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This chapter explores the Buddhist practice of purifying sinful actions through confession and atonement, presenting the four essential powers of proper confession: cultivating remorse, engaging in remedial practices, resolving to avoid future offenses, and finding support through the Three Jewels and bodhicitta. Śāntideva emphasizes that bodhisattvas with skill-in-means (combining wisdom and compassion) can overcome even serious transgressions through practices like reciting mantras, making offerings, and cultivating the altruistic mind of bodhicitta, which serves as a powerful cosmic fire capable of burning away all negativity. +
This chapter focuses on patience (tolerance) as the third perfection necessary for purifying negative emotions and karmic obscurations, presenting three types of patience and emphasizing how bodhisattvas must cultivate an unperturbed mind even when facing extreme suffering or harm. Through extensive scriptural citations, Śāntideva demonstrates that with proper practice and the armor of patience, a bodhisattva can transform even the most severe physical torture into opportunities to perfect all six perfections simultaneously while maintaining an unwavering commitment to achieving buddhahood for all sentient beings. +
Chekhawa Yeshe Dorje ('chad kha ba ye shes rdo rje) was born in a place called Luro or Lura (lu ro / lu ra) in 1101, the iron-snake year of the second sexagenary cycle. His father was called Pakpa Kyab ('phags pa skyabs) and his mother was Sonam Kyi (bsod nams skyid). The name of their clan was Ja (bya), which is sometimes given as the name of his birthplace.
As a young boy he became a student of Rechungpa (ras chung pa, 1084-1161) at Loro (lo ro), and was given the vows of novice monk (dge tshul; SK: śrāmaṇera) at the age of twenty-one at Loro Zhingsar (lo ro zhing gsar) by a Khenpo Tsewerwa (mkhan po rtse ber ba, d.u.) and Chak Rinchen Chang (chags rin chen 'chang) or Lobpon Dakpo Tsangdulwa (slob dpon dwags po gtsang 'dul ba). They gave him the name Yeshe Dorje. Shamiwa Monlambar (sha mi ba smon lam 'bar, 1085-1171) gave him teachings on Vinaya and related topics.
Soon after he accompanied Rechungpa to Nyel (gnyal) to an assembly of a Ngor Jetsun Bhora (ngor rje btsun bho ra, d.u.) that was presided over by a Ngok Lotsāwa (rngog lo tsA ba; certainly not Loden Sherab, who passed away in 1109). Inspired by the teachings, he sought out full ordination, which was ultimately granted by Tsarong Joten (tsha rong jo stan, d.u.), Zhang Sherab Tring (zhang shes rab spring, d.u.) and Dakpo Tsangdulwa (dwags po gtsang 'dul ba, d.u.) in 1123, when he was twenty-three.
Read more at [https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Chekhawa-Yeshe-Dorje/5791 The Treasury of Lives] +
Christopher Jones: Defining a "Buddha-Nature Discourse": The Case of the Mahāmeghasūtra (Sprin chen po'i mdo) +
Scholars of Buddhism in Tibet and elsewhere have proposed different lists of which discourses (''sūtras''; Tib. ''mdo'') in Mahāyāna Buddhism are sources for teaching about buddha-nature. Among these, there are those texts that teach some account of buddha-nature using the enigmatic expression ''tathāgatagarbha'' (Tib. ''de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po''). Crucially, these two categories are not quite the same: discourses concerned with buddha-nature exceed those that use the term ''tathāgatagarbha'', whereas passing mention of ''tathāgatagarbha'' does not mean by itself that a discourse promotes anything that we can accurately call buddha-nature teaching.
