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From the University of Hamburg Website regarding this publication:
Buddhism in Past and Present
From the winter term 1996/7 to the winter term 2005/6 the University of Hamburg conducted under changing academic leadership (Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen, Prof. Dr. David Jackson, Prof. Dr. Eli Franco, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Dr. Jan Sobisch, PD Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes) a non-curricular study program titled “Buddhism in Past and Present.” This program (lectures, group work, plenum discussions), initiated by the coordinator Prof. Dr. Klaus Glashoff for persons interested to study Buddhism after their academic education, was organised in collaboration with the Tibetan Centre in Hamburg, and temporary with the Buddhist Society Hamburg under the auspices of the Department for Continuing Academic Education (Arbeitsstelle für wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung), University of Hamburg, with the aim of acquainting participants with the rich historical, philosophical and practical aspects of Buddhism.<br> The lectures were delivered not only by teaching staff and other affiliated persons of the University of Hamburg but also by scholars from other German and European universities, and by representatives of various living Buddhist traditions as well.<br> The lectures covered a broad range of topics: the historical development of Buddhism from the beginning up to the teachings of Japanese Zen and various contemporary forms of Buddhism; Buddhist ethics; women in Buddhism; meditation; and violence and non-violence from a Buddhist perspective.<br> With the lecturers’ permission, we are here making transcripts of their lectures available. The lectures were meant for the participants of the study program and should not be considered publications in a strict sense. ([https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/en/publikationen/2-buddhismus-in-geschichte-und-gegenwart.html Source Accessed Feb 18, 2021]) +
With the guardians of conscientiousness and vigilance at our side, and strengthened by the practice of patience, in chapter 7 Śāntideva then moves on to the fourth of the ''pāramitās'' along the bodhisattva's path to enlightenment, the practice of diligence. +
This paper deals with controversial matters, because the life of Asaṅga is shrouded in mystery. His thorough use of the Āgamas, the Sanskrit equivalent (roughly speaking) of the Pāli Nikāyas, permits some intriguing, if not fascinating considerations of the old canon. The old identification by Hsuan-tsang of Asaṅga's early school as Mahīśāsaka is here newly discussed.
The first topic is to establish Asaṅga as a brilliant author. The section "Asaṅga and the Mahīśāsakas (first approach)" aims to prove Asaṅga's reliance on the Āgamas. The section "Asaṅga and the Mahīśāsakas (second approach)" deals with specialized tenets attributed to the Mahīśāsakas. The section "Asaṅga and the Mahīśāsakas (third approach)" comes to a conclusion about the name Mahīśāsaka. Source: ''Untying the Knots in Buddhism: Selected Essays'', 89–90. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
A central question of this work is what a specifically Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics might look like, given that Madhyamaka denies there is much if anything that can be said to be ultimately true. Ethical theorists commonly resort to metaphysical claims to support their views about ethics: think, for example, of the role of the Forms in Plato, of God in divine command theories, of ''li'' in neo-Confucianism. The Madhyamaka claim that there are no ultimately real entities (''dharmas''), with its implication that the metaphysical enterprise simply makes no sense, suggests to many that Madhyamaka must lead to moral nihilism. (Chapter 3 of this volume raises that question in an especially dramatic form.) The present chapter responds to that charge. But it does so in a roundabout way. It begins with the question of whether there is such a thing as ethical theory in the Buddhist tradition as a whole. The answer turns out to be a qualified yes, but insofar as what it identifies as a distinctively Buddhist contribution to ethical theory relies on the metaphysics of non-self, one wonders whether a Mādhyamika can endorse it. The rest of this chapter addresses that question. (Siderits, preliminary remarks, 119) +
In the eighth chapter of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', the Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva has often been interpreted as offering an argument that accepting the ultimate nonexistence of the self (''anātman'') rationally entails a commitment to altruism, the view that one should care equally for self and others. In this essay, I consider reconstructions of Śāntideva’s argument by contemporary scholars Paul Williams, Mark Siderits and John Pettit. I argue that all of these various reconfigurations of the argument fail to be convincing. This suggests that, for Madhyamaka Buddhists, an understanding of ''anātman'' does not entail acceptance of the Bodhisattva path, but rather is instrumental to achieving it. Second, it suggests the possibility that in these verses, Śāntideva was offering meditational techniques, rather than making an argument for altruism from the premise of ''anātman''. +
In this Wisdom Podcast episode host Daniel Aitken joins Douglas Duckworth as they discuss Douglas's translation ''The Great Hūṃ''. Douglas Duckworth is a professor of religion at Temple University in Philadelphia. He received his PhD in religious studies (Indo-Tibetan Buddhism) from the University of Virginia in 2005, and he previously taught at Kathmandu University. In this episode, Douglas shares his journey of becoming interested in the text during his studies in India and Nepal, and he shares the challenges and rewards of working on such a monumental text.
