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From Bodhicitta
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A
Asaṅga (Chn. Wuzhuo [無著], Tib. Thogs med) was an Indian scholar-monk and author of influential treatises. Early sources have it that he hailed from Gandhara, and most modern scholars place him in the 4th or 5th century CE. Both tradition and modem scholarship regard him as a key figure in the establishment of the Yogācāra or Vijñanavāda school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Like Asaṅga, his teacher Maitreya or Maitreyanātha (Chn. Cizun [慈尊], Tib. Byams pa, Byams pa mgon po) — who should not be confused with the 11th-century tantric master Maitreyanātha, also known as Advayavajra — is credited with the authorship of several important treatises, of which the majority are Yogācāra works, but the identity and even the very existence of Maitreya are subject to much scholarly debate. Traditional Buddhist sources agree in identifying Maitreya with the high-ranking heavenly bodhisattva and future buddha of this name (Chn. Mile [彌勒], Tib. Byams pa). Since fairly early times, the Buddhist tradition was also more or less unanimous in ascribing the production and promulgation of all the early treatises associated with the Yogācāra school to the activities and cooperation of these two figures, although historical sources often disagree regarding the authorship of the individual works. Moreover, in the traditional legends and attributions of authorship, the third great Yogācāra master, Vasubandhu, repeatedly comes into play as well. Leaving aside the already mentioned debates over Maitreya's identity, historical-minded modern scholarship tends to deviate from the traditional perspective with regard to the bulky and fundamental ''Yogācārabhūmi''(''śāstra'') (Treatise on the Levels of Those who Engage in Spiritual Practice). (Source: Delhey, "Asaṅga/Maitreya(nātha)," 73). +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Śikṣāsamuccaya has not received much attention from scholars although it contains a great number of extracts from texts which have not been preserved elsewhere in the Sanskrit original. For this reason Jürg Hedinger's book is to be welcomed. The main part of his study is an analysis of chapters 11-13 of the Śikṣāsamuccaya which deal with life in the forest and meditative practices: 'III. Das Leben in der Wildnis' (pp. 37-47); 'IV. Die Schulung der geistigen Prozesse' (pp. 49-96); 'V. Die Anwendung der Achtsamkeit' (pp. 97-139). The introductory chapter gives some information on Śāntideva, his work and his place in the history of the Madhyamaka school. Useful is the analysis of the structure of the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The next chapter gives a brief survey of the contents of the first ten chapters. Chapters 14-19 are briefly discussed in the sixth chapter of Hedinger's book: 'VI. Die weiteren Stadien der Bodhisattvalaufbahn' (pp. 141 — 161). The book concludes with an English summary (pp. 165-168), a bibliography (pp. 169-173) and a Sanskrit index (pp. 175–178). (de Jong, "Review," 230-31) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/24654597 Read more here] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
When we begin any spiritual practice, we must first examine our motivation. In order to practice the Mahayana Path, our motivation should not be for ourselves alone; we must seek to obtain Buddhahood for the sake of all living beings. Without this vast motivation, the practice becomes just another worldly activity.
In order to have this motivation we must first generate Bodhi Mind. Bodhi Mind has two aspects, aspirational and operational. We will explore aspirational Bodhi Mind first by studying its five components.
The first component of aspirational Bodhi Mind is the non-abandonment of living beings, which insures that the Bodhisattva Vow is not lost or degenerated. The Buddha has said that if we understand this one dharma, or teaching, we will understand all the dharmas. Let us say we have been repeatedly bothered and harmed by a certain person, in fact so often that we reach the point where we think that if there were ever a chance to help this person we would refuse to give help. If harm actually came to them and in some way we could stop it and we did not, then that is what is called abandoning a living being. We must strive never to do this. +
This article, "Atiśa (Dīpamkaraśrījñāna)—His Philosophy, Practice and its Sources" by Miyazaki Izumi, offers an in-depth examination of Atiśa's philosophy and practical teachings, with a particular focus on the diverse sources he utilized, especially in his non-tantric works. Miyazaki highlights Atiśa's pragmatic approach. The paper meticulously traces how Atiśa integrated various prominent Indian Buddhist texts, such as Asaṅga's ''Yogācārabhūmi'' and Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', into his system, demonstrating a rich intellectual heritage that he synthesized for the benefit of his disciples.
