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This article by Chizuko Yoshimizu examines the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' (BV), a treatise traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna that serves as a doctrinal bridge between the Sūtra and Tantra vehicles. While the work centers on the "Bodhicitta Verse" found in the ''Mahāvairocana'' and ''Guhyasamāja'' tantras, Yoshimizu argues that the BV's primary objective is to redefine "Bodhicitta" through a strict Madhyamaka lens rather than a Yogācāra one. The author suggests the text is a post-eighth-century work influenced by the philosophical frameworks of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, specifically characterized by its rigorous critique of Yogācāra concepts like "self-awareness" and "intrinsic purity." Ultimately, the BV asserts that Bodhicitta must be understood not as a "pure mind" but as the realization of emptiness and the lack of inherent existence, aligning the highest view of the Pāramitāyāna with the practice of the Vajrayāna. (Abstract created by Gemini Apr 22, 2026) +
This 1988 article by Fujita Kōkan examines the ''Bodhisattvapratimokṣacatuṣkanirhāra'' (Toh 248, Ōtani 914), a Mahāyāna sūtra quoted extensively (under the abbreviated title ''Bodhisattvapratimokṣa'') in Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' and referenced in Prajñākaramati's ''Pañjikā'' commentary on the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''.
Fujita first distinguishes this text from a superficially similar but textually unrelated "Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa" found in a Cambridge Sanskrit manuscript (introduced by N. Dutt in 1931), showing that the manuscript's composite text—combining a ''Bodhisattva-saṃvara-vidhi'', part of the ''Vinayaviniścayopāliparipṛcchā'', and a fragment of Nāgārjuna's ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa''—is a different work entirely, despite a scribal colophon labeling it "bodhisattvaprātimokṣaḥ."
The article then surveys the actual content of the ''catuṣkanirhāra'' text (a sūtra framed as a dialogue between the Buddha and Śāriputra, transmitted via Atiśa's translation team), tracing through the fourteen passages Śāntideva quotes from it—covering topics like generosity, renunciation, humility, patience, and the bodhisattva's distinctive qualities versus those of śrāvakas. Fujita also reviews earlier Tibetan doctrinal debates (Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Tsongkhapa) over how a "bodhisattva prātimokṣa" relates to the śrāvaka prātimokṣa. He concludes that this sūtra treats the six pāramitās and related bodhisattva conduct in an unsystematized way (unlike a formal śikṣāpada code), with the arousal of bodhicitta as a key distinguishing feature from śrāvaka prātimokṣa. (Abstract generated by Claude.ai July 25, 2026]) +
In this essay several challenges are raised to the project of classifying Śāntideva's ethical reasoning given in his ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', or ''Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva'', as a species of ethical theory such as consequentialism or virtue ethics. One set of difficulties highlighted here arises because Śāntideva wrote this text to act as a manual of psychological transformation, and it is therefore often difficult to determine when his statements indicate his own ethical views. Further, even assuming we can identify a set of statements that accurately portray the moral position of Śāntideva, it is argued that these statements underdetermine which foundational normative theory should be ascribed to him. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In the classical Mahāyāna thought the basic mental attitude of bodhisattvas ''bodhicitta'' ('mind of awakening')—is usually defined as consisting of two parts: ''praṇidhicitta'' ('mind of resolution') and ''prasthānacitta'' ('mind of progress'). In three classical and most revered works of later Mahāyāna-Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' and ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'') and Kamalaśīla's ''Bhāvanākrama''—almost identical definitions of the twofold nature of the ''bodhicitta ''are to be found. . . .
The ''Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra'' instead seems to be one of the most authoritative source
in the discussion on the ''bodhicitta'' "theory" for the authors of later Mahāyāna. In
the sutra itself, however, the very term ''bodhicitta'' occurs in very few occasions
clearly having a secondary meaning while the main subject of discussion is the
person's attitude towards and activity in a certain state of mind that is called ''anuttturā samyaksaṃbodhi'' ('supreme perfect awakening') . . . (Läänemets, 113–15) +
Towards the end of the eighth century CE, during the reign of Khri Sroṅ lde b(r)tsan (''rg. c.'' 755-794/7), there took place an event of the greatest significance for Tibetan history and culture which had an enduring influence on later religious and philosophical development in Tibet and was to shape important areas of it. This event was the famous encounter, the so-called 'Great Debate of bSam yas', between the Chinese ''ho-shang'' Mo-ho-yen (''hva šaṅ'' Mahāyāna/Mahāyan) and disciples of Śāntarakṣita including the Indian Kamalaśīla and members of the great Tibetan sBa (dBa', dBa's) clan such as Ye šes dbaṅ po and dPal dbyaṅs.
