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From Bodhicitta
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This article presents a critical examination of Hirakawa Akira's influential theory that Mahāyāna Buddhism originated among lay Buddhist practitioners engaged in stūpa worship, rather than from ordained monastic communities. Hirakawa's 1968 work ''Shoki Daijō Bukkyō no Kenkyū'' (''A Study of Early Mahāyāna Buddhism'') argued that early Mahāyāna bodhisattvas were lay people who adopted the Ten Good Precepts (''daśakuśalakarmapatha'') instead of the ''prātimokṣa'' monastic rules, that Mahāyāna texts criticized sectarian ''bhikṣu''s, that bodhisattvas lived in stūpas rather than monasteries, and that doctrinal differences prevented ordained and Mahāyāna practitioners from cohabiting.
Through detailed textual analysis, this study identifies fundamental logical contradictions in Hirakawa's argument, particularly his assumption that śrāvakas of the Śrāvakayāna were synonymous with sectarian bhikṣus. The author demonstrates that Hirakawa's evidence can equally support an alternative hypothesis: that Mahāyāna Buddhism emerged from within monastic communities, with both ordained ''bhikṣu''s and lay supporters contributing to its development. The study challenges Hirakawa's interpretation of key texts and argues for the possibility that ordained bodhisattvas and Śrāvakayāna practitioners coexisted within sectarian communities during the formative period of Mahāyāna Buddhism. +
A Suggestion of the Buddhist View of Life and Death for Contemporary Thanatology: From Conviction of Death to Awakening Bodhicitta (Yang 2020) +
생사학에서 죽음의 논의는 자신과 타인의 죽음을 모두 포함하는 것이다. 죽음은 다양한 인간 관계에서 이뤄지는 사건이기 때문에, 생사학에서 죽음의 문제는 내세(來世)보다 현세(現世)에 관심을 두고 논의되는 것이어야 한다. 본 논문은 이러한 문제를 대승의 보살 사상을 통하여 검토하고자 한다. 죽음을 개인적인 영역으로 끌어들일 때, 죽음에 대한 성찰은 나의 자율성에 근거하여 이뤄진다. 한국과 타이완에서 생사학의 활동으로 이뤄지고 있는 연명의료 중단에 대한논의와 일본에서 이뤄지는 삶의 마무리 활동인 '슈카츠'에서도 이러한 태도가 잘 나타난다. 그러나 이러한 인식과 태도는 죽음에 대한 성찰이 개체 차원에서 이뤄지고 있다는 점에서 검토할 필요가 있다. 생사학은 타인의 죽음 인식에 대한고통의 문제를 근본적으로 포함하고 있다는 점에서, 대승 보살의 생사관을 검토하는 것은 생사학에 대한 이해의 범위를 확대하는 데 도움이 될 것이다.
In Thanatology, the discussion of death includes both the death of oneself and others. Since death is an event that takes place in various human relationships, the problem of death in Thanatology should be discussed with interest in this world rather than in the after life. This article aims to examine these issues through the thoughts of Mahayana Bodhisattva. When death was brought into individual sphere, the reflection on death is based on personal autonomy. This thought is evident in the discussions about the cessation of life-sustaining treatment in Korea and Taiwan, and the ‘Syukatsu’ activity in Japan which is held towards the end of one’s life. However, these perceptions and attitudes need to be reviewed in the point that the reflections on death are practiced at the individual level. Since Thanatology fundamentally deals with the sufferings for others' perceptions of death, examining Mahayana Bodhisattva's view of life and death will help to broaden our understanding of Thanatology. +
This article by Gregory Forgues provides a comprehensive overview of the Indian commentaries on the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA). It details thirteen commentaries composed by Indian authors, highlighting how the BCA was used both as a Mahāyāna practice manual and a debate manual. The article traces the evolution of the BCA from its earliest known version in Dunhuang manuscripts to later Sanskrit recensions and Tibetan translations. It explores the various commentators, their approaches, and the historical context of their works. The article also discusses the two main traditions of the BCA transmission to Tibet, emphasizing the influence of Candrakīrti's thought on later scholars. It concludes by examining the continuous evolution of the root text and its Tibetan translations in relation to the various Indian commentaries, illustrating the complex history of the BCA's transmission from India to Tibet.