Miyazaki also addresses several complex and debated aspects of Atiśa's thought, particularly his nuanced stance on philosophical classifications. For instance, while later Tibetan doxographies often categorized Atiśa within specific Madhyamika subdivisions, the article suggests that Atiśa himself did not rigidly adhere to such distinctions in his own writings. It further investigates the apparent discrepancies in his reliance on different sources for distinct aspects of practice, such as Asaṅga for ''śīla'' and Bodhibhadra for ''dhyāna'', and his unique views on the role of logical inference in realizing ultimate truth. The article concludes by identifying areas for further scholarly inquiry, aiming to clarify Atiśa's genuine philosophical position by privileging his original texts over subsequent interpretations, thereby contributing to a more precise understanding of this pivotal figure in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. +
Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's (982-1054) ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatārabhāṣya'' comprises two distinct commentaries that transform Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' from an ethical manual into a complete system of Buddhist practice. Drawing on his extensive training under Serlingpa and other masters, Atiśa presents an innovative framework using the metaphor of a scythed chariot wheel to organize the text's teachings according to practitioners' capacities: eleven points for middling practitioners, three for superior, and thirty-six for lesser capacity students. His systematic correlation of the ten chapters with the ten bodhisattva ''bhūmi''s demonstrates how the same text operates at multiple levels of realization, serving both beginning practitioners and advanced bodhisattvas. The commentary's ''Nineteen Revolutions of the Wheel-like Path'' reveals how the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' functions as a complete method across all stages from the path of accumulation through buddhahood. This interpretive framework established the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' as one of the foundational texts of the early Kadam tradition and demonstrated its sufficiency as a vehicle for supreme awakening in Tibetan Buddhism. +
This article presents a critical edition, translation, and analysis of Atiśa's ''Satyadvayāvatāra'' (''Introduction to the Two Truths''), tracing the development of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths from Nāgārjuna to Atiśa over nearly a millennium.
Lindtner demonstrates that while Nāgārjuna established the two truths doctrine as a pedagogical tool to reconcile absolute reality with Buddhist Abhidharma concepts, later Madhyamaka thinkers—particularly Bhāvya—developed increasingly sophisticated responses to epistemological and ontological objections raised by Yogācāra and Mīmāṃsaka opponents. The theory evolved from Nāgārjuna's simple distinction between conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and absolute truth (''paramārthasatya'') into more complex formulations involving subdivisions of each truth and the use of logical inference to indicate the absolute.
Atiśa's ''Satyadvayāvatāra'', a concise 28-verse text, represents the culmination of this tradition, synthesizing insights from Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Bhāvya, Dharmakīrti, Śāntideva, and Śāntarakṣita. Rather than introducing original philosophy, Atiśa functions as a faithful transmitter who expertly summarizes the core issues: the twofold nature of conventional truth (false and genuine), the ineffability yet pedagogical necessity of discussing the absolute, the role of ''pramāṇa''s in debate versus realization, and the indispensability of conventional truth as a means to understanding emptiness. The article includes extensive translations from Nāgārjuna's authentic works with their ancient commentaries, demonstrating the sources upon which Atiśa's synthesis depends. +
B
In the previous chapter, we examined the serious ethical concerns about how we treat animals. But that is not the whole story. If we are concerned with poverty and the increasing inequalities between rich and poor, if we are concerned about the environment and human health, and if we accept the conclusions of scientific studies presented by reports like those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC, established by the UN), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Worldwatch Institute and others, then we can’t help but question the excessive practices of animal breeding and wonder about the negative impacts that consuming meat has for humans and for our environment. +
It has been nearly thirty-five years since I first opened ''The Way of the Bodhisattva'', and revisiting it now at the behest of ''Inquiring Mind'' fills me with a renewed appreciation for the vitality and breadth of the text. What appeared to me all those years ago as a beautiful but lofty and distant map of the bodhisattva path now feels deeply personal, subtle and provocative. Indeed, part of what draws me close to the work is a powerfully empathetic connection to the book’s author, Shantideva, who lived in the great monastic university of Nalanda in eighth-century India. Although we recognize him today for his great scholarship and deep wisdom, what immediately ignites my interest is that Shantideva was considered by his contemporaries to be a loser.
