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Manipulating the Memory of Meat-Eating: Reading the Laṅkāvatāra's Strategy of Introducing Vegetarianism to Buddhism +
This paper examines vegetarianism in the eighth “no meat-eating” (''amāṃsabhakṣaṇa'') chapter of the ''Laṅkāvatāra'' with specific attention to how the sūtra confronts the previous dietary code (which allowed meat-eating) and combats Buddhist resistance to the new doctrine. This study corroborates previous observations that vegetarianism in Indian Buddhism was a response to outsiders’ censure, rather than an expression of a specific Buddhist doctrine. It goes on to explore how the ''Laṅkāvatāra'' introduces a new dietary norm, one that was incompatible with the preexisting monastic code that allowed monks to partake of meat pure in three aspects (''trikoṭiśuddha''). The ''Laṅkāvatāra'' replaced the three conditions for meat to be pure with the three modes of killing, thereby rendering the old regulation into a rule that makes any form of meat-eating impossible. In an effort to suppress intra-Buddhist resistance to vegetarianism, the sūtra prophesized the future appearance of anti-vegetarian Buddhists and identified them as heretics. Eliminating the past and future possibility of meat-eating, the ''Laṅkāvatāra'' defines Buddhism as a meat-free tradition.
Read this article [https://www.academia.edu/38459497/Manipulating_the_Memory_of_Meat_Eating_Reading_the_La%E1%B9%85k%C4%81vat%C4%81ra_s_Strategy_of_Introducing_Vegetarianism_to_Buddhism here]. +
This study investigates manuscripts of Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA) from Nepal's collections. Liland personally analyzed 18 Sanskrit editions spanning from a palm-leaf manuscript dated 1180 CE to paper copies from 1943 CE, plus several commentaries including the previously unstudied ''Bodhicaryāvatāraṭippanī''. Through comparative textual analysis of key verses, he identifies three distinct developmental stages of the BCA text and traces manuscript relationships. The study reveals that Nepal's manuscript collections provide a much firmer foundation than the handful of texts used in previous critical editions by Minayev and La Vallée Poussin, making possible a new, more accurate critical edition of this important Buddhist text. +
La Dhârani qui porte le nom de Marîcî est une invocation dont la puissance s'applique â tout. Elle offre ce caractére particulier d'être très populaire en Chine. Elle a sa place dans le canon bouddhique chinoise; mais elle est aussi imprimée à part, en sorte qu'on peut se la procurer assez facilement. Il existe au moins deux textes chinois sur Marîcî, le Marîcî Sûtra et le Marîcî dhârani Sûtra (Sûtra de Marîcî et Sûtra de la Dhârani de Marîcî). Mais toutes les éditions de la Dhârani ne concordent pas parfaitement entre elles, soit qu'elles proviennent de textes différents, soit (ce qui est plus probable) qu'elles soient des traductions plus ou moins exactes et surtout plus ou moins abrégées d'un texte unique. Les traductions chinoises n'ont pas l'exactitude minutieuse et même servile des traductions tibétaines.<br> Voici la traduction de la verision tibétaine de notre Dharanî. +
Measuring the Immeasurables: Development and Initial Validation of the Self-Other Four Immeasurables (SOFI) Scale Based on Buddhist Teachings on Loving Kindness, Compassion, Joy, and Equanimity +
Multiple measures exist that examine the attentional aspects of meditation practice, but measurement of the compassion component is relatively understudied. This paper describes the development and initial validation of a scale designed to measure application of the four immeasurable qualities at the heart of Buddhist teachings: loving kindness, compassion, joy and acceptance toward both self and others. Our analyses suggest four distinct subscales: positive qualities toward self, positive qualities toward others, negative qualities toward self and negative qualities toward others. Initial examination of reliability and validity showed high internal consistency for the subscales as well as strong concurrent, discriminant, and construct validity. We believe the Self-Other Four Immeasurables (SOFI) scale has broad utility for research on mindfulness, positive psychology, and social psychology.
Download full article [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225563125_Measuring_the_Immeasurables_Development_and_Initial_Validation_of_the_Self-Other_Four_Immeasurables_SOFI_Scale_Based_on_Buddhist_Teachings_on_Loving_Kindness_Compassion_Joy_and_Equanimity here]. +
This article surveys Buddhist textual attitudes toward meat-eating across the history of the tradition, and proposes what the author considers an ethically adequate contemporary Buddhist position.