This article is invaluable for researchers, scholars, and students interested in Buddhist philosophy and in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' as well as its commentarial tradition. It provides a detailed historical and textual analysis that offers insights into the development and interpretation of this central Buddhist text. The article's exploration of different versions and translations of the BCA, along with its examination of various commentaries, allows readers to understand the nuances and evolving interpretations of the text over time. Furthermore, the article's discussion of the two waves of transmission to Tibet helps contextualize the BCA within broader historical and cultural frameworks. By offering this comprehensive overview, the article serves as an excellent starting point for further research into the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', its commentaries, and its significance in Buddhist thought and practice. +
In Wang et al. (2022), we presented a philological analysis and introduction of a newly-identified palm-leaf manuscript (ZX0617-ZB20) containing Prajñākaramati's ''Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā'' (hereafter BCAP). Through systematic collation with the standard edition established by de la Vallée Poussin (1901-1914), we reconstructed BCAP’s commentaries on ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' (BCA) 1.1, 3.28-33, and 4.1-14 passages conspicuously absent from the aforementioned critical edition. Building upon this foundation, Wang et al. (2023) extended this reconstruction to encompass the commentary on BCA 4.15-48, similarly omitted from de la Vallée Poussin (1901-1914). These successive publications have rendered publicly accessible all lacunae in the standard edition that our manuscript evidence permits to supplement. Given that these reconstructed passages constitute the manuscript's principal scholarly contribution, our initial research prioritization focused on their transliteration and analysis. Consequently, even though our team had nearly completed transliterating the entire BCAP manuscript, we temporarily deferred further verification and comparative work (involving the Tibetan translation of BCAP and various cited works) on the remaining, less critical portions. Subsequent to disseminating these findings, however, we received communications from several scholars engaged in producing the first complete modern-language translation of BCAP. This development is particularly significant, as BCAP, despite its century-long status as a critically edited text, has only been partially translated and remains without a full translation to this day. Recognizing that our ongoing transliteration and textual comparisons might benefit this translation effort, we have decided to present here a transliteration of the remaining portion of Chapter 1 of our BCAP manuscript, along with a comparative analysis against the Tibetan version of BCAP, relevant cited works, the ''Bhāvanākrama'', and the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya''.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
We have two versions of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'': the standard Sanskrit version with ten chapters (abbr. as ''BCA''), and the Tibetan version from Tun-huang with nine chapters (abbr. as ''BCT''). According to recent studies we can assume that the ''BCT'' had been written earlier than ''BCA''.[1] Since Chapter 2 of the ''BCT'' is divided into two chapters in the ''BCA'' (Chapters 2 and 3), Chapter 8 of the ''BCT'', the chapter on ''Prajñā'', which I shall take up here, corresponds to Chapter 9 of the ''BCA''. The difference between two versions is greatest in this chapter: the ''BCT'' has only 90.5
''kārikās'' whereas the ''BCA'' has 168. As a whole the ''BCA'' must have been an extended version of the ''BCT'', but there are also 22.5 ''kārikās'' which exist only in the ''BCT''.[2] Here I discuss some of these ''kārikās'', ''BCT'' 8.40-44ab and 45-52, specifically the latter half.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#A. Saito, "Śāntideva's Philosophy an Expressed in the Early Version of his ''Bodhisattva-caryāvatāra'', Chapter 8, " ''Tokai Bukkyo, Journal of Tokai Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies'' 39, 1994 Nagoya, pp. (1)-(17), and two other publications by the same author indicated in notes (3) and (9) of this article; C. Ishida, "The Prātimokṣa and the Deśanā-ritual in the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'': Some Evidences of its Revision and Retranslation," ''The Bukkyo Shigaku Kenkyu, The Journal of the History of Buddhism'' 36-2, Kyoto 1993, pp. (1)-(27) and another paper by the same author indicated in the note (4) of this article.
