Property:Abstract
From Bodhicitta
This is a property of type Text.
S
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
A work of the class called Vyákarana, or narrative, in which various forms of meditations are described at length, pre-eminence being given to a meditation or ''Samádhi'' called 'the king of Samádhis'. Its object is to show the process by which a votary of Buddha may rise to the highest eminence, each chapter showing a step in the gradual progress of the human mind in its moral condition, and reciting one or more stories on moral excellence in illustration of the different stages of that progress.
The principal interlocutors are Buddha and Chandraprabha, and the scene is laid on the Gṛidhrakúṭa hill where Buddha expounded the principles of a religion which showers its blessings at all its stages, at the beginning, at the middle, and at the end. (Mitra, preliminary remarks, 207-8) +
The ''Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa'' belongs to the great mass of literature representing the middle period of Mahāyāna sūtra literature. As such it is quite difficult to date with certainty, as it neither represents any outstanding or special doctrinal viewpoint, nor has been much employed as a canonical source in later scholastic literature. It is however still interesting for, among other things, its standpoints on the teachings and implications of emptiness, and its views on arrogance and judging others for their religious views. It also warns against the purely rhetorical use of Mahāyāna doctrines, such as the teaching on emptiness. The text is also itself a very typical example of what aptly can be called "Mahāyāna Rhetoric". (Source: [https://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=volume&vid=73 Bibliotheca Polyglotta]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
What do we gain from reading Śāntideva as a moral phenomenologist? For
one thing, we avoid the procrustean strategy of locating him in the standard Western doxography of ethical positions comprising areteic, deontological,
and consequentialist ethics, and then having to explain away all of the differences between his views and the doctrines central to everyone else in each of those philosophical systems (''siddhāntas''). I have argued elsewhere for this understanding,[1] and will not repeat those arguments here. More importantly, we open ourselves to a very different way of thinking about the content of ethics and moral development than those dominant in Western ethical thought, and we find in classical Indian ethics a way of responding to some important contemporary moral issues.<br> In this chapter, I will first explore a bit more deeply the idea of moral phenomenology and Śāntideva's account of moral cultivation. I will then turn to the use to which we can put moral phenomenology in thinking about phenomena like implicit bias, and conclude with a few remarks about how to imagine the bodhisattva vows in the contemporary world. (Garfield, preliminary remarks, 192)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Garfield, "What Is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva"; Garfield, "Mindfulness and Ethics"; Garfield, "Buddhistische Ethiks"; Garfield, ''Engaging Buddhism''. +
This chapter will explore Śāntideva's presentation of the practice of substituting one's own perspective on oneself with that of another. It will focus especially upon his literary strategies to create in his readers the capacity to perform this practice. A lot of the chapter will center upon the logic and the metaphors within the text itself. It will also consider some provocative statements on the different, but perhaps relevant way a master actor sees herself from the viewpoint of her audience. In this I will draw upon the writings of the renowned Japanese dramatist and theorist of Nōh Zeami Motokiyo (c. 1363-c. 1443). I want to explore the phenomenon of seeing oneself from the vantage of others both in terms of Śāntideva's goal of compassion and in terms of its larger potentials in the phenomenology and ethics of being in the world, as intimated in Zeami's artistic vision. (Gyatso, "Seeing from All Sides," 101) +
Seeing the Interdependent Arising, the Dharma, and the Buddha: Introduction to and Translation of Professor Sempa Dorje's Commentary on the Ārya Śālistamba-Sūtra +
This thesis engages the ''Śālistambasūtra'' through the lens of its most recent
commentary—Dr. Sempa Dorje's ''<i>'</i>phags pa sā lu'i ljang pa zhes bya ba'i mdo don legs par bshad pa blo gsal rna ba'i rgyan'' (hereafter "''rGyan''," English: ''An Adornment to the Ears of those with Clear Minds, Elucidating the Meaning of the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra, or Seeing Interdependent Origination, the Dharma, and the Buddha: A Commentary on the Ārya Śālistamba-Sūtra'')—which is also the first and currently the only treatment of this fundamental text which was composed in Tibetan language by a Himalayan Buddhist scholar. While Sempa Dorje claims to merely restate Kamalaśīla's commentary to make it more easily accessible to the contemporary Tibetan reader, I argue that this modern commentary does more than just that. The ''Seeing'' is an exemplary work bridging the gap between traditional Tibetan composition and modern writing – exploring the potential of Tibetan writing to enter
the conversation of academia. It also serves as an illustration of developments in literary Tibetan, and demonstrates the conservatism on the one hand, the innovation in thought on the other, in terms of one of the most central topics in Buddhist thought –interdependent origination.
