View source for Articles/Issues of Controversy and Their Development

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The texts exchanged between Mi pham and Rab gsal discuss a wide range
of topics, from rather trivial issues such as mistakes in spelling or grammar, to the most essential matters like the nature of reality; from mistakes
that are considered as personal idiosyncrasies, to substantial differences
between established scholastic traditions.

The development of the debate is fundamentally determined by Rab
gsal's first criticism. In this text, the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'', Rab gsal raises the issues that
have to be addressed not only in Mi pham's direct answer, but that also continue to be discussed in Rab gsal's reply and Mi pham's further answer. As
already described in the earlier chapter, Rab gsal organises his accusations
into four topics, divided into two categories: "faults of great impudence"
(''spyi brtol che ba'i nyes pa''), comprising topics I and II, and "faults that are
raised after investigation" (''brtag zin bslang ba'i nyes pa''), containing topics III
and IV. Each of these topics is related to a specific passage of the BCA. In
his answer, the ''Rab lan'', Mi pham almost always follows the text of Rab gsal
precisely and hence also its structure. While the later works, Rab gsal's ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' and Mi pham's short reply, use a different meta-structure, the
issues discussed are very often grouped together according to the fourfold
thematic outline introduced in Rab gsal's first text.

Due to its overarching importance for all texts involved, this structure
is also adopted in the present overview. While the aim of this chapter is
to offer a comprehensive presentation of the content of the debate as it
evolved, it does not aspire to include all individual lines of argumentation.
Unlike the following chapter, it focuses solely on the main issues within a
certain topic. The selection of these issues is based on the respective context and the weight that is ascribed to them in the individual texts. While subplots of a more secondary nature are neglected, this presentation allows
us to monitor the main threads of the debate and the dynamic intellectual
sparring it involved. Thereby, the discussion of the selected topics is followed through its various steps – from Rab gsal's ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' to Mi pham's ''Yang lan''. As described in the earlier chapter, the presentation of the individual
topics and the relation between them is rather clear in the first step of the
debate, that is, Rab gsal's ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' and Mi pham's ''Rab lan''. In contrast, the
later works, i.e., Rab gsal's ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' and Mi pham's ''Yang lan'', often
merely hint at a position stated earlier, and it is thus sometimes extremely
difficult to know at precisely which passage a certain criticism is aiming.
In view of this situation, the presentation of the content shows a clear focus on the first step of the debate, and only includes discussions from the
second step when the relation between an earlier and later statement is clear.

The individual discussions are highly technical and often assume a
tremendous prior knowledge of the problems involved and their background in Tibetan scholasticism. Before discussing a certain topic, the
following presentation will therefore first establish the necessary background: the general context of a certain passage in the BCA, and its place
in Tibetan scholasticism, particularly within the Dge lugs tradition, which
then helps to contextualise the statements in Mi pham's ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' and
to understand why these were attacked by Rab gsal. A synopsis at the end
of each topic will then tie these various layers together.

<h3>Topic I: The Interpretation of BCA IX.1</h3>
The first of the four issues is concerned exclusively with problems that arise in the interpretation of BCA IX.1:<ref>The counting of the verses of the BCA follows Oldmeadow 1994.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The Sage taught this whole entourage (''parikara'') as having insight as its aim.
Therefore, one should generate insight with the wish for the cessation of suffering.<ref>For my translation of the root text I used the explanations in Prajñākaramati's commentary (BCAP), as well as its translation by Peter Oldmeadow (1994). The translation of the term ''parikara'' is in particular problematic. In his commentary (as edited by La Vallée Poussin), Prajñākaramati gives the following explanation regarding the literal meaning of ''parikara'': ''parikaram iti parivāraṃ paricchedaṃ saṃbhāram iti yāvat'' (BCAP 344.7–8); here and below, bold print marks elements of the original text in the commentary. Considering that this passage seems to point out the mere literal meaning of the term (and as we can see in the course of the BCAP such a mere gloss of a certain word is a very typical feature of Prajñākaramati's commentary) and comparing it with the Tibetan translation of this passage, I share Oldmeadow's doubt (1994: 4, n.4) that ''paricchedaṃ'' might better be changed to ''paricchadaṃ''. Thus, Prajñākaramati explains ''parikara'' (entourage) as retinue (''parivāra''), following (''paricchada''), and gathering or collection (''sambhāra''). BCAP 350.8 explains ''kāṅkṣā'' (wish) as desire (''abhilāṣa'') and wish or will (''chanda''); BCAP 350.6–7 glosses ''nivṛtti'' (cessation) as extinction (''nirvāṇa'') and pacification (''upaśama'').</ref>

''imaṃ parikaraṃ sarvaṃ prajñārtha hi munir jatau''/
''tasmād utpādayet prajñāṃ duḥkhanivṛttikāṅkṣayā''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 344.4–5.</ref>
''yan lag 'di dag thams cad ni''// ''thub pas shes rab don du gsungs''//
''de yi''<ref>yi D: yis P.</ref>''phyir na sdug bsngal dag''// ''zhi bar 'dod pas shes rab bskyed''//<ref>Cf. BCA (D, fol. 30b7–31a1; P, fol. 35a3–4); for the Tibetan text of the BCA, the Derge as well as the Peking edition were compared.</ref>
}}
With this verse, the famous ninth chapter of the BCA opens. It points
out the importance of insight (''prajñā'') – the perfection (''pāramitā'') that forms
the main subject of the chapter and gave it its name. Insight is explained
as a means for ending suffering – the overall goal of Buddhism – and
other preparatory means, i.e., "this whole entourage (''parikara'')," are also explained as "aiming at" insight. But what precisely is meant by "entourage"
and what is its relation to insight? This needs further annotation, which
it received in the Indian as well as in the Tibetan tradition. Scholars of
all Tibetan Buddhist schools regard Prajñākaramati's commentary as the
most eminent Indian work on the BCA, and it is for this reason that it is
used here to outline some principle issues concerning the interpretation
of this verse.<ref>Dietz (1999: 35ff.) gives an overview of the ten Indian commentaries that are contained in the Tibetan ''Bstan 'gyur'' and characterises the BCAP as the most important among them. In the course of the debate between Mi pham and Rab gsal, both scholars refer repeatedly to the Indian commentaries to support their respective interpretations. Thereby, the references to the BCAP outnumber by far the references to the other commentaries, showing evidently that both scholars accept Prajñākaramati as the primary Indian authority on the BCA.</ref> In his ''Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā'' (BCAP), two different ways of interpretation are laid out. The first relates ''parikara'' to all five perfections and establishes insight as the primary aspect (''pradhāna'') among the other perfections.<ref>Cf. BCAP 344.11–13.</ref> Here, all five perfections act as a cause (''kāraṇa'', ''hetu'') for gnosis (''jñāna'') or the awakening of a complete Buddha (''saṃbuddhabodhi'');<ref>Cf. BCAP 344.14–345.5</ref> but only if they are accompanied by insight do they "reach the state of [being] a cause of that (highest gnosis) and receive the title 'perfections'."<ref>BCAP 345.9–10: ''taddhetubhāvam adhigacchanti/ pāramitānāmadheyaṃ ca labhante/''.</ref>Even though insight is explained as the primary aspect and as the "eye" or leader (''netra'') of the other perfections, complete awakening cannot be accomplished without them.<ref>Cf. BCAP 345.17–346.4.</ref> "For this reason," so Prajñākaramati summarises, "the entourage of generosity (''dāna'') etc. is established as having insight as its aim."<ref>BCAP 346.4: ''tasmād dhānādiparikaraḥ prajñārtha iti siddhaṃ''//.</ref> A second interpretation explains ''parikara'' as denoting ''śamatha'' that was laid out in the preceding chapter. Here, ''śamatha'' is explained as the cause of generating insight (''prajñā'') and hence to have insight as its aim.<ref>For this second interpretation, see BCAP 348.4–349.5.</ref>

A look at Rgyal tshab's commentary on the BCA gives an impression of the standard interpretation of this passage in the Dge lugs school, that is, Rab gsal's scholastic background.<ref>Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) was a direct disciple and one of the two main followers of Tsong kha pa, the founder of the Dge lugs school. As such, his scholastic interpretations – including his commentary on the BCA – have shaped the view of future generations fundamentally. For his dates, see TBCR, http://www.tbrc.org/#library_person_Object-P65 [accessed March 03, 2011]. In his commentary ''Spyod 'jug rnam bshad rgyal sras 'jug ngogs'' (''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'') Rgyal tshab's explanations of the ninth chapter of the BCA are very closely related to his teacher Tsong kha pa's work on the very same chapter, called ''Spyod 'jug shes rab le'u'i tīkka blo gsal'' (''Blo gsal''). The colophon of the ''Blo gsal'' does not mention an author, but suggests that it contains Tsong kha pa's elaborations that were later written down by one of his disciples; cf. ''Blo gsal'' 36b5ff. This idea is shared by Seyfort Ruegg, who also mentions another work, the ''Shes rab le'u'i zin bris'', which also contains explanations of Tsong kha pa on the ninth chapter of the BCA that were written down by his disciple Rgyal tshab; see Seyfort Ruegg 2004: 337, n. 33. In the present investigation, Rgyal tshab's ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' and Tsong kha pa's ''Blo gsal'' are used as representatives for the standard tradition of textual exegesis of the ninth chapter of the BCA in the Dge lugs school. For a translation of Rgyal tshab's commentary, see Sweet 1977.</ref>

Like Prajñākaramati, Rgyal tshab points out two ways of explaining "entourage" (''parikara''). It can either refer exclusively to ''śamatha'' – which is explained in the chapter of concentration (''dhyāna'') – or to all the five perfections that are explained in the preceding chapters.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 206.12–14.</ref> Among these two possibilities, Rgyal tshab shows a clear preference: according to a certain interpretation, "the earlier (way of relating ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') is also possible, but it is good if it is explained here according to the latter (way of relating it to all five perfections)."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 206.14–15: ''snga ma yang rung mod kyang 'dir phyi ma ltar bshad na legs so''/. Note that this passage is a literal quote from Blo gsal 2b1–2.</ref> A major issue in Rgyal tshab's expla-
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nation is the question of whether the accumulation of merit (''bsod nams kyi tshogs'') is a prerequisite for developing insight. He emphasises that merit is not needed for the insight that corresponds to the realisation of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas; it is, however, needed to attain omniscience, the state of a Buddha.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 207.10–12: "For the extinction of the seed of obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib'') alone, one need not be adorned by limitless accumulations, but [such] is needed for the extinction of the seed of obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib'')" (''nyon sgrib kyi sa bon zad pa tsam la tshogs mtha’ yas pas brgyan pa mi dgos kyang''/ ''shes sgrib kyi sa bon zad pa la dgos''). Note that in the Dge lugs tradition, it is accepted that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have abandoned only obscuration of afflictions, whereas a Buddha has abandoned both, obscuration of afflictions and obscuration of knowables.</ref>

Both of these issues, the two ways of interpreting ''parikara'' and the question of the importance of the accumulation of merit, will reappear in the controversies on this verse. . . .

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<h4>Mi pham's Explanations of BCA IX.1 in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
In his commentary, Mi pham distinguishes, in general, two different ways
of explaining the relation between the other five perfections and insight.
One way is to explain it as cause and effect (''rgyu 'bras''), whereby each earlier perfection serves respectively as the cause of the later one.<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 2.5–6: ''<i>'</i>di la sbyin sogs snga ma snga ma rgyur byas nas shes rab skye bas na rgyu 'bras kyi tshul du bshad pa'ang yod mod''/.</ref> Applying this model to the root text would imply that the phrase "having insight as its aim" (''shes rab don du'') is to be understood in such a way that the causal string of each perfection, being the cause of the later one, leads eventually to the generation of insight, and in this sense "aims" at insight. Mi pham mentions this interpretation only in passing, and focuses on a second alternative, according to which the other perfections and insight are related as "support" (''grogs'') and "supported" (''grogs can''): the "aim" (''don'') of the perfections is still connected to insight, but rather than inducing the generation of insight, the perfections are a support (''grogs'') in accomplishing
the overall goal of the Buddhist path, omniscience. Among all perfections, insight occupies the leading role in this endeavour. Insight is the primary cause of ultimate gnosis (''mthar thug pa'i ye shes''), a goal that is not within the scope of the other perfections unless insight acts as their leader.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 3.1–2: ''phar phyin gzhan gyis de mi nus par ma zad phar phyin lnga po de dag shes rab kyis bzung nas gdod phar phyin gyi ming thob cing sangs rgyas su bgrod pa yin te''/.</ref> Mi pham likens this relationship to the example of a king and his troops: just as the troops follow their king to accomplish the goal of winning the battle, the other five perfections support insight in accomplishing buddhahood.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 2.6–3.2.</ref> As shown, Mi pham has decided on one of the two ways of interpreting ''parikara'' that were explained by Prajñākaramati and Rgyal tshab, a choice that he makes explicit in his further explanations:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 3.4–5: ''yan lag 'di dag ces pa le'u 'di'i gong du bshad ma thag pa'i bsam gtan la sbyar ba yod kyang phar phyin kun la sbyor dgos shing''/ [...].</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=There is also [the interpretation of] relating 'this whole entourage' to concentration (''bsam gtan'', ''dhyāna'') – explained immediately before this [present] chapter – but it must be related to all perfections [...].
}}
<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
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Rab gsal organises his criticism of this passage in five sections. The last one deals with the specific usage of the particle ''tsam'', meaning roughly "only/simply." Even though the polemics on this point are carried forward to the following texts, this matter is of limited importance for the interpretation of BCA IX.1 and therefore will not be dealt with in more detail in the current presentation. The other four sections are related to the following three issues in interpreting BCA IX.1.: (1) the relation between the other five perfections and insight, (2) the meaning of "''yan lag''" (''parikara''), and (3) the interpretation of "''don''" (''artha'').<ref>For an overview of Rab gsal's criticism, see the detailed summary of the ''<i>'Ju lan</i>'' in Chapter Five.</ref>

Rab gsal accuses Mi pham of denying the generation of insight through the other perfections, such as generosity<ref>Cf. Rab gsal's summary of Mi pham's position, ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 371.6–372.1: ''<i>'</i>dir sbyin sogs las de nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab skye ba la sbyar ba dang/ yan lag bsam gtan la byed pa mi rigs shing/ sbyin sogs kyis sangs rgya ba'ang mi 'thad zer ro''/.</ref> – an accusation that Rab gsal seems to derive from Mi pham's neglect of the position that views earlier perfection in relation to later perfection as cause and effect. According to Rab gsal, it is commonly accepted that insight is what is brought forth by generosity and the other perfections. To refute such a position would not only contradict the BCA itself and the Indian commentaries, but also certain passages of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''.<ref>The passage containing Rab gsal's position is ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 372.1–372.1 (JL I.1a, according to the outline of the summeries presented in the following chapter).</ref> Mi pham's explanation, emphasising the role of insight and explaining the other five perfections as "co-emerging support" (''lhan cig pa'i grogs'') of insight, would engender its own problems: since means (''thabs''), i.e., generosity etc., and insight are accepted as mutually supporting each other, Rab gsal argues, the role of insight would be turned upside down.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 374.1–3 (JL I.3).</ref> In contrast, Rab gsal points out that the perfections must be accomplished in a fixed order (''go rim nges pa'') in one line (''dkyus gcig''),<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.2.</ref> meaning one after the other – a process that culminates in the generation of insight and requires the development of the earlier perfections as a cause.

