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P
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The different versions and editions of the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' (hereafter abbreviated as SS), as well as relevant commentaries, have been mentioned by A. Pezzali[1] and, recently, by D. Seyfort Ruegg[2]. Regarding the problem of the authorship of the SS, A. Pezzali has recorded important comments by a number of scholars, and remarks that the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' is most often attributed to Nāgārjuna.[3] In the same context, Ruegg sums up:<br>
::On the basis of what Śāntideva has written in verses v. 105-6 of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' Buston and Tāranātha have ascribed to him a work entitled ''Sūtrasamuccaya''. The passage in question is not altogether clear, however, and Nāgārjuna, the author of the well-known ''Sūtrasamuccaya'', is also mentioned in it. At all events, no work entitled ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' attributable to Śāntideva is known to exist; and it has therefore been concluded that the above-mentioned ascription is erroneous.[7]<br>
Apropos Pezzali's monograph on Śāntideva, J. W. de Jong wrote a long article entitled "La Legende de Śāntideva,"[5] in which he also reviews Pezzali's work and completes her bibliographic information by enumerating what Japanese scholars published on the SS between 1965 and 1972.[6] In the same place he also discusses the question of attributing one ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' to Śāntideva. He mentions, in the section of Mahāyāna śāstras, the list of Dpal-brtsegs, which includes, ''inter alia'', a ''Mdo-sde sna-tshogs-kyi mdo btus-pa/Viśvasūtrasamuccaya'' and the SS attributed to Nāgārjuna. Both these works consist of five sections (''bam-po''). Although the ''Viśvasūtrasamuccaya'' is not extant, de Jong says that "la possibility n'est pas exclue que cet ouvrage soit identique au Sūtrasamuccaya que les commentateurs indiens du Bodhicaryāvatāra et les historiens tibétains attribuent a Śāntideva." Before mentioning two points that may be of some relevance to further discussion of the problem in hand, I should first like to say a few words about modern translations and the quotations in our text. (Pāsādika, preliminary remarks, 101–2)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Akṣayamati is an old appellation of the Mādhyamika scholar Śāntideva (ca. 790-850). The name "Akṣayamati" is found in the colophon of an early recension of the Tibetan translation of the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'', a verse treatment of the Mahāyāna bodhisattva path, which has been preserved only among the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang. In chapter 8 of this early recension, entitled "Exposition of Wisdom" (and corresponding to chapter 9 of the received text), there is a section in which the author deals with the topic of whether or not the Mahāyāna was taught by the Buddha. This section is of great interest, for the author employs distinctive reasoning when discussing whether or not the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness was taught by the Buddha. Whereas the discussion in this section in the new (received) recension is somewhat confused, the arguments are set out quite lucidly in the early recension.<br> In the following, I wish to examine the arguments about the authenticity of the Mahāyāna as set forth by Akṣayamati in chapter 8 of the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'', taking into account past research and comparing his reasoning with the treatment of this subject in other Mahāyāna treatises. As well as presenting a critical edition of the text and reconsidering the translation of this section, the highlighting of its distinctive features as a proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna should also be of some value. After having taken a look at the relevant verses by Akṣayamati (kk. 31–34), I shall make some further observations with reference to the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-vyākhyāna[-pañjikā]'', an anonymous commentary preserved in the Tibetan canon. +
Puṇya and Pāp in Public Health: Everyday Religion, Material Culture, and Avenues of Buddhist Activism in Urban Kathmandu +
In the dense settlements of old Kathmandu city, an urban ecology is fueled by abundant natural resources and sustained by a complex web of predator and prey species, all in a space dominated by human presence and practices. These include everyday activities in temples, roads, and homes that are rooted in Buddhist and Hindu doctrines. Both traditions emphasize non-violence (''ahiṃsā'') to all living beings, and adherents seek merit (''puṇya'') daily from feeding some of them. In light of the still chronic outbreaks of diseases like cholera, and especially in light of the threat of future avian-vector epidemics, a new avenue of doctrinal interpretation favoring human intervention might be developed based on the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', an important Mahāyāna Buddhist text. In the spirit of "engaged Buddhism," the discussion concludes with suggestions on how Newar Buddhist teachers today can use their cultural resources to shift their community’s ethical standpoint and take effective actions. +
R
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
:The Guide enjoins giving only vegetables and the like at first. Later, by degrees, one acts in such a way that one is even able to give up one's own flesh!<br>
: When the understanding arises that one's own flesh is no more than a vegetable, what difficulty is there in giving away one's flesh and bones? (7.25-26)[1]
'''MECHANISMS OF PROTREPTIC'''
The Greco-Roman philosophical tradition had a genre of literature called
"protreptic." ''Protrepsis'' means "turning toward," and while the genre might broadly be taken as a call to turn toward a different form of life,[2] the metaphor embedded in this term for it comes from Plato's ''Republic'', where at issue is specifically a turning of the soul toward reality:
:The power to learn is present in everyone's soul, and the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body. This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is... education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately... the virtue of reason ... never loses its power but is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned. (''Republic'' VII.518C-519A)[3]
