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From Bodhicitta
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No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Can we reach conclusions about how people should act from premises about how things are? ''Prima facie'' the Madhyamaka attempts to do just this in trying to move from the factual to the normative via the theory of emptiness. Scholars in the Madhyamaka tradition argue that because persons are insubstantial (''pudgalanairātmya'') and things other than persons are insubstantial as well (''dharmanairātmya''), unwholesome mental attitudes like attachment and aversion are without bases, since ultimately there is neither craver nor craved, nor a subject feeling aversion or a thing felt aversion toward, and for that reason actions motivated by such mental attitudes should not be performed.<br> Paul Williams has raised the point—using the conceptual framework of the two truths—that we would still want to assume that persons and things are conventionally real (even though ultimately unreal), rather than assuming that they do not exist at all (neither conventionally nor ultimately).[1] But this leaves unexplained why an insubstantial self cannot be the subject of attachment and aversion anymore—such attitudes do not seem to depend on holding some kind of ''ātman''-like view of the self. Or, to rephrase the problem slightly: most neuroscientists nowadays agree that there is no "pearl" in the mind, neither an anatomical nor a functional locus of control in the brain, no Cartesian theater where it all comes together. Most people know that a Rolex watch is just a compound of atoms and some (depending on their interpretation of quantum mechanics) might even believe that all these atoms are ultimately mind-dependent. Yet belief in these facts is generally not deemed to be incompatible with attachment to one’s own self or to one's Rolex watch.<br> The discussion between Williams and the Mādhyamaka thus revolves around two senses of self of different strength. The first, which we are going to refer to as the ''Self'', corresponds to the idea of an ''ātman'' in Classical Indian philosophy.[2] It is a permanent, unitary substance transmigrating from life to life that constitutes the foundation of our personal identity. The second sense of self, we will call this the ''person'', is an altogether less demanding affair.[3] It is neither permanent (though it persists for some extended period of time) nor substantial, depending on a variety of physical and mental factors for its existence. The person is, in short, what our conventional sense of self refers to, a dependent and impermanent entity, yet something that is nevertheless real. Williams argues that Śāntideva's argument is exclusively directed against the Self, not against the person. Madhyamaka reasoning, Williams claims, leaves the person untouched, something which is, after all, a good thing, since the denial of the person would have disastrous consequences for the project of a bodhisattva ethics. Yet while a person is in place, it is unclear why our familiar set of selfish attitudes supposedly directed toward the Self cannot just be redirected toward the person.
Possible Connections Between No-Self Theory and Ethics
In order to assess this argument, it is necessary to provide a closer examination of the relation between ontological and ethical thought in Madhyamaka.[4] We will focus in particular on the question whether the conventional existence of a self is a necessary pre-condition for Mahäyäna ethical practice. (Westerhoff, introduction, 203–4)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For further discussion of Williams's argument, see Chapters 6, 7, and 12 of this volume.
#For a comparative discussion of Śāntideva's ethics and a Classical Indian theory that incorporates such an ''ātman'' (Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta), see Todd (2013).
#For the sake of brevity we shall use the term ''self'' as shorthand for "Self or person."
#See also Chapters 2,7, 8, and 9 in this volume.
The Contrasts between the Bodhisattvayāna and the Śrāvakayāna in the Śikṣāsamuccaya's Theory of Bodhicitta +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This paper discusses the contrasts between the ''bodhisattvayāna'' and the ''śrāvakayāna'' in the theory of ''bodhicitta'' expounded in the first chapter of the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (hereafter ŚS). Two types of ''bodhicitta'', ''bodhipraṇidhicitta'' (ʻthe mind aspiring to Awakeningʼ) and ''bodhiprasthānacitta'' (ʻthe mind moving toward Awakeningʼ), in Śāntideva's works are well known in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.[1] In the explanation of ''bodhicitta'' found in ''sūtra'' quotations in the first chapter of the ŚS, we can see some examples of contrasts between the two vehicles. These contrasts serve to clarify and to emphasize aspects of the bodhisattvaʼs way of life especially in each context of the two types of ''bodhicitta''. However, this point has not been well established in former studies. Therefore, the following problems have remained unclear:<br>
:1. the ''sūtras'' quoted to illustrate contrasts;
:2. the topics that emerge from these contrasts;
:3. the relationship between the two types of ''bodhicitta'' and their contrasts.