The historical survey distinguishes two main strands. The earlier Vinaya tradition permits monastics to eat meat provided it meets the standard of "threefold purity," while largely disregarding the consumer's indirect responsibility for the killing that supplies the demand. The later Mahāyāna strand — emerging around the 5th century in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Aṅgulimālīyasūtra, and Laṅkāvatārasūtra — condemns meat-eating outright on grounds of incompatibility with compassion and loving-kindness, the doctrine that all beings have been one's parents in previous lives, the tathāgatagarbha teaching that all beings share Buddha-nature, and the consumer's co-responsibility for killing through demand. In East Asia the vegetarian strand became dominant among monastics, while Tibetan Buddhism remained largely non-vegetarian. Tantric contexts present a further complication, where ritual consumption of tabooed meat carried different valences entirely.
Turning to the contemporary situation, Schmithausen argues that several factors demand a reassessment. Modern factory farming inflicts suffering far exceeding that of traditional slaughter; the consumer's co-responsibility for this suffering can no longer be ignored; and large-scale meat and fish consumption contributes substantially to ecological damage including overfishing, water pollution, and deforestation. He addresses objections — from Tantric non-dualism, Jōdo Shinshū antinomianism, and the argument that plants too are sentient — finding none ultimately decisive.
His conclusion is pragmatic rather than absolutist: complete vegetarianism following the Mahāyāna strand is the most consistent response, but the present situation at minimum demands that consumers refuse to support cruel and ecologically destructive forms of animal production. Even modest reductions in consumption matter. The underlying ethical imperative, he argues, should be oriented not toward the consumer's own spiritual purity but toward the animals themselves as sentient fellow creatures.
This thesis is composed of two parts, one a translation, the other a commentary on the material that has been translated -- a set of three well known identically entitled works by the famous Indian Buddhist scholar, Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795 C.E.). The ''Bhāvanākramas'' are here translated from both Sanskrit and Tibetan sources. The commentary takes the form of an extended critical Prologue to the texts and is centred around an examination of the notions of meditation and insight as found therein. The first chapter of the commentary examines the various terms for meditation found in the texts and argues for a specific way of translating them that regards as normative only one of these, that is, ''bhāvana''. The argument is made that if one is to take the basic Buddhist distinction between intellectual and experiential wisdom seriously, no other concept of meditation will prove satisfactory. The concept of ''bhāvanā'' is contrasted with that of ''dhyāna'', and explained in light of other important terms, notably ''samādhi'', ''śamatha'' and ''vipaśyanā''. Two different conceptions of ''samādhi'' are identified as existing within the texts, one corresponding with ''dhyāna'' and one with ''bhāvanā''. The latter is identified as predominant. This conception holds that meditation is not to be principally identified as non-conceptual in nature, but rather encompasses both non-conceptual states and conceptual processes. These latter, however, are not to be identified with
ordinary reasoning processes (''cintāmayī prajñā'') but rather with a form of experiential knowing (''bhāvanāmayī prajñā'', ''vipaśyanā'') that is conceptual in nature. It is in accordance with this conception that the actual translation of the texts has been undertaken.
The second chapter of the commentary examines the concept of insight (''vipaśyanā'') in light of the earlier findings. Here the text is analyzed for its explanations of its insight, understood in terms of the important technical term ''bhūtapratyavekṣā''. Here an argument is made for translating this term in a particular manner consistent with the conception of meditation outlined in Chapter 1. The term is explored in light of key passages containing descriptions of the cultivation of wisdom as well as in light of other important technical terms appearing in the texts, notably ''dharmapravicaya'', ''smṛti'' and ''manasikāra''. Chapter 2 closes with a discussion of Kamalaśīla's ideas of śrāvaka insight meditation (''vipaśyanā'') and how it differs from that of the Mahāyāna. Most notable in this regard is the suggestion that Kamalaśīla may have regarded śrāvaka insight practices (''vipaśyanā'') as instances of ''śamatha'' meditation. In the third chapter the suggestion is made that such considerations could lead to the development of an important area of future research into the differences among diverse Indian Buddhist traditions. The concluding section of Chapter 3 contains a summary of the concrete findings of this analysis.