This more general question of the relation between the perfections also
affects the literal annotation of BCA IX.1, in particular the interpretation of
"''yan lag''" and "''don''." As mentioned before, Prajñākaramati and Rgyal tshab
set forth two traditions of interpreting yan lag. The former explains it as
referring to all perfections other than insight, the latter as referring only to
''śamatha'', the subject of the chapter of concentration (''dhyāna''), which directly
precedes insight. In his explanations, Mi pham dismissed the second interpretation, an action that is now the target of Rab gsal's objections: after all,
the second interpretation was mentioned by Prajñākaramati, the main Indian authority on the BCA.<ref>For Rab gsal's criticism, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.1–5 (JL I.1).</ref> According to this second interpretation, the "aim" (''don'') of ''śamatha'' is to generate insight, an understanding Rab gsal again backs up by quoting the BCAP.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.6.</ref> Here, ''śamatha'' is explained as the cause that brings forth, and thus "aims" at, insight. Both of these issues of literal annotation, viz. to relate ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'' and to relate "aim" to the generation of insight through ''śamatha'', are plausible when the relation between the perfections is seen as one of cause and effect. This is, of course, in contradiction to Mi pham's commentary. He interpreted ''yan lag'' as referring to all perfections as a support in accomplishing the highest goal of insight, awakening. Rab gsal accuses Mi pham of relating the "aim" (''don'') mentioned in the BCA to a (separate) aim gained through insight, while it should be understood as the very generation of insight that is brought about by ''śamatha''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 374.3–4 (JL I.4).</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
Mi pham defends his commentary by pointing out that the two ways of explaining the relationship between the perfections – insight and the other perfections as supported (''grogs can'') and support (''grogs''), or earlier and later perfections as cause and effect (''rgyu 'bras'') – do not conflict with each other; hence, there is no need to exclude either alternative.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 196.1–3 (RL I.1).</ref> A twofold interpretation is also the key to solving the apparent contradictions in understanding the meaning of "aim" (''don''). Both explanations are possible: one can either say that the other perfections aim at or support the achievement of awakening through insight, or the aim can be the generation of insight alone. The BCAP passage that Rab gsal quoted is taken from the specific context where the aim is related to the generation of insight (i.e., the alternative explanation that relates ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') and therefore does not refute the earlier interpretation, Mi pham counters.<ref>''Rab lan'' 196.5–197.2 (RL I.2).</ref> In this interpretation, he explains further, the "aim" is not the separate aim of insight as Rab gsal criticised, but it is the common aim of all perfections.<ref>''Rab lan'' 197.4–5 (RL I.3b)</ref>

Even though Mi pham refers to Prajñākaramati's alternative explanation (of relating ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') in order to point out the different possibilities of understanding the "aim" (''don'') of the "entourage" (''parikara''), he does not answer Rab gsal's accusation that ''parikara'' should be related to ''śamatha''.

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
In Rab gsal's answer to Mi pham's reply, the whole issue is brought quickly to an end. If Mi pham had admitted that ''parikara'' could be also understood as a cause (for the generation of insight) in the first place, runs Rab gsal's accusation of Mi pham, a debate would not have been necessary.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.4 (GC I.2c).</ref> Rab gsal's main concern here seems to be that Mi pham's explanations focussing on the importance of insight play down the role of the other perfections. He refers again to Prajñākaramati's commentary to point out that insight is based on the accumulation of merit, which includes the first three of the perfections.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.5. Here, Rab gsal seems to refer to BCAP 344.14–345.6, where Prajñākaramati describes how the individual perfections act as a cause of the attainment of unexcelled gnosis (''anuttarajñāna''). This passage also explains the division of the perfections among the two kinds of accumulations (''saṃbhāra''): the first three perfections, namely, generosity (''dāna''), discipline (''śīla''), and forbearance (''kṣānti''), are part of the accumulation of merit (''puṇyasaṃbhāra''), while the last two, viz. concentration (''dhyāna'') and insight (''prajñā''), belong to the accumulation of gnosis (''jñānasaṃbhāra''). The fourth perfection, perseverance (''vīrya''), is needed for both accumulations.</ref> With that, the discussion regarding the interpretation of BCA IX.1 come to an end and Mi pham does not mention this topic in his second reply to Rab gsal.<ref>The only issue connected to this chapter that appears in Mi pham's second reply is the polemic about the understanding of the particle ''tsam'' "only/simply." As indicated earlier, it is not of direct relevance for the interpretation of BCA IX.1 and therefore has not been treated in more detail.</ref>
-->

<h3>Synopsis</h3>
In his outline, Rab gsal classified this topic under the rubric "refuting faults of great impudence" (''spyi brtol che ba'i nyes pa dgag pa''). This suggests that
the errors that Rab gsal found in Mi pham's commentary on this passage of the BCA are not based on fundamental doctrinal differences between the traditions of the two, thus on established "errors," but that these are – in Rab gsal's eyes – merely personal idiosyncrasies, caused, for example, by a lack of thorough investigation or proper knowledge of the commentarial tradition. Rab gsal expressed this idea succinctly in his taunting verses at the end of the first (and major) point of criticism:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.4–5: ''phug tu 'tshengs pa'i ngan rtog cho 'phrul gyis''// ''<i>'</i>phags yul gzhung yang bod kyi zhar la spangs''// ''da ni gnyis med de ba datta yi''// ''bslab pa'i rgyar chud ston pa gnyis par 'jal''//. In this verse, Rab gsal compares Mi pham's way of interpretation to the behaviour of Devadatta, the Buddha's cousin, who intrigued against the Buddha for his personal gain.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Through the magical display of negative thought that is content within itself
The Indian texts as well are abandoned along with the Tibetan ones.
Then both are gone; trapped (''rgyar chud'') in the conduct
Of Devadatta, [you] should regard [him] as the second Teacher.
}}
With the clear intention of highlighting the role of insight in the accomplishment of buddhahood, Mi pham explained that all other perfections are a "support" (''grogs'') of insight. He contrasted this interpretation with another one that views earlier and later perfections as cause and effect (and therefore gives more importance to the other perfections that act as a cause of insight), but paid no further attention to it. Rab gsal seemed to have understood Mi pham's preference for the earlier and his disregard of the later model as an utter refutation of the interpretation that relates all perfections as cause and effect (''rgyu 'bras''), a view that would play down
the role of the other perfections and focus on the importance of insight alone. In his criticism, Rab gsal referred to various texts that lay out the legitimacy of explaining the perfections as cause and effect. The whole issue is effectively resolved by Mi pham's clarifying reply pointing out that both interpretations are valid.

Connected to these two different ways of understanding the relationship of the perfections are two different interpretations of the literal explanation of "entourage" (''parikara'') and "aim" (''artha''). Viewing the perfections as cause and effect, ''parikara'' can be explained as being related to ''śamatha'', the practice immediately preceding insight. Here, ''śamatha'' acts as a cause of insight and thus has insight as its "aim." Rab gsal pointed out this understanding to counter Mi pham's commentary that related ''parikara'' to all perfections, which support insight in its striving for awakening and thus have insight as their "aim." Again, Mi pham resolved the controversies with regard to the interpretation of "aim" (''artha'') by pointing out the possibility of two different, but not contradictory interpretations. The question of the interpretation of ''parikara'', on the other hand, was left open. Mi pham clearly refuted the possibility of relating ''parikara'' to concentration (''dhyāna'')
in his commentary, and did not reply to Rab gsal's criticism that pointed out the validity of such an interpretation as indicated in Prajñākaramati's BCAP.

All in all, the controversies that developed in relation to this topic appear not to be based on fundamental differences. Rather, Rab gsal's criticism seemed to have been instigated by the phrasing of Mi pham's commentary, a phrasing that sounded unfortunate to his opponent's ears, as it would belittle the importance of the other perfections attested in various scriptures.

<h3>Topic II: The Interpretation of BCA IX.78</h3>
The second topic deals most prominently with the interpretation of BCA
IX.78, in particular its third verse line, but touches also on problems that
appear in the explanations of the two preceding verses. The wider context
of this passage is the defence of the doctrine of selflessness, which was established earlier in BCA IX.58–70, against possible objections. BCA IX.76
deals with the doubt that the postulated non-existence of a self is incompatible with the Buddhist principle of compassion towards other beings.
After all, as BCA IX.76ab argues, "If a being does not exist, for whom is compassion [to be developed]?"<ref>BCAP 486.5: ''yadi sattvo na vidyeta kasyopari kṛpeti cet''/. The commentary explains ''kṛpā'' (compassion) as ''karuṇā'', the standard term in Buddhist doctrine that is usually translated as "compassion."</ref> The answer is given in BCA IX.76cd: a self is surely imagined by delusion (''moha''), but as such it is accepted for the sake of a certain result (''kārya''), namely the attainment of buddhahood, for which the development of compassion is necessary.<ref>Cf. BCAP 487.13 ff., for Prajñākaramati's explanations on this part of the verse, or, respectively, Oldmeadow 1994: 165f., for a translation of this part.</ref> This, quite naturally, leads to the next objection, presented in BCA IX.77a: "Whose result is it? There is no being."<ref>BCAP 489.7: ''kāryaṃ kasya na cet sattvaḥ''.</ref> As a self does not exist, there is no one who could attain a result and hence, the answer to the earlier objection is doubtful. In his answer in BCA IX.77bcd, Śāntideva agrees that this is true with regard to the absolute level (''paramārthataḥ''),<ref>BCAP 489.11.</ref> but argues further that the delusion of [the achievement of] a result (''kāryamoha'') – on the conventional level (''saṃvṛteḥ'')<ref>BCAP 489.19.</ref> – is accepted as a means towards the Buddhist goal. He concludes in BCA IX.77cd: "But for the sake of pacifying suffering the delusion of a result is not averted."<ref>BCAP 490.3: ''duḥkhavyupaśamārthaṃ tu kāryamoho na vāryate''//.</ref> Prajñākaramati's commentary then lists the doubts to which the next verse of the BCA is the answer. An opponent might question the use of the meditative cultivation of selflessness, arguing that one also has to accept the delusion of a self (''ātmamoha'') if one accepts the delusion of a result (''kāryamoha''), since the former is the cause of the latter and both are equally erroneous states of mind.<ref>BCAP 490.17–18: ''kāryamoho 'vidyāsvabhāvo 'pyupagamyate''/ ''tathaivātmamoho 'pi taddhetutvād astu''/.</ref> This then leads to the focus of this topic, BCA IX.78:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=But egoism,<ref>Here, egoism – as a translation of the technical term ''ahaṃkāra'' (Tib. ''nga rgyal'') – is not applied in its everyday usage of the term, as an excessive preoccupation with oneself, but as denoting the basic notion of the existence of oneself as a coherent personality and one's identification with it.</ref> which is the cause of suffering, is increased due to the delusion of a self.
Objection: Because of that, however, it cannot be averted. [Response:] The best is the meditative cultivation of selflessness.<ref>As before, the translation of individual terms is based upon Prajñākaramati's commentary. The BCAP (491.5–6) explains ''ātmamoha'' (delusion of [believing in] a self) as an "erroneous view of [seeing] a self in what is not a self" (''anātmany ātmaviparyāsadarśana''). Further, ''bhāvanā'' (meditative cultivation) is glossed with ''abyāsa'', denoting a repeated practice, which is said to be ''varam'' (best), or paramount (''uttamam''); cf. BCAP 492.12. For a translation of the relevant part of the BCAP, see Oldmeadow 1994: 169–173.</ref>

''duḥkhahetur ahaṃkāra ātmamohāt tu vardhate''/
''tato 'pi na nivartyaś cet varaṃ nairātmyabhāvanā''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 491.3–492.11.</ref>
''sdug bsngal rgyu yi nga rgyal ni''// ''bdag tu''<ref>''tu'' D : ''du'' P.</ref> ''rmongs pas 'phel bar 'gyur''//
''de las kyang bzlog med ce na''// ''bdag med bsgom pa mchog yin no''//<ref>Cf. BCA (D, fol. 33b6–7; P, fol. 38b2–3)</ref>
}}
In the first two verse lines, Śāntideva counters the earlier objection by
pointing out that delusion of a self (''ātmamoha'') leads to egoism (''ahaṃkāra''),
which is a cause of suffering. While the root text does not specify any details of the relation between the "delusion of a self" and "egoism," Mi pham and Rab gsal had very different ideas in this regard, as will be shown below. These two verse lines are followed by the next, in this case extremely condensed, objection "Because of that, however, it cannot be averted." The terseness of this line provides ample opportunity for interpretation; hence, it is not surprising that it became the major issue in the disagreement between Mi pham and Rab gsal on this topic. According to Prajñākaramati, the subject is egoism (''ahaṃkāra''), which cannot be averted for a certain reason, namely, "that," i.e., "seeing a self" (''ātmadarśana'').<ref>48</ref> In Sanskrit, the reason is indicated by the ablative case ending, which is translated in Tibetan
with the particle las. The use of this particle includes a range of various functions, of which the indication of a reason is a rather special case, but is commonly found in this usage in texts translated from Sanskrit. As will be shown later, this ambiguity of the grammatical function enabled Mipham to interpret this verse line in a very distinct way and therefore led to friction among the Tibetan interpreters. The opponent's objection is then followed by Śāntideva's answer in BCA IX.78d, which presents meditative cultivation of selflessness (''nairātmyabhāvanā'') as the "cause of the cessation of egoism" (''ahaṃkāranivṛttihetu'').<ref>Cf. BCAP 492.13.</ref>

