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From Bodhicitta
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One of the thoughts that characterizes early Mahayana Buddhism is the concept of bodhicitta (the aspiration for enlightenment). This bodhicitta can be identified as a term that brought about a transformation in the concept of the bodhisattva. In this paper, I would like to examine the bodhicitta in early Mahayana Buddhism, particularly its connection with the bodhisattva, its characteristics, and significance.
The term bodhisattva (bodhisattva, bodhisatta) was initially used as a designation for Shakyamuni Buddha's previous lives and his training period before attaining perfect enlightenment. This designation was limited to Shakyamuni alone and was never given to his disciples. For example, the formulaic phrase for bodhisattva is well known: "Monks, when I had not yet attained perfect enlightenment (sambodha) and was still a bodhisattva."
However, in the Buddhist biography "Mahavastu-avadana," in the section on the ten stages (dasabhumi), while referring to Shakyamuni entering the womb as a bodhisattva, the plural expression "bodhisattvas" (bodhisattvah) is used. The bodhisattvas are in samsara (cycle of rebirth), but they are not born through parents; rather, they are born through their own vows. The text describes how bodhisattvas make vows toward bodhi for the benefit and happiness of sentient beings.
In early Mahayana Buddhism, the concept of the bodhisattva underwent further transformation, with bodhisattvas becoming the most important active agents, and entirely new buddhas appearing. In the "Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra" (Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines), a bodhisattva is one who has aroused bodhicitta, and it is precisely because of this mind that one reaches supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttara-samyak-sambodhi). Various minds are mentioned as factors that make one a bodhisattva, along with bodhicitta. It teaches that the essential nature of this mind is pure.
Bodhicitta is generally interpreted as "the mind seeking bodhi." According to Har Dayal, in the compound bodhi-citta, citta is interpreted as "thought" or "idea," meaning "to perceive" or "to form an idea in the mind."
Regarding the formation of this term bodhicitta, there is an argument that it is not a shortened form of the phrase "anuttarayam samyaksambodhau cittam utpadayati" (arousing the mind toward supreme perfect enlightenment), but rather a newly coined term that evolved from "prathamacitta" (the first arousing of the mind). However, there is also the opposing argument that since this term is extremely rare in early Mahayana sutras, it is a shortened form of the more commonly used phrase "anuttarayam samyaksambodhau cittam utpadayati." (Translation of the Japanese supplied by Claude.ai Jan 13, 2026)
The object of this paper is to present a comparison of ''bodhicitta'' and charity. These concepts are central to their respective traditions (Mahāyāna Buddhism, Christianity), and for the sake of keeping the comparison within reasonable limits I will focus on two sets of texts: the writings of the Indian Buddhist monk Śāntideva (late seventh and eighth centuries CE) and those of the French Catholic nun Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897). My intention is that this comparison will help to clarify the similarities and the differences between the two concepts and provide thoughtful comment for Christians and Buddhists involved in interfaith dialogue and interested in comparative or interreligious theology. +
Buddha has given many discourses and teachings about individual and global happiness or peace. Of all these teachings, the Bodhisattva vow and its teachings are very crucial to promote peace in this conflict-ridden world. This chapter addresses the process of inculcation of peace from the Buddhist perspective. Specifically, it examines how the Bodhisattva vow and its teachings as well as practices help to maintain peace and harmony at individual and societal levels. The Bodhisattva worldview sees sentient beings from the eyes of equality because all sentient beings are equally capable to achieve great peace or happiness. Buddha, in course of finding a solution for conflict or suffering, has identified the main root causes as attachment, aversion, and ignorance, which in turn give rise to other mental defilements or negative emotions. Thus, real peace and happiness are only achievable by eradicating or controlling such mental defilements or their root, ignorance. ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-46349-5_28 Source Accessed Jan 15, 2025]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
I think it is absolutely essential for us to have loving kindness towards others. There is no doubt about this. Loving kindness is the essence of bodhicitta, the attitude of the bodhisattva. It is the most comfortable path, the most comfortable meditation. There can be no philosophical, scientific or psychological disagreement with this. With bodhicitta, there’s no East-West conflict. This path is the most comfortable, most perfect, one hundred percent uncomplicated one, free of any danger of leading people to extremes. Without bodhicitta, nothing works. And most of all, your meditation doesn’t work, and realizations don’t come.