Jeffrey Schoening has provided the scholarly world with a thorough and comprehensive work about the Sūtra and its Indian commentaries. This thesis builds on Schoening's work by adding an account of yet another stage in the life of the Sūtra. The main part of my thesis will be a translation of Sempa Dorje's commentary, the ''Seeing''. +
According to the compilers, this section of the book ''The Meditative Way: Readings in the Theory and Practice of Buddhist Meditation'' contains extracts from Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''. The edition they utilize is that edited by Cecil Bendall: ''Çikshāsamuccaya, A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching Compiled by Çāntideva''. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1957, pp. 118–124, 228–237. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is natural to think that, if the ego is an illusion, then egoism cannot stand. This is more than just natural, perhaps, if the 'ego' is simply the self referred to in first-person terms, and if 'egoism' is a generalized claim, for example a claim intended in an ethical (or some normative) sense.[1] If egoism 'cannot stand', in some such sense, this would not amount to denying that 'self-serving' patterns of behaviour might predominate regardless; and even where they seem restrained or muted, nothing in such an unmasking of illusion would rule out that roughly 'selfish' motives may underlie generosity, cooperation and the like. The fact that many such motives are unconscious may mean that, for better or worse, a better theoretical understanding of identity and personhood might not dislodge them. But the natural thought, the idea that egoism 'cannot stand', is rather that egoism could not be ''valid'' if the ego is an illusion.[2] That is to say, egoism – ''qua'' fundamental normative standard – would seem to be left without any prospect of justification if 'ego' and 'self' turn out to be illusory and thus disqualified from providing any ontological or referential basis for such posits as 'egoism' and 'self-interest'.<br> Moreover, normative egoism may not be the only view that would turn out to lack justification; the same disqualification might apply also to conceptions of duties that are alleged to depend fundamentally on who one happens to be: someone's legal guardian, heir, senior officer, etc.[3] Some would even say that the disqualification
should go global, in the sense that, once selfhood has been debunked, the subversion must – supposedly – be seen as undermining all of ethics. In the absence of a 'self' for any kind of genuine self-orientation, they say, nothing at all could be justified, at least in the sort of ultimate sense discussed by moral theorists and their detractors – detractors such as existentialists who flirt with a moral anti-realism of this kind.[4] Yet
most would feel that this reaction goes too far. A global rejection of all ethics, besides being so alien a notion as to be almost irrelevant to theorist and layperson alike,[5] hardly seems to follow from scepticism about only one particular kind of entity, such as 'the self'. Nonetheless, a transformation in our understanding of selfhood might well have profound ethical implications – implications ''within'' ethics.<br> Some of these ideas for adjusting our ethical orientation(s) may be 'natural' ways of responding to the claim that the ego is an illusion, but there are two sets of problems to consider: (a) Could any argument be robust enough and convincing enough to justify reconceptualizing what we mean by a sense of self or identity, let alone debunking such basic elements of common sense as these (e.g. relegating the common reference of 'I' and 'me' to the status of a mere illusion)? And (b) Even if there are grounds for debunking the notion of personal identity, be they philosophical or scientific, and even if they seem to be decisive with respect to ontology, must there be any ethical implications, let alone any outright disqualification of moral outlooks that already structure many people's lives?[6] Here I mainly consider the second question; but, reflecting the structure of this volume as a whole, I shall begin and end with some historical context for these questions. (Davis, preliminary remarks, 1–2)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#It would seem that 'psychological egoism' would be even more of a non-starter, as it probably is in any case; but the qualification in my next sentence complicates the task of explaining how and why that would be so.
#The (different) question of whether egoism is ''morally'' justifiable might not even arise, if in this sense egoism is not ''theoretically'' valid – that is, lacking the metaphysical credentials that would be required for a place in any ontology.
#These so-called 'agent-relative' duties (conceived as ''justified'' by their alleged agent-relativity) would also be disqualified by moral consequentialists – who hasten to add, though, that such duties can be important (even crucial) in serving a larger purpose, such as overall well-being. Illusionists about selfhood, not to mention those who critique notions of identity in more nuanced ways, could make the same accommodation, if they share that purpose. There are other views, situated somewhere between egoism and agent-relative deontology, which often go by the name of 'individualism', and which underlie certain liberal views in political philosophy; many of those views would also seem to be threatened – in their foundations – by any unmasking of the self as an illusion.