Insofar as talk of "turning souls" refers to souls, such a phrase may seem singularly inappropriate to a Buddhist context. But there are deeper affinities in the metaphor. The very notion of protreptic as a genre contains a sense of literature that does not just say something but ''does'' something. It does something to the audience; and what it does is transform their outlook wholesale. More specifically, protreptic aims, as Plato puts it, to turn us toward reality, or reorient us toward a comprehension of reality.<br> There is a further, related affinity in the presumption that such reorientation—grasping reality aright, in a way one ordinarily does not—is a moral matter. Such transformation is no mere accumulation of facts; turning toward reality transforms one's engagement with the world. Thus, for Śāntideva,[4] all virtues are essentially and primarily mental. For instance, "The perfection of generosity is said to result from the mental attitude of relinquishing all that one has to all people, together with the fruit of that act. ''Therefore the perfection is the mental attitude itself''" (5.10, emphasis mine).<br> And similarly with ''śīla'' (discipline, or restraint):[5] "Where can fish and other creatures be taken where I might not kill them? Yet when the mental attitude to cease from worldly acts is achieved, that is agreed to be the perfection of ''śīla''" (5.11).<br> And so with anger and the rest.[6]<br> Such reorientation implies a revised conception of what is possible, necessary, and appropriate, which in turn issues in feelings and actions. Actions and individual choices carry moral weight, of course—in the Buddhist idiom, they have karmic consequences. But they carry these because of the intentionality and ways of seeing that they contain, express, and perpetuate. It is our ways of seeing reality that inform our conceiving of intentions to act; and so it is through seeing reality that we transform ourselves, and the quality and nature of our actions.7 This process of coming to see reality does not, for Śāntideva at least, arise suddenly and all at once.[8] It arises rather through several more minor or local revisionings, which it is the work of the ''Guide'' and other such texts and related exercises to effect.[9] The transformation of outlook, the perspective thus attained, are the core and substance of the moral life—as epitomized in the perfection of wisdom or insight (''prajñā'') standing at the culmination of the path.<br> While a great deal of modern moral theory attends to action, decision, and the principles underlying correct choice, by the time we reach the point of choosing an action we are already fairly well down the road of ethical formation and ethical thought. All the truly decisive elements occur upstream, as it were, where the world is characterized in a certain way and categorized, where meanings take shape and options emerge. At the point of choice among a few well-articulated options, we might say with Sartre, ''les jeux sont faits''.[10]<br> Buddhist ethical thought, reflective and hortatory, respects this fact implicitly, and Śāntideva's ''Guide to Bodhisattva Practice'' (''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', hereafter ''Guide'') exemplarily so. Rather than argue for this or that ultimate ground of normativity, the ''Guide'' aims to change the categories in which we experience the world, the perspective we take on our own experiences, and to modify quite comprehensively what is "on our minds." This emphasis on transforming experience is what makes so apt Garfield's preferred characterization of Śāntideva's ethics as "phenomenological."[11] This transformation should alter what we see as possible, necessary, and reasonable regarding action and feeling, and leave choice a theoretically quite uninteresting part of the chain of explanation.<br> Such protreptic texts appeal to reason and offer arguments—because after all, it is a feature of human creatures that they do also recognize and respond to these in distinctive ways. But it belongs to the very nature of the genre that such rational appeals do not swing free in some rarefied logical space (as claims like 2 + 2 = 4 seem to do). For protreptic attempts to alter what one recognizes as a reason; the "turning of the soul" consists in the recognition that what you took before to be a good reason is no reason at all, while something you had never properly seen is now appreciated as the salient rational consideration. Exactly this shifting appreciation of what counts as a reason makes the genre of protreptic an apt point of reference for a Madhyamika like Śāntideva.[12] For it allows categories and conceptualizations to be evaluated as progressively more apt, without implying commitment to any one set of categories as capturing the final and ultimate truth of the matter.<br> The difficulty for any Madhyamika is how to eschew any reference (or commitment) to ultimate reality and yet retain teleological notions of progress and path. Any Buddhist thinks our ordinary ways of looking at the world are terribly flawed and the cause of persistent suffering, but without recourse to some sort of "seeing things as they actually are" (in the metaphysical sense that a Madhyamika eschews), it is difficult to evaluate any ordinary conceptions as better and worse. They cannot be rejected on account of their being wrong or false, nor can changes in ordinary views be validated on the basis of being correct or closer to correct. A protreptic understanding of how Śāntideva is working here addresses the difficulty inasmuch as protreptic arguments do not aim to—and do not need to—prove that alternative positions are just plain false (in the way that 2 + 2 = 5 is just plain false), nor need they demonstrate that the preferred outlook is the ''only'' intelligible one. The everyday outlook is superseded and replaced, not proved wrong; the opening of the mind to new things as reasons counts as an improvement primarily on moral grounds (such ways of looking make us better persons and are better at ending suffering), but also on peri-epistemological grounds such as the ability of the new ways of seeing to shed more light on more of our moral lives, or to accommodate and explain the old ways of seeing and their inferiority.<br> To illustrate what it means to say that the ''Guide'', like any protreptic text, deliberately alters what we recognize and respond to as a reason or argument, we will look closely at two such transformations: the first, working on the audience of the text through the course of chapters 2 to 4, transforms how we conceive of ourselves and our situation; the second examines the way a transformation of outlook is effected through the depiction of the mind as menagerie in chapter 5, and how this prepares the audience for understanding an argument in chapter 6 in the right way. While these two instances are significant, they are primarily offered as illustrative: tracing their workings should give us tools for approaching the ''Guide'' as protreptic and articulating much of the rational work done implicitly through choice of categories and metaphor, which determine where and how to focus the audience's attention. (Carpenter, "Reason and Knowledge on the Path," 45–48)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Translations taken from Śāntideva, ''The Bodhicaryāvatāra'', trans. Crosby and Skilton, with occasional minor emendations.
#Stowers, "Letters of Exhortation and Advice," 92.
#Grube's translation, rev. Reeve as in Cooper, ed., ''Plato: Complete Works''.
#For the purposes of this essay, I use the name "Śāntideva" as indicating the author or authors combined with any unknown editors responsible for the text currently received under the name ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''.
#Often translated, as in Śāntideva, The ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', trans. Crosby and Skilton, as "morality."
