Property:Abstract
From Bodhicitta
This is a property of type Text.
M
The notion of the ''bodhisattva'', the selfless individual who is dedicated to alleviating the sufferings of others, is traditionally articulated within a Mahāyāna Buddhist framework. The question posed here is whether and to what extent this religious ideal can be conceived of, or instantiated by, individuals whose religiosity is framed by a different set of beliefs and values, taking the Roman Catholic Sister of Charity, Mother Teresa, as an example. The broader question of commensurability arises when the criteria for qualifying as a ''bodhisattva'', set within a specifically Mahāyāna context, are superimposed upon a figure who is solidly grounded within another religious tradition. At first glance, the requisite virtues of the bodhisattva—renunciation, compassion and wisdom—seem to intersect aptly with the life and teachings of the "saint of Calcutta." In the details, however, the Buddhist philosophical context of these requisites calls into question the legitimacy of attempting to blithely translate ideas and principles from one worldview to another. Ultimately, the contrivance may work, trumped by the attainments of the archetypal ''bodhisattva''. With figures like Mother Teresa, who are regarded as moral exemplars not only within their own traditions but in other traditions and beyond religion as well, perhaps we can expand our understandings of compassion and of the cultural and religious categories that delineate religious ideals. +
N
Alexander Csoma de Körös war einer der ersten, die uns über den Inhalt des Tanjur informierten.[1] Daher seien ihm—anlāßlich der 200. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages - diese Bemerkungen gewidmet, die einem der verbreitetsten Texte dieses großen lamaistischen Sammelwerks, dem ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', gelten.<br> Das Blockdruckfragment mit Teilen des von Čhos-kyi-'od-zer aus dem Tibetischen ins Mongolische übersetzten und kommentierten Werkes, das Anfang unseres Jahrhunderts von A. Grünwedel bei Turfan entdeckt wurde, befindet sich heute mit der Signatur TM 45 D 336 am Zentralinstitut für Alte Geschichte und Archäologie der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Es wurde 1954 von E. Haenisch[2] und J. W. Cleaves[3] ediert und bearbeitet und war in den folgenden Jahren Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen von F. Weller,[4] N. Poppe[5] und L. Ligeti.[6] Einige Stellen, die mir bis heute nicht geklärt zu sein scheinen, sollen hier nochmals näher betrachtet werden. Zugrunde liegt die letzte Edition des Turfantextes, die Ligeti 1972 publiziert hat.[7]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#A. Csoma de Körös, ''Abstracts of the Contents of the Bstan-Hgyur: Asiatic Researches'' XX (1839) II, No. 12, S. 553-585.
#E. Haenisch, ''Mongolica der Berliner Turfan-Sammlung'' I. ''Ein buddhistisches Druckfragment vom Jahre 1312: Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst'' 1953, Nr. 3, Berlin 1954.
#F. W. Cleaves, ''The Bodistw a cari awatar-un tayilbur by Čosgi Odsir: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies'' 17 (1954), S. 1-129.
#F. Weller. ''Mongolica der Berliner Turfan-Sammlung'' la. ''Zum Blockdruckfragnent des mongolischen Bodhicaryāvatāra der Berliner Turfansammlung: Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Liceratur und Kunst'' 1954, Nr. 2, Berlin 1955; ders., ''Anfragen eines Nichtmongolisten an den Mongolisten: Central Asiatic Journal'' III (1957/58), S. 23–61.
#N. Poppe, ''Antworten auf Professor Fr. Wellers Fragen: Central Asiatic Journal'' VII ( 1962), S. 42-59.
#L. Ligeti, ''A propos de quelques textes mongols préclassiques: Acta Orientalia Hungarica'' XXIII (1970), S. 251–284.
#L. Ligeti, ''Monuments préclassiques 1, XJ//e et X/Ve siècles: Monumenta linguae mongolicae collecta'' II. Budapest 1972, S. 115-134.
In this paper I am not going to present his doctrine of emptiness but another practical and human aspect of Buddha’s doctrine that is "Great Compassion" or Bodhicitta — the "mind of awakening." The doctrine of Bodhicitta is the acme of Mahayana Buddhist doctrine that affects all aspects of human life. Since there is a dearth of writings on this aspect of doctrine and since a majority of scholars have dealt little with this topic, I have attempted to illuminate this aspect of the teachings of Arya Nagarjuna. +
Spanish translation of the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇanāma'' by Nāgārjuna. +
Negi Lama (1894–1977) of Kinnaur, though never a monk, was one of the foremost Buddhist scholars of his time. After mastering classical Tibetan so as to understand fully the classical philosophic texts, he went to Tashilhunpo and Lhasa, receiving teaching there and himself teaching Tibetan grammar. Professional jealousy drove him to Khams where he spent 19 years, partly at the royal court, mostly at successive monasteries and yogins’ retreats, studying in libraries and gathering tantric initiations. He then returned to Varanasi in India to learn Sanskrit, the original language of Buddhist philosophy. While living there in very poor circumstances, the Dalai Lama heard of his reputation and made a special visit to meet him, subsequently arranging for him to move to Bodhgaya and instruct H.H. and others. By his collection and critical study of many little known teachings, otherwise lost in the Chinese occupation of Tibet, he gave a new impetus to Buddhist study. Tashi Rangyas of Leh was one of his disciples.
The man who is the subject of this presentation will probably be unknown to most of the readers. His name was Tenzin Gyaltsen (bstan 'dzin rgyal mtshan), but among the different ethnic groups of Tibetan culture in the Himalaya he was also known under various other names like Kunu (khu nu) Rinpoche, Kunu Lama and Negi Lama (ne gi bla ma). While working on a research project on modern Buddhism in the Himalaya I often had come across his name and became aware that he must have been an important personality of contemporary Tibetan Buddhism. However, apart from some fragmentary information I was able to get from some of my informants – who all spoke about him with deep respect – I could not find any complete account of his life, so that I was in the situation of having some pieces but being unable to complete the jigsaw.
By chance, while spending some time at the Ladakh Bauddha Vihara (Ladakh Buddh Vihar) in Delhi at the very beginning of 1993, I met Mr. Roshan Lal Negi, a scholar of Buddhism from Kinnaur, who introduced me to his father, Sangnak Tenzin (gsang sngags bstan 'dzin)⁴, who had himself been a disciple of Negi Lama for many years of his life. From Sangnak Tenzin’s narration I could record quite a complete account of Negi Lama’s life which is the main source of information I used for this paper.
Although it was an unexpected opportunity to get a first-hand account of his master’s life from Sangnak Tenzin, I stay aware of the fact that relying upon one single testimony as the source of information implies a certain lack of reliability for a scholarly contribution of this kind. Nevertheless Sangnak Tenzin, by the beginning of 1993 an old blind man of 82 years who since the death of his wife had lived a life consecrated to religion, had received his knowledge about the early life of Negi Lama from his master’s own narrations. The later parts of his account were Sangnak Tenzin’s own reminiscences.
Although Sangnak Tenzin’s account was quite different from the type of biographical accounts that can be found in traditional Tibetan hagiographies (rnam thar)⁵ it was not a purely historical account either.
Sangnak Tenzin’s obvious intention was to relate what he considered the most important episodes in the life of his guru, and not to give a historical account of his life in the scholarly sense of the word. His discourse was very enthusiastic and he conspiciously emphasized certain episodes which seemed to be of great importance to him while just passing over several years of time which he considered to be of lesser significance. Moreover, precise dates as well as topographical and personal names were rare and quite inaccurate in his account. I tried to cope with that problem by noting down problematic points during the interview and trying to clarify them afterwards. After each single part of the interview, which more or less coincided with the different phases of Negi Lama’s life, I inquired about some of the passages which I thought had not been treated intensively enough.