Since the late 1930s this event, which is now somewhat wrapped in the mists of time, has rightly attracted the attention of European scholars such as Marcelle Lalou, Paul Demieville, Giuseppe Tucci and Rolf Stein. More recently it has been investigated also by scholars in America and above all in Japan. This work has been of immense importance for our understanding of this eighth century event, although it must be said that much of the more recent research has generally tended to allow the significance of the 'Great Debate' for Tibetan civilization and thought to be eclipsed by problems in the history and doctrines of Chinese Ch'an. (A noteworthy exception to this tendency is the thesis on ''rdzogs chen'' just published by Samten Gyaltsen Karmay: ''The Great Perfection'' [Leiden, 1988].)
This paper will be concerned with aspects of this encounter as either a historical event or a more or less dehistoricized ''topos'', and with its significance in Tibetan historiography and doxography and for the history of Tibetan religion and philosophy. (Ruegg, 237) +
Like other Buddhist traditions, Tibetan Buddhism recognizes that because animals are sentient beings they have some level of moral standing, meaning that humans should take animal needs and concerns into account when deciding what to do in any given situation. In this article, therefore, I do not seek to determine whether animals have moral standing at all, but rather whether this moral standing is minimal (meaning that animal concerns are far below human concerns) or maximal (animals and humans are equally important). Through an analysis of Tibetan Buddhist textual sources, I argue that while this tradition does place humans above animals, it nonetheless grants animals a relatively high degree of moral status, and as such the impact of human actions on animals needs to be taken seriously.
Read this article [https://journals.openedition.org/emscat/3865 here]. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
'''1.''' The last chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA) is called the ''pariṇāmanā pariccheda'' ('the chapter on the transfer of merit to others'). In spite of this title, the text is not clear as to the merit of what deed is transferred and who transfers the merit. From the context up to the preceding chapter, it is inferred that the same one that has entered the ''bodhicaryā'' ('the practices for the enlightenment') transfers its merit. But it is generally understood otherwise that the merit of composing the text entitled Bodhicaryāvatāra is transferred by the author Śāntideva.[1] This understanding is derived from the first verse (BCA 10.1), which summarizes the whole chapter as follows:<br>
:BCA 10.1 ''bodhicaryāvatāraṃ me yad vicintayataḥ śubham/<br>tena sarve janāḥ santu bodhicaryāvibhūṣaṇāḥ //''<br>
: "By the merit of me, who is deliberating the entering into the practices for the enlightenment<br> (''bodhicaryāvatāra''-), all people shall become embellished with the practices for the enlightenment (''bodhicaryā''-)."<br>
The expression ''bodhicaryāvatāraṃ me...vicintayataḥ'' is interpreted as "of me (i.e. the author), who is deliberating (i.e. composing a book on) the ''bodhicaryāvatāra''."[2]<br> '''2.''' Probably, this interpretation has been given on the basis of the apparent correspondence of BCA 10.1 to the opening verses of the text (BCA 1.1-3), where the author declares his making of the book. However, the authenticity of these verses is dubious, because of the fact that the Tun-huang ms. of BCA does not have these verses,[3] but puts devotional verses in their place.[4] The same declaration verses also appear in a more suitable context in the introduction of the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (ŚS p. 1<sup>9-14</sup>) which is supposed to have been composed by the same author. ŚS starts
with the verses of invitation for all beings to the holy words and thereafter inserts the present verses. It is likely that these declaration verses were borrowed from ŚS into the enlarged vulgate version of BCA,[5] probably on account of the sameness of the next verses of both texts (BCA 1.4=ŚS p. 2<sup>1-2</sup>), which will be examined below. (Kajihara, introductory remarks, 25-26)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#L. de la Vallee Poussin, ''Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas'' (Paris 1907), p. 143; M. L. Matics, ''Entering the path of Enlightenment'' (London 1970), p. 284; G. Kelsang Gyatso, ''Meaningful to Behold'' (London 19893), p. 359; P. Sharma, ''Śāntideva's Bodhicharyāvatāra'' (New Delhi 1990), Vol. II, p. 471f. Cf. also n. 2.