#Patience in 5.12; the famous verse at 5.13 ("where would there be leather enough to cover the entire world?") targets ''vīrya'' (zeal, resoluteness, diligence); 5.14 highlights controlling the mind in the manner of mental cultivation; and 5.15 describes the perfection of wisdom with its "no fruit comes from a dull mind that bears comparison with a sharp mind on its own."
#This reverses the consequentialist interpretation of Goodman in ''Consequences of Compassion'', which takes action to be the means of character transformation; on the view taken here, if there is to be talk of means and ends, it will be transformations of seeing or understanding that are the means of transforming action. However, the character transformation (consisting, as it does, in increasing insight into reality) is the only part of this that could claim to be good in itself; the improved actions that follow are themselves instrumentally useful so long as one is but imperfectly enlightened, and dry up altogether (in some sense) when one has attained full understanding of reality.
#The question was apparently the great point of dispute at the legendary "Council of Lhasa" debate (supposed to have taken place at Samye Monastery in Tibet, in the late eighth century CE), as a consequence of which (so the legend goes) the Chan view of sudden enlightenment was banished from Tibet in favor of the position of the Indian faction (represented by Kamalaśīla) that enlightenment is gradual.
#See for instance Buddhaghosa's ''Path of Purification'', which details exercises for effecting revisions of reality in specific ways, suited to specific characters. Buddhaghosa often recounts or refers to Buddhist tales to illustrate his points—that is, to get the audience to see things as he is recommending we see them. Such tales are a vast store of literature used to shape outlook and categories for experiencing the world differently.
#Not for nothing do latter-day Buddhists such as Stephen Batchelor see a common cause between existentialist and Buddhist ethics.
#See Garfield, "What It Is Like to Be a Bodhisattva," and Garfield, ''Engaging Buddhism'', ch. 9; also, this volume.
#Śāntideva is working within the Mahayana tradition inaugurated by Nāgārjuna, called Madhyamaka. One hallmark of Nāgārjuna's approach is a thoroughgoing anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism, which nevertheless makes use of ordinary claims and conceptions for advancing along the path toward enlightenment.
Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself +
Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature, detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article takes as its point of departure a recurring theme in the writings of the 8th Century Indian Buddhist thinker, Śāntideva, who subjects his own behaviour and thought to minute scrutiny in argumentation with himself, only to be puzzled at his own seemingly irrational persistence in ways of thinking that he knows to be wrong and actions that he knows to be worse courses. The Buddhist's situation is profitably comparable to issues of akrasia, weakness of the will, that are taken up by Plato, Aristotle and many modern philosophers, including notably Donald Davidson and David Wiggins. +
This chapter examines Tibetan Buddhist relationships with the natural world through the organizing concept of "sustainable taming" — the ideal of putting nonhuman resources to human use in ways that remain ecologically viable. Drawing on ethnographic, historical, and textual sources, it explores how Tibetan practices including soul-sharing beliefs, pilgrimage, animal sacrifice, vegetarianism, and ritual animal release reflect complex and often contradictory attitudes toward animals. A key doctrinal context for these contradictions is the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya followed by Tibetan monastics, which permits meat eating — in contrast to the Chinese Fanwangjing that shaped East Asian Buddhist vegetarianism — contributing to an environment in which meat consumption is deeply embedded in both religious and ecological life on the plateau. Against this norm, the chapter highlights Shabkar (1781–1851) as a prominent vegetarian dissenter who drew on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and other Mahāyāna sources to argue that eating animals — understood as reincarnated kin — is morally intolerable, and who dismissed the common practice of reciting mantras over slaughtered animals as a moral evasion. The chapter also notes a contemporary movement toward meat abstention in Kham documented by Barstow and Gayley, as well as the explicit link between animal release and vegetarianism in the practice of Khenpo Tsültrim Lodrö. While the extension of personhood to mountains, lakes, and animals fosters relational and ecologically minded sensibilities, the chapter argues that traditional Buddhist compassion remains limited in its biocentric focus on individual animals, falling short of a fully ecocentric environmental ethic. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
There are two versions of the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'', viz. the current version with ten chapters and an earlier version with nine chapters. The former is available in Sanskrit and is also included in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, while the latter is found only in the Dun-huang manuscripts, in Tibetan. Hereafter, the current and the Dun-huang versions will be abbreviated as "BCA" and "BSA", respectively. Earlier studies have shown that in India both versions were used, and that in Tibet the earlier version was translated first and only later was the current version translated and, subsequently, retranslated. The latest translation has been widely used, especially by the Bka' gdams pa school.[1]<br> In this paper I discuss a series of verses concerning the equality of self and other, one of the major topics upon which the two versions differ. The series of verses appear in both versions, but in different chapters. In the BSA they appear at the end of the 'Chapter on Strength' (''vīrya''), while in the BCA they are found at the end of the 'Chapter on Meditation' (''dhyāna'').[2]<br> Commentators have remarked on the differing location of the respective verse series, and have argued to which chapter the series properly belongs.[3] However, they have not commented upon the dissimilarities between the respective series themselves, despite the fact that in the BCA the series contains a significantly greater number of verses, including verses that express ideas not found in the BSA.<br> Examining these differences, I have come to the conclusion that the characteristics of the verses exclusive to the BCA may have a significant relationship to the positioning of the verses in the text. In this paper I investigate how the relocation of the verses from the 'Chapter on Strength' in the BSA to the 'Chapter on Meditation' in the BCA may have influenced the content of the verse series. (Ishida, introduction, 1)
Remarks on Akṣayamati (Blo gros mi zad pa), Being the Author of the Earlier Version of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
As was already clarified by previous articles,[1] the earlier version of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' is ascribed to a certain ''ācārya'' named Blo gros mi zad pa (* ''Akṣayamati'') and not to Śāntideva.