In the Dge lugs tradition, as shown in Rgyal tshab’s commentary, the issues of BCA IX.78 are connected to an earlier verse of this chapter, namely
BCA IX.26.<ref>At this stage, both Rgyal tshab (''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 248.17–8) and Tsong kha pa (''Blo gsal'' 24a2) refer back to BCA IX.26. The relevant quote was apparently overlooked in Sweet's translation, cf. Sweet 1977: 236.</ref> There, the conceptualisation (''kalpanā'') [of things] as truly established (''satyataḥ'') was described as the cause of suffering.<ref>Cf. BCA IX.26cd: ''satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkhahetur nivāryate''// (BCAP 405.10).</ref> According to Rgyal tshab, it is in this way that the objection raised in BCA IX.78c must be understood. Rebuffing the earlier statement that suffering is stimulated through the delusion of a self, an opponent counters:<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 248.20–249.3: ''kho na re de 'dra ba'i rmongs pa ldog pa de las kyang bden 'dzin ldog pa med pa ste''/ ''ldog mi nus la lan cig ldog kyang 'khor ba'i phung po ltar slar yang 'byung bas gtan zad du 'gyur ba med do zhe na''/. Note again that Rgyal tshab's commentary is very close to the way Tsong kha pa explains this passage; cf. ''Blo gsal'' 24a3.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Through that, i.e., the averting of such a delusion (of a self), however, grasping as truly [established] (''bden 'dzin'') cannot be averted; one is not able to avert it, and even if one averts it once, it appears again, like the ''skandhas'' of samsaric existence, and therefore does not become utterly exhausted.
}}
While Rgyal tshab shares Prajñākaramati's basic grammatical construction of the verse line, in the sense that for both scholars, the ablative case ending – or the particle las in Tibetan – indicates a reason, he has a different understanding of the content of this reason. According to Rgyal tshab the pronoun "that" in BCA IX.78c must be read as "the averting of the delusion of a self." In this interpretation, the opponent in the BCA concedes that it is possible to avert the delusion of a self, but counters that such does not suffice for averting "grasping as truly [established]" (''bden 'dzin''), which is seen as the cause for suffering. Unlike Prajñākaramati, for whom "that" refers to "seeing a self" (''ātmadarśana'') as the active cause that prevents averting egoism (''ahaṃkāra''), Rgyal tshab explains the pronoun as an antidote to the
delusion of a self, which, however, does not constitute a sufficient cause for averting another kind of grasping, namely grasping phenomena as truly established. . . .
<!--
<h4>Mi pham's explanations of BCA IX.78 in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
In his commentary, Mi pham explains BCA IX.78ab as follows:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 60.6–61.1: ''<i>'</i>khor ba'i sdug bsngal thams cad kyi rgyur gyur pa'i bdag tu 'dzin pa'am''/ ''nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal ni bdag yod du bzung ba'i rmongs pas 'phel bar byed de''/ [...] ''rmongs pa de med na bdag tu mi 'dzin la''/ ''bdag 'dzin de med na 'khor bar 'khor zhing skye bar mi 'gyur te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Self-grasping or egoism that thinks "I am," which is the cause of all suffering of ''saṃsāra'', is increased, due to the delusion of holding a self to exist. [...] If this delusion does not exist, one does not grasp at a self, and if that self-grasping does not exist, one will not circle and be born in ''saṃsāra''.
}}
Here, Mi pham clearly points to a causal relationship between the "delusion of a self" and "egoism," whereby the former acts as a cause of the latter. Mi pham does not expound further on his exact understanding of "delusion of a self" and "egoism," but, in view of his earlier and later explanations, it is clear that both refer to the concept of a self as inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'').

Above, two different ways of unwrapping the terse objection of BCA
IX.78c were explained, one by Prajñākaramati and another by Rgyal tshab.
Mi pham presents yet another way of reading this verse line:<ref>54</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Just like you are not able to turn the mind away from an imagined self (''btags pa'i bdag''), you also cannot turn the mind, the subject, away from that, i.e., an inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') self, as [this self] is since time without beginning connected to the innate disposition.<ref>Here, I differ from my earlier translation of the verb zlog pa as "to avert." For Mi pham the relationship between the subject of the verb, i.e., the mind (''blo''), and its respective object, i.e., an imagined self (''btags pa'i bdag'') or an inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') self is important: the mind cannot avert this object, or, to be more close to the Tibetan construction, the mind cannot turn away from (''las'') this object.</ref>
}}
Mi pham does not understand the particle ''las'' as an indicator for a reason as did both Prajñākaramati and Rgyal tshab. In combination with the verb ''zlog pa'' – "to avert, to turn away from," etc. – he interprets it as a preposition that expresses the relationship between a subject and its corresponding object. The phrase "''de las''" thus indicates the object – i.e., "that" (''de'') – ''from'' (''las'') which the subject, i.e., one's mind, cannot turn away.

In his interpretation, the opponent's objection carries the doubt that the conception of an imagined self (''btags pa'i bdag''), that is, the conscious acceptance of the notion of a self, which was implied earlier in BCA IX.76 and 77 as necessary to develop compassion and strive for the result of the Buddhist path, viz. awakening – and the conception of an inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') self, i.e., the innate belief in a self as a coherent and enduring entity, are similar cases: just as one cannot avert one, one can also not avert the other.

Countering this objection, Mi pham explains in the following how these cases are different. In the domain of how things appear to ordinary beings, there is no reasoning that would allow to refute appearances that are based on a "mere imagination" (''btags pa tsam''); "grasping as inherently established" (''rang bzhin gyis grub par 'dzin pa''), on the other hand, can be abandoned by "meditative cultivation of selflessness" or, as Mi pham paraphrases this expression from the root text, "a mind that realises the mode of existence of things" (''dngos po'i gnas tshul rtogs pa'i blo'').<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.2–3: ''de gnyis mi mtshungs te btags pa tsam rten nas 'byung ba'i dbang gis snang ba la so skye'i ngor mi snang bar sgrub byed kyi rigs pa med la bzlog kyang mi dgos mod''/ ''rang bzhin gyis grub par 'dzin pa ni dngos po'i gnas tshul rtogs pa'i blo bdag med bsgoms pas spong nus te''/.</ref> It is therefore that this method is suggested in Śāntideva's response in BCA IX.78d.

At the end of his commentary on BCA IX.78, Mi pham returns to the issue of interpreting the controversial line of BCA IX.78c:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.5–6: ''de las kyang bzlog ces pa 'dir''/ ''de las'' [C ''las'' om.] ''zhes pa bdag 'dzin zlog byed kyi gnyen po dang''/ ''bdag 'dzin gyi rgyu sogs su rloms nas 'grel tshul ches mang ba zhig byung yang 'brel 'grigs pa dka' la''| ''<i>'</i>dir 'phags yul gyi gzhung bzang bzhin du yul de dag las kyang zhes sbyar bar byas'' [C ''bar byas'' om.] ''na don du 'thad do snyam pa kho bo gcig pu'i rnam rtog go''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Here, in relation to the words "''de las kyang bzlog''," a great many ways of explanation appeared, presuming that the expression "''de las''" [would refer] to the antidote that averts self-grasping or the cause of self-grasping etc., but [then], a suitable connection [in the text] is difficult. If, however, it is here (in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'') interpreted (''sbyar ba'') as "''yul de dag las kyang''," similar to the excellent scriptures of the Noble Land, the meaning is logical. This thought (''snyam pa'') is my idea (''rnam rtog'') alone.
}}
This very last sentence already indicates that Mi pham's interpretation of this verse line is somewhat unusual. He explicitly rejects two other ways of understanding the phrase "''de las kyang bzlog''."<ref>In the present context, I use the Tibetan expression untranslated in order not to exclude any of the different interpretations by Prajñākaramati, Rgyal tshab, and Mi pham explained above.</ref> One reading mentioned by Mi pham as false, is to relate "''de las''" to the "cause of self-grasping"
(''bdag 'dzin gyi rgyu''). As shown above, Prajñākaramati paraphrased the pronoun de (Skt. ''tad'') with "seeing a self" (''ātmadarśana''), which – as indicated by the ablative case in Sanskrit – is seen as the reason or cause of egoism (''ahaṃkāra''). It seems that Mi pham in his commentary – of course, without mentioning it, and probably also without being fully aware of it – rejects exactly the interpretation that Prajñākaramati suggested.<ref>Mi pham describes the two other ways of interpretation with the Tibetan word ''rlom pa'', which has a clear pejorative meaning, indicating that the other commentaries are not seen as a mere alternative, but as a wrong way of reading. Given that Prajñākaramati is unanimously accepted as the Indian authority on the BCA and in this function also referred to in Mi pham's explanations, it seems unlikely that Mi pham would directly attack Prajñākaramati. However, the position that Mi pham attacks seems to be exactly that of Prajñākaramati, even though Mi pham does not specify its proponent by name.</ref>

The second reading that Mi pham refutes is to relate "''de las''" to the "antidote that averts self-grasping" (''bdag 'dzin zlog byed kyi gnyen po''). In Rgyal tshab's explanations, the pronoun "that" was elaborated as denoting "the averting of the delusion of a self." This antidote to self-grasping was, however, described to be insufficient for averting grasping [phenomena] as truly established (''bden 'dzin''). Again, Mi pham does not mention a specific proponent of the position he refutes, but it obviously corresponds to the position taken by Rgyal tshab.

Mi pham ends this passage of his commentary by pointing out that the way of explanation he suggested is "my idea alone," but that it is, nevertheless, in accordance with the Indian scriptures.

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
Clearly, Rab gsal is provoked by Mi pham's critical remarks on other ways of interpreting BCA IX.78c. In his refutation of Mi pham's commentary, Rab gsal quotes exactly this part of Mi pham's explanations as the position of his opponent that is the object of his attack.<ref>The passage that Rab gsal quotes corresponds to ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.1–6.</ref> While there is a clear focus on the interpretation of this particular verse line of the BCA, Rab gsal expands his criticism also to its surrounding commentary. Not only does Rab gsal refute aspects of Mi pham's commentary on the other verse lines of BCA IX.78, but also on its two preceding verses and more general
problems that occur in the interpretation of this passage. As shown in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'',<ref>Cf. Chapter Five.</ref> Rab gsal's analysis of this topic can be grouped into nine sections, each of which contains one or more lines of criticism. For the sake of clarity, I will limit myself to the controversies that are directly relevant to the interpretation of BCA IX.78c, which can be seen as the core of this topic.<ref>Of the topics mentioned in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' in Chapter Five, the present discussion includes only JL II.1a, II.2b, II.4, and II.9b. Accordingly, the further development of these controversies in the subsequent texts, i.e., ''Rab lan'', ''Ga bur chu rgyun'', and ''Yang lan'', is also confined to these chosen issues.</ref>

Rab gsal starts his refutation with a discussion of Mi pham's specific understanding of the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c. As shown above, Mi pham read the particle ''las'' in combination with the verb "to avert, to turn away" (''zlog pa'') as an indicator of a disjunction between the subject and an object. Such an interpretation, argues Rab gsal, is wrong for various reasons. One reason is that of context and consistency. Only one verse earlier, in BCA IX.77d, the same verb, "to avert, to turn away" (''zlog pa''), appears. In Mi pham's commentary to this verse, the verb ''zlog pa'' was not understood as an action where one's mind turns away from a separate object. Since the two passages are so closely related, both must be read in the same way – to construe one passage in one way and the next in another way is illogical, a "bad proclamation" (''ngan skad''), thus Rab gsal rebukes Mi pham.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 376.2–3.</ref> Another argument is that Mi pham's interpretation is not supported by the Indian scriptures.<ref>For this argument, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 376.3–6</ref> Rab gsal quotes passages from the commentaries of Prajñākaramati and Kalyānadeva to show that neither of them understands the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c as a disjunction of the subject from an object. Mi pham's idiosyncratic interpretation of this passage is therefore – as Rab gsal calls it – a "raising of denials that burden the scriptures of the great paṇḍitas of the Noble Land with the defilements of one's own faulty explanations."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 376.5: ''rang gis nyes bshad kyi dri ma 'phags yul paṇ chen gyi gzhung la 'gel ba'i bsnyon gdeng ba''.</ref>

Apart from the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c, Mi pham's way of literal paraphrasing, of adding content to the terse formulation of this verse line, is another object of Rab gsal's criticism. In Mi pham's way of reading BCA IX.78c, this verse line carries the objection that the conception of an imagined self (''btags pa'i bdag'') and an inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') self are similar cases: just as one cannot turn the mind away from the earlier, one also cannot turn the mind away from the latter. The answer to this objection then points out that these are indeed different cases. Since there is no reasoning that would refute appearances that are based on a "mere imagination"(''btags pa tsam'') with regard to the perception of ordinary beings, they cannot be negated; appearances as inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') phenomena, on the other hand, can be negated. For Rab gsal, the assumed dissimilarity of these two kinds of appearances is based on the question whether the respective appearances can be negated within in the domain of ordinary beings’ perception or not. Rab gsal therefore counters that there is also no reasoning that would prove that appearances as inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') phenomena are not perceived by ordinary beings, and hence, Mi pham's
claim of the dissimilarity of the two cases is impaired.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 378.2 (JL II.2b). Rab gsal's position is supported by Tsong kha pa's comments in his ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'', which emphasise that the perception of all ordinary beings is tainted by grasping phenomena as truly established; see Tauscher 1995: 208.</ref>

While Rab gsal refuted the grammatical construction, as well as the
understanding of the general content of Mi pham's interpretation of BCA
IX.78c, he did not set forth his own reading of this verse line. This is, however, presented in another discussion, Rab gsal's critique of Mi pham's commentary on BCA IX.78ab. Here, Rab gsal attacks – among other things – the causal relationship between the "delusion of a self" (''bdag tu rmongs pa'') and "egoism" (''nga rgyal'') that Mi pham suggested. He argues that both delusion and egoism – as understood by Mi pham – refer to self-grasping, and so it would not necessarily be the case that the former is the cause of the latter, but that this relationship could be also reversed.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 379.2–3: ''bdag yod du bzung ba'i rmongs pa de bdag 'dzin yin nam ma yin pa dang''/''bdag gnyis kyi khyad par dpyad de phyi ma snga ma'i rgyur yang zlog go''/.</ref> In contrast, Rab gsal then presents his own interpretation of this part of the BCA. It seems that, according to his understanding, "delusion" (''rmongs pa'') refers to the self-grasping with regard to phenomena, while "egoism" (''nga rgyal'') refers to the self-grasping with regard to persons. Reading BCA IX.78ab in this way, the causal relationship between the earlier, i.e., delusion, and the later, i.e., egoism, can be accepted. As Rab gsal explains, the objection raised in BCA IX.78c must be read accordingly:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 379.5–6: ''kho na re''/ ''gang zag gi bdag 'dzin bzlog pa de las''/ ''yang chos kyi bdag tu 'dzin pa bzlog pa med do zhe na''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Through that, i.e., the averting of self-grasping with regard to a person, however, self-grasping with regard to phenomena cannot be averted.
}}
Rab gsal shares Rgyal tshab's understanding of the grammatical construction, according to which the earlier averting of self-grasping is not a sufficient cause for averting the later kind of grasping. Their literal rephrasing of the verse line, however, differs. Rgyal tshab formulated the opponent's objection as a tension between "the delusion of a self" and "grasping as inherently established," for Rab gsal, it is the averting of "self-grasping with regard to a person," which does not suffice for averting "self-grasping with regard to phenomena." While it is quite likely that Rab gsal is aiming at a similar interpretation as Rgyal tshab, he does not say so explicitly, and will be criticised for this deviation from the authoritative reading of his scholastic forebear by Mi pham.