Read more [https://www.inquiringmind.com/article/3101_33_bondurant_3-beautiful-loser-shantideva-and-the-way-of-the-bodhisavttva/ here] +
Becoming the Wish-Fulfilling Tree - Compassion and the Transformation of Ethical Subjectivity in the Lojong Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism +
This dissertation explores the possibility of viewing ourselves as beings who have "compassion at the core" in order to make a contribution to the emerging fields of contemplative science, positive psychology and the interdisciplinary "science of compassion." It does so by drawing from Tibetan and Sanskrit texts from the Buddhist ''Lojong'' (''blo sbyong'') tradition, as well as contemporary research in psychology, neuroscience, phenomenology and anthropology that focuses on compassion, emotions, empathy, embodiment, and meaning in life. Much of this research involves a reorientation away from an individualistic account of selfhood towards a recognition of the deeply social and moral nature of experience itself and the implications this has for our understanding of human nature, compassion, and ethics. Particular attention is paid to sources and concepts employed by contemporary, secular compassion training protocols such as Cognitively-Based Compassion Training (CBCT). After exploring key questions in contemplative science, such as reductionism, religious experience and the role of ethics and metaphysics, the dissertation turns to the specific types and ingredients of compassion as understood in the ''Lojong'' tradition. It then elucidates an implicit “contemplative phenomenology” in the ''Lojong'' tradition and compares it to strains of western phenomenology, suggesting that the development of a theoretically robust contemplative phenomenology will be very helpful to the future project of neurohpenomenology in contemplative science. The final chapter explores grounded and embodied cognition as well as psychological research on emotions and the implications these research areas have for contemplative science. The conclusion revisits the implications for our understanding of compassion and ethics when experience is seen as fundamentally interpersonal and moral. This perspective is then applied to the specific topic of "meaning in life" as studied in positive psychology with suggestions for developing a “relational theory of meaning” that centralizes the interpersonal and the ethical dimensions of meaning.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (''ŚS''), a compendium of the Mahāyāna practices, was compiled by Śāntideva (ca.7-8C.), and has been most cherished through Indian-Tibetan Buddhism. Outlined by 27 verses of his own, substantiated by vast excerpts from sutras, connected by his explanatory sentences, it is divided into 19 chapters, and now existent in original Skt., and Tib. and Chinese translations (D3940, P5336, and T1636). A version just of his own 27 verses, is also existent in Tib. (D3939, 4549, P5463), and so are 2 treatises (D3942, 4550, P5338, 5464, and D3943, P5339) closely related to ''ŚS''. The Chap.16, corresponding vs.22-25ab, where the title 'Bhadracaryāvidhi', the Ritual of Practises of Samantabhdra is given in Skt., expounds the developments of oneself (Skt. ātmabhava), enjoyments (bhoga), and goodnesses (śubha), citing 37 excerpts of sutras. The focus of Chap.16 is v.25ab, with its prosaic explanations. In this paper, we would explore Bhadracaryā in ''ŚS'', paying attentions to these points; 1) the meanings of Bhadracaryā, in the ''Bhadracaryāpraṇidhānarāja'' (''Bhad''), and the interpretations of it, in the Commentary on it by Dignāga (''D Comm'' in, D4012, P5513): though supposed to be a Yogacara-work, its authorship is not decided yet, the most widely accepted of its commentaries, 2) the treatments of it in ''ŚS'', and their predecessors, showing at the Appendix the sources of the sutras quoted in Chap. 16. (Nakamikado, introduction, 4) +
Whether or not the Buddha really died from eating a rotten pork dish, it appears certain that, during the earliest period of the Buddhist tradition in India, meat was not comprehensively prohibited for ordained monks and nuns. Certain restrictions were applied in their partaking of meat, but the Buddhist canon unambiguously records that the Buddha refused to adopt vegetarianism when it was proposed by his cousin, or the saṅgha-splitter, Devadatta. The most commonly cited permission for meat-eating for the ordained is epitomized in the concept of "pure in three aspects" (''trikoṭiśuddha'') according to which a Buddhist monk or nun can eat donated meat unless she or he has directly seen, heard, or suspected that an animal was killed specifically for his or her own sake. This conditional allowance of a meat diet came to be completely banned, however, in several Mahāyāna sūtras that appeared in the first half of the first millennium, including most famously, the ''Laṅkāvatāra''.