:'''I'''. Concerning the latter name, there are a lot of references to the name Śāntideva (or Zhi ba'i Lha in Tibetan) both in Indian and Tibetan sources, the earliest of which may possibly be that given by ''Prajñākarmati''(c.950-1000) in his BCAP.
:'dir' phags pa Zhi ba'I Iha degsung rab mtha' dag gi don gyi de kho na nyid rtogs shing/ .... (BCAP, D La 41b5) "Here, the respectable Śāntideva having understood the real meaning of all the teachings .... " (Unfortunately, according to LVP's note, the first folio of the unique Sanskrit ms., which must have contained the above part, is missing).
Other references to the same name are found in Vibhūticandra's BCA-''tātparyapañjikā'' Viśeṣadyotanī[2] and other commentaries on the BCA,[3] and also in Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's (982-1054), that is, Atiśa's ''Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā'',[4] Jñānaśrīmita's (c. 980-1030) ''Sākārasiddhiśāstra'',[5] ''Subhāṣitasaṃgraha''[6] etc.
:'''II'''. On the other hand, the author's name *Akṣayamati occurs in the colophon of the Tibetan manuscripts from Dun-huang as follows:[7]
''Byang cub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa // slobs dpon Blo gros myi zad pas mdzad pa rdzogs s-ho//rgya gar gyi mkham po sa-ra-vad-nya-de-va dang/zhu chen gyi lo tsa pa ban'de dPal brtsegs kyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o//'' (Stein no.629, Ka 40b4-5) "The ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'', written by ''ācārya'' * Akṣayamati, is completed. It was translated, edited and established by the Indian Paṇḍiita Sarvajñādeva and the great translator, Buddhist monk dPal brtsegs".
Byang cub sems dpa'i spyod pa la jug pa/slobs dpon Blo gros myi zad pas mdzad pa rdzogs so// (Pelliot no. 794,. Ka 24b7) "The ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'', written by ''ācārya'' Akṣayamati, is completed".
From these two colophons, it seems clear that before the translation of the BCA was established in the early ninth century, the BCA had traditionally been ascribed to a certain ''ācārya named Blo gros m(y)i zad pa, most probably * Akṣayamati, in Sanskrit.
:'''III'''. Then arises a question: Who is the author Akṣayamati? Is he not identical with Śāntideva? Can we take the name Akṣayamati as an epithet of Śāntideva? In order to cast a new light on this question, let us here [look?] to other references to this name. (Saito, preliminary remarks, 308–10)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See Saito (1986) pp. 79–87, 100–101.
#De Jong (1975) p.170: ''śāntidevanāmā praśāntatvāt=zhi ba dang ldan pas zhi ba'is lhas zhes ming btags'' / (D Sha 194a2).
#''BCA'' - ''tippanī'', BCAP, LVP ed., p.1, n.3: ''ihayam ācārya-Śāntidevah''; Kṛṣṇa pa's ''BCA-duravabodhana-nirṇaya-nāma-grantha'', D Shah 91 a 2-3 etc; Vairocanarakṣita's ''BCA-Pañjikā'', D Shah 96a3 etc.
#D No.3948, Khi 241 a6 etc.
#''Jñānaśrimitrabandhāvali'', Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, A. Thakur ed. 1959, p. 476.11-12: ''Sākārapakṣa eva tu Śāntidevapādānām abhimatah/-''
#''Subhāṣita-Saṃgraha'', C. Bendall ed., 1905, pp.22.11, 67.22: ''Śāntidevapadāir apy uktam/''
#Cf. The colophon of the current editions of the BCA gives a brief explanation of the three stage procedure used for rendering it into Tibetan:<br>''Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la'' 'jug pa slob dpon Santa(sic)-de-vas mdzad pa rdzogs so// [1] rgya gar gyi mkhan po sarva-jña-de-va dang/zhu Chen gyi lo tsā ba bande dpal brtsegs kyis cha che'i dpe las bsgyur ''cing zhus'' te gtan laphab pa las/ [2] slad kyis rgya gar gyi mkhan po Dharma-śrī-bha-dra dang/zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba bande Rin Chen bzang po dang/śākya blo gros Kyis yui dbus kyi dpe dang 'grel pa dang mthun par bcos shing bsgyur te gtan la phab pa'o// [3] yang dus phyis rgya gar gyi mkhan po su-ma-ti-kī-rti dang/zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba dge slong Blo ldan Shes rab kyis dag par bcos shing bsgyor te legs par gtan la phab pa'o// (DLa + oa5-7).(D La 40a5-7) "The ''BCA'' written by Śāntideva is completed. [First], having been translated from a Kāśmīra manuscript, it was edited and established by the Indian Paṇḍita Sarvjñanadeva and the great translator, Buddhist monk dPal brtsegs. [Secondly], later, having been emended in accordance with both a manuscript from "middle country" (''madhyadeśa'') and a commentary, it was retranslated and established by the Indian Paṇḍita Dharmaśrībhadra, the great translator, Buddhist monk Rin chen bzang po (958-1055), and Sakya blo gros. [Thirdly], in later time, having been embedded correctly, it was retranslated and established properly by the Indian Paṇḍita Sumatikīrti and the great translator, Buddhist monk Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109)".