In accordance with his reading of BCA IX.78c, Rab gsal's interpretation of Śāntideva's response in BCA IX.78d is also related to the grasping of phenomena:<ref>69</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The best is the meditative cultivation of the perfection of insight that realises the selflessness of phenomena.

}}
Referring to several scriptural sources, Rab gsal emphasises that self-grasping with regard to phenomena creates the basis for self-grasping with
regard to persons.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 378.5–381.1 (JL II.4).</ref>

At the very end of his discussion of this topic, Rab gsal comes back to
the point of departure of this controversy, Mi pham's critical statements on
the explanation of BCA IX.78c. Rab gsal points out that Mi pham's remarks
show an obvious contradiction: on the one hand, Mi pham said that his
specific interpretation of this verse line is "my idea alone," on the other
hand, it should be "in accordance with the Indian scriptures."<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.6: ''<i>'</i>dir 'phags yul gyi gzhung bzang bzhin du yul de dag las kyang zhes sbyar bar byas'' [C ''bar byas'' om.] ''na don du 'thad do snyam pa kho bo gcig pu'i rnam rtog go''/.</ref> Naturally, so Rab gsal argues, it can only be the one or the other:<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 383.5–6: ''<i>'</i>thad 'dzin gyi blo de khyed gcig pu'i yin na''/ ''<i>'</i>phags yul gyi 'grel byed dag gi thugs la med par 'gyur la''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=If this thought that holds [such an interpretation as] correct is yours alone, then it would not exist in the mind of the commentators of the Noble Land.
}}
<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
Describing his specific understanding of the grammatical construction of
BCA IX.78c as "my idea alone," Mi pham seemed to be fully aware that his
interpretation is somewhat unusual. In his answer to Rab gsal's criticism,
he does not make any attempt to reconcile his peculiar reading with that of
the Indian commentators quoted by Rab gsal. Instead, Mi pham choses to
disagree, but points out that his diverging interpretation as such does not
constitute a fault, as long as there is no conflict with regard to the overall
meaning:<ref>''Rab lan'' 198.3–4: ''gzhung so sos 'chad tshul mi 'dra ba byas kyang don la 'gal ba med na snga ma kho na bskyar zlos ma byas pa tsam zhig gis skyon ci la 'go''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Individual texts use different ways of explanation, but why should one be tainted by a fault simply because one did not repeat solely the earlier [way of explanation] as long as there is no contradiction with regard to the meaning?
}}
Mi pham treats this whole issue rather briefly. He does not further
explain the reason for his specific interpretation, nor does he respond to
Rab gsal's accusation that his grammatical understanding in this verse line
should be identical to the similar case two verse lines earlier.

Regarding the content-related issues of BCA IX.78c, Mi pham points
out that Rab gsal's refutation is based on a misunderstanding. He agrees
with Rab gsal's objection that there is no reasoning that could refute that
phenomena appear as inherently established (''rang bzhin gyis grub pa'') to
ordinary beings, but, he continues, "there is a proof [showing] that [phenomena that appear as inherently established] are not established in the
way they appear [...]."<ref>''Rab lan'' 199.5: ''snang ba ltar ma grub pa'i sgrub byed yod pas'' [...]</ref> As Mi pham explains, his claim of the dissimilarity of the two kinds of appearances was not based on the mere fact that they appear or do not appear in the perception of ordinary beings, as Rab gsal assumed, but on whether their manner of appearance is in accordance with their mode of existence. With this clarification by Mi pham, Rab gsal's objection is deprived of its basis and this specific controversy is effectively resolved.

One of the most detailed answers in this discussion is devoted to Rab gsal's criticism of Mi pham's interpretation of BCA IX.78ab and the presentation of his own reading of the whole verse that Rab gsal added. Rab gsal's argument was that, in Mi pham's understanding, both "delusion of a self" (''bdag tu rmongs pa'') and "egoism" (''nga rgyal''), that were mentioned in BCA IX.78ab, refer to the same thing, namely self-grasping. Since both are the same, a causal relationship between them cannot be established, Rab gsal pointed out. In his response, Mi pham first confirms that he indeed intended the relationship between delusion and egoism to be one of cause and effect. He seems to accept Rab gsal's reasoning that a causal relationship cannot be established between identical things, but points out that such is not the case with regard to the objects of the present discussion, i.e., delusion of a self, which was also referred to as "self-grasping" in Mi pham's explanations, and, on the other hand, egoism:<ref>''Rab lan'' 201.6–202.2: ''gong ltar bshad tshul de ni de byung gi 'brel yin kyang khyod kyis brjod pa'i skyon de ga la yod de''/ [...] ''bdag 'dzin ni lta ba'i cha dang''/ ''nga rgyal ni nga rgyal bdun gyi nang tshan du bshad pa ltar byas na mi 'thad pa gang yang med do''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Even though the way of explanation as [given] above refers to a causal relation, where is the fault that you mentioned? [...] If one follows [the system of explanation] according to which self-grasping is explained as a part of the view and egoism as a division of the seven [types of] egoism,<ref>These seven types are: egoism (''nga rgyal''), egoism of superiority (''lhag pa'i nga rgyal''), egoism exceeding egoism (''nga rgyal las kyang nga rgyal''), egoism of thinking "I exist" (''nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal''), manifest egoism (''mngon pa'i nga rgyal''), egoism that assumes [only] slight [inferiority] (''cung zad snyam pa'i nga rgyal''), erroneous egoism (''log pa'i nga rgyal''), see ''Dung dkar tshig mdzod'': ''nga rgyal bdun''.</ref> then there is not anything that is improper.
}}
In the following, Mi pham introduces a couple of other valid ways of
interpreting this passage.<ref>For these alternative interpretations, see ''Rab lan'' 202.3–203.4.</ref> His point in doing so seems to be to advocate
a general openness towards different ways of understanding, rather than
a restriction to one exclusive reading. Nevertheless, he continues with a
criticism of Rab gsal's interpretation that reads this passage as an issue
between self-grasping with regard to phenomena (''chos kyi bdag 'dzin'') and
self-grasping with regard to persons (''gang zag gi bdag 'dzin'').<ref>For Mi pham's criticism of Rab gsal's position, see ''Rab lan'' 203.4–204.6</ref> In the Dge
lugs scholastic system, grasping phenomena as such (''chos tsam'') is regarded
as valid cognition (''tshad ma''); only grasping as truly established (''bden grub'')
is what is to be abandoned. Mi pham therefore argues that Rab gsal has to
add the specification "truly established" (''bden grub'') to his reading of this
passage.<ref>At the end of his criticism, Mi pham comes back to this issue and confronts Rab gsal
again with the premisses of his own philosophical system: "You should investigate: is it not
[your] belief that there is nothing unsuitable if [appearances] are grasped on the conventional level as mere skandhas or carriage or 'I,' if [they] are not grasped as truly established (''bden grub'')?" (''Rab lan'' 204.5–6: ''bden par ma bzung na tha snyad du phung po dang shing rta dang nga tsam bzung na mi rung ba med ces 'dod pa min nam dpyod cig''/).</ref> As seen earlier, Rab gsal's Dge lugs forebears Tsong kha pa and
Rgyal tshab clearly related this passage of the BCA to the conceptualisation
of things as truly established. Under the pressure of his own scholastic
tradition, it is hardly surprising that in his later answer, Rab gsal has not
anything to add to this accusation.

Further, Mi pham criticises the causal relationship between self-grasping with regard to phenomena (''chos kyi bdag ’dzin'') and self-grasping with regard to persons (''gang zag gi bdag 'dzin'') asserted by Rab gsal. He argues that such a causal relationship would imply a temporal sequence, where first the skandhas, i.e., the phenomena that form the basis for the imagination (''gdags gzhi'') of a person, are grasped, following which a person is grasped. This would lead to the unwanted consequence that a situation is imaginable where one only grasps the ''skandhas'', but not a person.<ref>In his earlier criticism of Mi pham's explanations (''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 382.6f.), Rab gsal emphasised that self-grasping is an error that deviates from the mode of existence since time without beginning. This is in contradiction to the consequence of the present statements that a situation becomes possible where one does not have self-grasping with regard to persons since time without beginning, so Mi pham argues; cf. ''Rab lan'' 204.1–2: ''thog med nas gang zag gi bdag tu 'dzin pa can ma yin pa'i skabs kyang yod pa sogs rang gis gzhan la gang 'phel ba dang gang gis 'phel ba mi 'thad pa sogs skyon brjod pa yang dran par byos shig''/.</ref> At the end of this passage, Mi pham puts his criticism into perspective:<ref>''Rab lan'' 204.4–5: ''des na phung por 'dzin pa med na gang zag gi bdag 'dzin mi 'byung ba'i med na mi 'byung gi 'brel ba brjod pa la skyon brjod pa ma yin kyang''/ ''gzhan la de byung gi 'brel ba'i thad nas khyed rang gis brgal ba la nyams mtshar du lan bstan pa rigs pa'i rnam 'gyur du byas so''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Thus, I did not say that there is a fault in stating a relation of "[one] does not arise if [the other] is not present" in the sense that self-grasping in regard to persons does not arise if grasping the ''skandhas'' is not present. Instead, I gave an answer in the form of teasing remarks (''nyams mtshar'') with regard to your own refutation of others from the perspective of causal relation; this was done to show [what is possible when using] a logical approach.
}}
As indicated earlier, Mi pham seems to accept different interpretations of BCA IX.78ab, but demonstrates that he, too, can criticise Rab gsal's reading, just as Rab gsal objected to his commentary.

The last of Rab gsal's complaints, the apparent inconsistency between
Mi pham's description of his explanations as "my idea alone" and his claim
that they would be in accordance with the Indian scriptures, is resolved
quickly. Mi pham clarifies that by calling his interpretation that of "me alone" he did not mean to exclude the earlier Indian masters, but simply
wanted to point out that he is the only one with such an interpretation
in this current time and place.<ref>82</ref> Such a position can certainly be accepted
by Rab gsal, and hence the discussion ends with this reformulation of Mi pham's original intention.

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
Of the four topics that were regarded as central for the presentation of this topic, only two are further discussed at this stage of the controversies: Mi pham's specific understanding of the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c and Rab gsal's alternative interpretation of the whole verse. In both cases, Rab gsal finds contradictions in Mi pham's explanations.

Concerning the first, Rab gsal argues that there is an irreconcilable gap between Mi pham's interpretation in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', a commentary explicitly criticising other explanations, and his later explanations in the ''Rab lan'' – Mi pham's answer that Rab gsal addresses consistently with the short title ''Zab snang'' – which claimed that there is no contradiction to the meaning of the Indian commentaries:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 435.6–436.1: ''sher ṭika tu de las kyang'' [A ''kyang'' om.] ''bzlog ces pa bdag 'dzin bzlog par sbyar ba mi rigs zhes bshad kyang''/ ''zab snang 'dir dge ba lha dang sher 'byung gi dgongs par song bas rung zhes dngos 'gal du bud''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the ''Sher ṭika'' [you] had explained that it is not correct to interpret the phrase "de las kyang bzlog" as the "averting of self-grasping" (''bdag 'dzin bzlog pa''), but here in the ''Zab snang'' [you] said that [this interpretation] is possible since it arrived at the intention of Kalyānadeva and Prajñakaramati. Thus, [your statements] are exposed as a direct contradiction.
}}
Mi pham does not attempt to refute these accusations in his second
answer. The most central issue of this topic ends with Rab gsal's exposition
of the disapproving nature of Mi pham's commentary. There, he clearly
had criticised alternative interpretations of BCA IX.78c, a fact that can not
be done away with the reconciling remarks made later in his ''Rab lan''.