#Poussin,"Bodhicaryāvatāra", ''Muséon'' XI (1892), p. 103; E. Kanakura, ''Satori he no michi'' (in Japanese) (Kyoto 1965), p. 211; and the translations in the books listed in n. 1.
#See A. Saito, "''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' Ascribed to Ācārya Akṣayamati" (in Japanese), in ''Buddhism and society in Tibet''『 チ ベ ッ トの 仏 教 と社 会 』(ed. Z. Yamaguchi, Tokyo 1986), p. 84.
#Poussin identifies the first two verses as the preliminary stanzas of the ''Mūlamadhyamaka'' and translates the third verse, which consists of a salutation to the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas (''Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library'', London 1962, p. 196).
#For the relations between the vulgate longer version and the Tun-huang ms. of a shorter version, see Saitō (1986), pp. 103-105.
To date, a unique Sanskrit Ms. of Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' has been found in the Wright Collection, now preserved in Cambridge University Library. Although the critical edition of this text was published by C. Bendall as early as in 1902, some of the characteristics of this Ms. have not yet been made clear, especially with regard to the date of its copy. From his discussion on both the colophon of this Ms. and the life history of Vibhūticandra, the present author draws the conclusion that the Ms. was copied in all probability in the beginning of the 13th century by Jagaddala Mahāpaṇḍita Vibhūticandra, whose name, as the contributor of this Ms., is found in its colophon. The same Vibhūticandra is most likely to have copied the Ms. at Sa skya region and brought it later into Kathmandu where the Ms. was found. +
This article discusses the concept of bodhicitta (enlightenment mind) as presented in Kamalaśīla's ''Bhāvanākrama'' (''Stages of Meditation'') works. Here's a summary:
The article examines how Kamalaśīla presents two different conceptions of bodhicitta across his writings:
In the first volume of the ''Bhāvanākrama'', bodhicitta is divided into:
Praṇidhicitta (aspiration mind): The initial vow to become a Buddha for all beings<br>
Prasthānacitta (implementation mind): Aspiration accompanied by practice
In the middle volume of the ''Bhāvanākrama'', bodhichitta is instead divided into:
Conventional bodhichitta: Similar to praṇidhicitta - the initial resolution to attain enlightenment<br>
Ultimate bodhichitta: Not a stage of practice but a transcendent state attained through practice
The article also discusses Kamalaśīla's ''Yogabhāvanāvatāra'' text, which presents bodhichitta in the same way as the middle volume of ''Bhāvanākrama'', focusing primarily on śamatha (calm-abiding) and vipaśyanā (insight meditation). The author analyzes textual connections between Kamalaśīla's works and Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'', noting that:
Kamalaśīla's first volume borrows extensively from the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''<i>'</i>s discussion of bodhichitta<br>
While the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' presents multiple causes for generating bodhichitta, Kamalaśīla critically selects and emphasizes compassion (''karuṇā'') as the primary cause
The article concludes by clarifying the relationships between these texts and their presentations of the bodhicitta concept in Buddhist meditation practice. (Generated by Claude.ai Apr 11, 2025]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
So far the spiritual path has been described in terms of our own fulfillment. As we realize that our accustomed way of relating to desirable objects has been keeping us trapped in a circle of perpetual dissatisfaction, we become more and more motivated to activate a deeper level of our being. Our purpose is to experience a type of peace and happiness that is stable and reliable, unruffled by changing circumstances and uninfluenced by the passage of time. But even this higher aspiration to win release from the frustrating cycle of desire and dissatisfaction is still incomplete. Why? Because it is primarily concerned with only our own welfare.
Before, perhaps, our desires were limited to the possession of sensory objects, while now - through the development of some renunciation - they are directed towards the
realization of our deepest potential. But the emphasis still remains, <i>'</i>''I'' want this, ''I'' don't want that.'