However, although he doubtlessly tried his best, Sangnak Tenzin was not always able to give an accurate answer, obviously because I asked questions which seemed to be of secondary importance to him, and about which he therefore had never really thought or enquired. The antinomy between critical-scholarly and devotional-religious discourse in the interview situation is a well-known methodological problem of fleldwork research on which I do not intend to elaborate further here. Pointing out the existence of this problem is, however, important in the present context since it may explain some of the shortcomings of this contribution. Nevertheless, in spite of those limitations Sangnak Tenzin’s account also included many anecdotal items, which I think cast an interesting light on the personality of his master by making him appear in a very human perspective.
I completed the basic material from Sangnak Tenzin’s testimony with some pieces of information I had been able to collect in the course of my research work before and after my encounter with Sangnak Tenzin. Thus, in spite of some contradictions, I could in parts amend for the almost total lack of dates in the interview. Where sources apart from the interview have been used, the name of the informants or the references of the sources used are given in the footnotes⁶.
Although I still am aware of the fact that some points need further investigation, I have come to the conclusion that enough material is available for giving a preliminary but valuable account of Negi Lama’s life, as well as for an appreciation of the influence he exerted on Tibetan Buddhism as a whole.
Thanks to several previous studies, the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (''MPNS'') has been proved to shift its central thought from the ''buddhakāya'' idea to the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea. The present author has shown in another paper (Suzuki [1999]) that the movement between the ''buddhakāya'' idea and the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea appears in the larger context including the ''MPNS'', and has extracted this context from the various Mahāyāna ''sūtras'' under the name of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra''-Group (''MPNS''-G), which consists of the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' (''MMS''), the ''MPNS'', the ''Aṅgulimālīyasūtra'' (''AMS'') and the ''Mahābherisūtra'' (''MBhS''). While the ''AMS'' is a direct successor of the ''MPNS'', the ''MBhS'' succeeds the ''MPNS'' critically and shifts back its central thought from the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea to the ''buddhakāya'' idea again.<br> The ''MPNS''-G declares or suggests the non-emptiness of the ''tathāgata''. This is reinterpretation of the ''pratītyasamutpāda'' and the ''śūnyatā'' idea, and follows the rule of the historical Buddhist hermeneutics. It is especially worthwhile to note that the ''MBhS'', like the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' in the ''Vijñāptimātra'' idea, devaluates the ''śūnyatā'' idea as imperfect. This quite negative attitude toward the ''śūnyatā'' idea does not appear in any other Indian texts on the ''tathāgatagarbha'' idea including the ''MPNS'' and the ''AMS''. Aiming at establishing the theory that every sentient being is able to perform religious efforts and become ''buddha'' on account of the nonemptiness and the eternalness of the ''tathāgata'', the ''MBhS'' must reject any ''sūtra'' concerning the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. Though the ''MPNS'' is a pioneer in reinterpretation of the the ''śúnyatā'' idea, the ''MPNS'' cannot devaluate it perfectly because the ''śūnyatā'' idea is one of the main backgrounds to the ''MPNS''. The ''MBhS'''s decisive attitude toward the ''śūnyatā'' idea devaluation becomes possible by having the ''MPNS'' as its basis. (Source: [https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=27072&item_no=1&page_id=28&block_id=31 UTokyo Repository])
From the University of Hamburg Website regarding this publication:
Buddhism in Past and Present
From the winter term 1996/7 to the winter term 2005/6 the University of Hamburg conducted under changing academic leadership (Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen, Prof. Dr. David Jackson, Prof. Dr. Eli Franco, Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Dr. Jan Sobisch, PD Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes) a non-curricular study program titled “Buddhism in Past and Present.” This program (lectures, group work, plenum discussions), initiated by the coordinator Prof. Dr. Klaus Glashoff for persons interested to study Buddhism after their academic education, was organised in collaboration with the Tibetan Centre in Hamburg, and temporary with the Buddhist Society Hamburg under the auspices of the Department for Continuing Academic Education (Arbeitsstelle für wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung), University of Hamburg, with the aim of acquainting participants with the rich historical, philosophical and practical aspects of Buddhism.<br> The lectures were delivered not only by teaching staff and other affiliated persons of the University of Hamburg but also by scholars from other German and European universities, and by representatives of various living Buddhist traditions as well.<br> The lectures covered a broad range of topics: the historical development of Buddhism from the beginning up to the teachings of Japanese Zen and various contemporary forms of Buddhism; Buddhist ethics; women in Buddhism; meditation; and violence and non-violence from a Buddhist perspective.<br> With the lecturers’ permission, we are here making transcripts of their lectures available. The lectures were meant for the participants of the study program and should not be considered publications in a strict sense. ([https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/en/publikationen/2-buddhismus-in-geschichte-und-gegenwart.html Source Accessed Feb 18, 2021]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Bei heutigen Buddhisten und auch bei Buddhologen — zumal solchen, die selbst Buddhisten sind — liest man nicht selten, die Einsicht in das Nichtvorhandensein eines Selbstes oder in die Leerheit münde ''zwangsläufig'' in universales Mitleid ein. Das ist jedoch m.E. nicht ohne weiteres einsichtig. Einsichtig erscheint eher ''Loslösung'' von den als nichtselbsthaft bzw. leer erkannten Dingen, und folglich ''Aufhören'' von Handlungen, die auf dem Anhaften an ihnen basieren. Woher aber soll der Impuls für ein darüber hinausgehendes altruistisches Tätigwerden kommen? Kommt er wirklich allein aus der Nichtselbst- bzw. Leerheitserfahrung? Oder kommt er nur zum Vorschein, wenn er schon vorher unabhängig davon — durch Üben von Mitgefühl etwa — in das Persönlichkeitskontinuum eingespeist worden ist, und wird durch die genannten Erfahrungen lediglich von Behinderungen befreit?
Für den Ideengeschichtler und Philologen liegt es nahe, zunächst einmal die traditionellen Texte nach einer Antwort zu durchforsten. Nach meinem bisherigen Eindruck, den ich vor einigen Jahren, auf der Basis zugestandenermaßen keineswegs erschöpfender Untersuchungen, in zwei kurzen Beiträgen[1] zu skizzieren versucht habe, ist eine solche automatische Ableitung des Mitleids aus dem Nichtvorhandensein eines Selbstes oder aus der Leerheit zumindest in der vor- bzw. nicht-tantrischen Primärliteratur des indischen Buddhismus relativ selten, bzw. nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen, anzutreffen.
Im alten Buddhismus dient die Betrachtung der Nichtselbsthaftigkeit nach allem, was ich sagen kann, stets der ''Loslösung''. Loslösung und Mitleid sind zwar nicht inkompatibel, können aber doch auch in einer gewissen Spannung zueinander stehen.[2] Zur Begründung von ethischem Verhalten wird in den kanonischen Texten m.W. nicht die Nichtselbsthaftigkeit (der Persönlichkeitskonstituenten etc.) bzw. die Nichtfeststellbarkeit eines Selbstes (''attan/ātman'') herangezogen, sondern (neben der Karma-Lehre)[3] die "Goldene Regel", nach der die anderen so zu behandeln sind, wie man selbst behandelt werden möchte. Hier ist also das Selbst nicht eliminiert, sondern im Gegenteil — unhinterfragt — vorausgesetzt.[4]
Auch für das Mahāyāna bezeugen nach meinen bisherigen Beobachtungen nur wenige Texte eine direkte Ableitung des Mitleids aus der Leerheit, und es bleibt offen, wie das zu verstehen ist.[5] Viel häufiger findet man Aussagen, nach denen zwar beide für den Bodhisattva-Weg unabdingbar sind, sie aber keinesfalls zwangsläufig einander nach sich ziehen, sondern eher geradezu in einer Spannung zueinander stehen und sorgfältig gegeneinander ausbalanciert werden müssen.[6] Manchmal heißt es, daß in der ''eigentlichen'' Leerheitserfahrung das Mitleid nicht aktuell auftreten könne, sondern nur im Anschluß an diese.[7] Allenfalls beim Buddha wird eine vollkommene Synthese postuliert (und offenbar auch in der Vajrayāna-Praxis,[8] vielleicht, weil sie "die Frucht zum Weg macht", d.h. den Status eines Buddha durch meditativ–rituelle Vorwegnahme zu realisieren versucht).