You’ll hear Daniel and Douglas discuss:
*the text's structure, its thematic elements, the profound philosophical implications of bodhicitta;
*the structure and significance of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'';
*the ninth chapter's unique challenges; and much more! +
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No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
At an October 1991 performance of chant by the Gyuto monks, Professor Huston Smith suggested that as the rain forests are to the world's physical atmosphere, so Tibet is to the world's spiritual atmosphere. I don't know whether I agree with his
analogy, but I do find significance in linking Tibetan Buddhism and Ecology in one sentence. In fact, I believe that Buddhism in general, and Tibetan Buddhism in particular, express an ecological attitude, though the tradition itself would not use
what we might initially recognize as ecological language. I make this assertion because I believe that Mahayana is ecologically conscious by its nature, and that tantra, as a mode of Mahayana, is in part a practical working out of techniques which express that ecologically conscious nature. +
Editors as Canon-Makers: The Formation of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon in the Light of Its Editors' Predilections and Agendas +
This paper examines how editors shaped the Tibetan Buddhist Canon (''bsTan 'gyur'') through their editorial decisions and agendas during its formation in the 14th century. Through analysis of catalogues and manuscript evidence, the study reveals that editors' personal predilections, school affiliations, and religio-political factors significantly influenced three key areas: (1) policies on including or excluding duplicate texts, (2) decisions about incorporating pre-existing collections as building blocks, and (3) authentication strategies for works suspected of pseudepigraphy.
The research demonstrates that while editors generally avoided confrontational approaches and favored inclusion over exclusion in borderline cases, they made decisions that were not free from sectarian bias. The paper shows how different editorial traditions—particularly the Old sNar thang, Tshal pa, and Zhwa lu editions—established varying policies, with Bu ston's Zhwa lu edition proving especially influential on later mainstream editions. The study concludes that the Canon as transmitted today reflects not simply an objective collection of Buddhist literature, but rather a carefully curated corpus shaped by the complex interplay of scholarly judgment, sectarian interests, and practical considerations of its various editors. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Der vorliegende Aufsatz enthält die Edition eines Blockdruckfragments der Berliner Turfan-Sammlung, das unter der Signatur U4711 (T III M 195) aufbewahrt wird. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Blockdrucktext, von dem 3 Blätter (davon nur eines vollständig) erhalten sind. Jedes Blatt enthält 5 Seiten und jede Seite 4 Zeilen. Der Anfang des Fragments (d. h. Z. 1—4) ist beschädigt. Nach der chinesischen Numerierung können wir feststellen, daß unser Text das Ende vom Blatt 11, das Blatt 12 vollständig und den Anfang vom Blatt 13 des Faltbuches enthält. Nach dem Hinweis des Kolophons selbst wurde der buddhistische Text aus dem Sanskrit ins Uigurische von PrajM-Ön übersetzt (Z. 39—40: ''y(a)rlïy üz-ä änätkäk til-intin uygur til-ingä praty-a Siri'' . . .). Das uigurische Fragment ist ein Teil aus der ''Vinaya-viniécaya-upâli-pariprcchâ'', deren tibetischer und chinesischer Text sowie einige Sanskrit-Reste von P. Python herausgegeben wurden (Paris 1973).
