluk doctrine on the arhats' realization of emptiness, which, in his view, cannot match the full spectrum of the bodhisattvas' realization, since the latter involves the emptiness of all phenomena and not just the self of persons.
5.1. Mipham's Critique of the Geluk Doctrine on the Arhats' Realization of Emptiness
While Mipham does not directly link the Geluk definition of the object of negation to the question of whether arhats realize emptiness or not, his writings suggest that he considers such core Geluk tenets as the main reason why Geluk scholars are compelled to defend their position. If the object of this nonimplicative negation is merely inherent existence, it seems logical that arhats who could realize the absence of inherent existence at the level of the person could extend the same reasoning to the components of the person and by extension to all phenomena. For Mipham, the Geluk school's interpretation of the object of negation is too narrow, which leads to inconsistent positions such as the Geluk doctrine of the full realization of emptiness by arhats. From the perspective of his own approach, this consequence follows from the fact that, since the realization of emptiness as interpreted by the Geluk school addresses only one of the four extremes, it leads to a partial understanding of emptiness, which does not equate to the nonconceptual ultimate realization.
However, based on the Mahāyāna pro domo discourse expounded in BCA 9.41–49, Mipham holds that true arhats—in the Mahāyāna sense, buddhas—negate all four extremes, thus achieving a nonconceptual ultimate realization of emptiness that is not limited to the self of persons but extends to all phenomena. Mipham therefore understands these verses as propounding the specificity and superiority of the Mahāyāna tradition since they emphasize a more comprehensive realization of emptiness beyond the mere cessation of afflictive emotions.[47] He considers this cessation to represent a limited form of realization preventing arhats from overcoming subtle cognitive obscurations and achieving the omniscience characteristic of a buddha. Mipham's refutation of the Geluk position highlights the nonconceptual realization of emptiness, challenging the Geluk position on what constitutes full realization and the scope of what arhats have truly negated. In his view, without a complete negation of all extremes, arhats fail to attain the realization of emptiness as a nonconceptual and unmediated direct understanding of reality. He insists that a genuine and complete realization of emptiness must therefore go beyond the mere negation of inherent existence to include a negation of all conceptual extremes, thus aligning with the Mahāyāna view of ultimate liberation and buddhahood. According to Mipham, the arhats' realization of emptiness is thus of rather limited scope. It tends to focus on the personal self and does not necessarily extend to a deeper, more encompassing understanding of the emptiness of all phenomena. This more comprehensive realization is crucial for the development of the bodhisattva path, which aims at complete buddhahood and the liberation of all beings, not just of oneself, but it is unnecessary if personal liberation is desired. While arhats have overcome the afflictive obscurations that lead to personal suffering and rebirth in samsara, they have not fully eradicated cognitive obscurations. These obscurations, which involve subtle residues of ignorance about the nature of reality, remain until they attain full buddhahood. In Mipham's view, fully realizing emptiness implies the complete elimination of these deeper cognitive obscurations, a state that arhats do not attain. Mipham's critique extends to how this limited scope impacts the efficacy and depth of the path of liberation followed by arhats. This, according to Mipham, is supported by the fact that the path of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is significantly shorter than the bodhisattva path.
5.2. The Two Types of Clinging
In line with the argument mentioned above, Mipham explains that arhats remain bound to a lesser form of liberation that does not culminate in omniscience and full buddhahood because they mainly negate the extreme of inherent existence at the level of the person and do not address the full spectrum of the four extremes as presented in the broader Mahāyāna doctrine with regard to all phenomena. Mipham argues that while arhats have a significant realization of emptiness, particularly the emptiness of the self (selflessness of persons), they do not possess the full realization of emptiness as understood within the Mahāyāna context, which includes the emptiness of all phenomena (selflessness of phenomena).[48] This distinction is crucial in understanding the full scope of realization required for complete liberation in Buddhist scriptures, and Mipham uses it to argue against the limitations he perceives in the Geluk approach to arhatship and their realization of emptiness:
- Clinging to the self of persons: The first type of clinging involves the belief in an inherently existing "self" or "I" that exists independently within persons. This is a fundamental misconception targeted by much of the initial stages of Buddhist practice across all traditions. Overcoming this form of clinging is usually associated with the attainment of arhatship in non-Mahāyāna traditions.