Zur Ethik-Begründung dient auch im Mahāyāna häufig die Goldene Regel in Gestalt der Betrachtung der anderen bzw. aller Lebewesen als einem selbst gleich (''ātma-para-samacittatā'' etc.); so etwa im ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra'', wo dies einmal (vs. 14.37) auch als "Sehen eines großen Selbstes" bezeichnet wird. Sie kann aber vermittels der Schau der Leerheit als des einheitlichen wahren Wesens aller Dinge und Lebewesen (''dharmadhātu'') vertieft werden, wobei es in diesem Zusammenhang aber weniger auf den Aspekt der Leerheit als auf den ihrer ''Allgegenwart'' ankommt.[9] Möglicherweise stammt dieser Gedanke aus Kreisen, die den ''tathāgatagarbha''-Gedanken lehrten, die verborgene oder potentielle Anwesenheit der Buddhaschaft in allen Lebewesen. In einer Lehrrede dieser Tradition, dem ''Aṅgulimālīyasūtra'', wird jedenfalls die Anwesenheit eines durchgängigen, einheitlichen Wesens in allen Lebewesen ausdrücklich als Grund für asketischethisches Verhalten ihnen gegenüber gelehrt.[10] Die verborgene oder potentielle Buddhaschaft in den Lebewesen kann natürlich auch unabhängig von einer solchen Wesenseinheit eine Haltung des ''Respektes'' ihnen gegenüber begründen.[11]
Śāntidevas ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (''BCA'') ist im Rahmen dieses zentralen Fragenkomplexes von großem Interesse, nicht zuletzt weil sein Verfasser sich eingehend um die Begründung bzw. Motivation altruistischen Verhaltens bemüht und dabei auch neue Wege zu gehen scheint. Es gibt jedoch im 9. Kapitel des ''BCA'' (über die Einsicht, ''prajñā'') auch ein paar Stellen, an denen die Spannung zwischen Nichtselbst bzw. Leerheit einerseits und Mitleid bzw. altruistischer Ethik andererseits zum Ausdruck kommt, und auf diese möchte ich zuerst eingehen (Abschnitt 2). Anschließend sollen dann einige Partien des ''BCA'', die sich um die Motivierung
eines altruistischen Verhaltens bemühen, besprochen werden, zunächst solche aus dem 8. Kapitel (Abschnitt 3), und dann eine aus dem 6. Kapitel (Abschnitt 4). Ich ziehe dabei auch Prajñākaramatis Kommentar (''BCAP'') mit hinzu, da er zur Klärung der Argumentation Śāntidevas wesentlich beiträgt und in einigen Fällen diese auch weiterführt. Auf eine darüber hinausgehende Berücksichtigung der umfangreichen indischen und tibetischen KommentarLiteratur, wie sie für einzelne Verse von Paul Williams (1998) durchgeführt wurde, muß ich im Rahmen dieses Beitrages verzichten. Mein Ziel liegt nicht in einer erschöpfenden Analyse des exegetischen oder logischen Potentials der einzelnen Gedankengänge oder gar in einer philosophischen Kritik. Es geht mir mehr um eine Herausarbeitung der ''Bandbreite'' dieser Gedankengänge, bei denen es sich m.E., auch wenn manche in der Gestalt formeller Schlußfolgerungen auftreten, letztlich weniger um Beweise als um ''Betrachtungen'' handelt, mit denen
der angehende Bodhisattva die eigene altruistische Gesinnung, nach der er strebt, festigen soll. Aus dieser Perspektive hoffe ich, mit den vorliegenden Zeilen einen kleinen Beitrag zum Verständnis des ''BCA'' zu leisten, wenngleich in dem Bewußtsein, daß er angesichts seines zugestandenermaßen skizzenhaften Charakters den Ansprüchen des Kollegen, dessen Andenken dieser Band gewidmet ist, kaum genügt hätte. (Schmithausen, introductory remarks, 551–53)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Sc. Schmithausen 2000a und 2000b.
#Am eklatantesten in der Schmithausen 2000a: 135-136 (mit Anm. 76) zitierten ''Vibhāşā''-Stelle (T Bd. 27, 428c17-21).
#Und gelegentlich auch dem Hinweis auf diesseitige Nach- und Vorteile (so z.B. ''Majjhimanikāya'' Bd. III, pp. 163-164 und 170-171). Auch im ''BCA'' wird beiläufig auf die erwünschten und unerwünschten Folgen im Jenseits (8.126-129) und Diesseits (8.132) hingewiesen.
#Schmithausen 2000a: 127-128 und 2000c: 30-34.
#Ders. 2000b: 448-449.
#Ders. 2000b: 442-446. Die mit allen vorzüglichen Qualitäten versehene Leerheit ist, wenn ich recht sehe, ein Ausdruck für eben diese Balance: vgl. ''Aṣṭasāhasrikā'' (''Aṣṭ'') p. 183,10, dazu ''Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā'' (''AAĀ'') p. 496,9: "'mit allen vorzüglichen Qualitäten versehen', d.h. nicht ohne Freigebigkeit usw. (''sarvākāravaropetām iti dānādy-avikalām'').
#Ders. 2000b: 448 mit Anm. 66. Ich erinnere mich, daß der Dalai Lama in einer seiner Unterweisungen im Herbst 1998 in Schneverdingen eine ähnliche Feststellung machte, mit dem Zusatz, daß Koinzidenz nur in der tantrischen Praxis möglich sei. Explizit im gleichen Sinne auch Geshe Thubten Ngawang in: ''Tibet und Buddhismus'' (Vierteljahresschrift des Tibetischen Zentrums e.V. Hamburg), 16. Jg. Nr. 63 (2002): 11: "Im Vollkommenheitsfahrzeug" werden "Weisheit und Methode ... voneinander getrennt praktiziert. Im Tantrayāna ... werden Weisheit und Methode als Einheit geübt."
#Vgl. die vorige n.
#Schmithausen 2000b: 449-450 und 2000c: 34.
#''Peking-Kanjur'' mDo, Bd. Tsu, 202b2-205a8 ≈ ''T'' Bd. 2, 540a18-541a24 (Abstandnehmen von Geschlechtsverkehr, Töten und Fleischverzehr). Vgl. Schmithausen 2000b: 450 und 2000c: 34.
#''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (ed. E.H. Johnston, Patna 1950) 1.166.