#Saito (1993) p. (25). +
This paper examines the textual transmission and Sanskrit restoration of Atiśa's ''Bodhipathapradīpa'' (''Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma''), one of his most important works composed in Western Tibet around 982-1054 CE. The author evaluates Losang Norbu Shastri's 1984 Sanskrit restoration, comparing it with earlier attempts by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya.
Eimer demonstrates that the Tibetan text is transmitted through three distinct lines: (a) the Madhyamaka sections of Tengyur xylographs, (b) the Jo bo'i chos chung sections of various Tengyurs, and (c) paracanonical manuscripts and blockprints. Through detailed textual criticism, he identifies numerous variant readings and problematic renderings in Shastri's edition, providing corrections based on multiple canonical and noncanonical sources.
The paper highlights significant challenges in Sanskrit restoration from Tibetan translations, including issues with meter, word choice, and technical terminology. Eimer shows that while traditional translation dictionaries like the ''Mahāvyutpatti'' provide guidelines, many of Shastri's Sanskrit equivalents deviate from standard conventions. A key contribution is the presentation of the original Sanskrit version of lines 229-232, preserved in manuscripts of the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'', which demonstrates how multiple restoration attempts can differ significantly from the authentic text. +
The history of vegetarianism in the Buddhist world has followed a complicated and in some respects perhaps surprising course. Although the idea of Ahiṃsā 'non-harming' is generally proclaimed and respected in Buddhist thought and practice, what might seem to be its logical corollary, namely abstention from eating the flesh of animals killed for their meat, is both relatively rarely discussed in Buddhist literature and far from generally practised in most parts of the Buddhist world. That the idea of vegetarianism was however at least partially thematised in Buddhist thought from an early period is shown by the references in the Vinaya to abstention from meat-eating in certain conditions and also, curiously enough, by the mention of it as one of the ascetic practices that the Buddha's cousin-antagonist Devadatta insisted upon. +
This essay examines the 356 verses on bodhicitta composed by Khunu Lama Tenzin Gyaltsen (khu nu bla ma bstan 'dzin rgyal mtshan, 1895-1977) in 1959 and subsequently published as ''Jewel Lamp: In Praise of Bodhicitta'' (''byang chub sems kyi bstod pa rin chen sgron ma'') in 1966. Offering a handful of experimental translations of selected verses, this essay reflects on the ''Jewel Lamp'' both from a literary perspective and as a site for thinking about bodhicitta in a twentieth century context. I consider how the ''Jewel Lamp''<i>'</i>s meditations on bodhicitta are informed by Khunu Lama's knowledge of Tibetan and Sanskrit poetics and literary theory, as well as by his lifelong practice of renunciation. I argue that Khunu Lama depicts poetry and Buddhist practice as involving parallel processes of self-cultivation and transformation.<br>
དཔྱད་རྩོམ་འདིར་ཁུ་ནུ་བླ་མ་བསྟན་འཛིན་རྒྱལ་མཚན་(༡༨༩༥-༡༩༧༧)གྱིས་སྤྱི་ལོ་༡༩༥༩ལོར་མཛད་ཅིང་། ཕྱིས་སུ་སྤྱི་ལོ་༡༩༦༦ལོར་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་ཀྱི་བསྟོད་པ་རིན་ཆེན་སྒྲོན་མ་ཞེས་པར་སྐྲུན་བྱས་པའི་བྱང་སེམས་སྐོར་གྱི་ཤོ་ལོ་ཀ་སུམ་བརྒྱ་ང་དྲུག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་དེར་དཔྱད་བརྗོད་བྱས་ཡོད། ཚིག་བཅད་རེ་འགའ་ཚོད་ལྟའི་ཚུལ་དུ་བདམས་བསྒྱུར་བྱས་པ་དང་དུས་མཚུངས་སུ། རྩོམ་ཡིག་འདིར་རིན་ཆེན་སྒྲོལ་མར་རྩོམ་རིག་གི་ལྟ་སྟངས་དང་དུས་རབས་ཉི་ཤུའི་སྐབས་མཚམས་ཀྱི་བྱང་སེམས་སྐོར་གྱི་བསམ་བློའི་གནས་བབ་གཉིས་ཐད་ནས་རྟོག་ཞིབ་དང་། རིན་ཆེན་སྒྲོལ་མའི་བྱང་སེམས་སྒོམ་རིམ་ལ་ཁུ་ནུ་བླ་མའི་བོད་དང་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གྱི་སྙན་ངག་དང་རྩོམ་གཞུང་སྐོར་གྱི་མཁྱེན་པ། དེ་བཞིན་ཁོང་གི་སྐུ་ཚེའི་ཧྲིལ་བོའི་བྱ་བྲལ་ཉམས་ལེན་བཅས་ཀྱིས་ཤུགས་རྐྱེན་ཇི་ལྟར་འཐེབས་པ་ངོས་འཛིན་བྱས་ཏེ། ཁོང་གིས་སྙན་ངག་དང་ཆོས་ཉམས་ལེན་གཉིས་ཀ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ནང་སེམས་ཡར་རྒྱས་དང་བཅོས་བསྒྱུར་ལ་གཅིག་མཚུངས་ཀྱི་ལམ་རིམ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཐུགས་གཞིགས་མཛད་ཡོད་པ་ཁུངས་སྐྱེལ་བྱས་ཡོད།། +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Śāntideva (fl. first half of the eighth century?) is generally acknowledged as one of the most important Madhyamakas in India, yet the philosophical aspects of his lengthy poem ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' have