Connecting with our buddhanature, our enlightened nature, often feels very far away, like it's not even possible. But it is much closer than we think. For example, when we are suddenly moved to compassion for someone, right then our buddhanature is shining through us. If we tune into ourselves at that moment, we can feel our innate goodness, our unconditioned pure being. Or when someone looks at us with complete love, we can allow it in and feel the same.
Tonglen, which means taking and sending, is a meditation practice that cultivates unconditional compassion and love. In Tonglen, as we open to our own or others' suffering and allow it to be transformed into compassion, we awaken to the compassion and love that is at the core of who we are. We first bring loving awareness to ourselves, and then we exchange self for others. Taking and sending for ourselves can unearth feelings of self-hatred, low self-worth, deficiency, and unworthiness, among others. As we gradually work through these feelings and open to increased kindness and compassion for ourselves, it helps heal our core wounds and loosens our self-fixation, facilitating a deeper opening into compassion and love. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/meditations-on-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
In chapter 8, Śāntideva then moves on to discuss the real heart of what is required for spiritual transformation—that is, the ability to see and experience the suffering of others as one's own suffering. Such a goal requires the cultivation of meditative concentration and the conditions conducive to achieving such a goal. +
Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself +
The textual history of the Yogācāra tradition begins with the ''Śrāvakabhūmi'', an exposition of the theory and praxis of the spiritual path along lines common to a few Northern ''Śrāvakayāna'' schools, most notably the ''Sarvāstivāda''. In less than a century from the conclusion of its formation, this work became part of the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', a monumental encyclopedic treatise which laid the foundations of a brand-new Mahāyāna tradition — the school of meditation adepts (''yogācāra''), mainly known for its theory on consciousness (''vijñānavāda'') According to it, our common representation (''vijñapti'') of the world is the only (''mātra'') entity actually existing. And to make things worse, its workings distort the possibility of a true insight into Reality (''tathatā''). Though far from being spelled out in all its details, the first clearly identifiable statement of this new view is found in the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'', a scripture which seems to have been independently compiled but was later incorporated into the ''Yogācārabhūmi''.
What made this new school, with part of its roots strongly anchored in an orthodox ''Śrāvakayāna'' tradition, develop a totally new outlook? Obviously, the answer is not simple, and the origins of this novel perspective are complex. From the standpoint of the textual history, however, one could reasonably argue that what lies between the traditional views of the ''Śrāvakabhūmi'' and the revolutionary ideas presented in the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' are the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' and the earlier parts of the ''Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī'' The former is a treatise (or rather anthology) dedicated to the philosophy and practice of the ideal Mahāyāna virtuoso (bodhisattva) treading along the messianic path of liberating all sentient beings and of perfecting himself for the attainment of the Awakening. Like the ''Śrāvakabhūmi'', this text also became part of the ''Yogācārabhūmi''. The ''Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī'' is the auto-commentarial portion of the ''Yogācārabhūmi'' which glosses and elaborates upon terms and subjects in the preceding (and most likely, earlier) parts of the text.
It is tempting to refer to the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' as a 'missing link'. 'Link' it is but 'missing' would be an overstatement. Modern scholars, mainly in Japan, have examined many of its philosophical and philological facets. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, a systematic examination of the meditative practices in the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' has not been undertaken so far. The present paper attempts to fill in this gap, albeit in a very limited fashion and scope. (Source: "Meditative Practices in the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi''," 884–85)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The revival of Buddhism during the eleventh Century C.E. known to Tibetan historiography as the "latter dissemination of the Doctrine" (''bstan pa'i phyi dar''; see ''BA'': 63-101) was motivated, to a large extent, by revulsion against the general breakdown of religious practice, discipline, and conduct which had prevailed during the preceding two centuries (Th'u bkwan: 96; Stein: 70-72). Consequently, in order to reestablish the faith on a firmer foundation, the reformist bKa' gdams pa sect founded by the followers of Atiśa (982-1054) undertook as one of its more important missions the presentation of the fundamentals of Buddhism in a manner easily accessible to the clergy and educated laity. One of the means by which this was accomplished was the development of succinct and useful guides to the essentials of Buddhist practice—the uniquely Tibetan literary genre of "Mental Purification" (''blo sbyong''). After an examination of the meaning of the term ''blo sbyong'', and a general survey of the early history and sources of this genre, this paper will examine two of its most noteworthy examples: the ''Blo sbyong don bdun ma'' ("Seven-Topic Mental Purification") (''LBDDM'') originating in the bKa' gdams pa tradition, and the ''bLo sbyong mtshon cha 'khor lo'' ("Wheel Weapon Mental Purification") (''LBTCK''), whose provenance will be discussed below. (Sweet, introductory remarks, 244) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', the "Entry of the Course towards Enlightenment", is one of the greatest classics of the Mahayana tradition. In approximately 1000 verses Śāntideva has outlined the entire process through which the aspirant attains the stage of Bodhisattva.