- Clinging to the self of phenomena: The second type of clinging extends beyond the personal self to encompass all phenomena. It involves the belief in inherent existence in all observed and experienced phenomena, not just the self. Mipham argues that true realization of emptiness must also address this clinging, as it is equally a source of delusion and suffering. He posits that without overcoming this clinging, one's realization of emptiness remains incomplete, and thus the practitioner's liberation is not full or ultimate.
Longchenpa, a major figure in the Nyingma tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, profoundly influenced Mipham. His works explore the nature of reality, emphasizing the nondualistic understanding of emptiness as well as the inseparability of appearance and emptiness. For Longchenpa, even if it is said that arhats realize emptiness, this realization cannot be compared to the scope of the bodhisattvas' realization. Mipham draws on Longchenpa's explanations to bolster his arguments, insisting on the superiority of the Mahāyāna perspective, which offers a more complete and ultimate form of liberation compared to the path that focuses solely on personal liberation.
5.3. The Two Obscurations
In his discussions on the two obscurations, Mipham criticizes the Geluk view for understating the necessity of overcoming both obscurations to attain the complete realization of emptiness. However, it is important to note that Mipham defines the two obscurations differently:[49]
1. Afflictive obscurations are primarily the emotional and mental afflictions that arise from attachment, aversion, and ignorance arising from clinging to the self of the person. They include mental afflictions such as anger, desire, and ignorance. Overcoming these is associated with the attainment of arhatship, which is essentially seen as liberation from the cycle of rebirth (i.e., samsara). For Mipham, the afflictive obscurations are the obscurations resulting from the defilements that "come from the view of the transitory collections [as being real]"[50]—namely, the clinging to the self of the person.
2. Cognitive obscurations are not merely the residual habitual patterns left after the afflictive obscurations are cleared but are closely tied to the more subtle dualistic perceptions that persist even after one has a realization of emptiness. These obscurations hinder the realization of the nondual awareness that is a hallmark of Dzogchen practice, where the ultimate aim is not only the cessation of suffering but the recognition of the mind's inherently enlightened state. These obscurations are the cognitive veils preventing an individual from seeing things as they truly are, without any distortion. They are the obscurations resulting from "the belief in the three spheres"[51]—namely, the clinging to the self of phenomena.
Much of the debates involving the two obscurations can be at times obscured (pun intended!) by the different definitions the debate protagonists use for these terms. In his discussion with Drakar Tulku, Mipham rejects entailment made on the basis of the Geluk definitions of the two obscurations that involve statements he made on the basis of his own definitions.[52]
5.4. The Two Accumulations
Just like Geluk scholars, Mipham emphasizes the importance of the two accumulations—merit and wisdom—in achieving buddhahood. However, he stresses the importance of wisdom, which involves the full realization of emptiness, as being crucial not only for transcending obscurations but also for supporting the accumulation of merit through compassionate activities.[53] In Mipham's approach, wisdom is essential to realize the nondual and nonconceptual ultimate as an experiential insight into the nature of reality. In his view, both accumulations are mutually supportive, but the accumulation of wisdom, which involves the direct realization of emptiness, is central for overcoming both afflictive and cognitive obscurations. Meanwhile, the accumulation of merit supports this process by creating the favorable conditions necessary for contemplation and realization. Moreover, merit also facilitates the development of the awakening mind (i.e., bodhicitta), which is characterized by the wish to achieve buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings, further linking the realization of emptiness with compassionate activities. Considering Mipham's understanding of the two types of clinging and two obscurations with regard to arhats and bodhisattvas, it appears logical that he emphasizes the importance of wisdom. In his approach, wisdom is what truly distinguishes bodhisattvas and buddhas from arhats, whereas, in the Geluk system, this role falls to merit, which brings us to another point of contention, the relationship between the six perfections in BCA 9.1.
6. Interpreting the Relationship Between the Six Perfections in BCA 9.1
BCA verse 9.1 is about the relationship between the six perfections on the bodhisattva path, particularly, the interplay between wisdom (prajñā, shes rab) and the other perfections. The debate between Mipham and Pari Rabsel on this particular point shows how their interpretation of Madhyamaka presented above impacts, down the line, their understanding of some verses of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, such as BCA 9.1. The present verse is therefore particularly interesting because it is the first verse in the ninth chapter of the root text on a simple topic, and yet it is difficult to make sense of the protagonists' positions when the progression of the commentary and polemical exchanges do not follow the logical flow of thought, from one's understanding of Madhyamaka down to one's interpretation of a subsidiary point.