#We are here concerned primarily with ethics and only secondarily with meta-ethics, so concerns with moral anti-realism will remain mostly in the background; I do include at the end of this chapter, however, a few comments on the intersection of meta-ethics and the metaphysics of personhood (see also notes 34, 37 and 38 below).
#The term 'ethics' will be used here in such a way as to cover more than 'morality'. Global rejections of ''moral'' truth warrant consideration, at least for theorists. Some other chapters in this volume also take seriously Pyrrhonist rejections – even those that go beyond their more usual ''suspensions'' – of moral belief; and yet, insofar as the Pyrrhonist goal is ''ataraxia'', which is meant to be a ''desirable'' state of mind, this goal can itself be considered ethical in a broad axiological sense.
#Perhaps most ambitiously, Charles Goodman (2009) argues that a morally demanding form of impartial consequentialism follows from reductionism about personal identity (in conjunction with other elements of Buddhist axiology); cf. earlier work in this vein by Siderits (2000). For the most part, in this volume, we consider more modest ethical claims – sometimes prudential claims having to do with value(s) agents can find in their own lives, sometimes a moral altruism that leaves open the full shape of whatever moral theory should prevail. Claims like Goodman's, however – focused on impartiality and/or cosmopolitan concern – surface in Chaps. 2, 5, 10, 11 and 13, respectively by Griffin, Davis & Renaud, Ramlakhan, Harris and Davis & Sahni.
A number of scholars have attempted to situate the Buddha's teachings within the primary Western ethical theories, namely consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. One challenge that each has confronted is Buddhism's emphasis on the ultimate non-existence of the self. In his writings, Charles Goodman has put forward an account of how the realization of the ultimate non-existence of the self would lead a practitioner to consequentialism. The present comment challenges the account offered by Goodman, and argues that an ethical-particularist account better squares Buddhist ethics with Buddhist metaphysics. This comment also shows how Goodman's more recent work, while constituting a significant retreat from his earlier argumentation, still fails to motivate a consequentialist reading of Buddhist ethics. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The crucial issue to examine here is the relationship between the Ownership view of self, which compellingly accommodates many of our firm intuitions with respect to agency and ethics, and the various theoretical programs that revise our belief in an owner of mental occurrences. In section 2.2, I address some of the glaring challenges No-Self views face in terms of providing both a compelling, general account of agency, and a specifically convincing account of ethical agency. I argue that No-Self views require re-description of some fundamental features of forward-looking agency and language-use, and I show how such re-descriptions face formidable problems that are better met by an Ownership view. . . .<br> In section 2.3 of the present chapter, I will lay out the conceptual territory of contemporary views on selfhood. My goal is to better situate No-Self views. I specifically set up the conversation in light of the Madhyamaka-Buddhist "emptiness" thesis—the view that nothing in reality has intrinsic existence or inherent essence (''svabhāva''). I focus on Madhyamaka, because its ethical champion, Śāntideva provides one of the more systematic ethical treatises in the Mahāyāna corpus. Moreover, I need to situate Madhyamaka and Śāntideva’s altruistic project in terms of competing Buddhist No-Self views.<br> In 2.4, I cover with greater detail the utilitarian-leaning ethics we may extract from Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' and his ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''. Śāntideva provides us with a version of the No-Self view that presumably aims to derive moral conclusions from ontological insights. Furthermore, as theorists like Charles Goodman have contended, Śāntideva's work aims to justify a version of act-consequentialism, which promotes altruism and agent-neutral ethics.[4] This should be taken seriously, because there are independently compelling reasons to disavow the belief in a real self or a real owner of experiences. So if we can develop a workable ethics out of such insight, then we may have an ethically compelling reason to dispense with our belief in real selves. . . .<br> . . . Finally, in 2.5, I will also assess some of the leading reconstructions of the crucial passages, 101-103, in chapter 8 of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. In these passages, Śāntideva argues that we must endorse robust altruism. I will ultimately conclude, like Harris,[7] that denying the existence of the self fails in any straightforward way to justify an altruistic moral imperative. There may be better ways to reconstruct Śāntideva's work. However, I cannot currently devise a strategy for rescuing Śāntideva's argument (although I provide some original takes on the leading critiques of his argument, while providing a metaphysical option that might bolster Śāntideva’s thesis). It seems to me that the most compelling reason I might have for helping someone—or for being committed to altruism—is through some form of identification with that person. At some general level of empathic identity, your pain might as well be my pain: this is something we can share. At some level of metaphysical description "we are all one," and so any suffering is suffering for all. At some level of social generality, I would want to be free of pain, and I believe that this is a right that anyone who is sufficiently unbiased would have to extend to everyone in a Rawlsian-contractualist sort of way. However, in all these scenarios—pace the Buddhist emphasis on "emptiness"—the important distinction between self and other is always maintained. The key to altruism, I believe, rests somewhere in the paradoxical notion of forging real identity amidst accepted difference. (Maroufkhani, introduction, 39–47)
''Bodhicitta'' is both sublime and practical. Sages have confessed to its rigor in terms
of contemplation and study, but it never stopped them from pursuing it nonetheless. The
philosopher-sage Thich Nhat Hanh was one who had a deep grasp of Bodhicitta which, due
to his many experiences, have given it a twist of ancient and modern – yet all sacrosanct.