drawn little attention from modern scholars. To the best of my knowledge Williams's work is the first book-length scholarly study devoted exclusively to Śāntideva's philosophy and as such it deserves our attention and appreciation. The book consists of five chapters; each forms an independent essay and, buddhistically enough, they are not meant to form a whole. Nevertheless, two principal concerns are apparent throughout the book. The first is the variety of interpretations of the ''BCA'' mainly by Tibetan commentators, which reflects what happened to Madhyamaka ideas when they reached Tibet. Williams's second concern is a critical philosophical interpretation of some key verses of the text. Each chapter centres on a verse or a small group of verses from the philosophical chapters (8-9) of the ''BCA'' which Williams submits to critical philosophical analysis; he then reflects on the consequences of the arguments, compares them to modern (mainly British) philosophical doctrines, and does not hesitate to discard them when he considers them to be faulty or unconvincing in this light. It is unfortunate, however, that Williams's philosophical interest is not matched by a philologically founded and historically sensitive understanding of Śāntideva's text. (Franco, "Review," 123) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559614 Read more here] +
A critical review of four of the five articles by Williams collected in the book, with particular focus on Williams' interpretation of Tibetan commentarial literature on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and his analysis of Śāntideva's arguments in favor of altruism. [https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2010/04/pettit991.pdf Read more here] +
Altruism as Antidote to Demagoguery: Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara Chapter 3 as Method for Countering Identity Divisions +
What is altruism and how may shifting individuals' attentions from self to other diffuse the self-centered power of sustained victimology, identity divisions, and demagoguery? My paper examines altruism, demagoguery, excerpts from Chapter 3 of Shantideva’s ''Bodhicharyavatara'', and the fostering of altruism through the practice of bodhichitta. Particularly as it pertains to the commitment a bodhisattva makes in acting for the wellbeing of all sentient life in the development of aspirational and action bodhichitta through spiritual activism. Individuals need not be Buddhist to foster, express, or practice the bodhisattva commitment. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In the eighth chapter of his ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', or ''Introduction to the Practices of Awakening'' (hereafter, BCA), the eighth-century Indian Buddhist monk Śāntideva appeals to the nonexistence of any enduring self as a premise in his argument that we ought to commit to impartial benevolence. A striking feature of this argument is that it appears in a chapter that is otherwise comprised of meditations designed to develop disenchantment with samsara and increase compassion for others. Almost all of the verses preceding the argument, which begins at verse ninety and continues for about fifteen verses, focus on some unsatisfactory aspect of samsaric experience, like the unreliability of impermanent things like friendship and wealth. Particularly striking are a set of forty verses in which Śāntideva imagines himself in a charnel ground contemplating rotting corpses. It is rather jarring to find him transition from these graveside contemplations to an extended argument for benevolence.<br> In a past article, I argued that we can resolve this tension by treating the argument as a meditation designed to lessen selfishness (Harris 2011 ). Although this is one function of these verses, Garfield, Jenkins and Priest are right to point out that this is no reason to think the argument is not also meant to rationally convince (2016). In this essay, I reverse my former approach; rather than interpreting what appears to be an argument as an extended meditation, I show how the meditations of the first half of the chapter establish an important premise in the argument. Reading the text in this way shows how Śāntideva can respond to a potentially powerful objection which I develop by re-examining Śāntideva's premises through the lens of comparative philosophy. Like Śāntideva, Derek Parfit argues in his masterwork ''Reasons