Nearly all of the Indic materials that record discussions of meat-eating are canonical, that is, believed to have been spoken by the Buddha himself and therefore of a prescriptive nature. The one exception is the anti-vegetarian polemic that consists of seven verses accompanied by auto-commentary in the ninth Mīmāṃsā chapter of the ''Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā'' composed by the sixth-century Madhyamaka scholar, Bhāviveka (500-570 CE). This text is noteworthy because it documents an active defense of a Buddhist meat diet against others' censure. However, while he refutes his non-Buddhist opponent's claims, Bhāviveka eventually contradicts a pro-vegetarian Mahāyāna sūtra, the ''Laṅkāvatāra''. This paper argues that Bhāviveka's anti-vegetarian discourse cannot avoid being read as a critique, even though he did not intend for it to be so.
Read this article [https://journal.kabs.re.kr/articles/article/bqJM/ here]. +
In his famous text the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by nonpersons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue that by reading Śāntideva's argument as practical advice rather than as a philosophical claim about rational coherence, his argument can still have important insights even for those who reject his philosophical reasoning. +
Blasphemie und Sakrileg im Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verses Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.64 +
From the University of Hamburg Website regarding this publication:
Buddhism in Past and Present
From the winter term 1996/7 to the winter term 2005/6 the University of Hamburg conducted under changing academic leadership (Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen, Prof. Dr. David Jackson, Prof. Dr. Eli Franco, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Dr. Jan Sobisch, PD Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes) a non-curricular study program titled “Buddhism in Past and Present.” This program (lectures, group work, plenum discussions), initiated by the coordinator Prof. Dr. Klaus Glashoff for persons interested to study Buddhism after their academic education, was organised in collaboration with the Tibetan Centre in Hamburg, and temporary with the Buddhist Society Hamburg under the auspices of the Department for Continuing Academic Education (Arbeitsstelle für wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung), University of Hamburg, with the aim of acquainting participants with the rich historical, philosophical and practical aspects of Buddhism.<br> The lectures were delivered not only by teaching staff and other affiliated persons of the University of Hamburg but also by scholars from other German and European universities, and by representatives of various living Buddhist traditions as well.<br> The lectures covered a broad range of topics: the historical development of Buddhism from the beginning up to the teachings of Japanese Zen and various contemporary forms of Buddhism; Buddhist ethics; women in Buddhism; meditation; and violence and non-violence from a Buddhist perspective.<br> With the lecturers’ permission, we are here making transcripts of their lectures available. The lectures were meant for the participants of the study program and should not be considered publications in a strict sense. ([https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/en/publikationen/2-buddhismus-in-geschichte-und-gegenwart.html Source Accessed Feb 18, 2021]) +
Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra als Lehrschrift und Vorhaben: Zum Thema Ritual, Religion, Philosophie und Mystik im Buddhismus +
From the University of Hamburg Website regarding this publication:
Buddhism in Past and Present
From the winter term 1996/7 to the winter term 2005/6 the University of Hamburg conducted under changing academic leadership (Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen, Prof. Dr. David Jackson, Prof. Dr. Eli Franco, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Dr. Jan Sobisch, PD Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes) a non-curricular study program titled “Buddhism in Past and Present.” This program (lectures, group work, plenum discussions), initiated by the coordinator Prof. Dr. Klaus Glashoff for persons interested to study Buddhism after their academic education, was organised in collaboration with the Tibetan Centre in Hamburg, and temporary with the Buddhist Society Hamburg under the auspices of the Department for Continuing Academic Education (Arbeitsstelle für wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung), University of Hamburg, with the aim of acquainting participants with the rich historical, philosophical and practical aspects of Buddhism.<br> The lectures were delivered not only by teaching staff and other affiliated persons of the University of Hamburg but also by scholars from other German and European universities, and by representatives of various living Buddhist traditions as well.