6.1. What Is the Debate About?
The debate between Mipham and Pari Rabsel is about the meaning of BCA 9.1:
All these branches of the Doctrine
The Enlightened Sage expounded for the sake of wisdom.106As already stated in the introduction, the ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyāvatāra is an extremely concise exposition of the Madhyamaka view, recapitulating its various stages of development and polemical interaction with other schools, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. It is worth bearing in mind that on that famous occasion when Shāntideva recited his text from the lofty throne at Nālandā, he did so to a public already deeply versed in both the content and history of Madhyamaka. And his ninth chapter was no doubt intended as a brilliant and perhaps even lighthearted exposition of a highly recondite subject to a specialist audience of philosophers and academics. As it stands, the ninth chapter is scarcely comprehensible to the unassisted reader, and an extensive commentary is indispensable. Those of Kunzang Pelden and Minyak Kunzang Sönam are already available in translation, and the interested student will also derive much assistance from the other commentaries listed in the Bibliography. In an attempt to render the root text at least intelligible, almost all translators have resorted to the expedient of indicating in parentheses the different points of view (Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaisheshika, Ābhidharmika, and so on) referred to as the chapter progresses. But it is doubtful whether, in the absence of an extensive commentary, these additions do any more than complicate the issue and increase the dismay of the bewildered reader. In any case, they tend to obscure the fact that the ninth chapter, like the rest of the book, is composed in seamless verse, and is in fact a fast-moving, scintillating tour de force. With regard to the present translation, the aim has been to facilitate comprehension as much as possible, and a certain latitude of expression seemed justifiable, mainly in the way of explanatory paraphrase where possible and appropriate. The interpretation given in the commentary of Kunzang Pelden, and by implication that of his teachers Patrul Rinpoche and Mipham Rinpoche, has been consistently followed. See also Crosby and Skilton, p. in, for a helpful breakdown of the subject matter of this chapter.
Therefore they must cultivate this wisdom
Who wish to have an end of suffering.
[ src citation ]The Way of the Bodhisattva (2006)
Page(s) 137
Blankleder, Helena, and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicharyāvatāra. By Śāntideva. Rev. ed. Shambhala Classics. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2006.
[ toggle Tib. ]
[ tib / wyl ]
༈ ཡན་ལག་འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི། །
ཐུབ་པས་ཤེས་རབ་དོན་དུ་གསུངས། །
དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར་ན་སྡུག་བསྔལ་དག །
ཞི་བར་འདོད་པས་ཤེས་རབ་བསྐྱེད། །
yan lag 'di dag thams cad ni/_/
thub pas shes rab don du gsungs/_/
de yi phyir na sdug bsngal dag_/
zhi bar 'dod pas shes rab bskyed/_/
Mipham and Pari Rabsel delve into the interpretations of Tibetan terms like yan lag ("limb" or "branch") for the original Sanskrit term parikara ("entourage"), and don ("aim") in the BCA verse in question, with differences hinging on whether these refer to all perfections collectively or just to concentration and to what extent they aim to give rise to wisdom. The Indian and Tibetan commentarial tradition on the Bodhicaryāvatāra and, in the present context, the controversy between Mipham and Pari Rabsel suggest that these terms can be understood in ways that either support a sequential, causative relationship between the perfections or viewed as collectively aiming toward the goal of wisdom. For instance, the Indian commentary composed by Prajñākaramati, which is highly regarded across Tibetan Buddhist schools, accepts two possible interpretations of this verse. One approach interprets "all these branches" in the sense of the "entourage" (parikara) represented by the first five perfections, while wisdom represents their leader and the central factor for attaining the ultimate primordial wisdom (ye shes) associated with full buddhahood. The other interpretation sees the "branches" as referring specifically to concentration, the perfection immediately preceding wisdom. From this perspective, only concentration, which is discussed by Śāntideva in relation to meditation, is seen as a necessary step toward generating wisdom,[54] as are the first four perfections for each perfection they precede.