Below, these problems will be discussed by summarizing the theory of ''bodhicitta'' in the ŚS, and by examining the quotations that illustrate the contrasts of the two vehicles.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See Tamura 1982, 254–258; 1991. +
This article by Simon Houlton examines the Dalai Lama's teachings on mind training (''lojong''), focusing on his repeated presentations of Geshe Langri Thangpa's ''Eight Verses for Training the Mind'' (''Blo sbyong tshig brgyad ma''). Drawing on His Holiness's commentaries delivered in Manchester, Washington D.C., the Netherlands, and elsewhere, the piece moves verse by verse through the text, showing how each stanza builds a path away from our habitual self-centeredness—toward cherishing others and cultivating humility, confronting one's own afflictive emotions, and practicing ''tonglen'' (the exchange of self and other)—culminating in an insight into the illusion-like nature of reality. Throughout, the article emphasizes the Dalai Lama's central message: that loosening self-centeredness through even modest, sustained practice—regardless of one's level of attainment—can bring genuine peace of mind and benefit practitioners of any or no religious background. +
The ''Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra'' is a work included in the large sutra collection, the Mahāratnakuṭa, compiled by Bodhiruci in the beginning of the eighth century. The history of the Ratnakuṭa collection is obscure, but a review of available evidence seems to indicate that the collection was compiled no earlier than the fourth century and no later than the sixth century. The translation of the ''Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra'' into Chinese was done by Hsüan-tsang in 645 from a Sanskrit manuscript brought with him from India. A second version was done by the later Dharmarakṣa between 1004 and 1053. The Hsüan-tsang version is considerably longer than the Dharmarakṣa version, to which it is superior. The difference in length, however, is accounted for by a wordier style and the use of introductory, recapitulative and concluding phrases in the longer version which do not significantly alter the contents of the sutra, if we base our judgement on comparison of the ''dhyāna'' chapters of the two versions.
The term "Bodhisattva-piṭaka" has a wide currency in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, and is thought by some scholars to refer to a collection which actually existed in early Mahāyāna of works concerned with the Bodhisattva practice. There are instances of the term which support this view, but the term "Bodhisattva-piṭaka" is also often used simply to indicate scriptures of the Mahāyāna.
The ''dhyāna'' chapter of the ''Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra'' begins with a formulaic passage on the four ''dhyānas'' and then deals at length with the five ''abhijñās'' or supernormal faculties. This description comprises about half of the chapter. The remainder praises the ''dhyāna'' of the Bodhisattva, his aid of sentient beings and his spiritual knowledge, and ends with a verse section. Translations of both versions of the chapter, with notes, form Part Three of the dissertation. The Chinese texts, reproduced from the Taisho Tripiṭaka, are furnished in an Appendix.
A number of texts on ''dhyāna'' were examined for purposes of comparison with the ''dhyāna'' chapter of the ''Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra''. These were Saṇgharakṣa's ''Yogacarabhūmi'', Asaṅga's ''Śrāvakabhūmi'', and Buddhaghosa's ''Visuddhimagga'', as "Hinayana"-oriented treatments of ''dhyāna'', and as works which included a treatment of ''dhyāna'' within that of the group of ''pāramitās'', the verses on ''dhyāna'' of the ''Ratnaguṇasamcayagatha'' and the ''Dharmasamuccaya'', the ''dhyāna'' chapters of Āsaṅga's ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'', Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', and Ārya-Śūra's ''Pāramitāsamāsa'', and portions of Śāntideva's compendium, the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''.
This comparison showed a great variety in treatments of ''dhyāna'' in Buddhist literature, which we have roughly categorised as "Hinayana" and "Mahayana" in style. The "Hinayana" approach, is technical and expository, explaining methods of ''dhyāna'' for the practitioner, while the "Mahayana" approach emphasises the fact that the Bodhisattva practices ''dhyāna'' in order to aid sentient beings, and in extolling the Bodhisattva path may say relatively little about the practice of ''dhyāna'' as such. These two "phases" of the treatment of ''dhyāna'' occur together in certain works, and it seems that Buddhist writers did not feel them to be mutually inconsistent. The ''dhyāna'' chapter of the ''Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra'' is almost entirely Mahayana in the style of its treatment of ''dhyāna''. An assessment of its distinguishing qualities and its position in Buddhist tradition awaits further comparison with Mahayana sutra literature as well as commentarial and verse works such as those discussed here.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The title ''Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā'' means "the perfection of wisdom which cuts like the thunderbolt" (of Indra). "Diamond Sutra" has gained currency in the West on the unwarrented assumpton that ''vajra'' means "diamond". I have translated this text twice, once quite literally (Rome 1957, reprinted 1973), and once with greater regard for English idiom (London 1958, reprinted 1973). It is the second which I reprint here. (Conze, preface, ii) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Sanskrit title of this Sutra is ''Vajracchedika Sutra''. It is Number 9 of the Great Prajna Paramita Sutra, the author of which is unknown. It was written in the First Century and has been translated into the Tibetan and Chinese a number of times. This translation was made from Kumarajiva’s trans- lation from the Sanskrit into Chinese (384-417 A.D.) by Bhikshu Wai-tao and Dwight Goddard in 1935.