''No Time to Lose'' is based primarily on transcripts of teachings on the ''Bodhicharyavatara'' that Pema Chödrön gave at Gampo Abbey in 2001. It is, so far as I know, the first published commentary on the bulk of the ''Bodhicharyavatara'' by a Western-born teacher, and so represents a milestone in the course of the text’s transmission to the West. The translation of Shantideva’s verses on which she comments is that of the Padmakara Translation Committee (''The Way of the Bodhisattva'', Shambhala). Based on the Tibetan version rather than the Sanskrit original, it is, nevertheless, the clearest and most poetic ''Bodhicharyavatara'' translation in English. Chödrön comments on nearly every verse in nine of the text’s ten chapters. She has omitted chapter nine, on wisdom, noting that it involves a daunting and complex discussion of Madhyamaka philosophy that would merit a book of its own. (Jackson, para. 10) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In a recent article published in the pages of the ''Annual Report'', I remarked that there are only a few citations of the ''Bhadrakalpika-sūtra'' in extant Indian Buddhist literature. I gave a working edition with translation of available sources for the ''prathama-cittotpāda'' citations shared by two Indian sūtra anthologies, the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' and the ''Sikṣāsamuccaya''.[1]<br> In the present article, I introduce the only other major ''Bhadrakalpika-sūtra'' citation that I know - a passage that is quoted, in both cases by name, in the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' attributed to Nāgārjuna and in Daśabalaśrīmitra's ''Saṃskṛtāsaṃskrta-viniścaya''. I compare the citations with the Tibetan text of the ''Bhadrakalpika-sūtra''. I also quote passages on aeons from Bu-ston's 'History of the Dharma', written in 1322, and from Kong-sprul's 'Pervasion of the Knowable', written in 1864, as examples of how the materials were transmitted in the Land of Snows. Section 1 introduces the citations and discusses them in relation to the source texts and parallel terms, phrases, and contexts. Section 2 gives translations of the relevant texts, and Section 3 gives working editions of the Tibetan source materials. The translations and working editions are tentative, based on sources accessible to the writer. They do not pretend to be exhaustive. (Skilling, preliminary remarks, 59) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The four Tibetan manuscripts of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' (BSA)[1] found among the Dun-huang materials collected by Stein and Pelliot are different from the existing Sanskrit version of the same text, ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA), as well as its Tibetan translations found in the Tibetan Tripitaka. It has been over a decade since Dr. Akira Saito discussed the differences among the chapter arrangements and the number of verses between the existing BCA and these Dun-huang versions[2].<br> The popular Sanskrit version consists of ten chapters: chapters 1 to 4 are devoted to the generation of the "Thought of Enlightenment": 5 to 9 include the five ''pāramitās'' of ''śīla'' to ''prajñā'': and the tenth chapter is devoted to the transformation of merits. On the other hand, the Dun-huang version, unlike the Sanskrit, combines chapters 2 and 3 into one, giving us nine chapters in all. While the BCA contains 913 verses, there are only 701.5 verses in the BSA. That is, the difference is more than 200 verses. Many verses of BCA are omitted in the BSA and yet the BSA has verses that are not found in the BCA. Moreover, at times, different Tibetan translations are given to words which seem to be identical in Sanskrit. In that sense, the BSA is a quite different version. What must be noted, however, is the fact that, aside from their dissimilar organization of chapters 2 and 3, the Sanskrit and Dun-huang versions differ mainly in chapters 5 through 9.<br> Although the reason for the transmission of two versions is unknown, Saito assumes that the author himself could not have written two different versions. Based on the records of the two texts by Bu-ston and Tāranātha, both entitled ''History of Buddhism'', Saito concludes that the BSA reflects the original form of the text, while the BCA was a later version created by the addition of more verses or by the elaboration of the earlier text. The discussion in the present paper is based on Saito's view.<br> Recent research on the BCA is conscious of the differences between the two versions. When scholars discuss the second and third chapters of the BCA, they operate on the shared assumption that in the original text these two chapters were not separate[3]. This is because a series of rituals commonly called "Supreme Worship" are discussed there. Especially in Tibetan Buddhism after the time of Atiśa, the BCA, along with ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (ŚS), was thought to represent the liturgy of the Madhyamaka tradition. From this fact we can see the special position of the BCA in the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism[4]. I would point out that verses 97, 98 and 105 in chapter 5 are included only in the BCA, and that they are devoted largely to the liturgy of Madhyamaka.<br> In this paper, I will discuss these three verses in order to demonstrate how they contributed to the compilation and transmission of the two versions: the BCA and the BSA. (Ishida, "Notes on the Deśanā-ritual in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''," 199–200)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The original title of the Dun-huang version is ''Byaṅ c(h)ub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa''. Catalogue numbers of the manuscripts in the Stein Tibetan collection are: Nos. 628, 629 and 630-l; that in the Pelliol Tibetan collection is No. 794. I base my comments in this paper on the manuscript No. 628 in the Stein collection, which is almost the complete text. See Marcelle Lalou. ''Inventaire des Manuscrits tibétains de Touen-houang. conservés à la Bibliotheque Nationale'' I. Paris 1939: 174 and L. de la Vallée Poussin. ''Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library'', London 1969: 196-197.
#Akira Saito, "''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' Ascribed to Ācārya Akṣayamati." Zuiho Yamaguchi (ed.), ''Buddhism and Society in Tibet'', Tokyo 1986: 79-109 (in Japanese). do ., ''A Study of Akṣayamati (= Śāntideva)'s Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra as Found in the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang''. Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Tsu 1993 (in English).
#Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton (tr. with Intro. and Notes). ''The Bodhicaryāvatāra''. Oxford/New York 1996: intro. xxxiv and 9 ff. Jan-Ulrich Sobisch. "Das Ritual der Entschlussfassung im Bodhicaryāvatāra (Kap. II und Ill)." ''Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart'' Ill. Śāntidevas "Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung," Hamburg 1999: 11-23.
#Daien Kodama, "Chibetto ni okeru Kairitsu no Dento ni tsuite." ''The Bukkyo Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō'' 53, 1969. Kokan Fujita, "A Study of the ''bodhisattva-śīla'' in the 'Sila-paṭala' of the ''Bodhisattvabhumi''." JIBS :34-2: 874-867. do .. "One Aspect of the Acceptance of the ''bodhisattva-śīla'' in Tibet." JIBS 36-2. 1988: 878-871. There are three anthologies of the verses selected from the BCA. In two of them (BCAṣp and BCp), both edited by Dharmapāla of Suvarṇadvīpa, half of the verses deal with ''bodhicitta'' and "Supreme Worship." This fact suggests how the BCA was regarded in Tibet.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is well known that both the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'' (BSA/ BCA) and the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (ŚS) have traditionally been ascribed to Śāntideva, primarily on the basis of the following two facts: First, as will be discussed below, BCA Chapter V.105 refers to the ŚS and emphasizes the importance of its repeated reading since correct conduct is, it says, therein explained in some detail. Secondly, in addition to most of the Indian commentaries on the BCA available either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan, Tibetan tradition also has no doubt about the authorship of both works.<br> However, the situation recently changed when it became clear that the early version of BSA (BSA-I), which has so far been found only in the Tibetan manuscripts from Dūn-huáng, does not contain the above stanza and instead emphasizes the necessity of reading the so-called Nāgārjuna's Sūtrasamuccaya(SutraS).[1] In this connection, it has already been pointed out by Ishida [1988] [1993] [2001] that BSA-I and BCA are considerably different in their texts of the related verses, i.e. BCA, V.104–105 and BSA-I, IV.90–91. Comparing the corresponding stanzas of both versions, Ishida also confirmed that the text of the early version is probably more authentic in content than that of the later one. However, a few significant points yet remain to be discussed, especially with regard to the authorship and chronological order of BSA(BCA), ŚS and SūtraS. Having already dealt with this topic from the angle of the relationship between BSA(BCA) and ŚS[2], I will here confine myself to discussing the interpretation of BCA, V.104–106.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a reference to the three works, SūtraS, BSA(BCA) and ŚS, see under "Brief Reference".