Pari Rabsel, following Gyaltsap Je, Tsongkhapa's student, stresses the importance of the latter interpretation, highlighting the centrality of these perfections in developing the wisdom necessary to achieve buddhahood.[55] In the Geluk interpretation of this verse, the accumulation of merit is therefore emphasized, as it is the essential factor for a buddha's realization (i.e., omniscience) and distinguishes it from the arhats' realization for which an infinite accumulation of merit is not required.
Mipham, on the other hand, regards the perfections as supporting factors of wisdom, comparing this relationship to that of a king and his troops.[56] This metaphor underscores that while wisdom is topicalized as the central principle for the realization of full buddhahood, the other perfections are indispensable supporters in the journey toward awakening. Mipham challenges the idea that wisdom is solely a product of earlier perfections like generosity, instead suggesting a model of mutual support and coemergence as opposed to the model of a sequential, causative relationship between the perfections, where each perfection is the cause of the following one.
Pari Rabsel criticizes Mipham's interpretation of this relationship, particularly his perceived underemphasis on the role of the other perfections in generating wisdom. Pari Rabsel argues for the model where the perfections are sequentially causative, each building upon the other to culminate in wisdom, thus maintaining their integral role and respective importance in the path to enlightenment.[57]
Mipham defends his stance by asserting that both interpretations of the relationship between the perfections—where the perfections support wisdom and where they sequentially cause it—are not mutually exclusive and can coexist without conflict.[58] His approach suggests a flexible understanding of the text, accommodating multiple layers of interpretation. However, he clearly favors the view according to which the perfections, while supporting each other, collectively aim toward the development of wisdom, emphasizing a holistic relationship centered around the emergence of the perfection of wisdom rather than a linear progression leading to it.
6.1. Understanding the Protagonists' Positions on BCA 9.1
The protagonists' view on the relationship between the six perfections is connected to their understanding of the two accumulations (merit and wisdom) as key elements of the Mahāyāna path. Mipham understands the word "limbs" (yan lag) in the root text to refer to the first five perfections and the expression "for the sake of" (don du) to refer to wisdom. On the basis of this reading, all perfections are for the sake of the perfection of wisdom, which represents the main aspect of the path. Wisdom is therefore emphasized not only with regard to its pivotal role in achieving the ultimate goal of enlightenment but also because it distinguishes the realization of arhats and buddhas. It is therefore logical that Mipham considers other perfections as necessary and supportive of wisdom, while wisdom remains the central factor on the bodhisattva path. This stance highlights wisdom as the primary driver in attaining the deepest understanding and realization of the nature of reality, which is crucial for attaining full buddhahood. It is also a key factor for the very notion of “perfection” as a transcendence of duality for each of the five perfections. For example, the perfection of generosity, through wisdom, implies an absence of duality between the giver, the gift, and the person receiving the gift.
On the other hand, the Geluk tradition, as represented by Pari Rabsel, stresses the importance of the accumulation of merit since, in his approach, it distinguishes the realization of buddhas from that of arhats. In this view, the boundless accumulation of merit, accrued through practices like generosity, ethics, and patience, is essential to eliminate cognitive obscurations leading to the omniscience of a buddha.
The discussions and debates around the interpretations of the relationship between the six perfections also highlight the interplay between the view as a body of doctrines and the path as an array of contemplative and spiritual practices. In the context of Tibetan Buddhism, doctrinal interpretations are not just about intellectually understanding scriptures but also about applying their teaching in a way that is spiritually fruitful. The differing emphases on merit and wisdom in the Geluk and Nyingma schools therefore also reflect their unique way to engage in the path through specific practices.
The Geluk school, founded by Tsongkhapa, is known for its structured approach to study and practice, emphasizing a gradual path to enlightenment and the importance of a monastic and scholastic environment. This path involves a thorough grounding in the sūtras before advancing to tantra, stressing the importance of ethical behavior and the accumulation of merit as foundational to spiritual development. The emphasis on merit in the Geluk tradition is aligned with their approach that views the path to enlightenment as sequential and systematic, where the cultivation of virtuous qualities and merit is crucial for preparing the mind for deeper wisdom.