<br> Its theme is that all definitive things, phenomena and ideas are subjective and unreal, being merely manifestations of one's own mind; that even the highest conceptions of the Dharma and of Tathagata are mind-made and "empty." Max Muller writes of it, "In contradistinction to fallacious phenomena, there is the true essence of mind; underlying the phenomena of mind there is unchanging principle." Based upon this theme, the Sutra teaches how to practice the Six Paramitas.<br> At some time in its literary history the "eaves" of the text must have become displaced for it is at present in a confused development. The editor has numbered the sections according to the original order, and then has re-arranged them to present the Scripture in as readable and logical an order as possible. (Goddard, appendix, 661) +
Based on the study of two Indian commentaries extant in Tibetan on the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the paper investigates the significance of the title of this exceedingly popular Mahāyāna scripture. Tracing back the symbolism of the vajra to its origin in Vedic myth, it proceeds to show the survival of its imagery in the Buddhist idea of the vajropama-samādhi. This is followed by an analysis of Kamalaśīla's explanation of the meaning of the term "Diamond-Cutter", which relates it to a threefold path-structure inherent in the text itself. Then the central topic of the sūtra, the support of abhisamaya is analysed and found to be allied in meaning to vajropama-samādhi and āśraya-parāvṛtti, the "conversion of support". The next part of the paper seeks to extend this symbolism to the rest of the āśraya constituting the text, utilising Vasubandhu's explanation of the meaning of "non-corruption" (mi nyams-pa). Finally, the essential meaning of "vajra-cutting" is found to be encapsulated in the seemingly paradoxical threefold logical pattern repeatedly employed by the sūtra: X is (spoken of as) no-X; therefore it is (called or spoken of as) X. +
Based on the study of two Indian commentaries extant in Tibetan on the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the paper investigates the significance of the title of this exceedingly popular Mahāyāna scripture. Tracing back the symbolism of the vajra to its origin in Vedic myth, it proceeds to show the survival of its imagery in the Buddhist idea of the vajropama-samādhi. This is followed by an analysis of Kamalaśīla's explanation of the meaning of the term "Diamond-Cutter", which relates it to a threefold path-structure inherent in the text itself. Then the central topic of the sūtra, the support of abhisamaya is analysed and found to be allied in meaning to vajropama-samādhi and āśraya-parāvṛtti, the "conversion of support". The next part of the paper seeks to extend this symbolism to the rest of the āśraya constituting the text, utilising Vasubandhu's explanation of the meaning of "non-corruption" (mi nyams-pa). Finally, the essential meaning of "vajra-cutting" is found to be encapsulated in the seemingly paradoxical threefold logical pattern repeatedly employed by the sūtra: X is (spoken of as) no-X; therefore it is (called or spoken of as) X. +
The Distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika in Late Madhyamaka: Atiśa and Bhavya as Prāsaṅgikas +
This article by Jundo Nagashima investigates the historical development and nature of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika distinction within late Indian Madhyamaka, challenging the prevailing Tibetan doxographical accounts. Nagashima highlights the 500-year gap in Indian sources regarding this distinction after Candrakīrti, noting the scarcity of references to Candrakīrti before the 9th century CE compared to the more frequent mentions of Bhāviveka. The paper proposes that the key differentiator between these schools lies in their acceptance of a "concordant ultimate" (''brdar brtags pa'i don dam pa'i bden pa''), a conceptual ultimate accessible through inferential reasoning, which Svātantrikas like Bhāviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla embraced, while Prāsańgikas like Candrakīrti did not.
Nagashima then critically examines Atiśa's position, who is often classified as a Prāsaṅgika by Tibetan scholars. While Atiśa's rejection of inference as a means to attain ultimate truth aligns with the Prāsaṅgika view, the article points out perplexing evidence: Atiśa includes both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in his Madhyamaka lineage and participated in translating works of a later Bhavya (author of the ''Madhyamakaratnapradīpa'') more extensively than those of Candrakīrti. The paper argues that Atiśa's understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage and his Prāsaṅgika stance are heavily influenced by this later Bhavya, who, in the ''Madhyamakaratnapradīpa'', also limits the role of valid means of knowledge to conventional refutation and eliminates the Svātantrika's "concordant ultimate." This suggests that Atiśa's Prāsańgika classification is defined by his rejection of the "concordant ultimate" and his view of inferential reasoning as purely conventional, rather than a direct adherence to Candrakīrti's specific arguments against the earlier Bhāviveka. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The question of what exactly is the referent of the Buddhist denial of self continues to baffle the outside critical observer. The question has a long pedigree in Asia, where it was a fundamental and divisive issue among Buddhists. But it has also a long history in the West, where, closely allied to the question of "the meaning of nirvāṇa," it has produced a substantial literature. The western pedigree of the "no-self question" carries us from the times when it was assumed that the object of the "Buddhist" denial was the Upaniṣadic self (or Self with a capital according to one convention) through the times when some argued for a Buddhist Self (also capitalized).