and Persons'' that if one accepts reductionism about personal identity, one ought to be less specially concerned about one's own future well-being, relative to that of others. In the first section below, I explain why the Buddhist rejection of an enduring self is close enough to Parfit's reductionism to allow us to look at their arguments together. After discussing these arguments, I summarize a powerful response to Parfit by Susan Wolf that claims normative implications do not follow from Parfit's reductionism. This objection, I argue, also applies to Śāntideva. Although her argument is probably effective against Parfit, in the final section I explain how Buddhist claims about impermanence and suffering provide a response to Wolf. In other words, the verses of BCA's eighth chapter that develop these Buddhist themes also do philosophical work that strengthens the force of Śāntideva's argument. (Harris, preliminary remarks, 219-220)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The view that the most appropriate way to approach a Buddhist text is where available through a commentary is one with which I am basically in sympathy. Unfortunately, however, where we can find more than one commentary to a Buddhist writing we will often also find widely differing interpretations of even the same verse, particularly as regards philosophical points where the fact of difference appears not always to be realised by the commentators themselves. That we ourselves are not always fully aware of different interpretations is due partly to the emphasis placed in the past on the primacy of Indian commentaries, where often only one commentary to a key text survives, and perhaps partly also to an insufficient philosophical sensitivity to nuances and differences contained in the words used and their implications. I have attempted to show elsewhere however, in looking at the uses of the terms ''prakṛtinirvāṇa/prakṛtinirvṛta'' in the ninth chapter of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', that not only are there some radically different commentarial interpretations of the relevant verses, but when we tum to Tibetan commentators we find that they bring into their understanding of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' language from the ''tathāgatagarba'' tradition of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' which is entirely missing in Indian commentaries and not implied by the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' itself. Thus the relevant verses of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' are read by Tibetan commentators with reference to their different understandings of the ''tathāgatagarba'' tradition, which latter is not mentioned and presumably not needed by Indian commentators. The source for this way of reading the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' was probably the 11th/12th century lama rNgog bLo ldan shes rab, who was closely associated with the transmission and popularisation of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' in Tibet (see Williams (1992)). It is clear that reading the Tibetan commentaries will not necessarily tell us as such what the verse means (at least as regards something like the author's intentions), for Tibetan commentators bring into play their own concerns, and link traditions and ideas which may not always have been linked in India. Tibetan commentators moreover — both ancient and modern — often deeply disagree among themselves, although they are more wary of admitting to disagreeing with their respected Indian commentarial predecessors.<br> Yet they do disagree, even if perhaps they do not always realise that they have disagreed, or boldly proclaim the fact. By way of illustration I want to look further here at the Indo-Tibetan commentarial tradition to the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'', this time at a half-verse which occurs during Śāntideva's treatment and critique of Cittamātra:
''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' 9:28cd (=Tib. 27cd)
::vastvāśrayaś cet saṃsāraḥ so'nyathākāśavad bhavet//
::gal te 'khor ba dngos rten can/<br>de ni gzhan du mkha' 'drar 'gyur//<br>(Williams, preliminary remarks, 965-66)
An Indian Classic in 19th-Century Tibet and Beyond: Rdza Dpal sprul and the Dissemination of the Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra +
This paper highlights a particular episode in the entangled transmission history of the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'' (BCA). This prominent Indian Buddhist work outlines the path of a ''bodhisattva'', the religious ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and is nowadays considered among the world classics of religious literature. While it occupied a special position within many traditional Buddhist contexts—and in Tibet in particular—, it is only in the nineteenth century that it gained importance in the Rnying ma tradition and hence permeated ''all'' of the Tibetan Buddhist schools. As will be shown, Rdza Dpal sprul (1808–1887),[1] a charismatic yogin and scholar, can be placed at the centre of this development. His focus on a practice-oriented approach and a wide dissemination of the BCA's content not only fostered increasing interest within his own surroundings, but also opened up avenues for approaching this text that have come to be relevant in modern settings.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Here and in the following, the dates of Tibetan personalities are based on the TBRC database, if not specified otherwise. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It has traditionally been accepted that Śāntideva wrote both the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' and the ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra''. As regards the relationship between these two works, the following three significant facts have so far been clarified by a number of contemporary studies:<br>
:(1) The ''Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra'' (BCA), Chapter V.105 refers to the ''Śikṣāsamuccaya'' (ŚS) and emphasizes the importance of its repeated reading since correct conduct is, it says, therein explained at length.
:(2) The BCA and the ŚS share almost the same introductory verses composed of three successive stanzas in which the author(s) make vows at the outset of writing.
:(3) Vibhūticandra (fl.ca.1200), Bu-ston (1290–1364), Tāranātha (1575–1608), and Sum-pa mkhan-po (1704–1776?) unanimously ascribe three works, the ŚS, the ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' (SūtraS) and the BCA, to Śāntideva.<br>
However, the recent discovery of an early recension of the ''Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra'' (BSA), which has so far been identified only in the Tibetan manuscripts from Dūn-huáng, has rather dramatically changed the situation.[1] Having discussed the above first and third points in several earlier articles,[2] I would like to confine myself here to dealing with the second point and the related interaction between the ŚS and the BSA/BCA, while referring also to the probable chronological order of the BSA,the ŚS, and the BCA. (Saito, preliminary remarks, 17)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a list of references on the early recension of BSA, see Saito [2000] pp.107–108.
#Saito [2001][2004]. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The ''Guide to Bodhisattva Practice'' (''Bodhicaryavatara'', hereafter, ''Guide'') of Śāntideva is, before all else, a practical guide for those who aspire to the life of a bodhisattva, an individual whose determining principle is the attainment of ''bodhi'', or spiritual awakening. Not just his or her personal awakening, but rather the awakening of all, for ''bodhi'', in the Mahāyāna Buddhism that Śāntideva espouses, is a universal principle. To become an individual determined by an orientation to awakening in this tradition, one must abandon the personal, self-centered viewpoint that is our habitual condition, in favor of a growing embrace of an all-encompassing vision.[1]<br> To accomplish this requires a severe ethical and spiritual discipline. Egoistical tendencies to possessiveness, impulsiveness, indolence, and the like must be overturned by a rigorous commitment to generosity, dignified behavior, forbearance, and effort, while the mind itself must be collected and calm. The goal, however, is not merely to become a well-mannered person adept in tranquility meditation, however praiseworthy that may be. For manners and meditative calm alone remain compatible with the narrow perspective of the self-regarding individual. Indeed, they may well become sources of personal pride, wherein lies an inevitable danger. For Buddhism, as for the other wisdom traditions of India, the sole
means to avert such pitfalls on the path to spiritual perfection is to be
found in the acquisition of wisdom, insight into the real nature of things.