To explore differences between what we should call ‘buddha-nature’ and ''‘tathāgatagarbha’'' works, the present paper will take as a case study the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' (''Discourse of the Great Cloud''), which survives only in translations in Tibetan (''Sprin chen po’i mdo'') and in Chinese (Taishō no. 387 大方等無想經; also called 大方等大雲經). Although recognizably still the same discourse, our two versions of the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' differ significantly in their content. Although commentators in the Jonang tradition, including Dol po pa (C13–14th), have sometimes taken the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' to be a source for teaching about buddha-nature, the Tibetan version of the text certainly does not teach about this in a manner reminiscent of any other known Buddhist discourse, and is demonstrably not invested in the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' specifically. Attending to our two extant versions of the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'', I will highlight some of the difficulties in the classification of Buddhist works, especially where two versions of ‘the same’ discourse appear to teach quite different things.
Moreover, recent reevaluation of the history of buddha-nature thought in India suggests that while the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' is not interested in the expression ''tathāgatagarbha'', it may still have been produced in a milieu associated with the very early life of this term. It could be argued that in material of specifically the Tibetan translation of the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' we find traces of nascent thinking about ‘buddha-nature’ before this became tied inextricably to the term ''tathāgatagarbha''. I tentatively propose that the Tibetan version of this work, so far little-studied, may provide insights into the early life of buddha-nature teaching in India, and that while it may not be a member of any delineable ''‘tathāgatagarbha'' corpus’ it could nonetheless provide insights into a formative period of buddha-nature thought in India.
This article reports newly discovered Sanskrit quotations from Nāgārjuna's ''Ratnāvalī'' and ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' found in Abhayākaragupta's twelfth-century ''Abhayapaddhati'' commentary. The author identifies one previously unpublished ''Ratnāvalī'' verse and four ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' verses not yet known in Sanskrit, expanding our knowledge of these important texts. +
Comparative Confession: A Comparative Study of Confession in the Writings of Tertullian, Cassian, and Śāntideva +
This paper comparatively analyzes confession of sin across three Christian and Buddhist texts. Specifically, the paper compares the diverse ways in which confession is presented in Tertullian's ''De Paenitentia'', St. John Cassian's ''Conferences'', and Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. In so doing, the paper not only highlights the multiplicity of forms confessional practices may take (both between religious traditions and within a particular tradition), but also underscores the common theme among all three authors of confession’s fundamental role in personal transformation. After analyzing each author’s understanding of confession and its effects (encompassing spiritual, moral, and emotional domains), the paper concludes with a discussion of theological and ministerial implications. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Compassion is often thought of as sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others. Cultivating compassion begins by learning to tune in to other people in a kind and loving manner. This is not the understanding of the famous eighth century Indian Buddhist scholar Śāntideva. He presents a compassion training that relies on the recognition of the fundamental equality of all beings, and is sustained by disciplined self-education. His instructions have inspired not only the Tibetan Mind Training[2] tradition, but also secular compassion training models in contemporary North America. Śāntideva’s ideas are worthy of close consideration not only for scholars of Buddhism, but for anyone concerned with the question of how to foster compassion in societies that struggle with an increase of xenophobic voices and intolerance.[3]<br> This paper explores the meaning and ethical underpinnings of Śāntideva’s instructions, dubbed by Tibetan commentators[4] the "Equalizing and Exchange of Self and Other" passage. This passage is part of the Mahāyāna Buddhist treatise ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (Skt., literally ''Engaging in the Practice of Awakening''),[5] which is considered a world classic of religious literature. Contrasting my reading with contemporary interpretations by Charles Goodman (2015) and the philosopher trio Jay Garfield, Stephen Jenkins and Graham Priest (2015), I argue that Śāntideva’s “Equalizing and Exchange” passage is best understood as meditation instructions, rather than ethical theory or philosophical reasoning. The specificity of Śāntideva’s instructions is his deconstructive approach to compassion training. In a meditative process, the trainee deconstructs compassion-inhibitors, such as self-cherishing and prejudice, rather than strengthening empathetic emotions.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#(From the title): Paper presented at the AAR EIR, April 28, 2017 in Waterloo, ON, Canada.
#Lojong, Wylie ''blo sbyong''.
#On the rise of xenophobia, see Watch Human Rights, World Report 2017 (Place of publication not identified: POLICY Press, 2017).