This narrow concern for our own happiness and our own liberation makes it impossible for us to realize the vast potential of our human mind and heart. Such self-centred concern values the welfare of just one being - myself - over the welfare of the countless others who share life's problems with us. This extremely restricted view inevitably causes our heart to close. Then, even if we do not say so consciously, it is as if we feel, 'I am the most important person in the world. The problems that others have are of no concern to me; it is only my own happiness that counts.' +
P
In chapter 6 Śāntideva presents the topic of patience as the antidote to the most destructive emotion of anger. The chapter consists of verses on overcoming anger, cultivating patience, and respecting all sentient beings. Anger, according to Śāntideva, is never justified and is an emotion wholly destructive of positively accumulated karma. As this is the case, Śāntideva instructs through rational argument why the spiritual aspirant should see enemies not as objects worthy of anger or retaliation but as beings caught in the grips of their own afflictive emotions. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
''A Neglected Virtue''
"Patience is a virtue," a friend used to say, before grinning and boastfully adding,
“which I don’t have!” Unlike generosity or compassion, patience seems to be the
kind of virtue people are able to boast about lacking. My friend’s dismissive attitude
toward patience would not be out of place in contemporary analytic philosophy in
the West.[1] This attitude is most often expressed by neglect: one is hard pressed to find much discussion of patience in the works of Plato and Aristotle.[2] Later classics like Spinoza’s ''Ethics'', Mill’s ''Utilitarianism'', and Kant’s ''Metaphysics of Morals'' make no mention of patience at all.[3]<br> When patience is discussed, it is commonly described as a morally unimportant notion. Aquinas defends patience as a virtue, but quickly notes that it is not a principal virtue, and since the best virtues aim at the good and incline us to it patience is not one of them.[4] Aquinas’ criticism of the moral value of patience is echoed later by David Hume and Francis Hutcheson. Hume includes patience among traits that are valuable only for their effect on our conduct:
:There are many other qualities of the mind, whose merit is deriv’d from the same origin, industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy, with other virtues of that kind, which ‘twill be easy to recollect, are esteem’d valuable upon no other account, than their advantage in the conduct of life.[5]<br>Hutcheson includes it among traits that are admirable, but not in a moral way:
:A penetrating genius, capacity for business, patience of application and labour, a tenacious memory, a quick wit, are naturally admirable, and relished by all observers; but with a quite different feeling from moral approbation.[6]<br>
Here patience is described as having only instrumental value; it is a virtue that helps
us to achieve existing goals (goals that could be moral, immoral, or amoral). Since it
does not supply us with a morally good goal (as generosity and justice do), it is considered as morally valuable as having good business sense or being a clever conversationalist. This view is echoed in more recent discussions. For example, Michael Slote describes patience both as a “minor” virtue and an “other-regarding” virtue, good only for its benefit to others.[7]<br> In contrast to its treatment by many philosophers in the West, patience plays a central role in Buddhist ethics. One can hardly read a book about Buddhist ethics and not find at least ''some'' discussion of patience.[8] Many of the ''Jātaka'' tales, fables about the previous lives of the Buddha, feature lessons about patience.[9] In the Theravāda tradition, patience appears as one of the Ten Perfections (Pāli: ''pāramī''), the ten qualities that lead to becoming a Buddha.10 In Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is one of the Six Perfections (Skt: ''pāramitā'') of the ''bodhisattva'', the spiritual and ethical ideal of the Mahāyāna. The eighth-century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva’s ''Entering the Path of the Bodhisattva (Bodhicaryāvatāra)'', one of the most studied and quoted Buddhist texts, devotes an entire chapter to discussing patience. This attention to patience is continued by Tibetan thinkers like Tsongkhapa in his ''Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo)'' and Gampopa in his ''Jewel Ornament of Liberation (dwags po thar rgyan)''. One need not know much about the specifics of Buddhist thought to see that Buddhist thinkers care about patience in a way that analytic ethicists in the West do not.<br> The difference between Western analytic views and Buddhist views on patience is not simply a cultural or historical curiosity, but can shed light on the assumptions Western thinkers tend to make about patience and its role in moral life. Joseph Kupfer offers a recent restatement of these assumptions.11 First, following Hume, he claims that patience has only instrumental value: unlike justice or courage, patience does not supply us with goals, but is merely a means to achieving goals we already have. Second, following Hutcheson, he claims that patience does not itself have moral value; if it has moral value at all, according to Kupfer, it is as a product of more basic moral attitudes like self-respect or understanding of the flaws of others.[12]<br> In what follows, I argue that patience is not always of merely instrumental moral value, but ''can'' have moral value itself. In brief: patience and impatience often manifest how we relate to various sources of value in the world in morally important ways. My discussion will begin with patience in a Buddhist context and will offer a Buddhist-inspired account of which sort of patience has moral value and why. I am not suggesting that Western philosophers accept Buddhist ethics wholesale, only that examining a virtue in an ethical system that prizes it can shed light on what many ethicists in the West have overlooked.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The case for neglect is certainly weaker when applied to Christian ethics and philosophers outside the analytic tradition, who tend to take patience more seriously as a virtue. I will mention such thinkers, though they may well have less to learn from Buddhism in this respect than their analytic colleagues.