Why is bodhicitta necessary for success in meditation? Because of selfish grasping. If you have a good meditation but don’t have bodhicitta, you will grasp at any little experience of bliss: ‘Me, me; I want more, I want more.’ Then the good experience disappears completely. Grasping is the greatest distraction to experiencing single-pointed intensive awareness in meditation. And with it, we are always dedicated to our own happiness: ‘Me, me I’m miserable, I want to be happy. Therefore I’ll meditate.’ It doesn’t work that way. For some reason good meditation and its results – peacefulness, satisfaction and bliss – just don’t come. Read more [https://fpmt.org/mandala/archives/older/mandala-issues-for-1996/july/bodhicitta-the-perfection-of-dharma/ here]. +
A study and English translation of the ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' (BV), attributed to Nāgārjuna. Contains a discussion of the text's authenticity and a synopsis. Also contains the Tibetan version and Sanskrit fragments. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
While the ''Guide to Bodhisattva Practice'' (''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', hereafter the ''Guide'') is rightly celebrated for its intense focus upon the mind and its careful attention to a complex moral psychology (as many of the essays in this volume will attest), we should not lose sight of the significant role that the body and embodiment also play within Śāntideva's text. Indeed, throughout Śāntideva's work, the language of the mind cannot stand alone, but is constantly intertwined with and expressed through the language of the body. This should not be surprising if we remember the total interpenetration of the moral and physical orders characteristic of the Buddhist worldview. As Susanne Mrozik has so clearly demonstrated—specifically in connection with Śāntideva's other major work, the ''Training Anthology'' (''Śikṣāsamuccaya'')—the body and morality are intimately intertwined in Buddhist ethics: moral status is always reflected in the type of physical body one bears, and this body itself constitutes both the necessary condition for further moral development and the means by which such development is brought about, not only for oneself but also for others with whom one interacts.[1] It therefore stands to reason that as Śāntideva guides us along the bodhisattva path, he should pay ample attention to any number of different bodies: the body that should be avoided, the body one needs to advance, the body as a means of such advancement, the bodies that inspire us as we proceed, and the body one finally seeks to achieve. As Mrozik has noted, Śāntideva exists within a
world of "corporeal specificity":[2] not all bodies are the same, and the ''Guide'' thus describes for us various types. As we move along the bodhisattva path, moreover, Śāntideva offers a plethora of techniques to encourage our advance, including attitudes toward the body whose cultivation can be
helpful at specific points along the way—and these attitudes too are multiple and constantly shifting. To speak of "embodiment" in the ''Guide'' therefore involves both the ''actual physical bodies'' that are involved in the attainment of buddhahood and the ''attitudes toward the body'' that should be fostered along the path. In this chapter, I seek to offer a succinct account that encompasses both categories. In doing so, I draw freely from the ''Guide'' (using Crosby and Skilton's elegant translation for the most part),[3] for Śāntideva's statements concerning the body are scattered throughout the
text rather than being limited to any single discussion. (Ohnuma, "Bodies and Embodiment in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''," 114–15)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Mrozik, ''Virtuous Bodies''.
#Mrozik, ''Virtuous Bodies'', 34.
#Śāntideva, ''The Bodhicaryavatara'', trans. Crosby and Skilton. On two occasions (as indicated in the notes), I have used an alternative translation.