#Foremost among them is the influential commentary by Thogs med bzang po dpal, ''Ocean of Good Advice, Commentary on the Introduction to the Parctice of Bodhisattvas. Byang Chub Sems Dpa'i Spyod Pa La 'Jug Pa’i 'Grel Pa Legs Par Bshad Pa’i Rgya Mtsho'' (Reprint by Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang 2008). For a comprehensive list of commentators, see Frederik Liland, "The Transmission of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the History, Diffusion, and Influence of a Mahāyāna Buddhist Text" (MA, University of Oslo, 2009).
#For a multilingual edition of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA), see Śāntideva, "Bodhicaryāvatāra," University of Oslo, Faculty of Humanities, https://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=volume&vid=24.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The thought that compassion (''karuṇā'') is a central moral virtue, perhaps the central such virtue, of Buddhism, hardly needs argument.[1] The question that will concern us in this chapter is "why?" What is the ground for its being so?<br> Of course, compassion is a virtue, or at least valued, in most ethical traditions; and different answers to the question of what grounds it will be given in different traditions. A Christian might answer the question by saying that it is because God—at least, God
the Son—commanded it.[2] But in Buddhism, there is no ''deus'', and so
no ''deus ex machina''. If one is to find a ground for compassion, it has
to be something ''intra-machina''.<br> The machinery, of course, must be of a kind that is acceptable to Buddhist theory. To illustrate: Aristotle provided a justification for many virtues. He holds to a certain notion of human flourishing (''eudaimonia''). The virtues (''arete'') are those human dispositions that are conducive to such flourishing (see, e.g., Kraut 2010). Thus, temperance is a virtue: intemperance inhibits rational reflection, a core part of human flourishing. But if Buddhism has a notion of flourishing, it is not Aristotle's; and in any case, compassion is not a virtue that features significantly in the Aristotelian catalogue.<br> The notion of a virtue does not feature at all in a Hobbesean account of morality; but his machinery does provide a framework which grounds moral notions. Why, for example, should one obey the Sovereign? Because of a compact made to establish their sovereignty (see, e.g., Lloyd and Shreedhar 2008). But the fiction of a social compact has no role in Buddhist thinking. And again, compassion is not something particularly significant in Hobbesean thought.<br> What kind of machinery does Buddhism have for answering our target question? Fairly obvious considerations will take us some way. The Four Noble Truths assure us that human life is one of disquietude (''duḥkha''), and that a major cause of this is an attachment to an illusory self. Compassion, the concern for the well-being of others, is a good policy for dissipating such
self-centeredness. This is fine as far as it goes. But it relegates compassion to a piece of practical advice—on a par with: don't have a heavy meal before you meditate; it makes you drowsy. This has to be missing something important. And in any case, it hardly grounds the role that compassion plays in Mahāyāna thought. In this, the bodhisattva takes a vow of compassion to all sentient creatures, and it cannot be just so that this takes them further down the path of enlightenment. At a certain stage they have achieved individual enlightenment, including the dissipation of the illusion of self and the corresponding attachment. But they voluntarily refuse to take the final step in the process, entry into ''parinirvāṇa'', until all sentient creatures can do so as well.<br> The justification of compassion is, in fact, at its most difficult and crucial in Mahāyāna traditions. In this chapter, we will be concerned with the Madhyamaka tradition in particular, and those later Buddhist traditions that have endorsed its core metaphysical notion of emptiness (''śūnyatā'') (which is
most of them), a notion closely connected with conventional reality as it is conceived in these traditions, as we will see. I will argue that it is emptiness that grounds the virtue of compassion. The next section will provide enough background in metaphysical issues to make the ensuing discussion intelligible. We will then be in a position to look at the envisaged answer. Following that, we will look at an objection and some ramifications of the account. (Priest, introduction, 121–22)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#"Compassion" may not be the best translation of ''karuṇā'', given its connotations of passiveness. "Beneficence" or "caring" may be closer to the mark; but I will stick with the standard translation here. For further discussion of ''karuṇā'', see Chapters 4-7 of this volume.