<br> The lectures covered a broad range of topics: the historical development of Buddhism from the beginning up to the teachings of Japanese Zen and various contemporary forms of Buddhism; Buddhist ethics; women in Buddhism; meditation; and violence and non-violence from a Buddhist perspective.<br> With the lecturers’ permission, we are here making transcripts of their lectures available. The lectures were meant for the participants of the study program and should not be considered publications in a strict sense. ([https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/en/publikationen/2-buddhismus-in-geschichte-und-gegenwart.html Source Accessed Feb 18, 2021]) +
This article examines the textual relationship between the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA) and the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'', two important Mahāyāna Buddhist texts traditionally attributed to Śāntideva (8th century CE). Focusing on BCA verses V.104-106, which reference both the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' and the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'', the author analyzes the chronological and compositional connections between these works. The study compares multiple recensions of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'', including a 9th-century Tibetan version of 702.5 verses (BSA I) attributed to Akṣayamati, and later 10th-century versions of 913 verses (BSA II and III). Through philological analysis of Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese sources, as well as examination of commentarial traditions, the article addresses questions of authorship and the historical development of these texts within the bodhisattva training literature. The study challenges earlier scholarly assumptions about the composition and transmission of these foundational works of Buddhist ethical philosophy. +
Bodhicaryāvatāra 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths in the Prāsangika Mādhyamika +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The two truths (''satyadvaya'') have always been viewed by the Mādhyamikas as vital for an accurate understanding of their school;[2] significant differences in ontology, epistemology and religious practice rest on the definition of this concept. The controversy among Tibetan scholiasts revolving around the interpretation of the second verse in the ninth chapter (''prajñāpāramitāpariccheda'') of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (''BCA'') brings some basic divergences in their exegesis of the two truths into sharp relief. This verse reads as follows:
saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayam idaṃ matam/<br>
buddheragocarastattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtirucyate//
"The conventional (''saṃvṛtiḥ'') and the ultimate—<br>
these are accepted as the two truths. Reality<br>
(''tattvam'') is beyond the sphere of the intellect;<br>
intellect is called 'concealing' (''saṃvṛtiḥ'')."
The Geluk view, exemplified by Gyaltshap (''Rgyal Tshab'') and Tsongkhapa, holds that the second half of this stanza should not be taken in its literal sense, because if ultimate truth were not the object of some type of intellectual understanding, it would be unknowable, and it would therefore follow that all religious practice aiming at the realization of the ultimate would be in vain.[3] The earlier Sakya and later Nyingma commentators dissented from this line of interpretation, arguing that ultimate truth "cannot be objectified by the mind because it transcends all discursiveness (''prapañca'')"[4] although these commentators do affirm a non-intellectual intuition of the ultimate. This conflict of opinion is grounded in a difference of emphasis between Geluk and non-Geluk approaches to religious knowledge, which may be roughly designated as "scholastic" versus "yogic", or cognitive versus experiential. In the present endeavor to clarify this question we will deal with differing Mādhyamika definitions of the two truths, its treatment in the ''BCA'', the texts and arguments most often utilized by Tibetan scholars on this point and the historical context of this controversy. (Sweet, introduction, 79–80)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#(From the title) The material in this article appears in a different form in my doctoral dissertation, ''Śāntideva and the Mādhyamika: The Prajñāpāramitā-pariccheda of the Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (University of Wisconsin 1977) "The Sanskrit text that I have relied on in making my translation of the ninth chapter of the ''BCA'' (and for those verses translated in the present article) is that of P.L. Vaidya, ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' of Śāntideva (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960).