Another contradiction is seen in Mi pham's discussion of Rab gsal's
way of interpreting BCA IX.78. On the one hand, Mi pham did indeed point
out an unwanted consequence of Rab gsal's position; on the other hand, Mi
pham stated that he did not want to criticise a causal relationship between
the two kinds of self-grasping, so Rab gsal argues:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 436.3–4: ''bdag gnyis rim can du 'byung na snga ma yod la phyi ma med pa'i so skye yod par thal zer''/ ''de'i rjes de ma thag tu bdag 'dzin gnyis kyi de byung gi 'brel ba la skyon brjod pa ma yin kyang sngar ltar rigs pa'i rnam 'gyur byas gsung''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=[You] said that if [the conceptions of] the two [kinds of] selves arise in a sequence, it follows that there is an ordinary being, who has the earlier [kind of self-grasping], but does not have the latter [kind of self-grasping]. Right afterwards [you] stated that [you] did not say that there is a fault in [claiming] a causal relationship of the two [kinds of] selves, but that [you] showed [what is possible when using] a logical approach according to the earlier [kind of relationship].
}}
In his earlier letter, Mi pham had already referred to his criticism of Rab
gsal's position as "teasing remarks" (''nyams mtshar''), rather than a serious
attack. It seems to be for this reason that Mi pham does not give Rab gsal's
present objection any more attention and does not comment on it in his last letter.

Rab gsal then defends his earlier position of a causal relationship between self-grasping with regard to phenomena (''chos kyi bdag 'dzin'') and self-grasping with regard to persons (''gang zag gi bdag 'dzin''). Just like the mind, so Rab gsal argues, the two kinds of self-grasping arise from their respective four conditions;<ref>This refers to the four conditions for the emergence of mind and mental factors mentioned in the ''Abhidharmakośa'' and its commentary (II.64a): the causal condition (''hetupratyaya''/''rgyu rkyen''), the immediately preceding condition (''samanantarapratyaya''/''de ma thag pa'i rkyen''), the referential condition (''ālambanapratyaya''/''dmigs rkyen''), and the dominant condition (''adhipatipratyaya''/''bdag rkyen''); see AKBh 101. For a translation of this passage, see La
Vallée Poussin 1991: 305.</ref> if Mi pham's reasoning did indeed apply, then this would also pertain to the mind, which also has its causes, just like self-grasping, and it would lead to the absurd consequence that there would be sentient beings (sems can) who do not have a mind (''sems'').<ref>86</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4>
Of the controversies that were discussed in relation to this topic, it is only
the last issue that is taken up again in Mi pham's second answer. Mi pham
agrees that self-grasping – just as the mind – arises from its four conditions,
but, Mi pham argues, there is, nevertheless, a difference between Rab gsal's
example of mind and self-grasping: within the four conditions it is never
the case that mind is not present; it is, however possible that self-grasping
with regard to persons is not present, while self-grasping with regard to
phenomena is present, just like a certain mental image is present now, but
was not present yesterday – even though the image of yesterday as of today
is mental.<ref> Cf. ''Yang lan'' 465.5–466.1: ''sems dang bdag 'dzin rkyen bzhi las skyes kyang''/ ''rkyen bzhi'i nang na'' [C ''nas''] ''sems med pa mi srid pas sems med'' [AC ''sems med'' om.] ''sems can sogs mi srid la''/ ''de bzhin rgyu 'bras thams cad spyir thog med nas rgyun gyis 'jug kyang''/ ''bdag 'dzin gnyis po lhan cig thog med nas rgyun chags su 'jug pa min par''/ ''snga ma'i tshe phyi ma med pa srid kyang rung zhes smras te''/ ''bum 'dzin gyi dus su snam 'dzin nges par yod mi dgos pa bzhin yang''/.</ref>
-->


<h3>Synopsis</h3>
The point of departure of the controversies in this topic is Mi pham's critical commentary on the interpretation of, and, in particular, the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c. In his explanations, Mi pham explicitly objected to other interpretations and contrasted them with his own understanding of this passage. This he called "the idea of myself alone," a phrasing that suggests that Mi pham was aware of the idiosyncratic nature of his way of reading.

{{InlineImage
	|float=right
	|img=Varying interpretations of BCA IX.78c.jpg
	|width=500px
	|caption=
}}
Although Rab gsal's refutation extended also to the commentary on
the textual surroundings, including the other verse lines of BCA IX.78, but
also its two preceding verses, the main issues remained Mi pham's critical remarks and his interpretation of BCA IX.78c. Along with the earlier
topic, the discussion of this second topic is listed under "refuting faults of great impudence" (''spyi brtol che ba'i nyes pa dgag pa''). Again, Rab gsal's criticism seemed not to be instigated by major doctrinal differences, but by the provocative phrasing found in Mi pham's commentary. To Rab gsal, this was merely a "reflection of a picture of crooked stubbornness and confusion" (''<i>'</i>gal 'khrul gya gyu'i ri mo gzugs brynan''),<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 376.2: ''<i>'</i>gal 'khrul gya gyu'i ri mo gzugs brynan''</ref> a "raising of denials that burdens the scriptures of the great paṇḍitas of the Noble Land with the defilements of one's own faulty explanations,"<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 376.5: ''rang gis nyes bshad kyi dri ma 'phags yul paṇ chen gyi gzhung la 'gel ba'i bsnyon gdeng ba''.</ref> a "chatter, that has no basis,"<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 377.3: ''long gtam rtsa ba med pa''.</ref> etc. By referring to the respective passages in the authoritative commentaries of Prajñākaramati and Kalyānadeva, he pointed out that Mi pham's interpretation is not backed up by the Indian tradition. Mi pham, on the other hand, argued that divergence from the Indian commentaries does not, in itself, constitute a fault, as long as there is no contradiction in meaning. In his response, Rab gsal did not give in to Mi pham's attempt to reconcile his peculiar way of reading with more traditional interpretations. He pointed out that it was Mi pham who had refuted the others in the first place, and hence would contradict himself by claiming consensus with regard to the meaning. Again, refuting this objection seems difficult, and, instead, Mi pham opted to not mention this issue at all in his last letter.

While discussing Mi pham's commentary on BCA IX.78ab, Rab gsal
set forth his own understanding of the complete verse. In analogy to Rab
gsal's criticism of the content of his reading, Mi pham turned against Rab
gsal’s interpretation. In the course of the controversies, Mi pham referred
to a couple of valid readings of this passage, and it seems obvious that
he also accepted other possibilities of interpretation, not only the one he
suggested. Even though he pointed out that his criticism of Rab gsal's understanding was intended as "teasing remarks" (''nyams mtshar''), rather than
as a fully developed attack, arguments on this matter were exchanged and continued up to Mi pham's last letter.

Clearly, the main reason for this debate was Mi pham's refutation of
other explanations in his Nor bu ke ta ka. While the acceptance of other interpretations in his later answer suggests that Mi pham's earlier remarks
were not intended as strictly as their phrasing might imply, they provided Rab gsal with an opportunity for criticism against which Mi pham could defend himself only with difficulty.

<h3>Topic III: The Interpretation of BCA IX.41–49</h3>
The question of the general context of this passage of the BCA is already
part of the controversies that developed about its interpretation. In the Dge lugs tradition, as expressed in Rgyal tshab's commentary, the section of the verses BCA IX.41–57 is labelled "proving that even for someone who wishes mere liberation, realisation of emptiness is necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.14–15: ''thar pa tsam thob par 'dod pas kyang stong nyid rtogs dgos par bsgrub pa''. For a translation of the relevant passage of Rgyal tshab's commentary, cf. Sweet 1977: 208ff.</ref> According to this view, the respective verses show that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also need to attain complete understanding of emptiness in order to achieve their desired soteriological goal, which is the state of an Arhat. Yet, in the outline of Rdza Dpal sprul, according to whose explanations Mi pham composed his commentary on the ninth chapter of the BCA, the very same passage "proves that the Mahāyāna is the highest."<ref>''Spyod 'jug sa bcad'' 142.4: ''theg chen mchog tu sgrub pa''. For an edition and translation of Dpal sprul's detailed outline of the BCA, see Viehbeck 2005: 86ff.</ref> As the title indicates, this tradition reads this passage of the BCA as a proof that the Mahāyāna is supreme to the Hīnayāna,<ref>Note that the distinction Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna is not used as a self-evident categorisation, but as a distinction that followers of the Mahāyāna, such as Śāntideva and his Tibetan successors, use to distinguish their specific tradition from other Buddhist traditions. Often, as here in the BCA, it is employed in a polemical context, e.g., to defend Mahāyāna doctrines against possible objections from other Buddhist traditions.</ref> the path of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. As will be shown below, this supremacy is established in one way in terms of the complete realisation of emptiness (the Mahāyāna) as opposed to an incomplete realisation of emptiness (the Hīnayāna). Even though Mi pham uses slightly different titles in his own outline, the content of his commentary follows closely the ideas expressed in the outline of his master.<ref>In Mi pham's outline, BCA IX.41–53, called "abandoning objections with regard to the Mahāyāna, the means of expression" (''rjod byed theg chen la rtsod spong''), belongs together with its preceding passage, BCA IX.6–40, "abandoning objections with regard to emptiness, the object to be expressed" (''brjod bya stong nyid la rtsod spong''), and its subsequent section, BCA IX.54–58, a "summary of their content" (''de dag gi don bsdu ba''), to the overall section "abandoning objections" (''rtsod spong''), i.e., a passage that defends the tenets and scriptural tradition of the Mahāyāna; cf. the sa bcad of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' in Chapter Seven.</ref>

The passage under consideration starts with the objection of a (Hīnayāna) opponent, questioning the need for the realisation of emptiness to achieve the goal of liberation in BCA IX.41ab: "Liberation is [achieved] because of seeing the truth. Why [should it be achieved] through seeing emptiness?"<ref>BCAP 425.15: ''satyadarśanato muktiḥ śūnyatādarśanena kiṃ''/.</ref> As Prajñākaramati's commentary explains,<ref>BCAP 425.16.</ref> the "truth" that was mentioned refers to the "Four Noble Truths" (''catvāri āryasatyāni''), a core piece of Buddhist doctrine, emphasised particularly in the Hīnayāna tradition. Countering this objection, Śāntideva answers in BCA IX.41cd that the path of emptiness was established by the scriptures as a prerequisite for awakening: "Since the scriptures say that there is no awakening without this path."<ref>BCAP 426.14: ''na vinānena mārgeṇa bodhir ity āgamo yataḥ''//.</ref> This is followed by a discussion of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures, which continues until BCA IX.44. Śāntideva's main aim in this passage is to point out that the same arguments his (Hīnayāna) opponent uses to establish the authenticity of the literary corpus of his tradition equally apply to the Mahāyāna literature.<ref>This passage is not of special importance for the later controversies, and therefore not presented in more detail. For Prajñākaramati's commentary on this passage, see BCAP 427ff., or, for a translation, Oldmeadow 1994: 103ff.</ref> BCA IX.45ab addresses the issue of the beginning of this passage, the need to realise emptiness, from another angle: "The teaching has its root in monkhood, and precisely monkhood hardly exists."<ref>BCAP 435.10: ''śāsanaṃ bhikṣutāmūlaṃ bhikṣutaiva ca duḥsthitā''/.</ref> Śāntideva argues that the teaching, that is, the doctrine of the Buddha, is based on monkhood. Among the various types of monks, this statement refers to the highest form of monkhood, a monk that is "without kleśas" (''bhinnakleśa''), as Prajñākaramati points out <ref>Cf. BCAP 436.13: ''tatrāpi bhinnakleśo bhikṣuḥ pradhānaṃ''/ ''tasyaiveha grahaṇaṃ''/ ''tadbhāvo bhikṣutā''//.</ref> Such a state then "hardly exists, i.e., is not right without seeing emptiness, is not logical just because of seeing the truth."<ref>BCAP 436.17–437.1: [...] ''duḥsthitā''/ ''śūnyatādarśanam antareṇāsamañjasā kevalasatyadarśanato na yucjate''/.</ref> And, just as true monkhood is not possible without realising emptiness, the same applies to the achievement of the Buddhist goal, that is, nirvāṇa, as BCA IX.45cd continues: "For those whose minds contain references, nirvāṇa, too, hardly exists."<ref>BCAP 438.5: ''sāvalambanacittānāṃ nirvāṇam api duḥsthitaṃ''//.</ref>

While the earlier verses of this passage form the basis of understanding
the latter verses, their literal interpretation was not a point of discussion
between Mi pham and Rab gsal. The later part of this passage is a different
matter, and it is for this reason that the following verses are also quoted in
their Tibetan translation.

In BCA IX.46ab, Śāntideva addresses a possible objection of his opponents:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Liberation is due to the abandoning of ''kleśas''.
Response: Then it must be immediately after that.
''kleśaprahāṇān muktiś cet tadanantaram astu sā''/<ref>BCAP 438.9.</ref>
''nyon mongs spangs pas grol na de'i''// ''de ma thag tu der 'gyur ro''//<ref>BCA (P, fol. 37a3; D, fol. 32b3).</ref>
}}
Others might argue that liberation (''mukti'') is gained by dispelling the ''kleśas'', which is brought about by seeing the Four Noble Truths.<ref>Cf. BCAP 438.10–11: ''yadi cāryasatyadarśanataḥ kleśāḥ prahīyante''/ ''tato vimuktir upajāyate''/.</ref> In this case, Śāntideva counters, in the rephrasing of his commentator, "it must be, i.e., liberation must come to be, immediately after that, i.e., right immediately after the abandoning of ''kleśas''."<ref>BCAP 438.11–12: ''tadanantaraṃ kleśaprahāṇāt samanantaram evāstu sā muktir bhavatu''/.</ref> That liberation is not achieved immediately after abandoning the ''kleśas'' is proven in the other half of this verse, BCA IX.46cd:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=And for those a capacity of ''karman'' is seen, even though it is without ''kleśas''.
''dṛṣṭaṃ ca teṣu sāmarthyaṃ niḥkleśasyāpi karmaṇaḥ''//<ref>BCAP 438.14.</ref>
''nyon mongs med kyang de dag la''// ''las kyi nus pa mthong ba yin''//<ref>BCA (P, fol. 37a3–4; D, fol. 32b3).</ref>
}}
Śāntideva argues that, even though the ''kleśas'' are abandoned, there is still "a capacity, a potential (''śākti''), that brings forward a[nother] fruit."<ref>BCAP 438.16–17: ''sāmarthyaṃ phaladānaṃ prati śaktiḥ''/.</ref> Hence, as ''karman'' is not completely extinguished, this cannot be true liberation. For whom is this the case? Which state of mind does Śāntideva refer to exactly? According to his commentator Prajñakaramati, this refers to people who are devoid of ''kleśas'', and, specifically, to Arhats, such as Maudgalyāyana or Aṅgulīmāla.<ref>BCAP 438.15–16: ''teṣu prahīṇakleśeṣu'' [''prahīṇaklaśeṣu'']/ ''āryamaudgalyāyanāryāṅgulīmālaprabhṛteṣu''/.</ref> As will be seen later, the Dge lugs tradition strongly objects to relating this passage to Arhats, and the question of to whom Śāntideva is referring in his explanations can be seen as the key problem in the controversies between Mi pham and Rab gsal.