But just how this is to be understood is by no means immediately evident. Within classical Indian thought, just what constitutes wisdom came to be
sharply contested, not only between differing schools but also within them. Debate and philosophical inquiry thus became indissociable from the pursuit of wisdom, and in the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's book his preeminently practical concerns seem sometimes to give way to wrangling over philosophical fine points. However, philosophy in this case is placed in the service of the cultivation of contemplative insight. Śāntideva's practical and theoretical concerns are found, in the end, to be one.[2]<br> The subject of the ninth chapter of the ''Guide'' is ''prajñā'', often translated "wisdom," "higher knowledge," or "discrimination." As such, it is the "Perfection of Wisdom" (''prajñāpāramitā''), the pinnacle of the six perfections of the bodhisattva's path and identified as the goal of insight (''vipaśyanā''),
the contemplative "seeing through" that, conjoined with tranquility
(''śamatha''), forms the heart of Buddhist meditation. ''Prajñā'', as Śāntideva expounds it, corresponds to the teaching of the Madhyamaka tradition of Buddhist philosophy, spearheaded by Nāgārjuna during the second century CE. Nāgārjuna is widely known for his emphasis on the universal "emptiness" (''śūnyatā'') of phenomena, but the meaning of this concept has been subject to much debate.[3] Just how Śāntideva understands it will be among the chief concerns throughout this chapter.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#I have examined Śāntideva's approach to the Mahāyāna path in relation to what French philosopher Pierre Hadot, in the context of Hellenistic philosophy, has termed "spiritual exercise," forging a passage between an inauthentic, troubled existence and authentic peace and freedom. See Kapstein, "Stoics and Bodhisattvas."
#On the relationship between the theoretical concerns of Buddhist philosophy and Buddhism's practical ends, see Kapstein, "Introduction," in ''Reason's Traces'' and Kapstein, '"Spiritual Exercise' and Buddhist Epistemologists in India and Tibet."
#A nuanced philosophical introduction, with reference to much of the earlier scholarship, can be found in Westerhoff, ''Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka''.
In ''The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of "The Way of the Bodhisattva"'', Wulstan Fletcher and Helena Blankleder give a detailed presentation of Mipham's understanding of Madhyamaka and his responses to criticisms from Gelukpa scholars. Mipham's approach to reconciling the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools of thought is analyzed in depth in the light of his interpretation of the two truths, his view on ultimate truth, and his efforts to revive a distinct Nyingma voice in the Tibetan hermeneutical debate on how central Indian Buddhist scriptures should be understood.