The explanations therein may not even satisfy a Western philosopher, yet it need not be,
because Thay’s (Hanh) discourse appeals from a flow of long-lasting Oriental training
which is unique in itself.
The exposition provided for us highlights Bodhicitta as the be-all and end-all
of life, coupled with rigorous meditation and contemplation. He came to a point when
all life becomes meaningless if he alone pursues a path to peace. To satisfy this, he had
to deliberately suspend his Nirvana so as to teach the whole world of a life lived with
Bodhicitta.
The article is therefore both an exposition and a response. Thich Nhat Hanh did
all for the love of humanity, to shed light on the dullness of purposelessness and despair.
Now that the good news has been enunciated, how will the readers go forth? He issues a
few practical tips, all in the effort of making Bodhicitta come “in the flesh.” Again, it will all
depend on those who wish to take up the challenge to enjoy a life worth living. +
Bodhichitta is the aim to attain Buddhahood in order to help others as fully as is possible. The seven-part cause and effect method for generating this aim, and strengthening it once we’ve developed it, takes us through a sequence of emotions and understandings, starting with equanimity, through recognizing everyone as having been our mothers to remembering motherly love and, with gratitude, wishing to repay that kindness. This leads to developing love and compassion equally for everyone, an exceptional resolve and, as a result of this causal sequence, a bodhichitta aim. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
When we look at the history of Buddhism we find that in the Mahayana scriptures two concepts are the most profound, sublime and influential. These are the concepts of Bodhisattva and Sunyata. According to the ‘Vajrachedika Prajna Paramita Sutra the ideal of Bodhisattva is, “Never abandon all beings and to see into the truth that all things are empty.” The Bodhisattva ideal evolved from the Bodhisattva concept of the Pali Nikaya and gradually spread to a large part of Asia, particularly China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam. This form of Mahayana Buddhism influenced the people of these countries in almost every fields of life such as religion, politics, economics, sociology, psychology and culture. It has been rightly pointed out by Edward Conze that the two most noteworthy contributions of the Mahayana doctrine are the creation of the Bodhisattva ideal and the elaboration of the doctrine of Emptiness.
According to Har Dayal, the Bodhisattva doctrine originated probably in the 2nd century B.C. He says,” We may regard the second century B.C. as the chronological starting point for the development of the Bodhisattva.” According to N. Dutta it was around 2nd or 1st century B.C.[1]
Most religions teach us that the communication between the followers and God or Creator is based on an absolute belief in Him. If they have God’s favour they will find luck and happiness in the present and future. But the Buddha differed from this view. He is with the opinion that morality, concentration and purification of mind are necessary for ultimate liberation. The Buddha also exhorted people to stay away from evil not because of the fear of punishment from God but from a sincere wish for the welfare of all beings. He urged people to cultivate good qualities and develop the powers inherent within us with self confidence.
Santideva was a famous Buddhist philosopher saint. Though his life cannot be actually dated from references to him as found in historically datable sources we can infer that he lived in India during the last part of the seventh century and the first part of the eighth century. He followed the Mahayana tradition and has attained everlasting fame by composing Bodhicarayavatara and the Siksasamuccaya. These two books as a whole give a splendid account of Indian Mahayana thought on the theory and conduct of a Bodhisattva. The name of Santideva is associated above all with two extant texts the Bodhicaryavatara and the Sikshasamuchaya. (Sumanapal Bhikkhu, introductory remarks, 1)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Dutta, N, Mahayana Buddhism, Sri Satguru Publication, (New Delhi, 1978, p. 1. see also, Bhikkhuni Gioi Hiong, Bodhisattva and Sunyata, Eastern Book Linkers, New Delhi, 2005, p. 125.