This article presents an edition of a block-print fragment from the Berlin Turfan Collection, catalogued under the signature U4711 (T III M 195). It is a block-printed text of which 3 leaves survive (only one of them complete). Each leaf contains 5 pages, and each page 4 lines. The beginning of the fragment (i.e., lines 1–4) is damaged. Based on the Chinese numbering, it can be determined that the text contains the end of leaf 11, the whole of leaf 12, and the beginning of leaf 13 of the folded book (accordion-format manuscript). According to the colophon itself, the Buddhist text was translated from Sanskrit into Uyghur by Prajñā-Ön (lines 39–40 give the Uyghur phrase indicating "by decree/command, from the Indian [Sanskrit] language into the Uyghur language, Pratya Śrī..."). The Uyghur fragment is part of the Vinaya-viniścaya-upāli-parīpṭchā [a Buddhist canonical text on monastic discipline, framed as questions by Upāli], whose Tibetan and Chinese text, along with some surviving Sanskrit fragments, were edited by P. Python (Paris, 1973). (English translation provided by Claude.ai Aug 5, 2026)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Buddhism not only offers a system of ethics, it is fundamentally concerned with human conduct in the most ample meaning of the word. Buddhism did face the basic problems of moral axiology, both in its early and late speculations, although its method and vocabulary are different from that of the Western philosopher. Moreover, it is in this fact that we find one of the distinctive characteristics of Buddhism among the Indian systems of salvation. Specially in contrast to the Vedantins, with whom the Buddhists share many common traits in the order of metaphysics, Buddhism places value above being, existence above essence, function above structure.<br> It is in the realm of ethics that we find Buddhism's great contribution to Indian thought. The Four Noble Truths, for instance, formulated in clear opposition to the amoralistic speculations of the age, do not represent a mere statement of dogma or metaphysics, rather, they constitute one of the first expressions of ethical theory in the history of philosophy.<br> Yet, in spite of the evident fact that Buddhism taught a positive moral and ethical doctrine, the accusation of nihilism has been cast against Buddhism ever since its beginnings. More than once Gautama had to reaffirm his position of a middle way between nihilism and realism, moral and metaphysical.[1] In fact, avoiding these two extremes was the main philosophical problem of Buddhism. The question was always "how can we deny 'own-existence' (''svabhāva'')[2] without falling into nihilism."<br> Perhaps the latter schools were more often led by dogmatical considerations than by any sincere interest in safeguarding ethical values; the main issue was, then, not how to insure salvation, but rather how to secure orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the problem of the metaphysical justification of the path would always remain the avowed purpose of all philosophical speculation; thus, beyond
the complicated question of orthodoxy, and at a more immediate and fundamental level, would lie the problem of ethics and salvation.<br> Although ethics is often identified with morality, it would not be pertinent to the purpose of this article to clarify the doctrine of morality (''śīla''), that is, particular problems regarding rules of conduct. The issue is the foundation for the necessity of ethics, or, rather, of human perfection (''pāramitā''). The problem may be stated summarily as follows: how can perfection be necessary, or at all possible, without a substance and essence of the human subject (''ātman'')? There seems to be a radical contradiction between the doctrine of nonself, or, even more, that of emptiness, and any possible moral obligation.[3] (Gomez, preliminary remarks, 361–2)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#1 Cf., for example, ''Aṅguttara-Nikāya'' IV.174, 180, 182 ff.
#''svabhāva'', "own-becoming" or ("self-existence," the term's extension includes the supposed referents of our terms substance, essence, nature, character. I have translated it literally rather than using an inappropriate equivalent. For a discussion of this term and ample references, see Jacques May, ''Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti: douze chapitres''. (Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1959), p. 324, note 328. For the Aristotelian concept of ''ousía'' (ovoia), which is probably closer to ''svabhāva'' than the medieval substance, cf. ''Metaphysics'', V.8, VII.1-6, 16-17.