#See e.g. Nāgārjuna, ''Mūlamadhyarnakakārikā'' (''MMK'') 24:9, "ye nayorna vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayordvayoḥ / te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane//"<br>
#See translation of Gyaltshap's ''Byang.chub.sems.pa'i.spyod.pa.la.'jug.pa'i.rnam.bshad.rgyal.sras.'jug.ngogs'' in Sweet, op. cit., p.206-207.
#Mipham, ''Sher.'grel.nor.bu.ke.ta.ka'' (Varanasi: Tarthang Tulku, 1966), p. 9.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
All Tibetan sources agree that Śāntideva's ''Guide to Bodhisattva Practice'' (''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', hereafter ''Guide''), one of the most celebrated Indian Buddhist texts, constitutes a principal origin for the Tibetan mind training or ''lojong'' tradition. Mind training refers to a specific genre of instructions and their associated spiritual exercises, which include, among others, the famed practice of ''tonglen'', "giving and taking," and traces its immediate origin to the legacy of the Indian Bengali teacher Atiśa, who came to Tibet in the middle of the eleventh century. As in the ''Guide'', the central concern of ''lojong'' is to cultivate Mahāyāna Buddhism's highest spiritual ideal of ''bodhicitta'' (the altruistic intention to attain enlightenment for the sake of all beings) and to live one's life in accord with that aspiration. The Tibetan term for mind training, ''lojong'', is composed of two syllables, with ''lo'' standing for "mind," "thought," or "attitudes," while ''jong'' connotes "to purify, cleanse, refine, exercise, or train" (as in sports training). Associated, originally, with the Kadam School of Atiśa (982-1054) and his principal Tibetan disciple Dromtönpa (1005-64), over time, the ''lojong'' tradition became part of the common heritage of all Tibetan schools.<br> Today, as Tibetan Buddhism becomes more widely accessible to the world outside Tibet, it is often the ''lojong'' instructions that the Tibetan teachers share first with their new audiences. For example, when His Holiness the Dalai Lama spoke to a crowd of nearly a hundred thousand in New York's Central Park in 1999, he chose the "Eight Verses on Mind Training" as the basis of his talk. When the Dalai Lama returned to speak once more in Central Park in 2002, he chose as the topic for his talk Atiśa's "Bodhisattva's Jewel Garland," an important source text for ''lojong''.<br> On the surface, the relationship between the ''Guide'' and Tibetan mind training appears fairly straightforward. First and foremost, there seems to be a direct link, if not an equivalence, between the exchanging of self and others as outlined in chapter 8 of the ''Guide'' and <i>lojong</i>'s "giving and taking" (''tonglen'') meditation, which involves imaginatively taking on others' suffering, misfortune, and negative karma and giving to others one's happiness, good fortune, and positive karma. Second, the ''Guide'' is listed as one of the "six treatises of Kadam," which also include Śāntideva's ''Compendium of Training''.[1] Third, most ''lojong'' texts, especially since the appearance of Chekawa's "Seven-Point Mind Training" in the twelfth century, seem to contain disproportionately high numbers of citations from the ''Guide''. Fourth, Atiśa's explicit acknowledgment of Serlingpa (literally, "the one from the Island of Sumatra") as the principal source for his instruction on generating ''bodhicitta'', combined with the fact that Serlingpa's approach is thought to emphasize the exchanging of self and others, suggest the ''Guide'' to be the direct source of ''lojong'''s approach to cultivating ''bodhicitta''.[2] Finally, it cannot be a matter of pure coincidence that most Tibetan masters who have been ''Guide'' enthusiasts were also great advocates of ''lojong''. This is true from the earliest Tibetan ''lojong'' teachers, especially Langri Thangpa (1054-1123) and Chekawa (1101-75), to Ngulchu Thokmé Sangpo (1297-1371) and Tsongkhapa (1357-1419), and from Yongzin Yeshé Gyaltsen in the eighteenth century to Dza Paltrül in the nineteenth century.