#"[Y]ou shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength ,.. [and you] shall love your neighbour as yourself. There is no other commandment greater than these." Mark 12:29-31.
Compassion as a Matter of Fact: The Argument from No-Self to Selflessness in Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In his 1998 book, ''Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra'', Paul Williams claims that the argument for altruism made by Śāntideva in this, his most famous work, is fundamentally flawed. In an article of considerable length and scholarly weight, Williams argues that not only does Śāntideva fail to provide a rational basis for morality, as he purports to do, but that furthermore if his argument is taken to its logical conclusions, then Śāntideva has effectively "destroyed the bodhisattva path" (1998, 104). In this paper I want to examine closely Williams's rather startling claim. I want to look at what Williams's calls the argument from "no-self to selflessness" which is presented in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA), and his analysis of this argument. Using evidence from the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (ŚS), Śāntideva's other extant work, I then hope to show why I think Williams's understanding of Śāntideva's views are misguided. While I do think he is misguided, I believe he is so in a way which reveals something significant and interesting about Buddhist, or at very least Śāntideva's, thought. Namely, I think his discussion reveals that the view of reality held by Śāntideva cannot sustain the distinction, which Williams seems to want to make, between facts and values, or as they are called in Williams's paper, 'is's' and 'oughts', and that this failure to distinguish between facts and values has implications for how we approach Buddhist ethics. (Clayton, introduction, 83) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Buddhism traces its origins to the life and ministry of Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha Shakyamuni, who lived probably in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. He spent six years searching for a way that could help him to achieve liberation. In the end he was disappointed with the teachings and techniques of his Hindu masters, so he decided to discover his own method.[1] He achieved enlightenment and spent the rest of his life travelling throughout North India preaching his teachings, ''dharma''.<br> In his sermon at Banaras, the Buddha proclaimed the four noble truths, that would become the basis of Buddhism. The four noble truths are: 1. all existence is suffering (''dukkha''); 2. all suffering is caused by craving (''dukkha samudaya''); 3. all suffering can be ended (''dukkha nirodha'') by removing craving; 4. the way to end suffering is by practicing the noble eightfold path.[2]<br> The Buddha soon attracted many disciples and organized a community, ''sangha''. After his death, different interpretations of the Buddha's teaching and practice began to appear giving origin to different branches of Buddhism. The two main ones are the Theravada and the Mahayana, which were introduced to many places in Asia by the growing number of Buddhists.[3]<br> Mahayana literally means "the great vehicle"[4] to enlightenment. The main ideal of the followers of the Mahayana path is not a solitary quest for ''nirvana''[5] but to become a bodhisattva, a person who is a model of benevolence and compassion, and "who indefinitely defers his own deliverance in order to help in the salvation of others."[6]<br> Nakamura Hajime says that the origins of Mahayana are not yet entirely understood.[7] It seems that since its beginnings lay men and women were also prominent in the Mahayana orders. The members of these orders called themselves ''bodhisattvas'', which means that they wanted to achieve the state of Buddhahood itself. The virtue of compassion became central in their doctrine.[8]<br> The main feature of Mahayana Buddhism is the commitment that every ''bodhisattva'' makes "to work ceaselessly for the benefit of other beings and to transmit to them the merit generated by his or her own religious practice."[9] They refrain from entering Buddhahood and prefer to dwell among the living to alleviate their suffering.[10]<br> The ''bodhisattva'' is an ideal that can be achieved by every human being. It requires a process of meditation and practice, study and continued effort. In this paper I will concentrate my attention on the development of compassion in Mahayana Buddhism. I will present what are the main characteristics of a ''bodhisattva'' and then proceed to describe how that stage can be achieved. I will give particular attention to the role of reason and imagination and the practice of taking and giving. In sum, I am interested in finding out why the practitioners of Mahayana Buddhism want to develop compassion and how they do it.<br> I will use the text ''A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life''[11] written by Acharya Shantideva as the basic text. In it there are the practical guidelines, which everyone trying to become a ''bodhisattva'' should follow. The text also reveals Shantideva's spirituality, deep faith and literary imagination. It also shows clearly his intellectual ability to convince possible skeptic readers.[12] (Antunes da Silva, introduction, 813–15)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For the life of Buddha see F. Reynolds "Buddhism" in J. Fenton and others, ''Religions of Asia'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 153-160.