[2] The history of the debate has taken some new twists in more recent, and by far more sophisticated analyses (Collins 1982 & 1994; Oetke 1988; Tillemans 1996).<br> The consensus among western scholars points in the direction of a variety of Buddhist positions, and questions the wisdom (and ultimately the usefulness) of attempting to know what the original teaching may have been. Collins (1994) and Tillemans (1996) have examined this spectrum of conclusions.<br> In the present essay, I would like to add two more qualifications, exploring them briefly in light of selected Nikāya and Āgama texts. The hypotheses proposed in this paper are extensions or particular applications of the principle that was expressed by Collins with regards to the constructions of self generally. Collins (1994, p. 67) argues that "[o]ne might say that human beings are articulated conceptually as agents, by themselves and in relation to each other, in different ways, in different discourses." The hypotheses can also be construed as two theoretical qualifications to the quest for the Buddhist non-self. Both qualifications raise the question of what may have been the "self" or "selves" that were the object of the Buddhist critique. First, I propose that different Buddhist voices may interact among themselves and with non-Buddhist voices in ways that are not necessarily linear. This would mean that the terms "self" and "no-self" are not univocal. Buddhists and non-Buddhists could interact in polemics without assuming a single notion of self. Likewise, doctrinal experts and philosophers may argue for a propositional no-self, yet assume and propound other types of no-self—social, ethical, etc. These other notions of self and no-self are not necessarily linked to the ontology expressed or implied by the Buddhist philosophical critique.[3]<br> Second, the contemporary scholar's view of the Buddhist no-self presupposes notions (explicit or implicit) of what may have been the Buddhist notions of the self that is the object of the denial. These western preconceptions cannot be separated easily from our own notions of what is self. And, yet, we do not have a single set of such notions. We have, for instance, major differences of culture, class, and individual character that affect so-called "western notions of the self." The elusiveness and ambiguity of English selflessness, for instance, has been mentioned repeatedly in the scholarly literature. As still other examples of the problem one may mention the fact that Romance languages, for instance, have no simple, much less a natural, set of grammatical categories to distinguish self from "I." Contemporary English, colloquial and psychological, usage of words like "self," "ego," "inner self," and "identity," is equally problematic. The picture becomes even more confusing if we also consider words like "soul," "spirit," "personality," and "mind." All of these words have a privileged status in North American and British folk metaphysics and in the construction of the English-speaker's "selfimage" (if I may be allowed to incur in my own brand of obscurantism to make a rhetorical point).<br> However, slippage and confusion is not the privileged territory of the English speaker. Nor is the rhetorical or polemic exploitation of this slippage a new thing. Consider for instance a key passage in Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (La Vallée Poussin, 1914) Chapter IX, stanzas 68-71). What superficially may appear to be an argument against "the" notion of "self," turns out to be actually, against "one" particular notion of self—and one that is clearly tied to folk usage. (Gómez, introductory, 21–22)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Note #1 is from an excerpt which occurs before the first paragraph. The excerpt reads: The Venerable Ānanda sat next to the Blessed One and addressed him: "Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again 'the world is empty, the world is empty.' But in what sense is it said that the world is empty?" "Ānanda, it is because it is empty of self and of anything belonging to self that the world is said to be empty." Note #1 reads: Saṃyutta Nikāya (henceforth SN), IV.54. All references within the main body of the text and in the notes are to the standard title of classical works or, in the case of contemporary works of scholarship, to the last name of the author followed by the publication date as listed in the Bibliography at the end of this article. Abbreviations are noted on their first occurrence and are also listed at the end of the article. All translations of Pāli texts are from the Pāli Text Society edition. In this passage, and in similarly structured passages below, constructions of the type "Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again 'the world is empty, the world is empty.'" are free renderings of the Indian structure: "Reverend Master, it is said, 'the world is empty, the world is empty.'"
#Much of this literature has been reviewed and justly criticized by Collins (1982). The most recent advocates of the Buddhist self (or qualified self) have been Bhattacharya (1973) and Pérez Remon (1980). The problem may be more complicated than a simple choice between self and no-self. The question is of course what sort of self? And this question needs to be answered in a manner that is something more than a consideration of metaphysical propositions. For a movement in this direction, see Collins (1994), and the papers in Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes (1985). Of course, we still don't know for sure whether or not at least some of the early Buddhist critiques of ātman were directed at the advocates of Upaniṣadic doctrines.