<br> That said, a closer examination reveals that the actual relationship between the ''Guide'' and ''lojong'' is far more complex. In what follows I shall examine this important question so we might appreciate more accurately how the ''Guide'' may have shaped the development of this unique Tibetan tradition. My chapter is divided into four sections. Part 1 presents a brief outline of the key features of ''lojong'' so that its unique characteristics—terminology, outlook, and approach, as well as its spiritual exercises—can be recognized. Then, part 2 sketches a broad outline of the central theme of the ''Guide'' with specific focus on the unique practice of equalizing and exchanging of self and others as found in its eighth chapter. In part 3 I then correlate the ''Guide'' with ''lojong'' and trace the Indian sources, especially in Śāntideva, for the specific features of ''lojong'' and practice. Finally, in part 4, I conclude with some general observations on the place of the ''Guide'' in today's pluralistic world, and how it (and by extension Tibetan mind training) could play an influential role in the growing emergence of Buddhist-derived contemplative practices in the shared public domain, especially in the West. (Jinpa, preliminary remarks, 146–48)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a succinct explanation of the rationale for the choice of these six texts and how they are grouped into three sets of two, including their specific roles in the development of the practitioner on the path, see Kapstein, "Stoics and Bodhisattvas," 102 and note 3.
#On Serlingpa (Dharmakīrti) and Atiśa's relationship with him, including the legend of the latter's travel to the island of Sumatra to receive ''bodhicitta'' instructions from Serlingpa, see Shonu and Gyaltsen, eds., ''Mind Training'', introduction as well as "The Story of Atiśa's Voyage to Sumatra," 57-70. On the identity of Serlingpa, see Chattopadaya, ''Atiśa in Tibet'', 84-95.
The mind of enlightenment, bodhichitta, is always available, in pain as well as in joy. Pema Chödrön lays out how to cultivate this soft spot of bravery. +
From the University of Hamburg Website regarding this publication:
Buddhism in Past and Present
From the winter term 1996/7 to the winter term 2005/6 the University of Hamburg conducted under changing academic leadership (Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen, Prof. Dr. David Jackson, Prof. Dr. Eli Franco, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Dr. Jan Sobisch, PD Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes) a non-curricular study program titled “Buddhism in Past and Present.” This program (lectures, group work, plenum discussions), initiated by the coordinator Prof. Dr. Klaus Glashoff for persons interested to study Buddhism after their academic education, was organised in collaboration with the Tibetan Centre in Hamburg, and temporary with the Buddhist Society Hamburg under the auspices of the Department for Continuing Academic Education (Arbeitsstelle für wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung), University of Hamburg, with the aim of acquainting participants with the rich historical, philosophical and practical aspects of Buddhism.<br> The lectures were delivered not only by teaching staff and other affiliated persons of the University of Hamburg but also by scholars from other German and European universities, and by representatives of various living Buddhist traditions as well.<br> The lectures covered a broad range of topics: the historical development of Buddhism from the beginning up to the teachings of Japanese Zen and various contemporary forms of Buddhism; Buddhist ethics; women in Buddhism; meditation; and violence and non-violence from a Buddhist perspective.<br> With the lecturers’ permission, we are here making transcripts of their lectures available. The lectures were meant for the participants of the study program and should not be considered publications in a strict sense. ([https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/en/publikationen/2-buddhismus-in-geschichte-und-gegenwart.html Source Accessed Feb 18, 2021]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Definition:<br>
Realization of the soteriological objective to become a Buddha.
Bodhicitta – the "thought (''citta'') of enlightenment (''bodhi'')" – is the realization of the soteriological objective to become a Buddha as a fully liberated being [1, 2]. Although the theoretical conditions for its development could be traced already in earlier Buddhist texts, the concept is not prevalent here, like in later Tantric as well as non-Tantric Mahāyāna, where the Bodhicitta became a core concept being essential for the ideal of the Bodhisattva [3]. The term cannot be found in Pāli sources, but the expression bodhaye cittam as a forerunner appears in the ''Mahāvastu-Avadāna'' (Tale of the Great Events). +