''The Faults of Eating Meat'' is a Tibetan-language text by Shardza Tashi Gyaltsen (1859–1935), the preeminent Bon scholar and practitioner of his era. Written in a colloquial style for a broad but literate audience, the text navigates the tension between the Buddhist and Bon ethical imperative of compassion toward all beings and the practical reality of the high-altitude Tibetan diet. Shardza opens with a forceful condemnation of meat eating, equating it with karmic consequences and a lack of compassion, before conceding that meat may be a medical necessity in the Tibetan context—a position rooted in the indigenous medical tradition's view that abstaining from meat weakens the body and compromises one's ability to practice the Dharma. His resolution invokes the Vinaya rule of threefold purity, permitting only meat not seen, heard, or suspected to have been killed for the consumer, and proposes the consumption of meat from animals that died naturally or accidentally as the only ethically defensible option for those unable to maintain a vegetarian diet. The text reflects the broader vegetarian movement that flourished in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Kham, particularly among non-Geluk practitioners associated with the rime (nonsectarian) movement, of which Shardza was an active participant. As a Bon contribution to an overwhelmingly Buddhist discourse on vegetarianism, ''The Faults of Eating Meat'' occupies a distinctive place in the corpus of Tibetan ethical literature on diet and animal welfare. +
Rago Choktrul Thubten Shedrup Gyatso (1879–1972) was a prominent Tibetan Buddhist master of the Palyul tradition whose extensive four-volume collected works demonstrate his mastery of multiple Buddhist traditions and genres of religious literature. Among his notable contributions to ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' studies are ''Vines of Amṛta: A Prayer to the Lineage of the Bodhicaryāvatāra'', which elaborates on Patrul Rinpoche's shorter lineage prayer, and ''Drops of Nectar'' (''Bdud rtsi'i thigs pa''), a practical meditation guide focused on the dedication chapter.
''Drops of Nectar'' transforms Śāntideva's dedication verses into living practice by combining dedication (''bsngo ba'') with breath meditation (''dbugs sbyor'') and ''tonglen'' techniques. The text provides flexible instruction for practitioners of different capacities, from brief three-to-seven-breath sessions to extended practice periods, emphasizing the visualization of light rays to take in others' suffering and send out happiness and merit. Drawing on inspiring examples from masters like Tokme Zangpo and Karma Chakme, Rago Choktrul's approach makes the profound philosophical understanding of dedication accessible through practical meditation techniques that can transform ordinary breath awareness into bodhisattva practice. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is indeed true that the tradition of the bKa' gdams pa school has regarded Śāntideva's ''sPyod 'jug'' (hereafter: BSA[1]) as an important text[2] describing the bodhisattvas' way of practice, basically, from the Mādhyamika's point of view. However, it may also be accepted that one of the most significant contributions to the establishment of this text in the second diffusion (''phyi dar'') of Tibetan Buddhism was made by Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (1290-1364).[3]<br> His contribution concerning this text can be summarized in the following three points:
:(1) In the last chapter of his ''Chos 'byuṅ'' (1322), Bu-ston lists the BSA and its nine commentaries - two of which are now unavailable in our current bsTan 'gyur - in the separate "section of the BSA" (''sPyod 'jug gi skor'') but not in the preceding ''dBu ma'i skor'' ("Madhyamaka section").[4] Therein he gives a brief explanation of the difference between the earlier and later versions of the BSA.[5]<br>(2) When he later established the bsTan 'gyur at Źa lu monastery (1334), Bu-ston played an important role both in collecting the Tibetan translation of the BSA and its ten commentaries and in incorporating them into the ''dBu ma'i skor'', adding three commentaries, two of which are those on the early version of the BSA.[6]<br>(3) He afterwards wrote an extensive commentary on the BSA (1338) entitled ''Zla ba'i 'od zer''.[7] In its colophon, after explaining the BSA lineage,[8] Bu-ston refers to the names of six commentaries and other works he consulted.[9]
He then gives an important statement concerning both the background of a considerable number of problematic renderings of the BSA as well as his approach to handling those verses in question as follows:[10]
:('''A''') gźuṅ 'di gTsaṅ-nag-pas 'gyur sṅa phyi thams cad bltas nas / khoṅ raṅ gi thugs la gaṅ bde bsgrigs pa yin nam źes grag la /. ('''B''') rgya dpe daṅ 'grel pa daṅ mi mthun pa maṅ po snaṅ yaṅ / ('''C''') rNog 'gyur bzaṅ rna źig 'bad de btsal yaṅ ma rñed pas / don la 'gal ba chen po med pa rnams grags pa bźin du bśad / ('''D''') mi bcos su mi ruṅ ba rnams rgya dpe daṅ 'grel pa daṅ bstun nas logs su gtan la phab / [11] "('''A''') It is rumored whether or not this text [i.e. the Tibetan translation of the BSA] is what gTsaṅ-nag pa compiled from those [renderings] with which after consulting all the translations, old and new, he satisfied his own mind. ('''B''') It appears that a number [of renderings of the BSA] do not correspond with its Sanskrit text and the commentaries. ('''C''') I have made efforts to seek a reliable copy of rNog [Blo-Idan-śes-rab]'s translation, which, however, could not be obtained. Therefore, in accordance with well-known [interpretations], I have explained those [stanzas], the meaning of which contains no serious contradictions. ('''D''') As for those [renderings] which should not be left unrevised, I have decided [my own renderings] apart [from them] in conformity with the Sanskrit text and the commentaries."