#The eightfold path is subdivided into eight factors: the right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. See Amadeo Sole-Loris, ''Tranquillity and Insight'' (Boston: Shambhala, 1986), 14-19; W. Rahula, ''What the Buddha Taught'' (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1974), 16–50.
#Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. Mahayana is found chiefly in China, Tibet, Korea and Japan. For the expansion of Buddhism in Asia, see Reynolds, 187-215.
#N. Hajime, "Mahayana Buddhism" in M. Eliade, (ed.), ''The Encyclopedia of Religion'', vol. 2 (New York: Mac Millan, 1 987), 457.
#''nirvana'' can be translated as "the state of complete liberation from ''samsara''." ''Samsara'', or the cyclic existence, is the cycle of uncontrolled death and rebirth that is powered by delusions and contaminated actions. It is the basis for experiencing suffering. Cf. G.K. Gyatso, ''Universal Compassion: A Commentary to Bodhisattva Chekhawa's Training the Mind in Seven Points'' (London: Tharpa Publications, 1988), 160.
#Mircea Eliade, ''A History of Religious Ideas, 2'' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 218. According to Mahayana Buddhism there have been many ''bodhisattvas'' who have taken the vow to delay the liberation from the cycle of existence, in order to help the salvation of other sentient beings. The most popular and famous ''bodhisattva'' is Avalokitesvara. He is the embodiment of all the buddhas' compassion. SeeN. Hajime, 459.
#Ibid., 457.
#Ibid., 458.
#Ibid., 459.
#It should also be said that the ''bodhisattvas'' are not only limited to earthly life. They also live in the pure land. A pure land is a realm outside cyclic existence. See G. K. Gyatso. ''Meaningful to Behold: A Commentary to Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life'' (London: Tharpa Publications, 1986), 379, n. 76.
#A. Shantideva, ''A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life'' (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1979). When quoting or referring to this text I will use Roman numerals to refer to the chapters, and Arabic numerals for the stanzas.
#Shantideva lived in the seventh and eight centuries CE. He was a monk at the monastery of Nalanda. His influence in Tibet is very important. For the life of Shantideva see A. Pezzalli, "Santideva" in M. Eliade, (ed.), ''The Encyclopedia of Religion, 13'' (New York: Mac Millan, 1987), 67-68, or G. K. Gyatso, ''Meaningful to Behold'', 1–3.
The eighth century work of Shantideva is, in many ways, as fresh and as relevant today as it was when written. In this work, he used various psychological methods to inculcate Buddhist principles. These methods are of interest but the essence of his work lies in philosophy and ethics, including the madhyamika philosophy, which is taught today by the Dalai Lama. Shantideva's treatise on compassion, based on a view of interdependence rather than individual competition, takes us beyond the boundaries of psychology. His work is worth serious study for those interested in comparative religion. The ideal of the way of the Bodhisattva resonates with Christian teaching. Psychologists have much to gain from a study of works like this, if taken as inspiration beyond or supplementary to their own subject rather than trying to colonise or appropriate. +
Although it is well known that Schopenhauer claimed that Buddhism closely reflected his own philosophy, this claim was largely ignored until the mid-late Twentieth century. Most commentators on Schopenhauer (with some recent exceptions) since then have mentioned his Buddhist affinities but have been quite broad and general in their treatment. I feel that any general comparison of Schopenhauer's philosophy with "general" Buddhism would most likely lead to general conclusions. In this article I have attempted to offer a more specific comparison of what is central to Schopenhauer's philosophy with what is central to Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that is the concept of compassion.<br> In this article I focus on compassion as presented by its strongest advocate, the Madhyamaka philosopher-monk Śāntideva, and cover four main areas: (1) previous general comparisons between Schopenhauer and Buddhism; (2) the specific relevant ethics of Śāntideva; (3) the specific relevant ethics of Schopenhauer; and (4) comparisons between Schopenhauer’s and Śāntideva’s moral philosophy. This will lead to my conclusion that, in a detailed treatment of ethics, the two are not compatible. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Conclusion of the book summarizes the various ways in which the Socratic persona in Plato's dialogues functions as a paradigm, a figuration of the perfect person, a model for emulation, and an avatar of the divine generosity that extends its providential nature into the world of space and time. In a similar way, Socrates operates as a kind of demiurge within the dialogues, assimilating his interlocutors to the good, which is to say, approaching them in their more divine aspects as intellectual beings capable of achieving virtue via the avenue of self-knowledge. I also address one of the most prominent of what I take to be myths about Plato's Socrates, namely, that he espoused the philosophy of egoism. It is here more than anywhere else that the inner Socrates who is essentially contemplative, and the outer Socrates who is a moral philosopher and possibly an empirical psychologist, sharply diverge. I compare Socrates with the twelfth-century Indian Buddhist philosopher, Shantideva, in terms of the purport of the precept that everyone wishes to be happy and free from suffering. This comparison, I argue, allows us to see that the fundamental Socratic insight, that everyone wants the good, is compatible with a radically altruistic perspective that rejects egoism. (Ahbel-Rappe, preface, xxii) +
Confession and Purification of Sins by the Thirty-five Buddhas according to Upāli-Paripṛcchā: Japanese Translation and study of Byang chub sems dpa'i ltung ba bshags pa'i ti kka by Ye shes rgyal mtshan +
Takashi Fujinaka and Keikyō Nakamikado's 2011 article (Acta Tibetica et Buddhica 4: 155–198) presents a Japanese translation and study of Yeshe Gyaltsen's ''Byang chub sems dpa'i ltung ba bshags pa'i ṭīkka''. It surveys the confession-to-the-thirty-five-buddhas tradition rooted in the ''Upāliparipṛcchāsūtra'' and its role in Śāntideva's ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'', outlines the sūtra's content and Yeshe Gyaltsen's biography and text structure, provides a fully annotated translation of the commentary itself, and appends a translation of the ''Caturdharmanirdeśasūtra'', the doctrinal source for the "four powers" of purification underlying the practice. +
In chapter 2, Śāntideva demonstrates the importance of making offerings—material and nonmaterial—paying homage through veneration (prostrations), going for refuge, and, in particular, confessing one's evil deeds. By openly acknowledging one's past negative behaviors and tendencies through confession, only then can one begin to move in a different direction and transform oneself. +
In chapter 4 Śāntideva addresses the topic of conscientiousness (''apramādha'', ''bag yod''), sometimes also translated as carefulness, a mental factor whose function is to protect the mind from negative forms of action. It is a tool that allows us to meticulously examine our actions of body, speech, and mind, particularly within the perspective of what is to be taken up and what is to be avoided on the path. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In ''Consequences of Compassion'', Charles Goodman sets out to define the theoretical structure of South Asian Buddhist ethics in order to demonstrate how Buddhist thought may contribute to ongoing theoretical and substantive projects in Anglo-American ethics. In service of this aim, Goodman draws on the conceptual resources of contemporary analytic philosophy to identify the forms of moral reasoning evinced in Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna texts. Contrary to the commonly held view that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a form of virtue ethics, Goodman argues that these traditions of thought fall within the family of a welfare-based, universalist consequentialism. Even if one is not entirely persuaded that consequentialism provides a fully adequate interpretive framework for Buddhist ethics, or that Buddhism's primary contribution to contemporary ethics lies in this direction, Goodman makes a compelling case that scholars of Buddhist studies and Anglo-American ethical philosophy alike have much to gain by attending to the sophisticated consequentialist strategies deployed in Buddhist texts. (Meyers, "Review," 1) [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=25417 Read more here] +
What kinds of comparisons can legitimately be made between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Western ethical theories? Mahāyānists aspire to alleviate the suffering, promote the happiness, and advance the moral perfection of all sentient beings. This aspiration is best understood as expressing a form of universalist consequentialism. Many Indian Mahāyāna texts seem committed to claims about agent-neutrality that imply consequentialism and are not compatible with virtue ethics. Within the Mahāyāna tradition, there is some diversity of views: Asaṅga seems to hold a complex and interesting version of rule consequentialism, whereas Śāntideva is closer to act consequentialism. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Many Indian Buddhist texts have a great deal to say about metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and the philosophy of language; many of them offer quite a bit of guidance about how to live, and about the qualities of mind and heart that are worthy of ethical commendation; but most of these texts say nothing at all about the topics that we today would classify as ethical theory and metaethics.<br> Yet there was at least one Indian author who aspired to systematize Buddhist normative teachings into a coherent and general framework. This was the eighth-century North Indian monk Śāntideva. In his two major works, Śāntideva again and again justifies deviations from what would otherwise be binding moral rules whenever a person with compassionate motivation sees that these deviations would have good consequences.[1] He formulates what he calls a "universal characteristic of downfalls" thereby staking a claim to be offering a fully general action-guiding principle for the conduct of bodhisattvas—and that principle turns out to be a statement of utilitarianism.[2] He bases his entire ethical stance on a robust and consistently articulated conception of impartiality that centrally involves agent neutrality. And at ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (henceforth ''BCA'') IX. 90–103, he presents his Ownerless Suffering Argument, which seeks to justify the uniquely rational status of an unrestricted, impartial benevolence by appealing to the doctrine of no self.<br> In my book ''Consequences of Compassion'', I sought to argue that the various forms of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist ethics can best be understood as forms of consequentialism. I would now concede that many Buddhist authors simply didn't say enough about ethical theory to pin down any particular interpretation of the theoretical structure of their views as the uniquely correct one. However, the arguments alluded to in the last paragraph give us more than enough evidence to motivate the conclusion that Śāntideva was a consequentialist. In particular, a very fruitful way to read Śāntideva is as a reductionist about personal identity who also accepted what Parfit calls "the Extreme Claim": that if reductionism is true, I have no reason to give my future selves premium treatment, no reason to be any more concerned about my own future well-being than about the well-being of others.[3] The conjunction of these two views, which we could call extreme reductionism, contrasts with moderate versions of reductionism that have less revisionary normative consequences.<br> Vishnu Sridharan argues that my consequentialist account of Śāntideva's ethics oscillates in an unstable way between moderate and extreme versions of reductionism about persons. He also proposes that a form of particularism would be a better interpretation of Śāntideva's views. But a careful examination of the issues involved provides us, as I shall try to show, with reasons to resist these claims. (Goodman. introductory remarks, 637–38)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See the evidence collected in chap. 5 of ''Consequences of Compassion'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For further passages and analysis, based on work I have recently been doing on the ''Śikṣā-samuccaya'', see my essay "Śāntideva's Impartialist Ethics," forthcoming in the ''Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy'', ed. Jonardon Ganeri.
#See The Cowherds, ''Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness'' (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), pp. 145-146.
#See Derek Parfit, ''Reasons and Persons'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 307-312.
This excerpt from Markus Viehbeck's book ''Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism'' reconstructs the historical development of the controversy surrounding Mipham's commentary on the "Wisdom Chapter" of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', known as the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''. It outlines the challenges in reconstructing historical events from hagiographies and oral accounts, tracing the chronology of debates that lasted nearly thirty years. Key figures, including Mipham and his Geluk opponents, are described, along with the exchange of critical letters and treatises between them.
In this essay, Viehbeck shows how these debates connected scholars from different cultural regions and monastic centers across Tibet, illustrating the interconnectedness of Tibetan intellectual circles and the impact of their philosophical discussions. His overview demonstrates the complexities of reconstructing historical events from limited sources and offers insights into the nature and history of scholastic debates in Tibet. +