On the other hand, the Nyingma school places a significant emphasis on the direct realization of primordial wisdom or nondual awareness through practices such as Dzogchen. This approach is more immediate, focusing on the primordially pure and spontaneously present nature of the mind. The Nyingma emphasis on wisdom reflects their view that awakening can be directly accessed through a form of nondual and nonconceptual cognition, rather than being solely the result of gradual practices based on the idea of accumulation of what has always been, from their perspective, primordially present.
Overall, both schools uphold the necessity of both merit and wisdom and thus the interdependence of the six perfections but prioritize them differently according to their doctrinal orientations and to their practice of the path. The positions of Mipham and Pari Rabsel in the present debate reflect the differences between their respective traditions.
- ↑ For more on the historical context of these debates, see Markus Viebeck, "Context of the Controversies: Historical Development," in Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism: A Late 19th-Century Debate Between 'Ju Mi pham and Dpa' ris Rab gsal (Vienna: Association for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 2014), 29–38.
- ↑ The reference monograph for these polemics between Mipham and Geluk scholars is Viehbeck's Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 2014, which has been consulted extensively to produce this overview. For a brief introduction to the debates with Drakar Tulku and Pari Rabsel respectively, see Karma Phuntsho, Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To Be, Not to Be or Neither (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 213–14 and 215–16.
- ↑ For a detailed bibliographical list of all texts mentioned in this introduction, refer to Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 323–29.
- ↑ The "messenger of spring" is a name used for the cuckoo that is considered to announce the arrival of spring.
- ↑ See Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (Padmakara Translation Group), trans., The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of "The Way of the Bodhisattva" (Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2017), 62–71 for a detailed presentation of these topics. See also Karl Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition, including a translation of Pawo Rinpoche's commentary on the knowledge section of Śāntideva's The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhicaryāvatāra) (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2004), 557–60 for alternative lists from Tsongkhapa's and Gyaltsap Je's works, as well as the views of other Tibetan Buddhist scholars on these issues.
- ↑ On the slightly differing lists of the eight great difficult points in the Geluk tradition, see Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 35–36.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 99. This monograph provides a detailed examination of the polemical exchanges between Pari Rabsel and Mipham. It has been used here extensively as a reference to document relevant issues in the context of these discussions.
- ↑ Although Mipham claims that his view is in agreement with Indian commentaries, he also adds that this is his own original view. Viehbeck looked at this and noted that Mipham's interpretation actually differs from that of the most important Indian commentator, Prajñākaramati. See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 115.
- ↑ In the list of topics found in Mipham's Light of the Day Star, topics 2, 3, 4, and 5 are related, while topic 7 could have been included in topic 6.
- ↑ See Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 295–318.
- ↑ For this section, the main references used were the following works: José Cabezón, trans. A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992); Thupten Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); and Sonam Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the Middle Way (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2007). For the debate content itself, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 153–55. See also Brunnhölzl, Center of the Sunlit Sky, 562–69 and Phuntsho, Mipham's Dialectics, 56–113.
- ↑ On this point, see Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 49–62.
- ↑ See Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 60, and Guy Newland, Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path, new rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2009), 69–72.
- ↑ bum pa bum pas mi stong bum pa bden grub kyis stong.
- ↑ On Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the tetralemma, see Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 38–41, and Newland, Introduction to Emptiness, 59–61.
- ↑ See Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 40.
- ↑ See Constance Kassor, "Gorampa Sonam Senge on the Refutation of the Four Extremes," Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, 22 (2011): 121–137.
- ↑ Newland, Introduction to Emptiness, 61.
- ↑ For a general presentation of the two truths according to Tsongkhapa, see Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 148–76, Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, and Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 36–43.
- ↑ Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 194.
- ↑ For an overview of Mipham's interpretation of Madhyamaka, see Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 45–56. For a complete study of his view on the topic, refer to John Pettit, Mipham's Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), Phuntsho, Mipham's Dialectics, and Greg Forgues, Radical Nonduality: Ju Mipham Namgyal Gyatso's Discourse on Reality (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2024). Regarding Mipham's view on the object of negation, see Phunstho, Mipham's Dialectics, 56–113. For an extensive exposition of Mipham's refutations of his Geluk opponents regarding the interpretation of BCA 9.2, which represents the backbone of Mipham's arguments on the points investigated in this section, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 150–210.
- ↑ More specifically as a mere nonimplicative negation (med dgag tsam).