#The paradox involved in the simultaneous assertion of ''nairātmya'' and ''karmaphala'' was first pointed out in the West by Hendrik Kern in his ''Manual of Indian Buddhism'' (1896) (Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1968), pp. 49-50, the problem has been discussed in detail by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his papers "La negation de l'ame et la doctrine de l'acte" (''JA'', Sept.-Oct., no. 20 (1902): 237-306) and "Nouvelles recherches sur la doctrine de l'acte" (''JA'', Nov.-Dec., no. 2 (1903): pp. 357–450.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The ''Bodhicaryavātāra'', by the eighth century Buddhist poet, Śāntideva, is one of several important Buddhist works devoted to the exposition of the Bodhisattva's career. This ardent and detailed account of the heroic acts and grand ideals which characterize the Bodhisattva on his way to enlightenment has now been translated, with an introductory commentary, by Professor Marion L. Matics, under the title ''Entering the Path of Enlightenment''.<br> Śāntideva was an adherent of the doctrine of emptiness (''śūnyatā''), apparently as taught by the Mādhyamika School of Nāgārjuna. Like many other Buddhist authors, Śāntideva follows the traditional scheme of the successive stages (''bhūmi'') of the Bodhisattva's career, with their corresponding perfections, or virtues (''pāramitā'') in structuring his poem. With the exception of the substitution of several sections on the "thought of enlightenment" (''bodhicitta'') for the traditional first two perfections, giving (''dāna'') and morality (''śīla''), the poem leads one gradually through the perfections of patience (''kṣānti''), vigor (''vīrya'', translated by Matics as "strength"), concentration (''dhyāna'', translated as "contemplation"), and wisdom, (''prajñā''). The poem ends with a chapter on ''pariṇāmanā'', the transfer of one's own accumulated merit to all other living beings.<br> Professor Matics's lucid translation is greatly enhanced by a lengthy introductory commentary, which deals with the historical and doctrinal background of the poem and the concepts of the poem. Of particular value and interest is his commentary on the important Mahāyāna concept of "arousing the thought of enlightenment," the literature on which is exceedingly uncommon in English. Also noteworthy is his commentary on ''vīrya'', which contributes greatly in dispelling a common western stereotype of Buddhism as a refuge for the lazy and indolent. Matics's commentary is based not only on a close and sympathetic reading of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' itself, but also on a vast body of primary and secondary material. (Cook, "Review," 123–4) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1461923 Read more here]
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Combining as it does the theoretical with the practical sides of Mahayana Buddhism, Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatarā'' is one of the best known and most frequently used treatises of the pure Madhyamaka school, of which it is one of the latest productions of Indian origin (7th century). Śāntideva was also the complier of an extensive anthology of Sūtra texts dealing largely with the same topics, the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''; compared with this work the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' is practically more methodical and philosophically more systematic, but the fact that it is composed entirely in verse no doubt gives rise to many a difficulty in interpretation. In Tibet there are a number of important commentaries on this work (and in particular on its ninth chapter dealing with the Perfection of transcending discriminative understanding) which testify to the significance attached to it by the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition.<br> While there exist an English translation of Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' by C. Bendall and W. Rouse (London, 1922) and also two French translations of the ''Bodhicaryāvatarā'', one by L. de La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1907) and the other by L. Finot (Paris, 1920), in English it has been available only in the partial translation by L. D. Barnett first published in 1909 (second ed. 1947, with reprints). Mention should also be made of a recent monograph on the life, works and thought of Śāntideva by Amalia Pezzali (''Śāntideva, mystique bouddhiste des VII<sup>e</sup> et VIII<sup>e</sup> siècles'', Florence, 1968).<br> The present work is therefore the first attempt to provide a complete English translation of this important Madhyamaka treatise. In conformity with the prevalent conception of Śāntideva as a poet, mystic and practiser, it is the religious aspect of the work that seems to have been the focus of the translator's interest. Now in much of the Buddhist tradition religious thought is hardly separable from philosophy; and that Śāntideva was a philosopher is very clear, in particular from chapter IX, the longest in the book, which, as a quasi-independent treatise on ''prajñāpāramitā'' and ''vipaśyanā'', has been the subject of the separate and very detailed Tibetan commentaries mentioned above. But this aspect of Śāntideva's work has scarcely received the attention it merits from most Western scholars, this onesided evaluation of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' being reflected for example in Barnett's abridged translation where the fundamental ninth chapter is given only two out of a total of 84 pages. As evidenced by the work under review this evaluation seems to linger on—at least in the English-speaking world where the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' appears to have come to be regarded as an easy introduction to the Mahāyāna for the pious and religious minded—and to have hindered the understanding of this work as an important treatise of the Madhyamaka philosophical tradition. (Seyfort Ruegg, "Review," 88–89) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/600299 Read more here]