Remarks on an Instance of Intertextuality in the Eleventh Chapter of the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Phrase Tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati in Buddhist Sūtra Literature +
The ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' of Śāntideva is an excellent resource for scholars interested in the relationship between Buddhist texts as a significant portion of this seventh century text is made up of quotations from other, often significantly earlier, texts and as such examples of intertextuality occur often within its pages. Taking an instance of intertextuality between a pair of passages from two texts quoted in the eleventh chapter of the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'', the ''Ugradattaparipṛcchā-sūtra'' and the ''Ratnarāśi-sūtra'', as a starting point, this paper will explore the usage of a particular phrase shared in the passages quoted from both texts, ''tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati'' (grass, shrubs, medicinal herbs, and forest trees), as it occurs in all available sources. By using resources available through the digitization of Buddhist literature that have only become available to modem scholars in recent years, the instances in which this particular phrase occurs in extant Sanskrit texts can be uncovered with a reasonable degree of accuracy, uncovering that it appears to be used almost exclusively within well-known Mahāyāna Buddhist texts considered to be either ''vaipulya sūtras'' or found as part of the ''Mahāratnakuṭa sūtra'' collection. This paper collects the instances where ''tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati'' occurs as well as similar phrases used in Sanskrit and Pali texts with the goal of creating a preliminary study of the use of this phrase and its variations in Sanskrit and Pali sources that provides some insight into how the texts that employ the phrase ''tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati'' may be related and how this may further our understanding of the connection of certain types of texts in Buddhist—and especially Mahāyāna —''sūtra'' literature. +
This article surveys scholarship on the Indian commentary to the ''Kāśyapaparivarta'' (KPCy), preserved only in Tibetan and Chinese translation, occasioned by the 2008 publication of Ōtake Susumu's annotated Japanese rendering in the Shin Kokuyaku Daizōkyō series. Silk highlights the KPCy's close structural relationship to the ''Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī'' of the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', which shares substantial wording with the commentary's "extended commentary" (kōshaku) portion, and reviews the scholarly debate over which text is prior. He also addresses the vexed question of the KPCy's authorship, traditionally attributed in Tibetan sources to a Sthiramati — an attribution Silk finds doubtful given discrepancies with the well-known Yogācāra scholar of that name, suggesting instead that more than one significant author may have shared the name. Drawing on Suguro's hypothesis, Silk proposes that the KPCy's distinctive two-part structure (a word-by-word "abbreviated commentary" combined with a more philosophical "expanded commentary") arose because its author based the latter on the earlier *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī} while adding original, sūtra-focused analysis of his own. The article includes two comparative tables mapping the commentary's structure against Ōtake's edition, the Chinese and Tibetan canons, and the corresponding sections of the ''Kāśyapaparivarta'' sūtra itself. (Abstract generated by Claude.ai Aug 11, 2026]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
To date, one manuscript of Śāntideva's ''magnum opus'', ''Byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'' (''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'') or ''An Introduction to the Practice of Bodhisattva'' has been found in the Tabo collection.[1] It is incomplete and has only six folios. The last folio is numbered 12, the reverse of which ends with the first ''pāda'' or "quarter" of stanza 97 from Chapter 5. Thus, the whole work might not have contained more than 37 folios. This manuscript, though incomplete, is important in view of the textual history of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra''.
<center>I</center>
The following colophon of the current editions of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' (hereafter: BSA) gives a brief explanation of the threestage procedure used for rendering it into Tibetan:[2]
:''Byaṅ chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa'' slob dpon Śānta(''sic'')-de-vas mdzad pa rdzogs so// // (1) rgya gar gyi mkhan po Sarva-jñā(''sic'')-de-va daṅ/ źu chen gyi lo tsā ba bande dPal-brtsegs kyis kha che’i dpe *las bsgyur ciṅ źus te* gtan la phab pa las/ (2) slad kyis rgya gar gyi mkhan po Dharma-śrī-bha-dra daṅ/ źu chen gyi lo tsā ba bande Rinchen-bzaṅ-po daṅ/ Śākya-blo-gros kyis yul dbus kyi dpe daṅ 'grel pa daṅ mthun par bcos śiṅ bsgyur te gtan la phab pa’o// (3) yaṅ dus phyis rgya gar gyi mkhan po Su-ma-ti-kī-rti daṅ/ źu chen gyi lo tsā ba dge sloṅ Blo-ldan-śes-rab kyis dag par bcos śiṅ bsgyur te legs par gtan la phab pa’o// "The ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' written by Śāntideva is completed. [First], having been translated from a Kāśmīra manuscript, it was edited and established by the Indian pandita Sarvajñādeva and the great translator, Buddhist monk dPal brtsegs. [Secondly], later, having been emended in accordance with both a manuscript from Madhyadeśa "middle country" and a commentary, it was retranslated and established by the Indian paṇḍita Dharmaśrībhadra, the great translator, Buddhist monk Rin-chen-bzaṅ-po, and Śākya-blo gros. [Thirdly], in later time, having been emended correctly, it was retranslated and established properly by the Indian paṇḍita Sumatikīrti and the great translator, Buddhist monk Blo-ldan-śes-rab."