#Cf. Saito[2001]. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Prof. Hauer has started a series of studies, chiefly dedicated to the critical investigation of Indian religion.[1] We cannot help being very greateful to him for this, because we must acknowledge that the various aspects of Indian religion are not yet studied as they deserve.<br> I do not need to insist on proving the great importance of this research, which is likely to throw much light on many a problem; chiefly on that of the extent of the influences exercised by the aboriginal element on the evolution of Indian religious thought and Indian civilization in general. The Vedas have a great importance, no doubt,
but it is also true that Indian gods, mythology, practices, theories about sacrifice, etc., are, on the whole, very different from the religious ideas expounded in that famous book. The study of the
last phases of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and of its relation with the Hindu systems proper, will prove of the greatest importance for this kind of research; because it is just in the literature of that period that we find the most important documents of these new conceptions and meet the names of a host of gods, demons and goblins of whom we did not hear before that time.<br> For this reason I think that Prof. Hauer is quite justified in having started his Series with the study of such an important Mahāyāna text as the Laṅkāvatāra, which contains some very interesting allu- sions to the relation between the Buddha and the gods of Hinduism (cf. e.g., p. 192).<br> The first of the papers dedicated to our text is chiefly concerned with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system contained in the Laṅk., X, 546 ff. This section has been translated by the author, as he thinks that it represents the reply of the Mahāyāna to the new claim of the Sāṅkhya to be the doctrine of salvation (p. 5.). This Sāṅkhya is, according to the A., the new exposition of the system as contained in the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇna. The chronology of either text seems to support this view. In fact, this refutation is contained in the tenth Chapter of the Laṅk., which is wanting in the first Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra (443 A.D.), while it is found in the second
translation, made by Bodhiruci in the year 513 A.D. On the other hand, we may suppose that the ''kārikā'' was composed about 450 A.D. That is true, but I do not think we are allowed to infer from this, that there is any interdependence of this kind between the ''kārikā'' and the Xth Chapter of the Laṅk. First of all, the history of the various redactions of this text, represents a very difficult and complex problem. I have compared the three Chinese translations with the Sanskrit original and I already had the opportunity to point out that the text of the Laṅkāvatāra underwent many changes,[1] so that we may safely assume that different redactions of the Laṅk, circulated not only at different times, but also in different places. It is true that the allusion to the Huns, which is found in X, 785, must go back to the first decade of the 7th century A.D., but the fact remains that the Sanskrit text of the Xth Chapter, as it has been handed down to us in the Nepalese manuscripts, looks like a compilation from various sources. Thus it has been enlarged by the insertion of various ''ślokas'' already quoted in the preceding chapters in prose.[2] As a rule, all these double verses cannot be found in the translation of Śikṣānanda. This I say in order to show that the problem of the various strata composing the vulgata of the Laṅk, as well as the other concerning the age to which they must be attributed is a very complex one. They can only be solved by the comparative study of the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Therefore it is evident that the chronology based upon any passage of the present text cannot be relied upon as definitive, until the history of the text has been reconstructed. On the other hand, the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system, as contained in X, 558 ff, is neither one of the earliest, nor one of the best. The refutation of the ''satkāryavāda'' (Sāṅkhya) as well as of the ''asatkāryavāda'' (Vaiśeṣika) forms one of the chief contents of the dogmatical works of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It can be found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna, in the Śataśāstra of Āryadeva, in the Buddhagotraśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu etc.[1] Nor shall we forget that Vasubandhu and
Diṅnāga refuted at length the Sāṅkhya theories in their Paramārthasaptati and Pramāṇasamuccaya respectively. Moreover, as Diṅnāga himself tells us in his commentary upon the Nyāyamukha, he wrote a book exclusively devoted to refuting the Sāṅkhya system. Shen T'ai, a disciple of Yuan Chwang, who commented upon the Nyāyamukha, tells us that this work was a very large one, as it contained six thousand ''ślokas''.<br> Therefore I do not think that this criticism of the Sāṅkhya as contained in the Laṅkāvatāra can really throw much light on the history of the controversy between the two systems. In fact, we must acknowledge that the value of the Laṅkāvatāra, as a philosophical hook, is rather limited, although it is of the highest importance for the history of the evolution of the Mahāyāna Buddhologie and "Erlosungslehre."<br> But I can hardly believe that the passage in question is expressly directed against the Sāṅkhya system. It is only meant to assert the idealistic view which is expounded throughout the book. Kapila, it is true, is referred to by name in the verse X, 558 and in three other places; but Kaṇāda also is quoted in X, 548. . . .<br> But to which school did the Laṅkāvatāra originally belong? It is in general believed that it represents Yogācāra ideas. But, of course, we cannot learn very much from this mere name, because Yogācāra has certainly a very wide meaning. It is also considered as a synonym of Vijñānavāda, and therefore even the ''vijñaptimātratā'' theory of Vasubandhu is put under that same item.<br> In fact, according to the Chinese tradition the book is considered as one of the six ''sūtras'' of the Lakṣaṇa school. But if we read these volumes it will be easy to recognize that, though there are some fundamental notions that can be found all throughout, each text or group of texts presents its own peculiarities.<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.501828/page/n607/mode/2up Read more here . . .]<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
1. J. W. Hauer, Das Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra und das Sāṅkhya (eine vorläufige Skizzeo, Stuttgart, 1927.<br> Id, Die Dhāraṇī im nördlichen Buddhismus und ihre parallelen in der sogennannten Mithrasliturgie. Ibid.<br> Beitrage zur Indischen Sprachwissenschaft und Religionsgeschichte.<br>1. See. my Studio comparative fra le tre versioni cinesi ed il testo sanskrito del i capitolo del Laṅkāvatāra, Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, serie v, vol xviii, fasc, 5; and Una nuova edizione del Laṅkāvatāra in Studi Mahāyanici, Rivista di studi Orientali, vol. X.<br>2. In Studi Mahāyanici, pp. 574 ff., I have given a list of the verses inserted in the text, which have been repeated in the tenth chapter. This fact makes me rather doubtful whether many of the other verses collected there are not taken from some Mahāyāna text belonging to the same current of thought. Prof. Hauer thinks that the first Chapter belongs to the most ancient redaction of the book. I can hardly believe that; in fact, it cannot be found in the translation of Gunabhadra, and it has but very little relation with the rest of the book. On the other hand, I think that the gāthās represent the most ancient nucleus of the book, as it is shown by the numerous Prakritisms that have survived and that the redactors of the present vulgata could not avoid: e.g., desemi, pp. 76, 176, 181; vibhāvento, p. 95 ; vikalpenti, pp. 185 186; nāśenti, p. 190 ; deśyante for deśyamāne, p. 201.<br>1. For other references see Ui’s, Vaiśeṣika philosophy.<br>2. See my English translation of the Nyāyamukha in "''Materiailen zur Kunde des Buddhismus''" edited by Prof. Walleser, Heidelberg, to be published shortly.<br>
O
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is normal, in lndo-Tibetan Madhyamaka, to portray analysis as involving the investigation of whether ''x'' can be found under analysis, in other words—at least for Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka—whether ''x'' has inherent existence or not. This investigation is, of course, central to Madhyamaka, and forms the concern of insight meditation leading eventually to ''prajñā'', seeing things the way they really are. However, much of what comes under the range of analytic inquiry in Western philosophy is not simply a matter of the search for putative ultimate reality. Ethical inquiry, for example, is not ''in itself'' a matter of such ultimates. Clearly, in Buddhist meditation, and debate also—even in Madhyamaka writing—critical analytic reasoning is not only employed in the area of ultimate investigation, the investigation of whether something can be found under analysis and, therefore, has ultimate, i.e., inherent, existence. A Madhyamaka meditation manual, like Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', shows from the beginning how its author gives arguments, appeals to reason, in order to convince initially himself, and then any other reader (see 1: 2–3), to adopt a radically new vision and perspective. For Śāntideva, as a follower of Mahāyāna Buddhism, this new vision more often than not moves from his relationship to himself, his own concerns and projects, towards his relationships with other sentient beings. It is a move from self-centered egoism to an anticipated perfect altruism, but a move which is accomplished perhaps initially and in part, but certainly fundamentally, through appeals to reason, the ''rationality'' of the Buddhist spiritual path and ultimately, the complete rationality of altruism. (Williams, preliminary remarks, 307) +