#In spite of its focus on one body of literature, the reader will detect the instability of the concepts of self and no-self. As philosophical extensions of a pronoun with a wide range of discourse functions, "self' and "no-self' are fluid concepts. Their fluidity will become obvious from their changing position in the passages that follow, as well as from the uncertainty of the English translations ("myself," "my self," "no-self," "non-self," "not self," etc.).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Warren Todd sums up his book by posing the question 'how could one practice ethics amongst persons regarded as ignorant illusions?' (p.199). His book is distinguished by the range of mutually supporting ways in which he provides an exploration of ethics via an in-depth, clearly explained, metaphysically oriented study. Welcomed by the Dalai Lama and with a foreword by him, this is an outstanding and original book in its approach to ethics. Among its few failings is to throw the reader straight into the body of the text; an introduction would have been helpful.<br> Todd's book is animated by reference to the compassionate, ethically driven activity of 'enlightened beings' who common folk can emulate by adopting 'a selfless response to an illusory world', and who therefore develop corresponding ethics as a basis for realising spiritual teachings that can lead to their own enlightenment. Todd therefore has to choose which tradition or traditions to draw on to illustrate enlightened ethics and teachings. He is guided partly by Barbra Clayton pointing out that it is by comparison 'we come to know, integrate and articulate knowledge of anything' (p.26) and additionally by drawing on his own experience as a Mahāyāna Buddhist practitioner. Accordingly, Todd chooses to draw ethical principles from two apparently metaphysically opposed traditions, i.e. Vedānta Hinduism with its metaphysics of Self (''ātman'') and Mahāyāna Buddhism with its metaphysics of non-self (''anātman''). He then chooses a main exemplar of ethics from each of these traditions, i.e. Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, not least because these
masters have not been the subject of a previous comparative ethical study. Indeed, because this is a pairing of contemporaries active in 'the same Indian philosophical milieu', it therefore simplifies his aim of drawing comparisons between their respective ethics and approach to becoming enlightened.<br> In Chapter 1, Todd explains how Śaṅkara's Self and Śāntideva's non-self firstly have to be considered in relation to conventional and ultimate truth and secondly are both consistent with the paradoxical conventional reality of an individuated self.<br> In Chapter 2 Todd elucidates, separately for each master, the ethical and soteriological consequences of a self whose individuation is actually illusory, and remarkably finds these to be similar. He contrasts these similarities with their differences to Western notions of altruism that generally demand an individuated self that has a relative but no ultimate existence. He explains that ethical behaviour involves, according to both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, deluding oneself by deliberately constructing separate independent entities, and Todd therefore invents the term 'constructive altruism' to both encompass this activity and to be the title for his model of ethics. He also finds commonality in the process by which
both Upaniṣadic ''brahman''-knowers and Mahāyāna bodhisattvas exercise compassionate activity, and a novel way of expressing this, i.e. 'flickering' between ultimate and relative perspectives.<br> Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the worldview of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva which includes their often cross-cutting concepts and mutually commandeered
methodologies, and this serves as a foundation for the remaining chapters of Todd's book.<br> A central premise of Chapter 4 is that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, while radically opposed in terms of ontology of Self, nevertheless have spiritual and ethical goals that are 'so similar that they are able to take on a common opponent' (p.81), i.e. the Yogācāra. Thus chapter 4 marks a temporary change of tack to reinforce an understanding of ethics as necessarily involving a pretence that the illusory world is real but now reaching this conclusion from the different perspective of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva joining forces against the Yogācāra. Todd takes the reader through seeming contradictions to his argument by a thorough explanation of the Dalai Lama's point in his foreword that Śaṅkara's philosophical views have many similarities with those of the Yogācāra. However, Todd ultimately supports his premise, with an unbiased and multi-perspective style of argument that runs throughout his book, by concluding that it is not through philosophical but rather ethical views that the two masters can be seen to line up against the Yogācāra.<br> Chapter 5 includes Todd's elucidation of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva's notions of knowledge and wisdom that differ radically from modern Western understanding, notably because they rely on realisations and an ultimate as well as relative recognition of reality. An original aspect of the account in this chapter is that Todd incorporates his new theories of 'flickering' and 'constructive altruism' to add considerable explanatory power.<br> Chapter 6 brings the preceding chapters to a conclusion. It begins with an exploration of a question posed in respect of ''liberated'' persons i.e. why should ''they'' respond to illusory people in an illusory world? His explanation centres on arguing that such beings, whilst still unenlightened, reached liberation by embedding their ethics in a search for selflessness which necessitated treating illusory
beings as ''if'' they were individuated. He further argues that these ingrained ethics and the response to 'illusory' beings remains post-liberation. Todd develops simple but powerful explanatory models that identify and integrate the respective main domains of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva's ethics and teachings, and thereby facilitates comparative understanding. He explains how the concept of rebirth in both Hinduism and Buddhism leads naturally to concern for our future lives (via our 'continuum') and explains how this can be the basis of a rationale leading us to care for others. And using a triangulated approach to theory that is a feature of his book i.e. different theoretical approaches leading to similar conclusions, Todd uses his novel notion of 'flickering' to provide an alternative explanation, via relative and ultimate truth, of the way in which liberated beings relate to the illusory other.<br> Chapter 7 can be considered as an 'Afterword' where Todd reflects on how his prior articulation of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva's perspectives impact on women and 'lower castes'. This is compelling in its direct analysis that includes, for example, his argument that there is no contradiction between there never having been a female or outcaste Śaṅkarācārya (head of a Hindu Advaita monastery) with the
fact that a ''brahman''-knower does not discriminate by gender or caste.<br> Todd's book is notable for drawing on the wisdom of eighth century masters to provide a contemporary, engaging and original account of Indian metaphysics and ethics. From another perspective, the potential of Todd's book is indicated in the foreword by the Dalai Lama. It is to attempt to capture the age-old flavour of Indian intellectual openness and vibrant doctrinal debate, where seemingly contradictory schools of thought positively interact progressively to refine their respective points of view. As to how Todd realises this potential, in my view the work accords with the Dalai Lama’s assessment that Todd follows 'the pattern of critical examination in which both masters [Śaṅkara and Śāntideva] participated' (p.vii). (Abramson, Review, 172–74)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Despite differences in their ‘revisionary metaphysics’ and their position at opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the existence of an eternal substantial self, Todd demonstrates that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva have much in common with respect to morality and philosophical methodology. Todd focuses on points of convergence between Hindu and Buddhist thought rather than on the ''ātman''/ ''anātman'' distinction, which is typically viewed as divisive. He argues that understanding the differences between these traditions cannot be achieved without examining the influence of metaphysics in matters of religious and ethical praxis.