A study of the ideas presented in 8th century Buddhist monk and scholar Shantideva’s text called the ''Bodhicaryavatara'' or ''The Way of the Bodhisattva''.
The paper discuses the historical background of the text: 8th century India and its Buddhist rulers as well as the culture surrounding the large university and monastery that Shantideva attended called Nalanda. The ideas presented in his text illustrate the path to becoming a bodhisattva and developing universal compassion—the path of Mahayana Buddhism. The text discusses the need for these qualities for those who wish to become enlightened for the benefit of all sentient beings (a Buddha). This paper will address preparing for the path, dealing with anger, becoming enthusiastic, and practicing meditation. In order to understand the topic fully and to get more insight into the modern-day relevance of the text, the paper will also mention my experiences with the 10-day Introduction to Buddhism course and meditation retreat at Tushita Meditation Center. This paper will touch upon the ninth chapter of the ''Bodhicaryavatara'', Wisdom, which is the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness and dependent arising, but will not go into detail on the complicated subject. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Before beginning, I would like to offer my deepest respect, prayers and thanks to all those who continue to serve as teachers of ''bodhicitta''. This paper would not have been possible without my teachers in Dharamsala, most notably Geshe Dorji Damdul-la, to whom I owe whatever philosophical understanding I have gained over the last six months. It was, in addition, the goal of this project to further my own familiarity with and understanding of the text, rather than to offer any real "commentary", which would require a lifetime of study.<br> This paper is meant to be read alongside the Padmakara Translation Group's version of the ninth chapter of ''The Way of the Bodhisattva'', a copy of which I have included. I also feel it is important to mention that the format of the ninth chapter very much follows the question and answer debate style common to Buddhist monastic institutions of the past and present. During Shantideva's life, Buddhist and Hindu philosophers debated fiercely over the logical underpinnings of their respective traditions, which is why so much of the ninth chapter is devoted to refutations of Hindu philosophical viewpoints. (Barr, preface, 2) +
Shantideva lived twelve hundred years ago in northern India. He is the author of the Sanskrit classic elucidating the bodhisattva's way of life, known as the ''Bodhicharya-avatara'', or "''Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Way''."<br> Shantideva was by birth a prince, and when he was still a boy, the goddess Tara warned him in a dream about the miseries of worldly existence. On the very eve of Shantideva's royal enthronement, the wisdom deity Manjusri likewise admonished him, so Shantideva forsook his throne and went into the forest to practice yoga and meditation. Later he became a monk at Nalanda University.<br> This story shows how deceptive appearances can be, especially in the spiritual realm. Isn't it difficult to recognize the hidden saints among us? +
Christian Bernert shares some of his thoughts on the translation of the ''Ākāśagarbha Sūtra'', and the impact that 84000 and their donors have in spreading the Buddha's words. +
This article presents the editio princeps of eleven Buddhist manuscript fragments (the "Mannerheim fragments") collected during Baron Gustaf Mannerheim's 1906–1908 expedition through Central Asia, sent to the Finno-Ugrian Society in Helsinki. Nine fragments are in Sanskrit, one in Khotanese, and one is bilingual Sanskrit-Khotanese. Reuter transcribes, restores where possible, and philologically annotates each piece, identifying textual affiliations and discussing orthographic, dialectal, and grammatical peculiarities (Prakritisms, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit forms, scribal errors) throughout.
Fragments 1–2 are small, irregularly shaped pieces too damaged to yield a coherent sense or textual identification; Fragment 1 is tentatively judged the oldest of the set on paleographic grounds.
Fragment 3 is rhomboid, in a slanting Gupta script, and represents a discourse between the Buddha and Kāśyapa on the four classes of "false ascetics" (''duḥśīlaśīlavatpratirūpakāḥ''), correlated with ''dhūtaguṇa'' lists in the ''Dharmasaṃgraha'' and ''Mahāvyutpatti''.
Fragment 4 is a complete leaf, badly damaged, containing a metrical portion (verses 8–16) dealing with bodhisattvas adorned with the four dharmas, with a partial parallel noted in Mahāvastu II; the prose section on the reverse could not be matched to a known text.
Fragment 5 is identified as a portion of the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', corresponding to the printed text pp. 40¹⁶–41¹⁴, with the fragment's readings differing only slightly from the edition.