The purpose of the present paper is to make an inquiry into some of the significant meanings contained in the above paragraph of the colophon, with a few examples from chapter 9 entitled "Śer phyin gyi le'u (Chapter on the Completion of Wisdom)" of Bu-ston's commentary.
This article explores the concept of buddha-nature—the inherent capacity for enlightenment present in all beings—and reconciles it with Buddhist teachings on emptiness and non-self. Using the analogy of a jewel encrusted in dirt, the author explains that buddha-nature is the pure, unconditioned nature of mind that has always existed but is obscured by false beliefs in a permanent self and disturbing emotions. Rather than creating or strengthening buddha-nature through practice, spiritual work involves removing these fictional layers to reveal what is already present. This teaching affirms that all beings equally possess buddha-nature and thus the potential for awakening, making enlightenment both possible and accessible here and now. +
Poussin's "Buddhica" (1938) collects four short philological notes on Buddhist terminology: (1) a defense of Suzuki's reading of a ''Laṅkāvatāra'' verse distinguishing scriptural "mode of teaching" from doctrinal truth grasped by personal intuition; (2) a comparison of how Yogācāra thinkers (Hiuan-tsang/Dharmapāla vs. Vasubandhu/Sthiramati) model consciousness's structure; (3) a reconsideration of whether Madhyamaka admits an Absolute, revisiting his earlier debate with Stcherbatsky; and (4) a note on the terms ''mahāpadeśa'' and ''kālāpadeśa'', concerning criteria for scriptural authenticity. It was his last publication, appearing shortly after his death. +
Tibetan Buddhism idealizes the practice of compassion, the drive to relieve the suffering of others, including animals. At the same time, however, meat is a standard part of the Tibetan diet, and abandoning it is widely understood to be difficult. This tension between the ethical problems of a meat based diet and the difficulty of vegetarianism has not been lost on Tibetan religious leaders, including the eighteenth century master Jigmé Lingpa. Jigmé Lingpa argues repeatedly that meat is a sinful food, incompatible with a compassionate mindset. At the same time, however, he acknowledges the difficulties of vegetarianism, and refuses to mandate vegetarianism among his students. Instead, he offers a variety of practices that can ameliorate the inherent negativity of eating meat. By so doing, Jigmé Lingpa offers his students a chance to continue cultivating compassion without having to completely abandon meat.
Read this article [https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2013/04/Barstow-Between-Abstinence-final1.pdf here]. +
This article provides a philosophical overview of some of the central Buddhist positions and argument regarding animal welfare. It introduces the Buddha's teaching of ahiṃsā or non-violence and rationally reconstructs five arguments from the context of early Indian Buddhism that aim to justify its extension to animals. These arguments appeal to the capacity and desire not to suffer, the virtue of compassion, as well as Buddhist views on the nature of self, karma, and reincarnation. This article also considers how versions of these arguments have been applied to address a practical issue in Buddhist ethics; whether Buddhists should be vegetarian.