The following verses in the BCA dwell further on the issue of whether liberation is possible for those people who have abandoned ''kleśas'' – be they true Arhats according to the understanding of Prajñākaramati and later Mi pham, or be they Arhats in name only, as understood in the Dge lugs tradition. BCA IX.47ab addresses a possible objection:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: It is ascertained that desire, the cause, does not exist at that time.
''tṛṣṇā tāvad upādānaṃ nāsti cet saṃpradhāryate''/<ref>BCAP 439.16.</ref>
''re zhig nyer len sred''<ref>''sred'' : D ''sred''; P ''srid''.</ref> ''pa ni''// ''med ces nges pa nyid ce na''/<ref>113</ref>
}}
An opponent might argue that for those people who have abandoned ''kleśas'', desire (''tṛṣṇā''), which is "the cause of rebirth" (''punarbhavopādāna''),<ref> Cf. BCAP 440.1–2.</ref> does not exist at the present moment; hence, they are actually liberated and not subject to rebirth. This objection is then rebutted in the latter half of the verse, BCA IX.47cd:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=[Response:] Why does desire not exist for them, though it is non-afflicted, like delusion?<ref>In the present Sanskrit text of the BCA, it is clear that it is desire (''tṛṣṇā'') that exists "for them" (''eṣām''). This last expression shows the genitive plural case ending of the masculine form of the pronoun ''idam''; it is not possible to relate the pronoun to desire. In the Tibetan translation, however, the corresponding expression for "''tṛṣṇaiṣām''" is "''sred 'di''," a formulation that suggests that the pronoun ''<i>'</i>di'' (this) would refer to ''sred pa'' (desire). This interpretation was chosen by both Mi pham and Rab gsal, and probably by most of the readers of the Tibetan translation of the BCA. As will be shown later, such a reading of the line had further consequences for the way this passage is understood in the Dge lugs tradition.</ref>
''kim akliṣṭāpi tṛṣṇaiṣāṃ nāsti saṃmohavat satī''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 440.5.</ref>
''sred''<ref>''sred'' : D ''sred''; P ''srid''.</ref> ''<i>'</i>di'' <ref>''<i>'</i>di'' : P ''<i>'</i>di''; D ''de''.</ref> ''nyon mongs can min yang''// ''kun rmongs bzhin du ci ste med''//<ref>BCA (P, fol. 37a4; D, fol. 32b3–4).</ref>
}}
Śāntideva counters that even though those people have abandoned ''kleśas'', desire might still be present in them, but in a "non-afflicted" (''akliṣṭa'') form. An example of such a form of desire is delusion (''moha''). In BCA IX.48, the existence of desire in such people is proven through the existence of its cause, feeling (''vedanā''):
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Desire has feeling (''vedanā'') as its cause and feeling is present in them.
A mind that contains references has to abide somewhere.
''vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā vedanaiṣāṃ ca vidyate''/<ref>Cf. BCAP 440.9.</ref>
''sālambanena cittena sthātavyaṃ yatra tatra vā''//<ref>BCAP 441.8.</ref>
''tshor ba'i rkyen gyis sred pa yin''// ''tshor ba de dag la yang yod''//
''dmigs pa dang ni bcas pa'i sems''//''<i>'</i>ga' zhig la ni gnas par 'gyur''//<ref>BCA (P, fol. 37a4–5; D, fol. 32b4).</ref>
}}
Śāntideva argues against those who deny the existence of desire in people, who have abandoned the ''kleśas'', but not realised emptiness, that the presence of desire can be concluded through the presence of its cause, that is, feeling (''vedanā''). The only method to overcome this and achieve liberation is seeing emptiness, but when the mind clings to an object such as the Four Noble Truths, liberation is doubtful.<ref>See Prajñākaramati's explanations in BCAP 441.9–13, or a translation of this passage
in Oldmeadow 1994: 120.</ref> This thought is continued in BCA IX.49:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Without [seeing] emptiness the mind that is suppressed rises again
Just as in non-perceptual concentration (''asaṃjñisamāpatti''). Therefore, one should cultivate emptiness.
''vinā śūnyatayā cittaṃ baddham utpadyate punaḥ''/
''yathāsaṃjñisamāpattau bhāvayet tena śūnyatāṃ''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 441.14–15.</ref>
''stong nyid dang ni bral ba'i sems''//''<i>'</i>gags pa slar yang skye ’gyur te''//
''<i>'</i>du shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug bzhin''// ''des na stong nyid bsgom par bya''//<ref>BCA (P, fol. 37a5–6; D, fol. 32b4–5)</ref>
}}
As Prajñākaramati points out, a mind that did not realise emptiness is not liberated, but rises again, "even though it vanished for a short while due to the power of concentration."<ref>Cf. BCAP 441.17–18: ''samādhibalāt kiyatkālaṃ nivṛttam api''.</ref> To illustrate this process, the example of non-perceptual concentration (''asaṃjñisamāpatti'') is mentioned.

The promulgation of emptiness as the only method to achieve liberation that is expressed in this verse can be seen as the culmination and common aim of the preceding verses. Beginning with BCA IX.45, various consequences of lacking the realisation of emptiness are pointed out: inability for monkhood and ''nirvāṇa'', the presence of ''karman'', the presence of desire – although "non-afflicted" –, the presence of feeling (''vedanā''), and a mind that contains references. But to whose state of mind do these descriptions refer exactly? In Prajñākaramati's commentary on BCA IX.46cd, Arhats such as Maudgalyāyana or Aṅgulīmāla are explicitly mentioned as the object of the explanations.<ref>Cf. BCAP 438.15–16.</ref> The question of whether attributes like the presence of karman and desire can be reconciled with the state of a true Arhat – and Śāntideva's intention was thus indeed to relate this whole passage to Arhats – or whether such was not the case, forms the core issue of the controversies that developed between Mi pham and Rab gsal about this passage.

<h3>Interpreting This Passage in the Dge lugs School – Scholastic Background</h3>
As indicated above, in the Dge lugs tradition the passage under discussion is read as a proof that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas need to have an understanding of emptiness in order to attain their desired goal, arhatship. The discussion in the BCA, beginning with IX.41, is seen as an argument between a Śrāvaka opponent, who questions the doctrine of emptiness and claims that "liberation, the result of an Arhat, is attained because of cultivating a direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths, such as impermanence etc.,"<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.15–18: ''nyan thos sde pa kha cig na re bden pa bzhi'i rnam pa mi rtag sogs bcu drug mngon sum du mthong ba goms pas grol ba dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob par 'gyur gyi''/ ''chos thams cad bden pas stong pa nyid mthong bas ci zhig bya dgos pa med cing mi rigs so zhe na''/.</ref> and Śāntideva, who, as a proponent of the Mahāyāna, counters that "even for the attainment of the result of a Śrāvaka- or Pratyekabuddha-Arhat the realisation of emptiness is definitely necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 231.9–10: ''nyan rang dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob pa la yang stong nyid rtogs pa nges par dgos par thal''/.</ref> In the Dge lugs interpretation, verses BCA IX.45–49 are therefore related to states that are achieved by the path of the Four Truths, but do not necessitate a realisation of emptiness. That means that the subjects of these descriptions are Śrāvakas who did not attain arhatship, since they did not make use of the path of emptiness.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 233.20–234.1: ''nyan thos 'phags pa chos can''/ ''dgra bcom pa mi thob par thal''/ ''stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab lam du mi byed pa'i phyir''/.</ref> This general view also has consequences with regard to the literal annotation of individual verse lines. Discarding all ''kleśas'' is asserted to result in achieving the state of an Arhat. Since this passage is understood as not referring to Arhats, the ''kleśas'' mentioned in BCA IX.46 must be specified as "manifest (''mngon gyur'') ''kleśas''." According to this reading, Śāntideva is said to refute the assumption that abandoning only manifest ''kleśas'' would result in liberation, since those adepts still have ''karman'' for further rebirth, although they are devoid of manifest ''kleśas''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 234.9ff. or Sweet 1977: 214f., respectively, for a translation of this passage.</ref> At this stage, Rgyal tshab's commentary makes reference to another reading of this passage by "some commentaries and Tibetans" who relate it to Arhats. Although this is also the intention of Prajñākaramati, as was shown earlier, Rgyal tshab vehemently opposes this way of reading.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 235.13–16: ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams nyon mongs med kyang me'u dgal gyi bu dang 'phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bu sdug bsgal 'byin pa mthong bas de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref>

The Dge lugs understanding of this passage also affected the interpretation of the following verse, BCA IX.47. In the first part of it, the opponent counters that desire, the cause of further rebirth, is not present in the adepts who practice the Four Noble Truths. The second part is Śāntideva's reply to that, which we have translated above (p.129) in the following way:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=[Response:] Why does desire not exist for them, though it is non-afflicted, like delusion?
''kim akliṣṭāpi tṛṣṇaiṣāṃ nāsti saṃmohavat satī''//
''sred 'di nyon mongs can min yang''// ''kun rmongs bzhin du ci ste med''//
}}
Rgyal tshab’s interpretation of this verse differs considerably. It was already noted (p.129) that Rgyal tshab does not relate the pronoun ''<i>'</i>di'' (''eṣām'') to the adepts, as the Sanskrit text suggests, but directly to desire (''sred pa''/'tṛṣṇā'). Further, the particle ''yang'' (''api'') is not understood in its restricting function – which we translated as "though” –, but as an indicator of an inclusion. Translating the verse line according to this interpretation leads to a different rendering:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=[Response:] Why is there not also this desire that is non-afflicted, similar to delusion?