Fragment 6 (Plates III–IV) is identified as a portion of the ''Suvarṇaprabhāsa'', corresponding to parivarta 14 and to p. 68⁹ ff. of Rai Sarat Chandra Śāstri's 1898 edition (Buddhist Texts Society of India, Calcutta). Reuter transcribes and restores the fragment's stanzas (numbered 27–32 in the source), comparing its readings against Śāstri's printed edition line by line and noting divergences in wording, meter, and vocabulary.
Fragment 7 (Plate V) corresponds to a passage in the ''Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā'', 11th parivarta, but the fragment distributes the same text over two differently-numbered parivartas and shows enough divergence from the printed edition to suggest it belongs to a different manuscript recension, possibly related to Fragment 8.
Fragment 8 (Plate VI) is a complete leaf (numbered 147) closely allied to the ''Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā'', opening with the bodhisattva Subhūti's questions to the Buddha on the "dream-like" and "illusion-like" nature of phenomena, and possibly forming part of the same textual tradition as Fragment 7, though not the same manuscript.
Fragment 9 (Plate VII) could not be identified with any known text; its general argument concerns the invincibility of an irreversible (''avaivartika'') bodhisattva's mind against the hosts of Māra, illustrated by the simile of a lapis lazuli gem placed amid glass beads, whose luster the glass cannot eclipse.
Fragment 10 (Plate I) is a small, bilingual Sanskrit-Khotanese piece, difficult to read, containing scattered decipherable words in both languages.
Fragment 11 (Plates VIII–IX) is a Khotanese-language piece naming the otherwise rare bodhisattva Bhaiṣajasena, offering philological comparanda with other known Khotanese Buddhist manuscripts (the Stein collection and the Godfrey manuscripts), and providing material for Reuter's discussion of Khotanese numerals, loanwords from Sanskrit, and verb morphology.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Tun-huang manuscript[1] of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA) in Tibetan is a different text from the standard version. The BCA from Tunhuang has nine chapters, whereas our present text has ten. In this paper I shall refer to the former text as BCA 9, and the latter as BCA 10. Concerning the Tibetan translation of the BCA, there is a study by Dr. Akira Saito.[2] We don't know, however, why or how BCA 9 and BCA 10 were composed and handed down. So, in order to investigate this question, I shall compare these two texts and consider the differences between them. In this paper, I take up chapter 5 of BCA 10, in which the difference between two texts largely begins.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#ST 628, 629, 630-I, PT 794.
#A. Saito, ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' ascribed to Ācārya Akṣayamati, ''Buddhism and Society in Tibet'', pp. 79-109, Tokyo, 1986. +
This article examines the canonical Buddhist texts cited by prominent Madhyamaka masters, particularly focusing on the textual-critical importance of their quotations. The author emphasizes that citations by masters such as Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, Kamalaśīla, and Prajñākaramati are invaluable for reconstructing and understanding canonical texts, especially when original manuscripts have been corrupted through transmission or are no longer extant. The paper outlines several research projects examining specific texts: the ''Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā'' as cited by Candrakīrti in his ''Prasannapadā''; the ''Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra'' quoted by multiple masters; fragments of the ''Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra''; and the ''Bhikṣuprakīrṇaka'' preserved in Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''. Through detailed philological analysis comparing Sanskrit manuscripts with Tibetan and Chinese versions, the author demonstrates how these citations reveal textual evolution and transmission patterns. The study particularly highlights Candrakīrti's faithful citation method and shows how comparing corrupted manuscript traditions with quoted passages enables scholars to reconstruct more authentic readings, serving both textual criticism and the history of Buddhist philosophical ideas. +
Some Text-Historical Issues with the Bodhicittavivāraṇa by a Nāgārjuna and the Tibetan Commentarial Literature +
Van der Kuijp examines textual transmission problems in the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' (''Exposition of the Resolve to Become Buddha''), attributed to Nāgārjuna. He argues that the work's authorship is ambiguous—likely not by the famous Nāgārjuna I (2nd-3rd century) but possibly by a later author given textual evidence. The essay demonstrates how multiple Tibetan and Chinese translations contain significant variations, creating philological challenges. Van der Kuijp analyzes different manuscript versions, commentaries, and translation lineages to show how the text evolved through transmission. His detailed comparison of the first three verses illustrates specific textual corruptions and interpretive difficulties that arose across different recensions, highlighting broader issues in Buddhist textual scholarship. +