According to this information, which appears to have derived mostly from Bu-ston’s (1290-1364) description in his ''Catalogue of bsTan 'gyur'' (1335),[3] the BSA was translated three times: first by dPal-brtsegs in the early ninth century, secondly by Rin-chen-bzan-po (958-1055), and thirdly by Blo-ldan-ses-rab (1059-1109). The colophon also tells us the important fact that the first and second translators used different Sanskrit manuscripts from separate parts of India. Rin-chen-bzan-po was probably obliged to base his translation on a new Sanskrit manuscript because he was aware of significant differences between the earlier dPal-brtsegs's translation and the then prevalent Sanskrit text that Rin-chen-bzan-po had. The later version of the BSA was also cited in the commentaries he consulted.[4] Hereafter I will refer to dPal-brtsegs’s rendition as the earlier version, and the second and third translations as the later ones. The current Sanskrit text corresponds with the third translation established by Blo-ldan-ses-rab, though there are a number of partial, yet significant, discrepancies between them.[5]
With regard to the textual history of the BSA, the following points have previously been clarified by myself and other scholars:
(1) The current version consists of 10 chapters and 913 stanzas as counted both in Sanskrit and Tibetan. The earlier version, by contrast, has 9 chapters and 701.5 stanzas and is only available in the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang.[6]
(2) The difference between both versions lies not only in the number of stanzas, but also in their author’s names (Akṣayamati vs. Śāntideva) and the order and contents of the stanzas.[7]
(3) The current editions of the Tibetan translation contain a considerable number of problematic renderings of which Bu-ston became aware when he wrote his extensive commentary on this text in 1338. He therefore made his own renderings, when necessary, consulting a Sanskrit manuscript and several commentaries such as Prajñākaramati's ''Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā'' (BCAP) and others.[8]
<center>II</center>
The purpose of the present paper is to elucidate some of the significant features of the Tabo manuscript in comparison with the first and third translations of the BSA, which are available in the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang and the current bsTan 'gyur respectively.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Besides the BSA, an incomplete manuscript comprising 16 folios of Kalyāṇadeva's commentary: ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-saṃskāra'' (D No.3874, Q No.5275), translated by dGe-ba'i-blo-gros, has already been identified in the Tabo collection.
#D (No.3871) La 40a5-7; *D las źus te, QN la gtugs te, T (No. 327-2528) las bsgyur ciṅ źus te.
#''bsTan 'gyur gyi dkar chag'', La 90b5-7.
#Except for the two anonymous commentaries, BSA-''vyākhyāna''[-''pañjikā''] (D Nos.3873 and 3877), all the other commentaries in the current bsTan 'gyur are based on the later version. In his commentary Dīpaṃpkaraśrījñāna often referred to this later version as "the BSA composed of ten chapters (sPyod ’jug [gyi] le'u beu po)" (Q No.5872, ''Byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bśad pa, No 427b3, 461b4 etc.).
#See SAITO (1997)
#SAITO (1993), pp. (13) – (14), see also n.10.
#SAITO (1986), esp. pp.87–95 and (1993); ISHIDA (1998), (1996); KAJIHARA (1992).
#''Zla ba'i 'od zer'', Dza 210b7–211a2, cf. SAITO (1997).
The corpus of twentieth-century French-American philosopher René Girard posits a compelling cause of violence and its frequent imbrication with religion. Desire, Girard held, was not innate to the person, but was learned from another. Because we are left regularly seeking the same objects, rewards, or achievements of peers, violent conflict is inevitable. While Girard’s insights articulate forcefully the “rivalistic mimesis” in which we so easily engage, and while he saw in Christianity the clearest expression of an alternative vision, he has less to say about converting the rivalistic mimesis that engenders violent conflict to the pacific mimesis that does not. Expressing insights drawn from Buddhism’s foundational teachings and developed with the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the eighth-century Indian writer Śāntideva examines the motivating causes of desire, anger, and violence and finds them to be, like all phenomena in the universe, “empty” of substantial existence. Finding no substantial object with which to be angry, finding no substance to the prestige and honor he had previously sought, Śāntideva’s desires unravel, leaving only an objectless compassion for those who suffer. His text, Bodhicaryāvatāra, describes this transformation as well as the meditative techniques offered to guide his reader toward the same realization. This paper will recognize the resonances between Girard’s twentieth-century insights into the nature of desire and Mahāyāna Buddhism’s conception of emptiness, as expressed in Śāntideva’s seminal text. These resonances provide an opportunity to articulate a process of the conversion of rivalistic mimesis to pacific mimesis. Additionally, the meditative practices Śāntideva recommends will be offered as starting points for the development of similar practices within Christianity. In a world continuing to drift away from substantialism, such a development might reveal a Girardian conversion of mimetic desire to be a key component of Christian spiritual practice going forward. ([https://www.academia.edu/42603480/Ren%C3%A9_Girard_%C5%9A%C4%81ntideva_and_the_Emptiness_of_Desire Source Accessed May 17, 2021])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
There is much in Paul Williams' response to my review of his book to which I might reply, but I fear the debate may already be too protracted. So I shall take this opportunity just to try to clarify some key claims of mine about which I think Williams might be confused, and then leave it to the reader to decide where the truth lies. Since Williams has made it fairly clear where he stands, perhaps I should begin by indicating my own (present) views concerning the larger context in which our dispute is located. I do not think the Reductionist project—reducing persons to a wholly impersonal causal series of psychophysical elements—can ultimately be made to work. At the same time, I believe that Reductionism has the resources to answer the objections that its many critics, such as Williams, raise. The Reductionist view of persons is also, I think, compatible with at least two different sorts of ontology: the mental/material (''nāma''/''rūpa'') dualism of early Buddhism and Abhidharma and the naturalistic physicalism of much of contemporary analytic philosophy. Reductionism is likewise compatible both with belief in rebirth and with its denial. The real difficulty I see for Reductionism lies in answering the far more fundamental challenge of the Mādhyamikas. (Unlike Williams, I do not think the Madhyamaka claim that nothing bears its own essential nature is incoherent, or tantamount to metaphysical nihilism.) Yet I suspect that the key to understanding the bodhisattva's compassion may lie in seeing that the Madhyamaka critique does not undermine all the consequences of Reductionism. So I think it is worth investigating whether there is a plausible reading of Śāntideva's argument that makes more philosophical sense than Williams sees in it. (Siderits, introductory remarks, 453) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Buddhists have always been interested in freedom, but only recently have they begun to think about free will. Concepts closely related to freedom—spontaneity, independence, self-mastery—have been central to Buddhism since its beginnings. Serious Buddhist reflection on the problem of free will and determinism, however, is a product of dialogue between Asian and Western cultures. Unfortunately, this dialogue has barely begun, and very little is known about what a Buddhist position on free will might be like. Thus Galen Strawson has argued[1] that at least "certain schools of Buddhists" are committed to the non-existence of free will and the incoherence of moral responsibility. Mark Siderits, meanwhile, claims[2] that at least "early Buddhists" are, or should be, defenders of a particular kind of compatibilism. And Paul Griffiths asserts[3] that Buddhism involves a version of libertarianism. We can hardly expect to compare two traditions when one of them is as badly understood, from a philosophical point of view, as Buddhism still is.