On Entering into the Inconceivable State of Emancipation by the Practice and Vows of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra of the Mahavaipulya Buddha Avatamsaka Sutra +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The above title is an abridgement of the original, which in its entirety reads: "On Entering into the Inconceivable States of Emancipation, by the Practice and Vows of the Bodhisattva[1] Samantabhndra[2] of the Mahavaipulya Buddha Avatamsaka Sutra [3]".<br> This is the third part of the thirty-ninth chapter, (This chapter alone has forty volumes, and this is its fortieth volume), and is the supplement to the eighty volumes of the version of the T'ang Dynasty, known as the extra one, or rather the last volume of this Sutra. The original text of the supplement was presented to the Emperor Teh-Tsung of the T'ang Dynasty, by the King of Odra in Southern India.<br> The Emperor Teh-Tsung directed an Indian samana [4] named Prajna, to translate it from the Sanskrit[5] into Chinese. The work of translation was begun in the 12th year of the Era "Chen-Yuan" in the reign of the said Emperor (796 C.E.)<br> The Avatamsaka Sutra is recognized by all Buddhists as the King of all sutras by its vast and comprehensive synthesizing of all the threads in the web of the Dharma [6] (Law of the universe). Its thirty-ninth chapter, narrating the Vows of Samantabhadra, is the essence of the Mahayana [7] teaching of the whole sutra. At first sight its narration appears easily understandable, but if one reads the numerous commentaries on this sutra, written by various Buddhist savants, one finds that it has a profoundity of meaning wholly unrealized by the literal-minded. Moreover, this chapter is divided into three sections, the first and the second parts containing more subtle meanings that are not easily to be understood. Also there is the holy scene of striking beauty, wherein is portrayed in a most inconceivable manner, how the Kumara Sudhana[8] entered into the state of Samadhi,[9] and saw the innumerable shining Buddha-lands as well as the glorious figure of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra. In Chinese Buddhist circles, only the final part (the present version) is used for practising and reciting.<br> The metaphysical conception is certainly quite impossible to express in a completely satisfactory manner, either in speech or writing and is especially so in translation, its profound meaning can be entirely lost by even the slightest misinterpretation. I fully realized my incompetence in undertaking this work, for neither my learning of Buddhism[10] nor my linguistic knowledge entitle me to meet such a difficult task. However, having thoroughly impressed this chapter upon my mind by daily recitation over a considerable period of time, I am intuitively inspired to attempt a translation of it. I hope that later on if time permits, I may re-write this version, giving a more accurate translation of it when my studies are more advanced.<br> Among the many wondrous and beautiful things of this universe, Buddhist literature stands supreme; but the very short and simple phrases of its translations, typical of Chinese classical literature, has made the meaning rather incomplete to a foreign reader; and even to a native of China, if he is not conversant with the ancient classical Chinese literature, may fail to grasp their profound significance. I therefore have taken the liberty of adding words to certain sentences which perhaps not be entirely clear in meaning to my readers. These additional words are inserted in parenthesis.<br> The Sanskrit terms are now quite popular amongst many European Buddhists, who perhaps possess a deeper knowledge of them than I have. In order however to aid beginners, I append some notes on the Sanskrit terms appearing in this version; and also some explanations on certain knotty-points which may perplex the readers, are to be found at the end of this book. These notes, are chiefly based on the Chinese Buddhist Dictionary, (Edited by Dr. F. P. Ting), and partly taken from traditional teachings, (Both European and Chinese), may not be technically accurate, but they are popular explanations among Buddhists.<br> It is inevitable that Buddhist nomenclature should be different from the typical form of English writing. Even when a new science is formulated, there must be some new terms introduced to meet its requirements. This is particularly true of Buddhism, because it tells of Buddha-states, the very nature of which is well-nigh inconceivable and certainly is beyond the mental power of ordinary minds and which, therefore, no already-formed language can adequately describe. For this reason, it is necessary, if Buddhist truth be represented with accuracy, or nearly, that some new terms must be introduced, and which should not be bound by the typical form of English writing. It is my hope that this suggestion may be adopted by the European Buddhists in the near future.<br> The stanzas in the text are originally sixty-two verses, each verse consisting of four sentences, and each sentence composed of seven words, which should be rendered into poetical form, and in rhyme. Owing to the difficulties in translating, and lest the meaning should be lost if the words were bound by rhythm, I have translated them literally. I truly regret my failure in reproducing the melodious beauty of the text.<br> The "Vows of Samantabhadra" is also known as one of the "Four Sutras of the Pure Land School[11]" . The other three being:<br> (1) The Larger Sukhavati-Vyuha, translated from the Sanscrit into English by F. Max Müller.<br> (2) The Smaller Sukhavati-Vyuha, also translated by Max Müller.<br> (3) The Amitayur-Dhyana-Sutra, Translated into English By J. Takakusa.<br> These are all contained in volume 49 of the "Sacred Books of the East" published by the Oxford University Press, London.<br> The chapter of the Vows of Samantabhadra has stood alone without an English version during such a long interval since it was translated from Sanscrit into Chinese about eleven hundred years ago. Now the attempt of the present work has been made, and thereby the English translations of these "Four Sutras of the Pure Land School" are completed. (Chihmann, introduction, 1–4)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#A Bodhisattva is a "Buddha-to-be" whose rank is immediately below that of a Buddha. But it is not necessarily inferior to the state of Buddha-hood in perfection, as a Bodhisattva may also be a Buddha, who has renounced Buddha-hood in order to remain in touch with the beings of various worlds, in order to sustain and support them with his spiritual power, and so help forward their attainment of Nirvana.
#Samantabhadra is a great Bodhisattva; one of the two principal Bodhisattvas, the other being Manjusri, they are the subordinates of the Tathagata (or Dhyani Buddha) Vairocana, and are known as the Triple Saints of the Avatamsaka Sutra. Samanta means general or universal; bhadra means sage; and Samantabhadra, which is derived from these words, means the principle of universal love or compassion. He is also known as the Bodhisattva of Great Activity.
#Mahavaipulya Buddha Avatamsaka Sutra is the greatest Buddhist scripture. In Chinese it means: The Buddha's great and wide teaching, leading to the attainment of Buddha-hood by noble action, as a collection of many Rowers brough to fruition. Its abridged name being "The Flower-embellished Sutra." Sutra means scripture.
#Samana is a devotee who has joined the Buddhist Order (Sangha).
#Sanskrit is one of the classical Indian languages. The earliest Buddhist books were written in Prakrit; later put into Pali; and still later written into Sanskrit. The Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan Buddhist scriptures are most translated from the latter language.
#Dharma means "Law" in its widest sense. Its profound cosmic significance is too esoteric to be explained here. The various forms of Buddhist meditation are designed to awake the intuition of Bodhi and so to attained realization of the nature of Dharma. If it operates itself, then it refers to the fundamental laws of evolution in which all beings are involved, and under its operation every man building his own character, good or bad, and creating his own environment and destiny in the future.
#Mahayana is the school of the Great Vehicle of Salvation, whose object it is to deliver not only oneself, but also all beings, from the wheel of Birth and Death, and raise them to Buddha-hood.
#Kumara Sudhana i.e. "The Celestial Youth of the Treasure of Merit," who, having consecrated his life to the attainment of Buddha-hood, visited fifty-three Saints, and finally met the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra who advised him to be born in the Sukhavati the Most Happy World of the Buddha Amitabha, by means of practising the Tenfold Vow. The account is given in the Avatamsaka Sutra.
#Samadhi means concentrated equanimity, or an undisturbed state of mind; or meditative contemplation, which leading enter into the state of intuitive wisdom. It contains a deeper and wider sense than the explanation is given here.
#Buddhism is a body of teachings, consisted of the clements [sic] [elements?] of ethics, science, metaphysics, and the law of universe ct; taught Sakyamuni the Buddha (560-480 B.C.) Being the highest religion of the world, and the universal salvation of all sentient beings.