Read this article [https://philpapers.org/archive/FINBAA-2.pdf here]. +
Buddhism as Reductionism: Personal Identity and Ethics in Parfitian Readings of Buddhist Philosophy - from Steven Collins to the Present +
Derek Parfit's early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory. Within the study of Buddhism, it also has sparked a continuous comparative discourse, which seeks to explicate Buddhist philosophical principles in light of Parfit's conceptual framework. Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the ''anātman'' (no-self) doctrine and its relation to Buddhist ethics. I discuss in particular three dominant elements appropriated by Parfitian-inspired scholarship: Parfit's theoretical categories; philosophical problems raised by his reductionist theory of persons; and Parfit's argumentative style. I argue that the three elements used in this scholarship constitute different facets of one methodological approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which relies on Western terminology and conceptual schemes to establish a conversation with non-Western philosophy. I suggest that while this methodology is fruitful in many ways, philosophy as a cosmopolitan space may benefit significantly from approaching Buddhist philosophy using its own categories and terminology. +
Buddhism as Reductionism: Personal Identity and Ethics in Parfitian Readings of Buddhist Philosophy; from Steven Collins to the Present +
Derek Parfit's early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory. Within the study of Buddhism, it also has sparked a continuous comparative discourse, which seeks to explicate Buddhist philosophical principles in light of Parfit's conceptual framework. Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the ''anātman'' (no-self) doctrine and its relation to Buddhist ethics. I discuss in particular three dominant elements appropriated by Parfitian-inspired scholarship: Parfit's theoretical categories; philosophical problems raised by his reductionist theory of persons; and Parfit's argumentative style. I argue that the three elements used in this scholarship constitute different facets of one methodological approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which relies on Western terminology and conceptual schemes to establish a conversation with non-Western philosophy. I suggest that while this methodology is fruitful in many ways, philosophy as a cosmopolitan space may benefit significantly from approaching Buddhist philosophy using its own categories and terminology. +
Arya Asaṅga was one of Indian Buddhism's leading scholars in the middle Mahāyāna period, fourth - sixth centuries C.E .. His encyclopedic ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' is considered to be one of Buddhism's foremost expositions of bodhisattva doctrine.
The ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' contains a systematic description of the bodhisattva path
of practice (bodhisattva-śikṣāmārga'') that emphasises broad knowledge and general
education in the pursuit of enlightenment and liberation. The subjects of that education are the "five sciences" (''pañcavidyāsthānāni'') which range from Buddhist textual scholarship to the study of non-Buddhist religious literature and secular subjects, including works on grammar, logic, medicine and crafts.
The historical accounts of the seventh century Chinese pilgrim travellers Hsüan-Tsang and I-Tsing confirm that these five sciences were the basis for the curriculum at Nālandā Mahāvihāra, India's most renowned monastic university. Corroborating
information indicates that the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' was studied at Nālandā Mahāvihāra and that its views and values were influential in Nālandā's approach to education.
The inclusion of non-traditional subjects as valid areas of "liberating knowledge"
for Buddhists required an innovative philosophy of education. This was achieved in the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' by reformulating certain key Buddhist concepts, most notably ''dharma'' ("teachings"), ''prajñā'' ("wisdom-insight") and ''bodhi'' ("enlightenment"). The result was a comprehensive vision of religious education that encouraged a quest for general learning and broadened the range of knowledge deemed necessary for attainment of complete enlightenment (''anuttarasamyaksambodhi'').
To illustrate the importance of education and embody principles of its acquisition
and proper application, the ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' also developed portrayals of role types. These include the bodhisattva depicted as a novice beginner, teacher, and mentor; and the ''Tathāgata'' Buddha portrayed as the personification of "all-knowledge" and defender of the faith. The Chinese travellers' accounts confirm that the students and masters of Nālandā Mahāvihāra were involved, in their daily lives, in activities that corresponded to these roles.