The comparative nature of Todd’s analysis of Śaṅkara’s and Śāntideva’s derivation of ethics from metaphysical commitments produces new perspectives on these thinkers. For example, by comparing their treatment of shared intellectual opponents, the Yogācārins, (whom both interpreted as threatening morality) Todd reveals the centrality of ethics in the Advaitin and Madhyamaka projects.
Both thinkers regard belief in an 'individuated self' as... [https://doi.org/10.1093/jhs/hiw006 Read more here] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This searching and instructive book enlarges the current intensive debate on Buddhist ethics by clarifying the ontological foundations of ethical thinking and behavior in Mahāyāna Buddhism and in particular the Madhyamaka tradition. Conversely, it expounds the ontology of emptiness and the twofold truth with an eye to its ethical function. In addition, it reveals close affinities between Śāntideva's ontology and ethics and those of his contemporary Śaṅkara. Mahāyāna and Vedānta share a set of concerns and strategies, despite Buddhist denial of a permanent self and of Vedic authority and ritual. There is a "cross-cutting" (89) between the two traditions that makes a synoptic study illuminating. The claims that "all is ''brahman''" and "all is empty" espoused respectively by the two authors are so radical that "they each threaten their own traditions" (47) and make necessary a defense of the conventional practical world as the arena of ascetic striving and of compassionate action. Both Indian thinkers faced the riddle of how ethics can make sense when the "individuated self" is "ultimately denied" (3). [http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2016/11/Todd_OLeary_16_3.pdf Read more here] +
The Evolution of the Bodhisattva Ideal: A Comparative Philological and Doctrinal Analysis of the Pāli Canon and Early Mahāyāna Literature +
This study examines the development and transformation of the bodhisattva concept through comparative analysis of canonical Pāli texts and early Mahāyāna literature. Drawing upon philological evidence from the Jātaka tales, Buddhavaṃsa, and foundational Mahāyāna sūtras including the Lotus Sūtra and Perfection of Wisdom literature, this research traces the evolution from the historical Buddha's preenlightenment journey to the fully developed bodhisattva doctrine. The investigation employs textual criticism and doctrinal comparison to demonstrate how the bodhisattva ideal underwent significant conceptual expansion, shifting from describing the Buddha’s past lives to establishing a universal path of compassionate awakening. Findings reveal that while the Pāli tradition presents the bodhisattva path as exceptional and primarily retrospective, early Mahāyāna sources reconceptualize it as the supreme spiritual ideal accessible to all practitioners. This transformation reflects broader soteriological developments within Buddhist thought, particularly regarding the tension between individual liberation and universal salvation. The study contributes to understanding how fundamental Buddhist concepts evolved across different textual traditions and geographical contexts.
'''Keywords:''' bodhisattva, Pāli Canon, Mahāyāna Buddhism, comparative Buddhism, Buddhist soteriology. +
In chapter one of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', Śāntideva describes the excellence and benefits of bodhicitta (''byang chub sems''), the mind that wishes to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings, in order to inspire us to take up the path of the bodhisattva. +
Andreas Kretschmar, in his translation of Khenpo Kunpal's ''Drops of Nectar'', a commentary on the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' that is widely used in traditional curricula and among lay Buddhists, lists the various teaching lineages associated with the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' that developed in Tibet. +
The Final Leaves of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit: Part 1 Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
1. The text presented here in a revised edition and accompanied with an English translation was first made known by V. NÄTHER in 1975[1]. It belongs to the Pravrajyāvastu section of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayavastu, and is contained in folios 43 to 48 of the manuscript of that work discovered at Naupur near Gilgit in 1931[2]. Together with folios 49 to 53 of the same codex, embracing the conclusion of the Pravrajyāvastu and the beginning of the Poṣadhavastu sections, these leaves were immediately entrusted for inspection to Sir A. STEIN and committed by him to L. D . BARNETT, the librarian of the British Museum, who in turn forwarded them for treatment to S. LÉVI. After the latter's publication in 1932 of folios 49v3 to 53vl03, they remained untraceable until 1949 when, along with some photographs of the Stein Collection, they were delivered anew to the British Museum and deposited there under the shelfmark Or. 11878A[4]. Since the leaves were not available when he was preparing his edition of the Vinayavastu, N. DUTT resorted by way of a stopgap to reprinting with some changes and transpositions the abridged Divyāvadāna parallel and LÉVI's specimen respectively[5]; so did, relying on him, S. BAGCHl[6]. After RAGHU VlRA had obtained a microfilm of them as early as the mid-1950's[7], they were ultimately included in the ten-volume facsimile reproduction of the New Delhi Collection[8].