#The Pure Land School was founded as the Lotus Sect in China by the great monk Whei-Yuan (400 C.E.), who taught that faith in the Buddha Amitabha and prayer to Him will ensure re-birth in His Western Paradise (Sukhavati) or the World of Supreme Happiness. This doctrine is of course, based upon Buddhist scripture-teaching. The Buddha Sakyamuni laid special stress upon this method of Salvation in many of the sutras spoken by Him.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Truly, Śāntideva is "the vanishing poet." Paul Harrison once memorably characterized him thus when speaking of Śāntideva's ''Training Anthology'' (''Śikṣāsamuccaya''). He had in mind the curious fact that editors and readers often found themselves lost in the woods of what was presented as continuous prose in our editions, failing to see that more than a few trees among the thickets were lyrical verses. When verses were identified as such, many were identified as being citations rather than Śāntideva's own compositions.[1] To speak of "the vanishing poet," then, can mean that we have not always been in a position even to begin to hear Śāntideva aright, much less to interpret him.<br> In a sense, the poet Śāntideva vanishes even when we read the ''Guide''. It is easy enough to speak of the beauty of individual verses, but Louis
Gómez is right: "Alas, for all our expressed admiration for the poetical beauty of [the ''Guide''], we do not have to date any detailed explorations of the literary characteristics and merits of the work."[2] Nor, to the best of my knowledge, have even individual verses received the kind of literary attention they so richly deserve. Consider what follows, then, to be a very tentative introduction to the vanishing poet, and merely one cautiously suggested orientation to an altogether remarkable work. (Kachru, introductory remarks, 60)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Harrison, "The Case of the Vanishing Poet," 215-248; see also Harrison, "Verses by Śāntideva in the 'Śikṣāsamuccaya.'"
#Gómez, "The Way of the Translators," 267. See also the remarks of Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton about being cautious when assessing Śāntideva's literary merits, particularly in light of the norms and values of literature (''kāvya'') in Sanskrit, in Śāntideva, ''The Bodhicaryāvatāra'', trans. Crosby and Skilton, xxxviii-xxxix. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The position of Śāntideva in Madhyamaka philosophy has not been defined clearly. In the ''grub mtha' '' texts, he is generally considered to belong to the Prāsaṅgika school.[1] However, interpretation of his attitude toward epistemological theory has not reached any consensus, such as (a) whether external objects exist or not, or (b) whether images (''ākara'') exist in cognition or not. Now we can find three different views on this point : (1) he maintains the existence of external objects ; (2) he maintains there exist no objects external to the mind ; (3) he maintains the theory of cognition with images (''sākāra'', here, precisely ''satyākāra'' theory of the Vijñānavāda, which claims images to be true). The ideas of (1) and (2) are found in the ''BSAP'', the commentary by an unknown author on the ''BSA'' preserved in the Dunhuang collection, while the idea in (3) is presented by Jñānaśrīmitra and derives from an interpretation of a verse included in the canonical version of the same text,
the ''BCA''.<br> There are prior works on these views by Akira Saito[2], and the philosophical standpoint of the ''BSAP'' concerning (1) has been studied in detail. Although the ''BSAP'' takes the position of (1) based on a verse in the ''BSA'', Saito believes that the view of the ''BSAP'' author made this excessive interpretation, and therefore he does not extend his study to the philosophical view of the ''BSA'' itself. As for (2), we can presume from the criticism found in the ''BSAP'' that there was such an interpretation of Śāntideva. However, there is no description of the name of the interpreter or the reason why he took such a position. We do not know which version this philosophical position is based on, whether the ''BSA'' or the ''BCA''. As for (3), this seems to be the arbitrary opinion of Jñānaśrīmitra who was a Sākāravādin.<br> The reason for the existence of such varied opinions may be as follows: 1) Śāntideva did not directly discuss cognitive issues; 2) thoughts that developed later were applied to the interpretation and 3) there are differences between the ''BSA'' and the ''BCA'' texts. Recently, it has been clarified that the ''BSA'' is an earlier version than the ''BCA'' and has better organized contents.[3] In this paper, I will discuss the verses in the ''BSA'' that concern the cognitive theory, and I will analyze why Śāntideva was regarded as having the attitude of (2). (Ishida, introduction, 32-33)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Katsumi Mimaki, ''Blo gsal grub mtha' '', Kyoto 1982, p. 27ff.
#The articles abbreviated to Saito [1996a], [1996b] and [1997a] listed in Saito (2000a) p. 108, and Saito (2000b) : "Shāntideva saku ''Nyūbosatsugyoron'' no densho to hen'yo : shokibon tekusuto no hakken hiwa," in ''Reconstitution of Classical Studies'' 8, pp. 11-19.
#Latest articles are : Ishida (2002a) : "On the Refutation of 'Self-cognition' in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' : Structures of the Dunhuang Text and the Current Edition (in Japanese)," in ''Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Thought'', In Honor of Doctor Hajime Sakurabe on His Seventy-seventh Birthday, Kyoto, pp. 431-445 ; Ishida (2002b) : "The Theory of ''Parātmasamatā'' in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' : On the Structure of Chapter of ''Vīrya'' (in Japanese)," in ''The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association'', vol. 67, pp. (113) - (128) ; Ishida (2003) : "Why is the theory of ''parātmasamatā'' in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' situated in the chapter of ''dhyāna'' (in Japanese)," in ''Kansai University Philosophia'' 22, pp. 53-74.
On Prakṛtinirvāṇa-Prakṛtinirvṛta in the Bodhicaryāvatāra: A Study in the Indo-Tibetan Commentarial Tradition +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
According to Tsong kha pa, writing in his early ''Legs bshad gser phreng'' commentary to the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'', in general texts speak of four types of ''nirvāṇa'': the ''prakṛti'' or 'natural' ''nirvāṇa'', the nonabiding (''apratiṣṭhita'') ''nirvāṇa'' of bodhisattvas and Buddhas, and the ''nirvāṇas'' with and without remainders familiar — although not necessarily with the same meaning — from both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. The first of these, the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' (''rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das'') is defined by Tsong kha pa as 'the nature of ''dharmas'' which is free from extremes of verbal differentiation'.[1] It is clear therefore that for Tsong kha pa the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' is a type of ''nirvāṇa'' although why it should be called this remains to be seen. It is a ''rang bzhin'', a (fundamental) nature, the nature of ''dharmas''. The Tibetan ''rang bzhin'' translates ''prakṛti'' here, but of course it is more familiar as the Tibetan translation for ''svabhāva'', inherent existence. The equivalence of ''prakṛti'' and ''svabhāva'' in the expressions ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' and ''prakṛtinirvṛta'' is attested from Sanskrit sources. Prajñākaramati, commenting on ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' 9:104cd Tib. 103cd) glosses the verse's ''prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ'' with ''prakṛtyā svabhāvena parinirvṛtāḥ''. Interestingly, the Tibetan here uses only one expression, unusually in this context ''rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis mya ngan las 'das pa''. ''Rang bzhin'' had been used for ''prakṛtyā'' in the verse, so the use of ''rang gi ngo bo nyid'' in the commentary preserves some sort of distinction although it lacks the clarity of the Sanskrit. For Prajñākaramati the equivalence of ''prakṛtyā'' or ''svabhāvena parinirvṛta'' with ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' is attested from his subsequent comment — enormously important from the point of view of Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs interpretation — that living beings have the nature of liberation 'because of the continued existence in the continuums of all sentient beings of the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' which is defined as absence of inherent existence'. This time the Tibetan for ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' is the usual ''rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das pa''.[2] Much earlier the ''Samādhirājasūtra'' had spoken of all ''dharmas'' by nature (''svabhāvena'') conforming to an identity with ''nirvāṇa'', 'in all ''dharmas nirvāṇa'' is set forth'.