The process of globalization in today's world compels us to understand the world as a single unit, and deeply affects all aspects of our lives - economic, political and cultural. Buddhism retains its core concepts, yet has [the] capacity to include and develop new practices which makes its impact global. That is why with its concept of the Bodhisattva it has been able to move through countries, through cultures, through centuries. The Bodhisattva performs deeds, neither for himself nor his own but for all sentient beings for their welfare physical, ethical and spiritual upliftment. Thus, the ethical code and conduct of Bodhisattva ideal has a universal and eternal relevance, more so in the present-age of the danger of global destruction. Put simply, a self-centered attitude is the source of all sufferings - of one's own and of others-, while selfless attitude and a concern for others is the source of happiness, well-being and welfare of all - including one's own self. In light of this interpretation the present paper explores the causal connection between bodhisattva deeds, especially its concept of ethical code and conduct, and globalization, on the basis of ''Bodhicaryavatara'' of Santideva, as ideal giving solutions to the present-age challenges. The paper concludes that the performance of deeds and ethics are closely intertwined because performance of an action while gives opportunity to satisfy material needs if tainted by human greed, it may lead to unethical behaviour. But if, the same behaviour is galvanised by the enlightened reasoning, it will be an act of piety. Thus, it gives more stress on purification and chestening of the mind. A Manager acting thus uses critical faculties, reasoning, disciplined, and ethical mind to promote the welfare of all stakeholders. ([http://papers.iafor.org/wp-content/uploads/conference-proceedings/ACERP/ACERP2012_proceedings.pdf Source Accessed Feb 11, 2022]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Why are we worried about ethics, per se, in the context of conventional truth and the Madhyamaka understanding of the two truths? What is the ''special'' problem about ethics, once we understand that to take the two truths seriously is to take the conventional truth seriously as a ''truth?'' (Cowherds 2011). In this chapter, we argue that there is nothing to worry about; there is no special problem. Instead of ''solving'' a problem about ethics in the context of conventional truth, the project in this chapter is to ''dissolve'' an ''apparent'' problem. But this is Madhyamaka analysis, and so, following Tsongkhapa's practice (Cowherds 2011, esp. chapter 5) we must begin by identifying the object of negation, that is, to be clear about what we are arguing does ''not'' exist—in this case, the apparent problem. As we will see in subsequent chapters, however, demonstrating that the problem about ethics is not ''special'' does not by itself show that there are no difficulties in seeing how ethics is meant to go in the context of conventional truth. (Garfield, introduction, 77) +
Built on Emptiness: Śūnyatā as a Basis for Mahāyāna Ethics, With References to Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra +
In a 1968 conference, Luis O. Gomez acknowledged that the Buddhist conception of emptiness (śūnyatā) presents a challenge to the Western tradition of philosophical ethics and has given rise to charges of nihilism, even in Buddhism’s ancient setting. However, Gomez argues, that, far from leading adherents to an ethical nihilism, these doctrines provide a unique lens through which to see the motivations of Buddhist ethics. Beginning with the essay that followed from his presentation and continuing with the works of other Buddhist ethicists (Stephen A. Evans, Barbara A. Clayton, Jay Garfield, Stephen E. Harris, for instance), this paper analyzes and illustrates the ways that śūnyatā shapes a Mahāyāna Buddhist systematic ethic. After examining the ontological grounding which these conceptions illustrate, this paper then asks toward what kind of ethical issues are adherents oriented and what kinds of ethical responses are compelled. Finally, this paper addresses the ways that śūnyatā provides a basis for prioritizing ethical responses when conflicts are apparent. While several of the writers analyzed point out that developing such a systemic understanding of Buddhist ethics has not been a priority for the tradition, this paper agrees with those who assert that doing so is helpful less for the tradition itself and more for the cross-cultural conversations that facilitated by a shared vocabulary. Such common ground allows for a constructive cross-cultural comparison that may lead to better understandings of the ways that ethical systems are derived and operative. +
C
In this excerpt from the translators' introduction to ''The Wisdom Chapter'', Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher of the Padmakara Translation Group examine the controversy surrounding Mipham Rinpoche's commentary on the "Wisdom Chapter" of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', known as the ''Ketaka Jewel''. The rise of the Geluk school and its relation to other Tibetan Buddhist traditions are explored, along with Mipham's role in the nonsectarian Rime movement, which aimed to preserve endangered Buddhist Tibetan Buddhist traditions while fostering intellectual freedom.
This exploration of Mipham's motivations, his approach to doctrinal debates, and the challenges faced by non-Geluk traditions provides insight into the complex interplay between different schools of thought and the political landscape of Tibet. It sheds light on the complex relationship between historical and political conditions and the arising of doctrinal interpretations, offering context for understanding the philosophical debates that shaped Tibetan Buddhism. +