Two months before he passed away, Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche dictated this teaching to Dr. Berzin, had him write it down word for word and told him to preserve it as his most important teaching. It explains in detail the meditations for overcoming the greatest source of our unhappiness and problems – our self-cherishing attitude – and developing, instead, an attitude of sincerely cherishing others, the source of all happiness. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Contemporary normative ethics is dominated by debates between deontologists, consequentialists of various stripes and areteic ethicists with varying degrees of allegiance to Aristotle, with a few antirealists thrown in. That is, moral theorists are debating the subject matter of ethics. Does it concern our obligations and rights? Or is it concerned with the preconditions of happiness or human flourishing? With the maximization of good and the minimization of harm? Or perhaps with our feelings and dispositions? Or is there perhaps no subject matter at all? Of course despite all of this theoretical debate, there is a great deal of common ground between divergent ethical theories regarding the moral valence of most states of affairs, maxims of action and traits of character. We can fruitfully see these debates, and, as we shall see, the Buddhist intervention into these debates, as a kind of generalization of the ''Euthyphro'' problem: Are deontological maxims good because they maximize utility, or the other way around? Are virtues good because they conduce to the discharge of duty, or the other way around? In short, what, if anything, grounds moral value? I will argue that Buddhist moral theory enters this debate not through disagreements about the value of happiness, virtue or duty, but rather by arguing that these values depend on a more fundamental value: our phenomenological orientation toward the world. (Garfield, introduction, 278) +
In this paper I am interested in one specific resonance between Levinas and Śāntideva, namely their shared concern with the moral dimension of conceptual reification. For Levinas, ethics, the welcoming of the Other, requires a self-subverting discourse which does not exclude or assimilate alterity. According to Śāntideva, ethics requires the deconstruction of objects we perceive and conceive. This deconstruction, Śāntideva argues, liberates us from the attachments which result both in our own suffering and disregard for the sufferings of others. Levinas, with his commitment to "unsay the said" of his own discourse, and Śāntideva, with his account of the lack of inherent existence of all things, including emptiness itself, argue that ethics requires the deconstructing one's own discourse and conceptuality. +
Buddhism represents a vast and rich intellectual tradition which, until recently, received very little influence from Western philosophy. This tradition contains a variety of teachings about how to live and what to do in various situations. Buddhism tells us to purify our own minds and to develop lovingkindness and compassion for all beings. The various forms of Buddhism offer systematic frameworks for understanding the traits of character and types of actions that cause problems for ourselves and others, as well as those qualities and actions that help to heal the suffering of the world. When starting a Buddhist path, one agrees to follow rules of moral discipline that forbid various destructive actions; but once the mind has reached a very high degree of spiritual development, the rules are transcended and one acts spontaneously for the benefit of others.
Buddhism upholds lofty and demanding ethical values, but recognizes the need to adapt those values to the conditions of the real world. From a Buddhist point of view, animal life is precious, and human life is even more so. Ideally we should refrain from killing animals, adopt a vegetarian diet, renounce all forms of violence and live in harmony with nature. Yet there are some difficult cases in which violence and killing seem almost unavoidable. Some Buddhist writers have offered guidance on how to act appropriately and realistically in such situations, without abandoning the compassion and lovingkindness that form the basis of the Buddhist approach to ethics. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Blo sbyong, or 'mind training,' is a Tibetan Buddhist meditation practice that helps devotees remove destructive emotions and develop compassion towards all sentient
beings.[1] To have universal compassion is not only a crucial goal for Blo sbyong practice, but is also a representative characteristic of the career of a bodhisattva in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Best known as rGyal sras Thogs med or dNgul chu'i Thogs med, Thogs med bzang po (1295–1369) is a renowned Blo sbyong master. His ''Thirty-Seven Practices of Bodhisattvas'' (''rGyal sras lag len so bdun ma'') has attracted the most attention out of his ''Collected Works'' (''bKa' 'bum'' or ''gSung 'bum'') from scholars even today.[2]