<br> Although Buddhist scriptures and philosophical texts never explicitly confront the issue of free will, at least in the form in which we know it, there are passages in various of these texts that deal with related issues. These passages, taken from a number of texts that differ greatly in other ways, can be used to construct a Buddhist position about the problem of free will. This view about free will stems from deep features of Buddhist thought that are largely held in common by different articulations of the tradition. Therefore, most or all philosophers in the highly diverse Buddhist tradition would probably have been prepared to agree with it. This position is importantly different from what most Western thinkers say, but it doesn't represent an entirely new answer to the problem. Rather, Buddhist writers describe a way to live with the practical consequences of the absence of free will. As Strawson repeatedly points out, Western thinkers who have denied the reality of free will have continued to apply notions of moral responsibility in their own lives. Their practice is thus inescapably inconsistent with their theory. By drawing on Buddhist ideas, however, it is possible to develop a view on which perfect people do not ascribe moral responsibility. (Goodman, introductory remarks, 359)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Galen Strawson, ''Freedom and Belief'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 117-120.
#Mark Siderits, "Beyond Compatibilism: A Buddhist Approach to Freedom and Determinism," ''American Philosophical Quarterly'', vol. 24, no. 2 (April 1987), pp. 149-159, at p. 149.
#Paul J. Griffiths, "Notes Toward a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory," ''Religious Studies'', vol. 18 (1982), pp. 277-291.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
I am enormously grateful to Mark Siderits both for his kind comments on my ''Altruism and Reality'' and for the eminently courteous and intelligent way in which he has developed his disagreements with the two chapters of my book in which I apply the tools of contemporary analytical philosophy to assessing some of Śāntideva's arguments concerning issues related to personal identity, rebirth, and altruism. In writing those chapters—each an independent paper—I had intended to be provocative, for Śāntideva's arguments and their Buddhist context involve philosophical issues that have been vital down through the ages and are very much at the center of contemporary discussions in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. Our Buddhist thinkers put forward a position and arguments for that position. Those arguments beg to be analyzed, assessed, and developed. They may not work. If we are interested in truth (that sadly unfashionable concept), there is no avoiding wrestling with the arguments. In doing this we transcend the history of philosophy—the understanding of those thinkers who provide our material—and we do philosophy itself. We aspire to do philosophy just in the sense that Parfit or Strawson do philosophy. This wrestling with the arguments is, if you like, "analytic meditation." At least, it is what ''I'' take analytic meditation to be, and it certainly is an essential ingredient in what analytic meditation was and is in, for example, the dGe lugs tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.
On ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' 8: 97-98
''My Argument''
Where Mark Siderits and I disagree I have yet to be convinced that he is right. I don't suppose he thought I would be (which is not to say I might not become convinced in the future—I keep changing my mind). Let me begin with his discussion of my second chapter, the reprint of my paper "On Altruism and Rebirth: Philosophical Comments on ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' 8: 97-8." As I recall, the relevant philosophical argument is this: Śāntideva wants to argue (1) that in all pertinent respects (ontologically and morally) the relationship between me now and contemporary others is exactly the same as the relationship between me now and "my" next rebirth. That is, "my" next rebirth is in all pertinent respects other to me now, and this will remain the case so long as I am in the present incarnation. (2) I do, as a matter of fact, have altruistic care and concern for "my" future rebirth. (3) Therefore, in order to be rationally and morally consistent I should also have altruistic care and concern for contemporary others. Morally, the care and concern I have for one other (my future rebirth-the argument does not require reference here to more than one future rebirth) must be universalized to all others, including contemporary others. Śāntideva's argument is clever, and in practice may well be convincing for a Buddhist. If so, who could doubt the value of the results? But I have responded with the suggestion that in order to restore rational and moral consistency it is open to Śāntideva's opponent (or Śāntideva himself in his meditation, qua opponent) to reply that he or she had not realized that the relationship between me now and "my" future rebirth was one of difference, otherness, and to resolve to cease caring about his or her future rebirth(s) along with not caring about contemporary others. (Williams, "Response to Mark Siderits' Review" 424-25) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400185 Read more here]
Review of Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real: Buddhist Meditation and the Middle View, by Alex Wayman +
In this review, Robert Kritzer evaluates Alex Wayman's 1978 translation of the ''śamatha'' and ''vipaśyanā'' sections of Tsongkhapa's ''Lam rim chen mo'', describing it as an important contribution to Tibetan Buddhist studies despite some organizational flaws. While praising Wayman's meticulous scholarship and impeccable methodology—particularly his approach of contextualizing Tsongkhapa's work within its Sanskrit sources and demonstrating the continuity of Buddhist philosophy from India to Tibet—Kritzer notes that the introduction feels hastily assembled and requires careful reading to follow. The translation itself is extremely literal and sometimes awkward, with unconventional renderings of technical terms that may challenge readers unfamiliar with Indian Buddhist philosophy, though the inclusion of an English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary helps mitigate these difficulties. Kritzer particularly commends Wayman's analysis of Tsongkhapa's treatment of ''śamatha'', including his provocative reinterpretation of the famous debate between Kamalaśīla and Hvasang as concerning the proper sequence of ''samādhi'' rather than sudden versus gradual enlightenment, and his examination of how Tsongkhapa reconciles Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka dialectic with practical concerns about meditation and philosophical argumentation. Overall, Kritzer concludes that while the work demands considerable effort from readers, it is ultimately worthwhile and well-suited for serious scholars in the field. +