This examination of Mipham's writings and his responses to critics allows readers to understand the subtleties of the debates and the reasoning behind different positions. It explains the historical and cultural context of these philosophical discussions, including the role of sectarian affiliations and efforts to preserve and revive traditional interpretations, illustrating the diversity of Madhyamaka positions in Tibet. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The translation that follows is from Künzang Sönam's overview of the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's ''Way of the Bodhisattva'' on wisdom, entitled ''A Lamp Completely Illuminating the Profound Reality of Interdependence''. Künzang Sönam lived in Eastern Tibet in the nineteenth century, was a student of the famed Patrül Rinpoche, and wrote an extensive, three-part commentary on the ''Way of the Bodhisattva''. In his commentary, he illustrates the unique view of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka through the lens of Tsongkhapa's characterization of this view. Künzang Sönam's integration of Geluk-inspired Madhyamaka and his Nyingma lineage exemplifies the dynamic synergy that characterizes the "Gemang movement."<br> After laying out the two truths, the conventional and ultimate, according to the Madhyamaka tradition, Künzang Sönam argues that there is a radical difference between the respective Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika interpretations of Madhyamaka. He says that the main difference is that Svātantrikas accept something that exists on its own (''rang mtshan kyis grub pa''), while nothing exists this way, even conventionally, for Prāsaṅgikas. His characterization of the highest view of Madhyamaka, and how the three wheels of doctrine are interpreted, contrasts sharply with what we see in the Jonang tradition. The contrast between the excerpt translated here and what we see in Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa's text translated in Appendix A provides a sample of the wide spectrum of Buddhist interpretations in Tibet. (Duckworth, introduction, 187) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
It is a matter of gratification that a new edition of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' has been published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta.<br> Sixty years ago, in 1903, Asiatic Society published the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' with the ''Pañjikā'' of Prajñākaramati. Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin edited it. It has been out of print for a long time. The present edition is made by Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, a scholar as eminent as the former editor.<br> It is a complete edition of the text. It contains all the ''ślokas'' of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' in ten chapters.<br> The first edition was very rich and useful, because it contained the ''Pañjikā'' which is no less important than the text.<br> The present edition is devoid of the ''Pañjikā'' but rich with the addition of one hundred ninety-three ''ślokas'' which were not available in the first edition. The present edition contains also the Tibetan translation (in Tibetan script) of the text. It will be a valuable text book for students devoted to lndo-Tibetan Studies.<br> The late lamented Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya had barely completed his edition when death snatched him away from us. He had no time to revise it. His students well-versed in both Sanskrit and Tibetan were not near him; and so they could not help him in this difficult task. In such circumstances, as is natural, some mistakes have crept in.<br> It is a sacred duty for his past students to check and correct those mistakes. The present writer is one of his humble students who had the good fortune to be intimately associated with him for more than twenty years. In this paper an attempt is made to check mistakes and improve some of the readings of the additional ''ślokas'' with the help of the Tibetan translation. Printing mistakes are also checked and corrected. (Mukhopadhyaya, "Appendix," 287) +
This study examines how the ''Suvarna(pra)bhāsottamasūtra'' (''Discourse of Utmost Golden Radiance'') articulates its own potency—its intrinsic value and capacity to transform beings and the cosmos. Although this potency is the predominant theme of the text, it is never definitively named or located; it is only visible in its effects. The mysterious, indeterminate source of the sūtra's potency significantly contributes to its allure: what cannot be seen or located is infinite, and the infinite inspires awe and devotion.
The dissertation explores the complex relationships among the sūtra, the Buddha, and the ''dharmabhānaka'' (the orator), as well as the synesthetic representation of the oral/aural sūtra as a potent substance (especially as a rasa, a savory liquid that is also an aesthetic quality) that enters and transforms its audience and their world. The categories of analysis employed in this close reading are derived from the ''Suvarna(pra)bhāsottamasūtra'' itself: the relationships between the form and the content of the sūtra, and between the sūtra and its auditors and orators. The words of the sūtra are about the potency of the words of the sūtra; this involuted relationship between form and content is critical to the articulation of the sūtra's potency. The sūtra also asserts the critical dependence of its value and transformative capacity upon its being uttered by an eloquent orator and heard by a receptive audience—a scenario that is intricately mirrored in the narrative content and form of the sūtra. The role of these relationships in the articulation of the sūtra's potency informs the methodology of this study.
While the Sanskrit text is the primary focus of the study, Chinese, Tibetan, and Khotanese translations of the ''Suvarna(pra)bhāsottamasūtra'' are also considered. Translation, as an interpretive process, provides a crucial glimpse of the different ways in which potency has been interpreted and re-created in varied Buddhist communities, thereby both confirming and complicating the reading of the Sanskrit text presented in this study. ([https://dlbs.liberal.ntu.edu.tw/DLMBS/en/search/search_detail.jsp?seq=127536 Source Accessed Aug 5, 2026])