[3] The idea that all ''dharmas'' are by nature 'nirvanated' is of course familiar from the ''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'' and works in the same genre. It is clear that for Tsong kha pa, presumably following Prajñākaramati, the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' is another name for emptiness found in all ''dharmas'' without exception but particularly with reference to the mental continuum of sentient beings. It is the ''nirvāṇa'' which is the ''rang bzhin'' of ''dharmas''. For a Tibetan there immediately resonates two references here. The ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' as an unchanging nature within the continuum of sentient beings, a ''nirvāṇa'', carries with it a flavour of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory found in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. The ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' as a nature, a ''rang bzhin'', in ''dharmas'' indicates Candrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya'' on 6:181-2 in which Candrakīrti talks about the true nature of things, the ''dharmatā'' which is the same whether Buddhas occur or not, the true ''rang bzhin'', ''svabhāva'', of entities which is their emptiness of any ''svabhāva''.[4] In dGe lugs thought these two frames of reference come very firmly together. The ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' is emptiness, which applies to all ''dharmas''. In the mental continuum of sentient beings this emptiness is called the ''tathāgatagarbha'', and with it goes other terms perhaps originally not thought of in this vein in the Madhyamaka context of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' such as 'purified by nature' (''prakṛtiparisuddha'') and 'radiant by nature' (''prakṛtiprabhāsvara'').[5] In Tibetan almost invariably the standard word for ''nirvāṇa'' — ''mya ngan las 'das'', the transcendence of sorrow — is used for ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' and ''prakṛtinirvṛta''. If all ''dharmas'' are fundamentally or by nature ''nirvṛta'', in Tibetan they have by nature transcended sorrow. There is a psychological and soteriological aspect implicit in the language used which draws together the two dimensions of emptiness and ''tathāgatagarbha'' in a much stronger way than is necessarily the case with the Sanskrit. In spite of the apparent identity of ''prakṛtinirvṛta'' and ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' for Prajñākaramati, it is the former term which is used more often than not in Sanskrit texts, with its implications of 'by nature, fundamentally, from the point of view of inherent existence, extinguished', that is, empty. As the sūtras say, this is the nature of things whether there are Buddhas or not. It does not necessarily carry with it the direct psychological and soteriological overtones of '' 'nirvana' ''. And if we look at the use of these notions in the commentaries to the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' it is striking that there is no employment of what might be called '' 'tathägatagarbha'' concepts' in Indian commentaries on the relevant verses. These are, however, abundant in Tibetan commentaries, where the notion of the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa/ prakṛtinirvṛta'' — and thus also the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' — become absorbed into the nexus of ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought.<br> The concepts of ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' and ''prakṛtinirvṛta'', and their relationships to the ''tathāgatagarbha'', have been dealt with in his usual thorough and lucid way by David Seyfort Ruegg in his monumental ''La Théorie au Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra''. Ruegg has noted some of the relevant verses from the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', together with Prajñākaramati's commentary. In addition he has particularly devoted some space to a discussion of the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' and the ''prakṛtiprabhāsvara'' nature of ''citta'' found in the work of the eighteenth-nineteenth century Tibetan lama Gung thang 'Jam pa'i dbyangs. In common with late dGe lugs writings, Gung thang lama's work is a culmination of much that had gone before and is replete with subtle definitions and distinctions. As I have pointed out elsewhere, however, the contemporary study of Tibetan Madhyamaka is rather like shining a narrow beam at various points in a dark attic.[6] We cannot see the whole picture, we do not yet know much about relationships and rivalries involved, the development of ideas, alternative interpretations of the same text and how these relate to their Indian precedents. In spite of the pioneering work by scholars like David Seyfort Ruegg, we cannot yet write a history of Tibetan Madhyamaka. Ruegg has approached the issue of the ''prakṛtinirvāṇa'' in Tibet largely through reference to dGe lugs materials. By way of a footnote to his study I would like to take just four verses of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' which their commentators deem to be particularly relevant to our issue, and see what of interest for understanding the development of Madhyamaka can be derived from looking at a wider range of Indo-Tibetan commentaries.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Lhasa edition of the ''Legs bshad gser phreng'' reproduced in the microfiche edition of the ''Yab sras gsung 'bum'' by The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, vol. 44, Tsa, folio 35b: spyir myang 'das bzhir gsung rab las 'byung ste / rang bzhin dang mi gnas pa dang / lhag bcas dang lhag med kyi myang 'das so // de la dang po ni/ chos rnams kyi rang bzhin spros pa mtha' dag dang bral pa'o // gnyis pa ni / sangs rgyas dang byang sems kyi myang' das so // tham gnyis la gnyis las / theg dman gyi dbang du byas pa ni / This passage has been noted by David Seyfort Ruegg in his ''La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra'', Paris: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969, p. 450. On the translation of ''spros pa'' (''prapañca'') as 'verbal differentiation' see my 'Some aspects of language and construction in the Madhyamaka', ''Journal of Indian Philosophy'' 8 (1980), pp. 1-45, esp. pp. 30-4.
#See the Vaidya edition of the ''Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā'', Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960:<br><br>tan na kiṃcid ataḥ sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ//104//<br>ataḥ asmāt karaṇāt sattvāḥ prāninaḥ prakṛtyā svabhāvena parinirvṛtāḥ<br>parimuktasvabhāvāḥ / niḥsvabhāvatālakṣanasya prakṛtinirvāṇasya<br>sarvasattvasaṃtāneṣu sadā vidyamānatvāt /<br>=Tib.: de ni cung zad min de'i phyir /<br>sems can rang bzhin mya ngan 'das //103//<br>de'i phyir zhes te / rgyu des na sems dang srog mams rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis mya<br>ngan las 'das pa yin la / yongs su grol ba'i rang bzhin yin zhing / rang bzhin med<br>pa'i mtshan nyid rang bzhin gyis mya ngan la 'das pa /sems can thams cad kyi rgyud<br>la rtag tu yod pa'i phyir ro /<br><br>The Tibetan is cited from the Cone microfiche edition produced by The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, mDo vol. 26, folio 253b. Unless noted otherwise, all bsTan 'gyur texts will be taken from this edition. Verses from the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', however, are from the version published with the commentary by the twelfth century Tibetan rGyal sras dNgul chu Thogs med: ''Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la jug pa'i rTsa ba dang 'grel pa Legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho'', Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1982.
#Vaidya edition, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, Ch. 24, verse 4 cd: evaṃ sūnyeṣu dharmeṣu nirvāṇaṃ saṃprakāśitam // See also verse 6ab: sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvena nirvāṇasamasadṛśāḥ /
#For a discussion of these issues in the context of ''Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya'' 6:181-2 see Paul M. Williams, 'Silence and truth — some aspects of the Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet', ''The Tibet Journal'', VII; 1/2, 1982, pp. 67-80.
#For a short recent discussion of Tibetan views on the ''tathāgatagarbha'', particularly from a dGe lugs point of view (the position of rGyal tshab rje), see Doboom Tulku, 'Tathāgatagarbha', ''Dreloma'' No. 14, July 1985, pp. 24-8. Doboom Tulku also has studied works by Mi pham, Kong sprul and Shākya mchog ldan. He suggests that Rgyal tshab rje does not want to maintain that the emptiness of the mental continuum ''alone'' is the ''tathāgatagarbha''. Rather this term can also apply to various potencies within the mind.
#See Paul Williams, 'Introduction — some random reflections on the study of Tibetan Madhyamaka', ''The Tibet Journal'', vol. XIV;1, Spring 1989, pp. 1-9.
In this interview Prof. Kashinath Nyaupane answers questions about Sanskrit prosody, the study of poetic meters and verse in Sanskrit, with particular reference to the composition of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. +
Dragonetti responds to Christian Lindtner's criticism of her argument that the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' is not authentically by Nāgārjuna. She maintains three main points: (1) Verse 71 of the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' was borrowed from Maitreya's ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', not vice versa, because it appears organically integrated in Maitreya's work but awkwardly inserted in the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' without proper grammatical connection; (2) While accepting that Maitreya may have referenced Nāgārjuna elsewhere, this doesn't prove the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa''<i>'</i>s authenticity if it's a late work; (3) She disputes Lindtner's claim that the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' predates Nāgārjuna, arguing instead that similarities between it and the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' support her thesis of inauthenticity. +