<br><br>2. The subject-matter of the following pages is what passes in Divyāvadāna XXIII and Avadānakalpalatā LXVII under the title of Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna, that is, the legend of a merchant's son named Saṃgharakṣita, who, after entering the Buddhist congregation, happened to get into the submarine world of serpent-demons and, back on earth, to reach various places of recompense[9]. It is meant to illustrate the precept that a monk shall not teach the Law without request[10], which was violated in this case inasmuch as Saṃgharakṣita was deemed to have been kidnapped by the serpent-demons for the purpose of preaching[11]. The said precept was formulated by the Buddha in the context of another legend, the so-called Nāgakumārāvadāna, which treats of a serpent-demon having turned monk[12] and makes up, as it were, the frame story of the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna, with the tale of the present preceding and that of the past succeeding it. The aim of this superordinate Avadāna is to exemplify the maxim that a so-called phantom creature — an animal able to transform itself into a human being — must be removed from the congregation[13].<br> The whole former part of the Nāgakumārāvadāna and roughly the first quarter of the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna have been lost in the original Sanskrit; they are, however, still extant in a Tibetan translation of the Vinayavastu dating from the latter half of the eighth century[14] and handed down in the Kanjur division of the Lamaist canon[15].<br> The gap at the outset of the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna may be filled in a measure by means of the Divyāvadāna, the celebrated Mūlasarvāstivādaoriented compilation of Buddhist legends probably dating from the third century, chapters XXIII and XXV of which are a shortened version of the same Avadāna but in a form subsequently vitiated by errors and alterations[16]. Owing to a mistake by its compiler, the Divyāvadāna also gives the final portion of the tale of the present relative to the Nāgakumārāvadāna, which is hardly comprehensible by itself and hence caused many a difficulty of interpretation and classification[17].<br> There are at least two canonical translations of the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna in the Chinese Tripiṭaka. One introduces the fourth fascicle of the 出家事 Ch'u-chia shih[18]; done between 703 and 710 by I-ching, it sets in with the five hundred merchants sailing back to the seashore after Saṃgharakṣita's reappearance from the realm of serpent-demons[19]. The other is a separate sūtra from the time of the Eastern Chin dynasty (317-419) bearing the title 因緣僧護經 Yin–yüan Seng–hu ching[20]; it opens with a résumé of the tale of the present of the Nāgakumārāvadāna[21] and has the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna proper start with the five hundred merchants making up their minds to go on a business voyage, and to ask Saṃgharakṣita to keep them company and teach them the Law[22]. The latter version, without the 'preamble', has been quoted almost in full by Tao-shih (d. 683) towards the close of fascicle 92 of his 法苑珠林 Fa yüan chu lin[23].
<h5>Notes</h5>
#''Gilgit Fragment'', pp. 21–40 (Sanskrit text) and 59–82 (German rendering).
#On the history of the Gilgit finds see O. von HINÜBER, ''NAWG'' 1979, p. 329 ''sqq''., and — with special reference to the Vinayavastu manuscript — K. WILLE, ''Überlieferung'', ch. 3.
#''JA'' 220, 1932, p. 26 ''sqq''., with facsimiles of fol. 51v and the left third of fol. 53v.
#According to a letter from the Librarian.
#''MSV''(D) IV, pp. 27–51 (~ ''Divy''. XXIII, XXV, XXIV) and pp. 52–73, top.
#''MSV''(B) II. pp. 86.13–99.7 and pp. 99.8–109.8.
#Two sets of prints made from this film were found among the papers of the late J. NOBEL, who had been asked to undertake a Sanskrit reconstruction of the entire Pravrajyāvastu for the Śatapiṭaka project of the International Academy of Indian Culture in New Delhi; they are now kept in the Indological Institute of Marburg University. A second microfilm is owned by the Institute for Indian and Buddhist Studies of Göttingen University (shelf-mark: Xb 504).
#''GBM'' VI, Nos. 686–707.
#For a summary of its contents see R. MITRA, ''Literature'', p. 64 ''sq''.; G. TUCCI, ''Scrolls'', II, p. 506 ''sqq''.; J. L. PANGLUNG, ''Erzählstoffe'', p. 8 ''sq''.
#C f. ''Divy''. p.329.23: ''na bhikṣuṇānadhīṣṭena dharmo deśayitavyaḥ''.
#Cf. H. EIMER, ''Rab tu 'byuṅ ba'i gźi'', I, p. 30.
#For a brief argument see J. L. PANGLUNG, ''Erzählstoffe'', p. 8, and H. EIMER, ''Rab tu 'byuṅ ba'i gži'', I, p. 30.
#C f. ''Pravr''. (Tib.) II. p. 251.4–7: ''dge -sloṅ-dag gaṅ-zag sprul-pa ni chos-'dul-ba 'di-la mi skye-ba'i chos-can yin-pas I dge-sloṅ-dag khyed-kyis gaṅ-zag sprul-pa chos-'dul-ba 'di-las bsñil-bar bya 'o II "Monks, as a phantom creature is possessed of the nature of not developing in this Law and Discipline, you, monks, shall expel a phantom creature from this Law and Discipline."