}}
Rgyal tshab explains this line in the following way:<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 236.2–6: ''khyod dgra bcom par 'dod pa'i gang zag de'i rgyud sred pa 'di mngon pa nas bshad pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can min yang''/ ''mngon pa nas kun rmongs ma rig pa la nyon mongs can yin min gnyis su 'dod pa bzhin du sred pa la yang mngon pa nas bshad pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin pa gcig dang min pa gcig kyang ci ste med de 'dod dgos so''|</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=You must accept also this desire that is non-afflicted according to the explanations in the Abhidharma for the mental continuum of the person who is believed to be an Arhat – why is there not an afflicted and a non-afflicted [sort] according to the explanations in the Abhidharma with regard to desire as well, similar to the acceptance of both an afflicted and non-afflicted [sort] for delusion, i.e., not-knowing, in the Abhidharma.
}}
In Rgyal tshab's view, Śāntideva is implying that the opponent, who is rooted in the Abhidharma explanations, has to accept two kinds of desire, one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted – just as such is accepted in the Abhidharma tradition with regard to delusion – and points out that the non-afflicted type of desire is present in the adepts who understood the Four Truths, but did not realise emptiness. Rgyal tshab emphasises further that this differentiation of afflicted and non-afflicted desire is acknowledged in the opponent's own tradition, but not in the way desire is understood in his (and Śāntideva's) – Prāsaṅgika – system.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 236.6–8: ''gzhung des ni sde pa gnyis dang theg chen pa la thun mong du grags pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can ma yin pa'i sred pa'' [''srid pa''] ''yod par stan gyi rang lugs kyi sred pa la nyon mongs can yin min gnyis su 'dod pa gtan min par shes par bya'o''/.</ref> The adept in question then, is described as having abandoned one (the afflicted) kind of desire, the desire that derives from grasping a self as a self-sufficient entity, but not another (the non-afflicted) kind of desire, the desire that derives from grasping a self that is inherently established (''ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa''):<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 236.8–11: ''des na gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod du 'dzin pa'i bdag 'dzin gyis drangs pa'i sred pa'' [''srid pa''] ''mngon gyur ba re shig spangs kyang gang zag ngo bo nyid kyis grub par 'dzin pa'i 'jig ltas drangs pa'i sred pa'' [''srid pa''] ''ci ste med ces pa yin pas''/ [...]. This very same sentence is also found in the Dgongs pa rab gsal, Tsong kha pa's commentary on Candrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', and one of the most influential texts for the understanding of Madhyamaka philosophy in the Dge lugs tradition; see Dgongs pa rab gsal 61.4–6.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, [Śāntideva's statement] says: even though the manifest desire that derives from self-grasping that conceives a person to be self-sufficient, substantially existent (''rdzas yod''), is abandoned at that time, why is there not the desire that derives from the view of the transitory [collection to be the self] (''<i>'</i>jig lta'') that conceives a person to be inherently established (''ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa'') […].
}}
Clearly, an adept who views a person as inherently established cannot
be an Arhat. Rgyal tshab once again opposes the position that understands
this passage as referring to Arhats and understands the intention of this
passage to be that "Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas lack the realisation of the selflessness of phenomena."<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 237.7: ''nyan rang la chos kyi bdag med rtogs pa med pa''.</ref> According to him, this passage shows that also Śāntideva, "this Ācārya" (''slob dpon 'di''), accepts that grasping persons and phenomena as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') is a form of ''kleśa'', that is, obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''), a thought that is explained in more detail in Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 237.10–12: ''gang zag dang phung po bden 'dzin nyon mongs su 'dod pa slob dpon 'di'i yang bzhed pa yin te rgyas par shes par 'dod na rje nyid kyis mdzad pa'i dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad chen mo las shes'' [''shas''] ''par bya'o''//.</ref> Even though this text is a commentary on Candrakīrti's famous ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', it contains a detailed discussion of the present passage of the BCA, which must be regarded as the basis for Rgyal tshab's explanations of the relevant part of the BCA.<ref>Cf. ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 50ff., for Tsong kha pa's interpretation of ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' (MAv) I 8d, and 58ff., for his explanations of the current passage of the BCA. See also Hopkins 1980: 145ff. and 154ff., for a translation of the respective passages.<br>{{6nbsp}}As shown, the earlier passages of the ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' are often closely related to the formulations in the Tsong kha pa's ''Blo gsal''. The ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs<i>'</i>'' explanations of the present passage, however, are closer to Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' and are often mere literal quotes of this work. However, the exact relation between those three texts needs more investigation and lies outside the scope of the present study.</ref> In his commentary on ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' I 8d,<ref>See MAv 19.</ref> Tsong kha pa discusses the realisation of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and that of Bodhisattvas:<ref>''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 51.16–18: ''de ltar na sa ring du song ba kho na nas bzung nas''/ ''byang sems kyis rang gi blo'i stobs bskyed pas kyang''/ ''nyan rang rnams zil gyis gnon gyi''/ ''sa drug pa man chad du ni blo'i stobs kyis zil gyis gnon pa ma yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Thus, Bodhisattvas outshine Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also through their generation of mental power (''blo'i stobs''), only after having seized the ''dūraṅgamābhūmi''; on the sixth ''bhūmi'' and below, it is not the case that [those] outshine [them] through [their] mental power.
}}
Proving that the realisation or "mental power" of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and of Bodhisattvas is the same prior to the seventh ''bhūmi'' implies that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also have an understanding of emptiness. Tsong kha pa further points out that the Prāsaṅgika system classifies grasping as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') as obscuration of afflictions and accepts that this kind of grasping, together with its seeds, is abandoned by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, too.<ref>''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 52.10–13: ''lugs 'dis ni''/ ''gang zag bden 'dzin thams cad nyon mong can gyi ma rig par bzhed la''/ ''de slar mi skye ba'i tshul gyis spong ba la''/ ''de dag gi sa bon zad dgos shing''/''spangs pa de yang dgra bcom pa gnyis dang thun mong ba yin pas''/ ''bden 'dzin gyi sa bon spong ba ni shes sgrib spong ba min no''//.</ref> In the Dge lugs tradition, the question of the realisation of emptiness by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and the distinction between obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib'') and obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib'') are key issues for their understanding of the Prāsaṅgika approach, a philosophical view that the Dge lugs school, in particular, emphasises as the highest among the various Buddhist systems. The most prominent manifestation of the Dge lugs appreciation of the Prāsaṅgika approach is a work called ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', a text that defines the eight characteristics of the Prāsaṅgika approach from a Dge lugs viewpoint.<ref>This work (of which different versions exist) consists of Tsong kha pa's oral instructions, that were written down by his disciple Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. For an introduction and translation of this text, see Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 139ff.</ref> In the sixth chapter of this work, the Prasaṅgika tradition is distinguished by its assertion that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas' realisation of emptiness extends to phenomena (''dharma'') and is not to be limited to persons, as the Svātantrika tradition claims.<ref>See Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 227, for a detailed annotated translation of this chapter. Further, Lopez 1988 deals with the different stances taken by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti on
the question of the realisation of emptiness by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.</ref> There, understanding the emptiness of phenomena is described as a prerequisite for attaining the state of an Arhat,<ref>Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 230: "If dharmas having no self-nature are not understood, it is not possible either to maintain that ''nirvāṇa'' will be achieved." See also Seyfort Ruegg's explanation of this in n.137</ref> the issue that is debated in the controversies concerning the present passage of the BCA. In chapter seven,<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 234ff.</ref> the Svātantrika approach is characterised as one that accepts grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') and the seed of this grasping as obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''/''jñeyāvaraṇa''), while the Prāsaṅgika tradition asserts the very same to be obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''/''kleśāvaraṇa''). Since Arhats are held to have abandoned obscuration of afflictions, this classification implies that Arhats have also abandoned grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin''), and hence have understood emptiness.<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 247, in particular.</ref> While these characteristics are presented in a systematic way in the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', they also appear in Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal''. Here, Tsong kha pa refers to the present passage of the BCA as a proof of his own position in the interpretation of Madhyamakāvatāra I 8d, which argues that Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha-Arhats do indeed realise emptiness. While explaining BCA IX.41–48 in detail, Tsong kha pa opposes the position of "some commentators and Tibetans," which relates this passage to Arhats who have abandoned all kleśas.<ref>Cf. ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 60.1–4: ''gzhung de rnams ni de ltar bshad dgos kyi''/ ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams''/ ''nyon mongs med kyang mau gal gyi bu dang''/ ''<i>'</i>phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bus sdug bsngal 'byin pa mthong bas''/ ''de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no''// ''zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref> If one understood this passage as referring to Arhats, it would not only deprive Tsong kha pa of an argument in favour of his interpretation of the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', but it would also criticise two of the cornerstones of the Dge lugs understanding of the Prāsaṅgika tradition. There is no need to investigate Tsong kha pa's explanation of this passage in more detail, as the important aspects have already been discussed in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary, which follows the model of his master very closely, at times even literally. It is, however, important to consider the immense doctrinal background that is connected to this specific passage of the BCA. . . .


<!--
<h4>Mi pham's Explanations of BCA IX.41–49 in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, for Mi pham the general purpose of this passage of the BCA is to point out that the spiritual aim of the Hīnayāna tradition, attaining the state of an Arhat, is not ultimate in nature, but is surpassed by the state of a complete Buddha, the spiritual goal that is promoted in the Mahāyāna tradition. Here, the difference between these two states is discussed in terms of a complete realisation of emptiness or the lack thereof. According to Mi pham, Śāntideva's descriptions of religious adepts who have not realised emptiness do indeed refer to true Arhats. These are said to have not abandoned "undefiled ''karman''"
(''zag med kyi las'') and rebirth in a "mental body" (''yid kyi lus''). They therefore need to enter the Mahāyāna doctrine to gain a complete understanding of emptiness and achieve ultimate liberation.<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.3–5: ''zag med kyi'' [C ''kyis''] ''las dang''/ ''yid kyi lus bsam mi khyab 'gyur gyi 'chi 'pho ba rnams ma spangs pas grol ba gtan du ba min la''/ ''phung po phra ba rgyun kyang mi 'chad par gdod theg chen du 'jug dgos te''/ ''spang'' [C ''spangs''] ''bya shin tu phra ba mi spong ba'ang chos bdag med rdzogs par rtogs shing bsgom pa med pa des na'o''/.</ref> At the end of his explanations of the crucial passage BCA IX.46–48, Mi pham explicitly opposes the position which denies that Śāntideva's explanations refer to Arhats, a position taken in the Dge lugs tradition. He further criticises certain features of the literal interpretation of this passage, features that go hand in hand with this general stance, and that have already been pointed out in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6: ''<i>'</i>di la nyon mongs mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol na zhes sbyar dgos kyi''/ ''dgra bcom pa la sbyar ba mi 'thad ces dpe la lar bshad kyang rang gi zhe 'dod dang mthun par khrid pa tsam ste''/ ''pha rol pos kyang mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol bar mi 'dod bzhin du thal ba de 'dra 'brel med du 'gyur zhing''/ ''dgra bcom maud'' [B ''mong'', C ''mod''] ''gal lta bu la sbyar te rgya 'grel thams cad zhal 'chams par bkral zhing rigs pas kyang grub pa'i gzhung gi gnad chen po yin pas pra yas par mi bya'o''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In regard to this [passage, i.e., BCA IX.46], some texts explain that it should be understood as "Objection: Liberation is due to the abandoning of only manifest (''mngon gyur'') ''kleśas''," and that it is not right to relate it to Arhats. But [such an interpretation] only pulls [the original text] into harmony with one’s own wishes. As not even the opponents believe that one is liberated by abandoning only manifest [''kleśas''], such a consequence [as formulated above] would bear no relation [to the point in question]. That [this passage] refers to Arhats such as Maudgalyāyana is explained equally by all Indian commentaries, and it is proven by reasoning as well. As this is an important point of the scripture, one should not speculate about it.
}}
In the Dge lugs tradition, this passage of the BCA does not refer to
true Arhats, and hence the ''kleśas'' that are accepted as being abandoned by
an adept who has not realised emptiness are limited to mean "manifest ''kleśas''," as we have seen in Rgyal tshab's commentary on BCA IX.46. Here, Mi pham criticises this position for various reasons. First of all, such an
interpretation would be in contradiction to the authoritative scriptures, i.e.,
the Indian commentaries. But it would also contradict logic: restricting the
''kleśas'' that were mentioned in the opponent's objection in BCA IX.46a to
manifest ''kleśas'' would mean that the opponent accepts that one is liberated
by abandoning manifest ''kleśas'' alone. Such is not accepted by the opponent, as Mi pham points out.

The next aim of Mi pham's criticism is the distinctive interpretation
of BCA IX.47ab that was adopted in the Dge lugs tradition. As shown in
Rgyal tshab's commentary, Śāntideva's explanations were understood as
referring to two different kinds of desire, one that is afflicted and another
that is non-afflicted. While it was accepted that the adepts under consideration had abandoned afflicted desire, the one associated with grasping a self as a self-sufficient entity, they were said to still have non-afflicted desire, which was explained as grasping a self that is inherently established (''ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa''). Mi pham first quotes the relevant passage that is found in both Rgyal tshab's commentary and Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'',<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 236.8–11 and ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 61.4–6.</ref> almost literally, in order to refute it later:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.6–43.2: ''yang gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i bdag 'dzin gyis drangs pa'i sred pa mngon gyur re zhig spangs kyang''/ ''gang zag ngo bo nyid kyis grub par 'dzin pa'i 'jig ltas drangs pa'i sred pa ci ste med ces bshad sbyar mdzad kyang''/ ''skyes bu gcig gi rgyud na dus mnyam pa'i bdag 'dzin du mas drangs pa'i sred pa du ma yod pa 'gal la''/ ''phyi mas drangs pa'i rten 'brel bcu gnyis kyi nang tshan du gyur pa'i sred pa la nyon mongs can min pa'' [C ''la'' add.] ''ci ste yod''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Further, [this passage of the BCA] was explained [in the following way]: "Even though manifest desire that derives from self-grasping which [conceives] a person to be self-sufficient is abandoned at that time, why is there not the desire that derives from the view of the transitory [collection to be the self] (''<i>'</i>jig lta'') that conceives a person to be inherently established (''ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa'')?" It is, however, contradictory that there are various desires deriving from various [kinds of] simultaneous [forms of] self-grasping in the [mental] continuum of a single person; how should there be something non-afflicted with regard to the desire that derives from the later [kind of self-grasping], which is a part of the twelve [links of] dependent origination?
}}
Again, the Dge lugs interpretation is criticised for two reasons. Mi pham argues that it is illogical to accept various desires, deriving from different kinds of self-grasping, in a single mental continuum. Further, he points out that the latter kind of desire, referred to in the Dge lugs tradition as "non-afflicted," cannot be non-afflicted, but – as a part of the twelve links of dependent origination – must be afflicted. Mi pham then continues his criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation of this passage with some particularly trenchant remarks:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 43.3–5: ''khyad par gang yang ma sbyar bar'' [C ''ba''] ''spyir nyon mongs can min yang zhes dang''/ ''kun rmongs bzhin du zhes pa'i tshig gi nus pas sred pa nyon mongs can min pa zhig yod par bstan gyi''/ ''nyon mongs can gyi sred pa zhig yod par ci la ston te yi ge'i don la ma zhugs pa'i phyir''/ ''de'ang dpe dang dogs sel sngon du song nas ci ste med ces pa'i dam bca'i tshig tsam zhig bstan gyi''/ ''yod rgyu ci zhig yin dang yod pa'i gtan tshigs gnyis ka nyams pa'i ngag 'brel med de 'dra slob dpon bdag nyid chen po'i gsung la 'byung ba gnas med cing skabs med do''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The statement "though non-afflicted" was made in a general, without applying any specification; and by force of the expression (''tshig gi nus pas'') "like delusion," it was explained that there is a desire which is non-afflicted. But why should [this passage] indicate that there is an afflicted desire, since this does not lie in the meaning of the words? Further, simply a statement of the thesis "why does not exist" was given, preceded by the example and the removal of qualms.<ref>This refers to the example of delusion (''saṃmoha''/''kun rmongs'') mentioned in BCA IX.47d and the qualms of the opponent that were raised in BCA IX.47ab and refuted in 47cd.</ref> But there is no place or time at which such unrelated words, which are faulty in relation to both, to the thing which exists and to the proof of [its] existence, appeared in the teachings of the Ācārya, the Mahātma.
}}
Mi pham emphasises that the expression "though non-afflicted" in
BCA IX.47c must be understood as a general statement, and not – as Rgyal
tshab suggested – as a specific determination according to the Abhidharma
tradition.<ref>See above, p.132, and ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 236.2–6.</ref> As in his earlier statement, he again opposes the position that this line of the BCA indicates the acceptance of two kinds of desires, one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted, according to the Abhidharma tradition. Instead, he argues that Śāntideva's explanations refer only to non-afflicted desire. The Dge lugs understanding, which includes afflicted desire, is seen as an untenable deviation from the intention of Śāntideva, here called "the Ācārya, the Mahātma."

As shown, Mi pham's commentary explicitly criticises the Dge lugs interpretation of this passage of the BCA in terms of both its general aim and function, and of its resulting literal interpretation, and it is this disapproval of Mi pham's that forms the focal point of Rab gsal's later criticism.

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
Rab gsal begins his criticism with a statement of the "opponent's position" (''phyogs snga''), for which he quotes the passage of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', where Mi pham refuted the general idea that this passage does not refer to Arhats, as well as the specific interpretation of ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest ''kleśas'', as a deviation from the authoritative Indian tradition.<ref>I.e., ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6, see earlier, p.136.</ref> In the course of Rab gsal's refutation, Mi pham's other critical remarks on the Dge lugs interpretation of BCA IX.47 are also addressed. Among the various issues raised in the development of the controversies, we will focus on the following three main aspects: the general problem of the context and aim of this passage, i.e., whether Śāntideva's explanations refer to (true) Arhats or not, and the two problems of literal interpretation that are connected to the general perception of this passage, i.e., Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation of the ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest and the assertion that BCA IX.47cd refers to two kinds of desire (''sred pa''), one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted, which should be accepted in the Abhidharma tradition.