In spite of Thogs med bzang po’s importance, his texts that discuss Blo sbyong have received little academic attention. These Blo sbyong texts are included in different editions of his ''Collected Works''. This article analyzes the most complete edition of Thogs med bzang po's ''Collected Works'', printed in the Dergé Printing House (sDe dge par khang). First I shall show how this edition provides a more thorough context for Thogs med bzang po's Blo sbyong philosophy than any other edition. Second, I shall demonstrate how the two editors of Thogs med bzang po's ''Collected Works'' construct their religious identities by building on the transmission of Blo sbyong teaching that Thogs med bzang po established. In this way, those editors justify
their authority and the authenticity of the Blo sbyong tradition. +
Part of getting past a sense of self is breaking free from your own limited perspective on the world. This technique involves imagining yourself from different points of view and cultivating certain responses from those imagined perspectives. Originating with Shantideva, an important Buddhist thinker from eighth-century India, and later developed in the Tibetan tradition, it aims at changing our fundamental orientation to ourselves and others. In doing so, it attacks feelings of envy, jealousy, and insecurity at their source. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In traditional sagas, the motivations for action include courage, audacity, ingenuity, and a loyalty to family, tribe, and nation. The central figure, with disdain and fury, does battle against enemies. Patience and charity, not prominent among the lauded virtues, appear only in the form of brave endurance, resistance to temptation, and assistance to wounded companions. Amidst this background of Greek or Indian epics, the story Buddha's story moves against the current. When confronted with verbal and physical aggression, the Buddha does not experience hatred or the impulse for violence. And he instructs his followers how to respond if they come under attack: "''Our minds will remain unaffected, and we shall utter no evil words; we shall abide compassionate for their welfare, with a mind of loving kindness, without inner hate''" (MN 21.11). Unlike craving, which grasps for happiness in a limited object or person, and which is fearful of loss, loving kindness is unlimited in quantity, and unseeking of selfish gain.<br> Unconditional love or generosity recall a heroism akin to ''agape'' (a great love for all), in contrast with ''eros'' (sexual love) and ''philia'' (friendship). ''Mettā'' is closely linked with other divine abidings or ''Brahmavihāra'': compassion, gladness or sympathetic joy, and equanimity. Those abidings, working together as a way to overcome suffering, are each a "''liberation of mind''" (SN 9.20.4). The path of the divine abidings is a pathos: the patience of saints, the passion of Jesus, the passive resistance of Mahatma Ghandi. They are a way, if implemented, to end cycles of mimetic violence.<br> The divine abidings are visible in early Buddhist texts, and were used in meditation practices to promote the factors of awakening.[1] But in the earlier tradition, they are not foregrounded. Important in meditation, they are not sufficient to take one to the goal, but only to rebirth in the Brahma realms; they may be conjoined to enlightenment as a bonus, not as a cause.[2] For those who follow mindfulness teachings, compassion and well-wishing are mental states to be observed, like other mental states, in their arising and passing away. These states are comforting and skillful, but traditionalist teachers warn against becoming attached to them.[3] Mindful attention does not detract, however, from their joyful importance, and jātakas about the perfection of generosity (''dāna''), including the
''Vessantara Jātaka'', may be viewed as major precursors to Shantideva's work. (Flores, "Extreme Giving," 141-42)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Gethin, ''The Buddhist Path to Awakening'', 179-80.
#Harvey Aronson, ''Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism'' (Dehli: Motilal, 1980), 71.
#See Ven. Henepola Gunaratana, ''Mindfulness in Plain English'' (Boston: Wisdom, 1991), 140.
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This paper aims to show the strong connection between ''śraddhā'' and Mahāyānist practice expounded in the first chapter, Dānapāramitā, of the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''. The common meaning of ''śraddhā'' in Buddhist literature is the first step of practice, namely to put one's faith in the Three Jewels, and purity of one's mind. On the other hand, there is no difference in the basic meaning of ''śraddhā'' in the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' compared with other texts, but the manner of explanation is unique. That is, it expands the awakening of ''śraddhā'' based on the observation of ''parātmasamatā'' (equality of oneself and others), avoidance of unfortunate conditions such as ''akṣaṇa'' (eight difficulties) by ''śraddhā'', and accumulation of merits by ''śraddhā'' and transfer of those merits. From these views, we can see that, in the explanations of ''śraddhā'' in the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'', aspects conducive to the bodhisattva's practices are emphasized. ([https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330298084_Features_of_sraddha_in_the_Siksasamuccaya Source Accessed Feb 15, 2022]) +