#One of the revisors mentioned in the colophon is dPal-brtsegs of sKa, who flourished under King Khri–sroṅ lde'u–btsan (755–797). C f. G. TUCCI, ''Scrolls'', II, p. 680, n. 41.
#Its Pravrajyāvastu portion has been critically edited by H. EIMER, Wiesbaden, 1983; the Nāgakumārāvadāna is found at pp. 247.17–260.22 and 302.1–306.25, the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna at pp. 260.23–301.27. The first part of the Nāgakumārāvadāna was previously edited and put into English by J. R. WARE, ''HJAS'' 3, 1938, p. 51 ''sqq''. A Sanskrit fragment of it has just been traced by K. WILLE among the published Turfan finds (''SHT'' V, No. 1030, with wrong order of obverse and reverse); it corresponds to EIMER, pp. 250.11–252.7, and WARE, pp. 55–57.
#Translated from two Paris manuscripts (COWELL-NEIL's sigla D and E) and compared with the Narthang Kanjur by E. BURNOUF, ''Introduction'', pp. 280–299. A Gilgit fragment of the Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna probably originating from the Divyāvadāna version (pp. 336.23–339.6) has been transliterated by S. LÉVI, ''JA'' 220, l932, p. 18 ''sq''. (with facsimile of reverse); see K. WILLE, ''Überlieferung'', p. 133.
#A tentative rendering of this passage, based on a metaphrase by L. FEER of its Tibetan pendant in the Narthang Kanjur, is found at ''Divy''. p. 707 ''sq''. In this rendering the vocative ''Nandopananda'' has been interpreted either to relate to a certain Upananda, who, according to the previous narrative, had directed the Ṣaḍvārgika monks to the magic monastery created by the metamorphic serpent-demon, or to denote an exclamation of sorrow (p. 682a: "Gemini!"; ''MW'' p. 526c: "alas! woe is me!"). This view is untenable today; for the editors simply were not aware of the fact that the Ṣaḍvārgika monks themselves include two members named Nanda and Upananda (''Mvy''. 9471 ''sq''. ), and that these of course are addressed here as spokesmen of their group (thus J. R. WARE, ''HJAS'' 3, 1938, p. 60, n. 22; ''BHSD'' p. 290b s.v. ''Nandopananda''). The mention at ''MSV''(D) I, p. 95.4, of a serpent-demon king named Nandopananda is irrelevant to the matter in hand, no such king being referred to anywhere else in the Nāgakumārāvadāna.
#T, vol. 23, No. l444, pp. 1035b 11-1037c23.
#Cf. ''Divy''. p. 334.13 and ''Pravr''. (Tib.) II. p. 269.24 (~ below, p. 272).
#T, vol. 17, No. 749, pp. 565c1-572b 14.
#Turned into English by J. R. WARE, ''HJAS'' 3, 1938, p. 49 ''sqq''.
#Cf. ''Divy''. p. 331.8 and ''Pravr''. (Tib.) II. p. 263.4 (~ below, p. 269).
#T, vol. 53, No. 2122, pp. 964c12-969c28.
This is Khunu Lama Tenzin Gyaltsen's 1975 commentary on Lama Tsongkhapa's ''Foundation of All Good Qualities'', a concise prayer-text that encompasses the entire graduated path to enlightenment in verse form.
The teaching systematically covers the essential elements of the Buddhist path: proper guru devotion as the foundation of all spiritual attainment; recognizing the precious opportunity and impermanence of human life; understanding karma and its inevitable consequences; developing renunciation of samsara; cultivating bodhicitta by recognizing all beings as former mothers suffering in cyclic existence; practicing the six perfections, especially moral discipline; developing the union of calm abiding (''shamatha'') and penetrative insight (''vipashyana''); and entering the Vajrayana path as the swiftest route to enlightenment.
Khunu Lama emphasizes the Madhyamaka view as the most refined Buddhist philosophy and stresses that Tibetan Buddhism uniquely preserves all aspects of the Dharma—Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna—in their complete form. He concludes by encouraging his Western students to master Tibetan language and grammar to fully access these teachings and then spread the Dharma in the West, adapting presentations skillfully to suit different capacities of mind, like a doctor prescribing appropriate medicine. +
Vanessa Zuisei Goddard speaks of the four immeasurables as a "science of compassion," showing the power loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity. +
A scholarly article by Dr. Alexander Berzin on Study Buddhism surveying how the four immeasurable attitudes — love, compassion, joy, and equanimity — are understood and formulated across Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika/Sautrāntika, Mahāyāna, and Bon traditions. Drawing on Indian sources including Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Maitreya as well as Tibetan masters from Longchenpa to Tsongkhapa to Pabongkha, the article examines variations in the definitions of each of the four, their sequential ordering, whether they precede or follow the development of bodhicitta, and the levels of meditative concentration required for them to be truly "immeasurable." The article concludes with a detailed summary of the full range of interpretive variations across traditions. +