Akira Yuyama's review of Tucci's edition offers important scholarly observations about both the strengths and limitations of this long-awaited publication. While welcoming Tucci's critical edition of the Third ''Bhāvanākrama'' based on the Leningrad manuscript, Yuyama raises concerns about unclear editorial practices, particularly Tucci's mysterious reference to a possible second manuscript that is never identified or used in the apparatus. The reviewer criticizes Tucci's failure to provide complete textual variants between the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions, and suggests that including pagination from the more widely accessible Peking edition (in addition to the Derge) would have made the work more useful to scholars. Yuyama also questions the value of reconstructing entire lost Sanskrit texts from Tibetan translations, arguing that it is more philologically sound to simply note technical terms attested in other Indic sources. Despite these methodological critiques, Yuyama demonstrates the edition's scholarly value by providing detailed philological corrections and emphasizing the importance of identifying the numerous canonical quotations that appear throughout Kamalaśīla's text, a task requiring collaborative effort from specialists in various fields. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The ''Guide to Bodhisattva Practice'' (''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', henceforth ''Guide'') is rightly praised as a literary masterpiece of philosophy and ethics, so some modern readers might be surprised to learn of the importance of ritual and devotion both in Śāntideva's own text and in its broader reception in Buddhist history. Indeed, while the ''Guide'' compellingly portrays the internal struggles of an author, it clearly relies on a framework of common Buddhist practices and even serves as a basis for ritual in and of itself. If nothing else, such rituals provide a structure that reinforces specific progressions along the Buddhist path. Complementing the personal transformations through self-awareness that are foregrounded by the text, these rituals employ faith in higher powers and repetition to bolster the practitioner at critical moments. Accompanying its captivating philosophy and ethics, then, the ''Guide'' can be read to reveal actual practices of physical and material worship, such as making offerings to artistic images of the Buddha placed on an altar. Such activities are among the most common forms of Buddhist religiosity, and while they are only loosely addressed in Śāntideva's training text, they clearly underlie its composition and practice.<br> This chapter investigates the overall ritual structure of the ''Guide'' and describes material practices that correspond to specific passages. As with many aspects of Buddhist tradition, these rituals allow multiple, simultaneous levels of interpretation. In one sense, many of the rituals of the text directly support its well-known goals of mental transformation. Rituals of confession and dedication, in which one repeatedly rejects bad actions and devotes oneself to the benefit of others, may be considered mechanisms for improving the habits of one's mind. Such practices can also be understood in terms of faith and material performance. Confession, for example, depends on the real or imagined presence of a more awakened being to act as recipient and help subjects overcome the negative consequences of their past mistakes. The confession ritual described later in this chapter invokes thirty-five separate buddhas who are frequently depicted in paintings as a visual support for the practice. More elaborate rituals of offering involve not only artistic images of buddhas but also the daily placement of precious substances on altars, recitations, and other activities rarely noted when the ''Guide'' is treated solely in terms of its doctrines. (Huntington, introductory remarks, 132–33)
Rongtönpa (1367–1449), known as the "Master of the Ten Scriptures," was one of fifteenth-century Tibet's most influential scholar-practitioners who emphasized the integration of scholarly study with contemplative practice. His meditation manual ''The Precious Garland'' (''Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i sgom rim rin chen rgyan phreng'') presents a systematic method for practicing the essential teachings of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''.
''The Precious Garland'' distills the vast ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' into three key stages: foundational cultivation of aspirational and engaged bodhicitta, training in the six perfections with practical application, and dedication of merit. Rongtönpa's distinctive approach moves practitioners from analytical meditation to deeper contemplative states through a graduated method that first establishes conceptual understanding of the two truths, then progresses to meditation on emptiness using conventional appearances as the object, and finally achieves direct realization through sustained practice. Drawing explicitly on Atiśa's tradition, his instructions emphasize becoming familiar with appearances as illusion-like before resting in space-like meditation.
This concise text exemplifies Rongtönpa's broader contribution to Tibetan Buddhism: demonstrating that even the eighty-four thousand dharmas can be condensed into essential practice while maintaining both philosophical rigor and practical effectiveness. His approach addresses the fundamental unity of study and meditation, offering contemporary practitioners a clear framework for integrating the profound teachings of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' into daily practice. +
S
Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887) transformed the transmission of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' in eastern Tibet through his innovative practice-oriented approach, teaching the text over one hundred times and making it accessible to both monastic and lay audiences. Rather than composing a full commentary, he created three practical works: a step-by-step practice manual (''Spyod 'jug sgom rim''), structural outline (''sa bcad''), and lineage prayer (''brgyud 'debs''). His distinctive "three opportunities" method emphasized practical application through specific moments of intention refinement, focusing on bodhicitta as the foundation of all practice while integrating the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' with Dzogchen view and mind training traditions.
His influence extended through prominent disciples including Ju Mipham, whose ''Norbu Ketaka'' commentary sparked important philosophical debates, and Khenpo Kunpal, whose ''Drops of Nectar'' preserved Patrul's oral teaching tradition. This practice-oriented transmission established a network of study centers and democratized access to the text's teachings, making Patrul perhaps the most influential figure in popularizing the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' and ensuring its continued relevance as a living practice tradition rather than merely an object of scholarly study. +