#The S. C. Woodhouse ''English-Greek Dictionary'' translates ‘patience’ with various synonyms that capture various aspects of patience: ‘endurance’ (''karteria''), ‘forgiveness’ (''syngnome''), ‘gentleness’ (''praotes''), and ‘quietness’ (''hesychia''). There is discussion of these notions in the ''Nicomachean Ethics'', where Aristotle says that endurance is less choiceworthy than self-control (VII.7, 1150b1), and Plato’s ''Charmides'' offers quietness as a possible definition of moderation (''sophrosune''), but these are not discussions of patience in the sense I will discuss. Aristotle’s discussion of gentleness and anger (IV.5, 1125b26 ff), however, is closer to the notion I am concerned with. I thank Mary-Louise Gill for these references.
#Though when reflecting on his pietist upbringing Kant comes close to praising something like the notion of patience I will discuss, saying of his parents, “They possessed the highest qualities that a human being can possess, namely that calmness and pleasantness, that inner peace that can be disturbed by no passion. No Need, no person, no dispute could make them angry or cause them to be enemies of anyone” (quoted in Kuehn, ''Kant'', p. 40).
#''Summa Theologica'', Question 136.
#''A Treatise of Human Nature'' 3.3.4.7.
#''A System of Moral Philosophy in Three Books'', pp. 27–28.
#Slote, ''From Morality to Virtue'', p. 104. See also Kawall, who claims that patience is an other-regarding epistemic virtue, along with Fowler and Kam, who claim patience as a political virtue that is primarily good for society. Robert Adams’ discussion of patience (''A Theory of Virtue'', pp. 33–34) sounds somewhat non-moral, calling patience a “structural virtue” that is simply a matter of “personal psychic strength.”
#Popular introductions to Buddhist ethics nearly always include a discussion of patience. For example, the Dalai Lama’s ''Ethics for the New Millennium'', Hammalawa Saddhatissa’s ''Buddhist Ethics'', and Peter Harvey’s ''An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics'' all include several mentions of patience. I have never seen any mention of patience in a philosophical introduction to ethics by an analytic philosopher in the West.
#Rerukane Chandavimala Mahathera offers the following list: ''Mahāsīlava'' (''Analysis of Perfections'', p. 51), ''Khantivādī'' (p. 313), ''Chaddanta'' (p. 514), and ''Mahākapi'' (p. 516).
#See Mahathera, ''Analysis of Perfections'', p. 18.
#Kupfer, “When Waiting Is Weightless,” pp. 277–279.