- ↑ Regarding Mipham on the two truths with a focus on the ultimate, see Phuntsho, Mipham's Dialectics, 114–65. For a complete analysis, see Forgues, Radical Nonduality, 45–134.
- ↑ On this question, see Mikyö Dorje's position, which may have inspired Mipham, in Brunnhölzl, Center of the Sunlit Sky, 590–97.
- ↑ On this complex issue, see Thakchoe, Two Truths Debate, 61–63 and Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason, 93ff., and 157–58 regarding Tsongkhapa's position and those of his critics. For a detailed presentation and translation of Mipham's argument, see Forgues, Radical Nonduality, 48–52 and 112–15.
- ↑ This is because, in Mipham's (and in most non-Geluk scholars') view, establishing a distinction between the basis of negation (i.e., the phenomena manifesting as if they had inherent existence) and the negation object (i.e., inherent existence) results in expounding a position quite similar to that of Svātantrika: conventionally existent, ultimately nonexistent.
- ↑ For a detailed presentation of Mipham's view on the ineffability of the ultimate, see Phuntsho, Mipham's Dialectics, 175–207.
- ↑ Mipham rejects the formulation that a nondual mind realizes the nondual ultimate in the sense of a nondual mind realizing a nondual object. In his view, such statements can only be made from the standpoint of dualistic conventions belonging to the conventional sphere of concepts and imputations. They are therefore metaphorical and by way of consequence must necessarily correspond to the nominal ultimate, not the nonconceptual ultimate.
- ↑ Forgues, Radical Nonduality, 28.
- ↑ On Prajñākaramati's position on this point, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 126–30. Here, the elimination of cognitive obscurations refer to the realization of emptiness as opposed to the defilements that have been successfully abandoned by arhats.
- ↑ For a complete exposition of basic Geluk doctrines regarding this entire section, see Mkhas grub rje's Stong thun chen mo in Cabezón, Dose of Emptiness, 201–56. The full realization of emptiness refers in the present context to the realization of both the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.
- ↑ For a detailed explanation of obscurations, see section on this topic below.
- ↑ Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 133.
- ↑ On the Geluk interpretation of these verses, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 131ff.
- ↑ For a summary of Mipham's position on this issue, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 136ff.
- ↑ For a detailed exposition of this position in the context of the debates involving Mipham and Geluk scholars, refer to Drakar Tulku's A Pleasurable Discourse (see Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 297–99).
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 134.
- ↑ The two types of clinging refer to: (1) clinging to the self of persons (this is the belief in an inherent, independently existing self within individuals) and (2) clinging to the self of phenomena (this goes beyond the personal self to include a belief in the inherent existence of all phenomena).
- ↑ On this specific point, see Drakar Tulku's refutation of the Ketaka Jewel in Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 298ff.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 134.
- ↑ See Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 348.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 104
- ↑ For a complete summary of Mipham's interpretation of BCA 9.41–49 and his refutation of the Geluk position, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 136ff. See also Petitt's translation of Khro shul 'Jam rdor's commentary on the second topic of Mipham's Nges shes sgron me in Pettit, Mipham's Beacon of Certainty, 271–90. Khro shul 'Jam rdor was a student of Mipham. His commentary gives a detailed account of the issues at hand, which, in Mipham's Nges shes sgron me, are succinctly mentioned.
- ↑ Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 136.
- ↑ In the Geluk view, arhats are considered to attain the full realization of emptiness.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 148.
- ↑ See chapters 2, 3, and 4 in The Light of the Day Star in Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 209–31.
- ↑ Mipham's detailed reasoning and scriptural sources establishing his position can be found in chapters 2, 4, and 5 of The Light of the Day Star (see Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 209–13, 229–31, 233–59).
- ↑ See Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 234, as well as the entire fifth chapter (Ibid.: 233–59).
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 239.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 239. The three spheres refer to subject, object, and action, for example, giver, gift, and giving.
- ↑ Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 347.
- ↑ At the end of the fifth chapter of The Light of the Day Star, Mipham explains in detail the role of wisdom in the superiority of the bodhisattva path (see Blankleder and Fletcher, The Wisdom Chapter, 258–59).
- ↑ On Prajñākaramati's commentary of this verse, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 100–102.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 102.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 104.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 105–6.
- ↑ See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 106–7.