<br> It is recorded that Śāntideva's fellow monks at Nālanda regarded him as a lazy oaf whose sole functions were eating, sleeping and excreting. They felt that such idle monks were unworthy to enjoy the alms offered by the faithful. After all, was it not the obligation of monks constantly to study the dharma? They determined to expel him from their midst and consequently summoned him to recite
what he knew of the Buddha's teaching. Śāntideva appeared as he had been commanded before the monastic assemblage, but refused to begin, as they had
intended, his final farewell until he had been bidden by his teacher. When Jayadeva, his preceptor, commanded him, he ascended the lofty throne his hecklers had raised in order to increase his discomfiture and asked his audience whether they wished him to recite that which was known or that which was new. They reached a consensus that they desired him to expound that which was hitherto unknown.<br> He decided that his own ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' was too long and the ''Sūtrasamuccaya''[1] too brief for the occasion; so he began to create, while reciting, the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''. The lucidity of its expression and the profundity of its thought held his audience spellbound. Fortunately, several of the assemblage thought to take down his words; and three versions of the verses uttered on that occasion were circulated. Ultimately, Śāntideva held for the one in 1000 ślokas.<br> The ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' is superficially not an especially difficult text. Taken as a whole, it is one of the clearest of the Buddhist shastras. In the ninth and final chapter it was Śāntideva's intention to condense all Buddhist and, specifically, Mādhyamika thought around the concept of Transcendental Wisdom (''prajñā'')[2], to describe the process of the transformation of all consciousness into pure wisdom. To explain this chapter, the Prajñāpariccheda, commentators, Indian and Tibetan, have written volumes on the ''Bodhicaryavatāra''. (Smith, preliminary remarks, 1–2)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Bu-ston, Tāranātha, and a number of other Tibetan authorities refer to a ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' by Śāntideva. The ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' that we know today is attributable to Nāgārjuna. A number of ingenious solutions have been put forth to explain this situation. Please see Murti, T. R. V., ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. 2nd ed''. London, Allen and Unwin, 1960, p. 101, fn. 3.
#Prof. H.V. Guenther (''Jewel Ornament of Liberation''. London, Rider, 1959, p. 3 and 225) translates this key term with the superbly accurate but verbose "discriminating awareness born from wisdom". He points out that prajñā is a transcending function: with the help of prajñā we may "pass beyond the borders of our habitually unenlightened attitude and enter the realm of spirituality and enlightenment". It is this transcending function that would seem to be the most significant.
Mimesis: Some Reflections on Bodhicitta Verses in the Second Chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra (Korobov 2010) +
Although the ultimate ''bodhicitta'' functions within a non-dual model of cognition where oppositions (good and evil, pure and impure, ''saṃsāra–nirvāṇa'', etc.) do not exist, it is traditionally considered to be the wisdom cognising emptiness. In this paper I will try to explore the cognitive nature of the ultimate ''bodhicitta'' to answer the question ‘What kind of cognition is the cognising of emptiness?’ In the paper I also will make an attempt to describe the basics of ambivalent Tantric ethics in terms of the phenomenological category of imitation or ''mimesis''.
Verses on the ultimate ''bodhicitta'' in the second chapter of the ''Guhyasamājatantra'' are a subject of commentaries written by various Tibetan and Indian authors. The paper is supplemented with a translation of ''Bodhicittabhāvanā'' written by Ācārya Kamalaśīla. This short text is a commentary on verses proclaimed by Tathagāgata Vairocana in the second chapter of ''Guhyasamājatantra''. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br>
The mind of enlightenment is the generation of an altruistic
aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all
sentient beings. It means that you have decided to strive
for Buddhahood because you understand that only as a
Buddha will you be able to care for and help all other
sentient beings to escape the sufferings of cyclic existence
and become Buddhas themselves. This practice has three
elements: training in the attitudes of the four immeasurables, generating an altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment and the precepts for so doing.