#Cf. Mayeroff, who sees patience as an expression of caring (''On Caring'', pp. 12–13).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
For the most part, Dpal sprul's practice manual follows strictly the order of Śāntideva's treatise, but, given its own specific focus, places a different emphasis on individual elements. It opens with a quote of the first verse of the original text, thereby stating its central concern, namely, an explanation of the precepts of a bodhisattva. The main body of the text is then divided into four topics, presented in a logical sequence: First, the prerequisites for entering this practice are laid out. The second topic then leads the adept through a specific ritual for taking the vow of a bodhisattva. Having been prepared in this way, one proceeds to learn about the actual conduct of a bodhisattva in the third chapter. The concluding section describes the benefits of this kind of practice. Among these four topics, the first and the last are treated only marginally, clear emphasis being put on Chapters Two and Three, which can be seen as constituting the main content of Dpal sprul's text. (Viehbeck, "Performing Text as Practice," 558) +
In this paper I attempt to explain the contribution of meditation (''bhāvanā'') to
knowledge as it is presented in the ''Bhāvanākrama''s. Kamalaśīla’s presentation in
these texts makes use of the schema of three wisdoms or ''prajñā''s (''śrutamayī-,
cintāmayī'', and ''bhāvanāmayī-prajñā'') and a very specific understanding of the
notion of ''bhūtapratyavekṣā'' as "the discernment of reality." My analysis is framed
in the context of a recent controversy concerning the epistemological role of
meditation in relation to the views of the opposing sides of the historical debate
at Bsam yas. I argue that the ''Bhāvanākrama''s assign a necessary and very specific
function to conceptual meditation in the process of acquiring a direct, nonconceptual knowledge of reality (''nirvikalpajñāna''). +
This chapter examines two pedagogical works by the nineteenth-century Tibetan master Dza Patrul Rinpoche that exemplify his distinctive teaching style—accessible yet profound, playful yet spiritually sophisticated. ''The Low-Born Sage Speaks: The Ladder to Liberation'' presents Buddhist categories through interlocking verses that ultimately reduce the entire path to simple practices like examining one's own mind. ''The Explanation of Chudrulü'' offers a tongue-in-cheek etymology of a colloquial Tibetan expression, functioning simultaneously as humor, critique of excessive scholasticism, and subtle allegory about Buddhist practice. Both texts frame themselves as performances responding to challenges, showcasing Patrul's virtuosity through puns, wordplay, and multilayered meanings. They demonstrate how Patrul's compositional skill made complex Buddhist teachings comprehensible to ordinary practitioners while embedding deeper significance for advanced students. The chapter also explores Patrul's ecumenical approach to Buddhist lineages and his critique of overly scholastic methods, situating these works within the broader context of nineteenth-century Kham and the rime (nonsectarian) movement. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Franklin Edgerton in his monumental ''Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary'' (BHSGD) proposed a description of Buddhist Sanskrit texts based on the assumption of an original Middle Indic language that underwent a progressive "Sanskritization" in which these middle Indic forms gradually were purged. Edgerton proposes dividing Buddhist Sanskrit texts into three "loosely" chronological layers: in the first group prose sections exhibit as many irregular forms as the verses; in the second group, the verses show evidence of Middle lndo-Aryan forms while the accompanying prose sections are written in generally correct classical Sanskrit; and in the third group are texts whose verses "are substantially as Sanskritized as the prose parts."[1] The ''Vinaya-viniścaya-upāliparipṛcchā'', an early Mahāyānasūtra on monastic discipline, fits the description of Edgerton's second group. Śāriputra, in the first section of the text, asks the Buddha general questions about moral behavior and the Vinaya specialist Upāli asks him more specific questions in the second section. Upāli's final questions ask how Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas eradicate pride. The Buddha associates the elimination of pride with the repudiation of conceptual attachment to (''abhiveśa'') dharmas. He explains further in forty four verses the inconceivable and non-dual nature of dharmas.<br> Candrakīrti quotes sixteen of these forty-four verses in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ''. Candrakīrti uses the scriptural authority of the Buddha to enhance and strengthen his position on the empty and non-dual nature of dharmas. He believes that scriptural authority should be relied upon in situations where perception and inference fail to give certain knowledge about things that are beyond the scope of the senses (''parokṣa'').[2] Candrakīrti seems to recognize the language ot these ''sūtra'' verses as Sanskrit. He comments on their language only once and uses Pāṇini's ''Aṣṭādhyāyī'' and Patañjali's ''Mahābhāṣya'' to explain why in one ''Samādhirājasūtra'' verse a case ending appears to be missing and in another a singular verb is used where a plural is expected.[3] In this short paper I will examine the ''Upāliparipṛcchā'' verses which be quotes. I will suggest that metrical license accounts for the majority of the Middle lndo Aryan forms found in these verses. The anonymous author of the ''Upāliparipṛcchā'' verses uses the same techniques for preserving the meter that we find employed in the composition of Pāli verses. Edgerton argues against comparing Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit verses. "I frankly have never understood Pāli meter," he confesses, ". . . a great many Pāli verses baffle me."[4] Had A. K. Warder's ''Pali Metre'' been available to him he might have bad a different opinion. As Warder observes, Buddhist Sanskrit expands the metrical license already practiced in Pāli.[5] (Lang, introduction, 231–32)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Edgerton 1953: XXV
#See his commentary to ''Catuḥśataka'' XII.5 in Tillemans, (1990) vol. II, 17.
#See Bronkhorts 1993: 405-406.
#Edgerton 1953: 6 n15.
#Warder, 1967: 74, 78.
Prajñākaramati on Śāntideva's Case Against Anger: A Translation of Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā VI.1-69 +
A translation of a major part of Prajñākaramati’s canonical commentary on the Perfection of Patient Endurance chapter of Śāntideva’s ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. The introduction clarifies the importance of the commentary and explores what can be learned from it. Prajñākaramati’s comments help illuminate the meaning of the verses and provide evidence for the view that the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' should be understood as offering not just meditation exercises, but also rational arguments that can be evaluated as philosophy. +
Daniel Stender ("Preliminary Survey of Sanskrit Manuscripts of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''") offers a thorough survey of the available manuscripts of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. The article identifies the manuscripts that were used for the previous editions of the text and also locates the newly discovered ones, thereby facilitating future work on a revised version of the critical edition of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. (The editors, preface, ix) +
Problems in the Transmission of Vajrayāna Buddhism in the Western Himalaya About the Year 1000 (Ruegg 1984) +
This article examines the intercultural transmission of Indian Vajrayāna Buddhism into the western Himalayan region, particularly Tibet and surrounding areas, around the 10th and 11th centuries. It highlights the significant challenges in interpretation, practice, and doctrinal authenticity encountered during this period of transmission. The author details historical, political, and religious contexts, noting local syncretic adaptations including problematic ritual practices and sectarian disputes. Key figures such as Atiśa are discussed who played pivotal roles in addressing these practical and theoretical difficulties to shape the development and correct transmission of Vajrayāna Buddhism in the Western Himalaya.
This paper thus sheds light on complex issues arising at the Indo-Tibetan interface, illustrating the intricate dynamics of religious and cultural interaction during an important era of Buddhist dissemination and consolidation. +
Problems of the First Verse, Especially its Pāda a, in the First Group of Verses of the Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa-sūtra +
The Sanskrit text of the ''Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa-sūtra'' had for long time not been known till its manuscript, though not complete, was some twenty years ago found in the "Schøyen Collection" and studied and published by Prof. Braarvig, Norway. In the Sūtra, verses are found in three places separately, each group containing decades of them. Verses of the first group are almost complete; the second, fragmental; and the third, all lost.<br> Recently, I investigated the Sūtra, and specifically its verses, and found that there remain several important and serious problems unsolved, or rather, even unquestioned. In this paper, therefore, I would like to take up some problems in the first verse of the first group, especially its pāda a. The most important problem is actually that concerning its metre.<br> Pāda a of the first verse is as follows (with the other three pādas, as well):
:nirātma nirjīva niṣpudgala dharmā deśehi nāyaka anaṃtayaśāḥ /<br>śāntaḥ praśānta upaśāṃta satā ayam īdṛśa parṣa agravarā // 1 //
As is seen, the metre of both pāda b and c is the same, i.e. ''utthāpanī''; and that of pāda d could be ascribed to ''pramitākṣarā'', which is substantially the same as the ''utthāpanī'' metre (if the first long syllable of ''utthāpanī'' resolved into two shorts, its name changes and becomes ''pramitākṣarā''). Contrastively, the metre of pāda a is neither the same as that of those three pādas, nor easy to identify. Why? My answer is that probably the third word of pāda a, i.e. ''niṣpudgala'', is not original but changed most likely from something like ''niṣpoṣa'' which appears as a synonym of ''nirātman'', or ''nirjīva'', and even ''niṣpudgala'' itself in the ''Vajracchedikā'' and elsewhere. +