In the great books, the order of the four immeasurables is
usually given as love, compassion, joy and equanimity.
Here, however, the four are explained from the point of
view of practice so that equanimity comes first. Why begin
with this rather than love? It is a quintessential instruction
passed down from the many previous lamas of this lineage
that without the even-mindedness of equanimity it is
impossible to generate love and compassion. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Mindfulness is regarded by all scholars and practitioners of all Buddhist traditions as essential not only for the development of insight, but also for the cultivation and maintenance of ethical discipline. The English term denotes the joint operation of what are regarded in Buddhist philosophy of mind as two cognitive functions: ''sati/smṛti/dran pa'', which we might translate as ''attention'' in this context (although the semantic range of these terms also encompasses ''memory'' or ''recollection'')[1] and ''sampajañña/samprajanya/shes bzhin'', which I will render here as ''introspective vigilance''. The first function involves the fixation of attention on an object, and the second, particularly in the context of Mahāyāna literature, such as the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' and its commentaries, which is [the] focus of my discussion here, comes to include.[2] The careful maintenance of that attention and of the attendant attitudes and motivations.[3] When we bring attention and introspective vigilance to bear on an object, we can be said to be mindful of it. (Garfield, introduction, 1–2)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See Shulman (2010) and Gethin (1992, pp. 36ff) for excellent discussions of the interpretation of this term and its roots in Pāli literature.
#But see Analayo (2004) for a detailed discussion of the somewhat different sense this term has in the Pāli literature.
#Hallisey (2010) translates the Pāli cognate ''satisampajañña'' as ''moral discernment'' or ''prudence'',[141] while recognizing its sense as "''mindfulness and awareness of the way things are''[144] in non-moral contexts. The examples he offers as reasons for this translation, however, are not entirely compelling. In each case, the second translation would be felicitous. It appears that Hallisey is motivated in part by a discomfort with the moral import of ''mindfulness''. I hope that my case for its moral import in this context should set this worry to rest.
My purpose in this chapter is to present Śāntideva’s ethics as it is embedded in his accounts of the bodhisattva path of moral transformation and mental discipline. I will begin with a brief historical introduction to the interdependence of morality, concentration, and insight in Indian Buddhist traditions that is the basis of the bodhisattva ideal and bodhicitta, the awakened mind of wisdom and compassion. I then turn to an explicit discussion of Śāntideva’s account of the perfections of generosity, vigilant moral discipline, forbearance, and vigor. Each of these perfections, I argue, involves the cultivation of moral virtues through the development of a stable, attentive, and compassionate mind. This leads to a more explicit discussion of the fundamental role of mindfulness and the perfection of meditative concentration in Śāntideva’s ethics. For, according to Śāntideva, mindfulness is the very condition for the possibility of pursuing the bodhisattva training. With a stable and attentive mind, it is possible, then, to pursue the perfection of wisdom. Meditating deeply on the wisdom of emptiness, dependent origination, and the distinction between the two truths enables the embodied enacting of this insight in relation with others. Especially important to Śāntideva, this embodied insight allows the aspiring bodhisattva to overcome the fundamental delusion of a separate, substantial self that is at the root of our fearful and confused existence. Śāntideva’s moral thought has elements of both virtue ethics and consequentialism. However, in the end, I argue, his texts are best understood as meditation manuals that, through skillful means, help practitioners facing different situations and with different challenges overcome obstacles to awakening. Because awakening means cultivating particular embodied, skillful, affective, and cognitive ways of being in the world that involve attending with compassionate care to the needs and sufferings of others, the bodhisattva path is fundamentally about moral transformation and the development of moral consciousness. ([https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309430286_Mindfulness_and_Moral_Transformation_Awakening_to_Others_in_Santideva's_Ethics Source Accessed Feb 11, 2021])
The name 'Hwashang' has not always been equated with nihilistic wrong view in Tibetan Buddhism. The way Tibetan scholars and masters have taken Hwashang up into their historical narratives and philosophical systems after Hwashang's lineage was destroyed corresponds to the over- all philosophical and the corresponding historical stance these masters offered to their audiences whereby responding to their polemical and historical context. In the early days, before the formation of a functionally orthodox (Gelukpa) position on 'Hwashang' as a nihilistic wrong view which holds that one should abandon all thoughts, the Nyingma masters Nub Sangye Yeshe (gNubs Sangs rgyas Ye shes, 8-9th century) and Longchen Rabjam (kLong chen Rab byams, 1308– 1364) dis- played appreciation of ‘the master Hwashang’ whose teachings on non-conceptuality as a means to attain enlightenment resonated with theirs. However, those whose systems rejected such practice of non-conceptuality, such as Sakya Paṇḍita (Sa skya Pan di ta Kun dga'i rGyal mtshan, 1182–1251) and Tsongkhapa (rJe Tsong kha pa, 1357–1419), depicted 'Hwashang' negatively and rejected his teachings altogether, thereby using the historical narratives which after the ‘dark age’ had been altered to become pro-Indian. With the ascendency of the orthodox position on Hwashang, Jigme Lingpa ('Jigs med gLing pa, 1730-1798) alternatively displayed respect for 'the master Hwashang', but rejected the teachings he was said to have propounded. Mipham ('Jam mgon 'Ju Mi pham rGya mtsho, 1846–1912) thereafter typically finds common ground between the negative orthodox presentation and the older more positive Nyingma presentations. While Pettit claims Mipham uses a caricature of the "Hashang system" and Phuntsho hypothesizes that Mipham interpreted Hwashang, this thesis will show how he moreover creates a new Hwashang — a 'Hwashang makeover' — by appearing to take on the Gelukpa's presentation of Hwashang's system by describing it as nihilistic, while allowing for the importance of non-conceptuality on the path as the Nyingmapa's propounded.
Most of us tend to be Aristotelians when it comes to anger. While admitting that uncontrolled anger is harmful and ought to be avoided, we reject as undesirable a state of being that does not allow us to express legitimate outrage. Hence, we seem to find a compelling moral attitude in Aristotle's belief that we should get angry at the right time and for the right reasons and in the right way. But the reasonableness of the Aristotelian stance should not blind us to the fact that, historically speaking, competing views on the subject exist. I want to explore one such alternative account of anger. Both Buddhism and Stoicism, I will argue, carve out a position on the issue of anger that stands in marked contrast to the Aristotelian conception. In this essay, I want to examine the similarities between the Buddhist and Stoic views of anger, contrast this stance with the much more common (at least in the West) Aristotelian one, and, finally, consider the objections of a prominent Western scholar to this shared Buddhist/Stoic conception. +
Monastic Meat: The Question of Meat Eating and Vegetarianism in Tibetan Buddhist Monastic Guidelines (bca' yig) +
The practice of vegetarianism has long been connected with monasticism in Tibet, despite explicit statements in the vinaya that monks and nuns are allowed to eat meat. This paper examines one particular aspect of this connection: the rules governing meat eating found in monastic guidelines. Texts of this genre reveal a variety of approaches to the question of meat eating, from avoiding the issue entirely (the most common) to banning meat outright (the least). In this paper I argue that, when viewed collectively, those monastic guidelines that discuss meat do so in a measured way that makes clear that while meat is not fully condoned, individual monks or nuns can choose how strictly they will adhere to this ideal. Meat was, thus, generally permitted, but within a context in which it was still viewed in a negative light. +
J. Baird Callicott claims that moral pluralism leads to relativism, skepticism, and the undermining of moral obligations. Buddhist ethics provides a counterexample to Callicott; it is a robust tradition of moral pluralism. Focusing on one of the most significant texts in Buddhist ethics, Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', I show how it draws on a multiplicity of moral principles determined by context and skillful means (''upāya kauśalya''). In contrast to Callicott's description of pluralism as detrimental to moral life, I suggest that South Asian Buddhist traditions provide a model of moral reasoning that is both robust and flexible, a model appropriate for the many kinds of moral obligations that arise in the context of environmental ethics. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This concise and informative work constitutes a worthy contribution to the growing field of scholarship on Buddhist ethics. Clayton has carefully studied an important primary text by one of the most significant figures in Indian Buddhist history, the great scholar and poet Śāntideva. Her results help to expand our knowledge of ethical thought in the Mahāyāna. They also help advance the discussion of Buddhist ethics beyond the flawed theoretical framework established by Damien Keown. [https://networks.h-net.org/node/6060/reviews/16040/goodman-clayton-moral-theory-%C5%9B%C4%81ntidevas-siksasamuccaya-cultivating Read more here] +