The first problem is mainly addressed in the first two sections of Rab gsal's criticism. In the first section, he quotes passages from Prajñākaramati's commentary, as well as from Mi pham's ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' which – according to Rab gsal – imply that the religious adept under consideration grasps [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') and hence cannot be a true Arhat.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 384.4–385.6 (JL III.1).</ref> This thought is continued in the second section,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 385.6–386.3 (JL III.2).</ref> where Rab gsal accuses Mi pham that he as well – in his explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 35.3–6.</ref> – would regard worldly meditation as the example, mentioned in BCA IX.49c, and the path that is endowed with the aspects of the truths as it is explained in the Abhidharma – or, more precisely, the state of mind that is attained through this path – as what it serves as an example for (''dpe can'').<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 385.6: ''<i>'</i>jig rten pa'i bsam gtan ni dpe dang''/ ''mngon pa nas bshad pa'i bden rnam can gyi lam ni dpe can du byed pa''.</ref> If such is true, then Śāntideva's descriptions refer to a worldly religious adept, but not to a true Arhat, Rab gsal concludes.

Later in his criticism,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 387.3ff.</ref> Rab gsal addresses the issue of whether the
''kleśas'' mentioned in BCA IX.46a should be interpreted to refer exclusively
to manifest ''kleśas''. It is in this discussion that Rab gsal points out clearly
which religious adepts he has in mind with regard to this passage. Referring to a quote of the ''Āryadhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra'' (''<i>'</i>Phags pa bsam gtan pa'i dpe mkhyud kyi mdo'') in Candrakīrti's ''Prasannapadā'', he explains that these adepts are known as Arhats according to the Abhidharma tradition. Since they perceive phenomena as truly established, it is, however, not accepted in the Prāsaṅgika tradition that they have completely abandoned the ''kleśas'' that are explained in the Abhidharma tradition.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 387.3–4: ''da ni mngon 'gyur pa zhes gsungs pa'i dgongs pa zab mo sbran par bya ste''/ ''bsam gtan dpe 'khyud kyi mdo tshig gsal du bkod pa'i dgongs pa ltar''/ ''mngon pa nas dgra bcom par grags shing 'dir de dag gi don bsdus pa bden grub tu dmigs pa dang bcas pa des lugs 'dir mngon pa nas bshad pa'i nyon mongs de dag spangs pa ma yin te''/.</ref> Rather, the ''kleśas'' that are abandoned by such practitioners are limited to manifest ''kleśas'' alone.

With regard to the general issue of relating this passage to Arhats, Rab gsal acknowledges that such is accepted in the Indian commentaries on BCA IX. 46d, but opposes this interpretation as one that contradicts the root text of the BCA:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 389.3–4: ''rgya 'grel dag tu'ang las kyi nus pa mthong ba dgra bcom la sbyar ba rtsa ba'i gong 'og gi 'brel dang 'gal ba'i phyir na''/ ''rje thams cad mkhyen pas ji bzhin rang lugs su ma mdzad de''/ ''lung rnams ni sgra ji bzhin yin min dpyod pa'i gzhi yin zhing''/ ''dri ma med pa'i rigs pas gtan la 'beb par'' [A ''pa''] ''dgongs pa'i phyir''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the Indian commentaries too, "seeing a capacity of ''karman''" (BCA IX.46d) is related to Arhats. But as [such] is against the connection between the earlier and later [verses] of the root text, the Omniscient Lord (i.e., Tsong kha pa) did not accept it in this way in his own tradition, as he was of the opinion that the scriptures are the basis of investigating whether [the meaning] is literal or not and that [the meaning] is to be established by immaculate reasoning.

}}
Rab gsal argues that even the authoritative Indian scriptures must be
investigated as to whether they have to be understood literally or whether
they point to a meaning that is different from the literal one. This is the task
of reasoning, which outshines the mere reference to authoritative scriptures:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 389.5: ''des rgya gzhung mang pos bshad zer ba yang sgrub byed du mi che ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, even to say that [such] was explained by many Indian scriptures is not a compelling reason.
}}
The overall context of this passage is also an issue in the final discussion
of the last two sections on this topic.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 393.6–394.2 (JL III.6f) and 395.1–396.2 (JL III.7f).</ref> Here, Rab gsal points out that this
is the context where it is proven that Arhats need to realise emptiness. The ''kleśas'', such as desire and so on, are the opposite of the realisation of emptiness; ''karman'' then arises from these ''kleśas'' and leads to further rebirth. For
a true Arhat, however, the first element of this sequence of consequences,
the presence of desire, is not given.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 393.6–394.1: ''<i>'</i>dir stong nyid rtogs dgos par bsgrub pa skabs su babs pas de'i ldog phyogs nyon mongs dang''/ ''des dbang gis bsags pa'i las dang''/ ''<i>'</i>bras bu skye srid 'byung ba'i tshul dpyad pa 'brel la''/ ''mo'u 'gal gyi las de lta bu la sred pa'ang mi dgos pas'' [...].</ref> Seeking support from Candrakīrti's
''Madhyamakavatāra'', he reiterates his position of reading this passage as a
proof that suchness (''de nyid'') is not realised by the opponents' understanding of the Four Truths that is based on the Abhidharma, but that these still
grasp things as truly established and hence develop desire etc.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 395.3–4: ''khyod kyis bden pa mthong bas de nyid rtogs pa'i go mi chod pa dang''/ ''gzugs tshor bden par dmigs nas 'jug pas slar yang sred pa 'dod chags ’dren pa dang''/ [...].</ref>

The first aspect of the literal interpretation, the meaning of the ''kleśas'' mentioned in BCA IX.46a, has already been addressed in the general discussion about the role of this passage. Even though the second problem, the interpretation of BCA IX.47, is discussed extensively by Rab gsal, we will limit our presentation to a single issue, namely Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation that this verse makes reference to two different desires accepted in the Abhidharma tradition, one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted. In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Mi pham criticised this position by arguing that one cannot accept "various desires deriving from various [kinds of] simultaneous self-grasping in the [mental] continuum of a single person.”<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 43.1: ''skyes bu gcig gi rgyud na dus mnyam pa'i bdag 'dzin du mas drangs pa'i sred pa du ma yod pa 'gal la''/.</ref> Rab gsal counters this accusation, arguing that there is no such fault, since the two desires mentioned are not manifest; Mi pham's criticism would, however, backfire on certain aspects of his own doctrinal system:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 390.3: ''bdag 'dzin dang sred pa mngon gyur par ma nges pas 'dir skyon du mi 'gyur mod''/ ''khyed cag lugs 'dir kun gzhi dang nyon yid khas blangs pas de ltar skyon brjod pa mkhas pa'i mdun sar ngo tsha spangs pa ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Since self-grasping and desire are not ascertained as manifest, there is no fault. But, as ''ālaya'' and ''kliṣṭamanas'' are accepted in this tradition of yours, mentioning such a fault [means] giving up [any sense of] shame within the community of scholars.
}}
Rab gsal understood Mi pham's remarks as an argument against the
simultaneous presence of two different cognitive modes in a single mental
continuum, and introduces a new topic by countering that this is also in
contradiction to the simultaneous presence of ''ālaya'' ("basis consciousness")
and ''kliṣṭamanas'' ("afflicted consciousness") – two types of consciousness
that are commonly accepted in Yogācāra works apart from the six types
of consciousness connected to the individual senses<ref>These six types of consciousness are: eye consciousness (''mig gi rnam shes''), ear consciousness (''rna ba'i rnam shes''), nose consciousness (''sna yi rnam shes''), tongue consciousness (''lce'i rnam shes''), body consciousness (''lus kyi rnam shes''), and mind consciousness (''yid kyi rnam shes''); see ''Dung dkar tshig mdzod'':''tshogs drug phyir ma spro''.</ref> – that Mi pham accepts.

In his later explanations,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.3–393.2 (JL III.6c).</ref> Rab gsal opposes Mi pham's criticism that BCA IX.47cd teaches only the presence of non-afflicted desire, but not also of afflicted desire, as claimed in the Dge lugs tradition.<ref>See earlier, p.138, and ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 43.3–5.</ref> Rab gsal's argument is that by applying the particle "this" (''<i>'</i>di'')<ref>As explained earlier (see p.129, in particular), Rab gsal, as well as Mi pham, understand the pronoun "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') to be related to "desire."</ref> to "desire," its correlative – "that" (''de'') desire – is also implied, the earlier being non-afflicted and the latter afflicted.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.6–393.1: ''sred 'di zhes bkar'' [? A ''pa gal'', BC ''bkal''] ''te khyod kyis 'dod pa'i nyon mongs can min yang''/ ''kun rmongs bzhin zhes pha rol po la grags pa'i dpe bstan pa'i phyir''/ ''<i>'</i>dir pha rol pos med zer rgyu'i sred pa zhig bstan la''/ ''<i>'</i>di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''kho'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas'' [...].</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
In his response, Mi pham does not deal with the arguments concerning the
general question of relating this passage to (true) Arhats, which Rab gsal
set forth in the first two sections of his criticism in great detail. As a mere
summary, Mi pham replies that he indeed shares the understanding that
worldly meditation (''<i>'</i>jig rten pa'i bsam gtan'') is the example, and the path that
is endowed with the aspects of the [Four] Truths (''bden rnam can gyi lam'') is
what it serves as an example for (''dpe can'') in this passage of the BCA. There
is, however, no need to specify this path as the one that is "explained in the Abhidharma" (''mngon pa nas bshad pa'') – as Rab gsal suggested – , for it would be a great depreciation of the Abhidharma tradition to assume that its practitioners necessarily cannot attain true realisation.<ref>Cf. ''Rab lan'' 216.4–6 (RL III.1).</ref>

This vindication of the Abhidharma tradition is continued in the next
section. Rab gsal pointed out that the passage of the BCA – similarly to
the quote from the ''Āryadhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra'' – refers to "Arhats as known in the Abhidharma," who have only abandoned manifest ''kleśas''. Mi pham, in contrast, emphasises the falsity of this position:<ref>''Rab lan'' 219.3–5: ''bsam gtan dpe mkhyud kyi mdo nas gsungs pa de dang 'dra bar deng sang bod du bzhugs pa'i mdo 'ga' zhig las gsungs pa rnams ni rtogs pa ma thob pa'i dgra bcom pa mngon pa'i nga rgyal can yin par gsal la''/ ''mngon pa nas bshad pa'i lam nyams su len tshad la sbyar nas skur 'debs mi bzad pa byed pa shin tu mi rigs te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Similarly to the statement in the ''Āryadhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra'', statements in some ''sūtras'' that exist in Tibet nowadays make it clear that an Arhat who did not attain realisation has self-conceit (''mngon pa'i nga rgyal''). Applying [such] to all practitioners of the path that is explained in the Abhidharma, and [thus] depreciating [the Abhidharma tradition] in a terrible way, is, however, utterly improper.
}}
Mi pham clarifies that Arhats without realisation are not Arhats, even
in the Abhidharma tradition. These have "self-conceit" (''mngon pa'i nga rgyal''), meaning that they imagine having attained a state that they actually have not attained. Such adepts also have not practised the path of the Four Truths properly, since this practice does indeed lead to true realisation, as Mi pham emphasises. It is these adepts that appear as the opponents of the teachings of emptiness in the beginning of this passage (BCA IX.41). The later explanations, BCA IX.45ff., then refer to true Arhats, who – owing to their realisation – would not oppose emptiness.<ref>''Rab lan'' 219.2–222.2 (RL III.2a).</ref>

Earlier, Rab gsal justified the Dge lugs deviation from the Indian commentarial tradition, which relates BCA IX.46d to Arhats, as an interpretation
that is based on reasoning and not simply on scripture. Mi pham accepts
Rab gsal's general argument and acknowledges the role of reasoning in
understanding the meaning of the scriptures.<ref>''Rab lan'' 227.6: ''lung don rigs pas dpyad nas rigs pas 'thad pa yang dag pa mthong na rigs pa dbang btsan dgos par bshad pa ltar bdag cag gis kyang de ltar 'dod nas dpyad pa la zhugs pa yin no''/.</ref> He implies, however, that
the true reason for Rab gsal's position is simply that confirmation of the
Dge lugs interpretation cannot be found in the Indian tradition, and mocks
Rab gsal for placing his own understanding above that of the Indian masters:<ref>''Rab lan'' 227.1–2: ''rgya gzhung du mar ma bshad ces brjod rgyu ma rnyed nas''/ ''rgya gzhung rtsom pa'i paṇ chen de rnams kyis rtsa ba'i gong 'og gi 'brel dang 'gal ba ma mkhyen pas de dag gi lung tsam skyabs su mi rung bar khas blangs''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Having got no opportunity to say "not explained in various Indian texts," [you] claim that the great masters who composed the Indian texts did not know that [such an interpretation] is against the connection between the earlier and later [verses] of the root text, and hence their mere scriptures are not appropriate as a refuge.
}}
In the two answers related to the general embedding of this passage
of the BCA,<ref>''Rab lan'' 242.5–244.4 (RL III.6f) and 250.2–251.6 (RL III.7f).</ref> Mi pham rejects Rab gsal's position that a true Arhat has no desire and resulting ''karman''. Even though there is no further "nourishment" (''gsos 'debs''), no propelling effect with regard to the future, after the state of an Arhat has been attained, the present body of this Arhat is the result of desire and hence also the ''karman'' that ripens in this body is based on earlier desire, Mi pham explains.<ref>''Rab lan'' 242.6–243.1: ''dgra bcom thob zin nas sred pas gsos 'debs dgos pa ma yin gyi''/ ''sku tshe de'i lus 'phen byed kyi sred pas sngar gsos btab pa'i rten de la rdzogs byed kyi las smin pa yang sngar sred pas gsos ma btab par mi 'gyur te''/.</ref> At the very end of the discussion of this topic, Mi pham clarifies again the varying positions on the general role of this passage:<ref>''Rab lan'' 250.6–251.2: ''snga rabs pa'i rjes 'brangs bdag cag gis ni mngon pa nas bshad pa ltar bden pa mthong ba'i rang lam gyi de nyid rtogs pas go chod par sgrub la''/ ''khyed cag gis mi chod par bsgrub la''/ ''bdag cag gis stong pa nyid rdzogs par rtogs pa theg chen gyi rtogs rigs thun mong min par
sgrub''/ ''khyed cag gis rdzogs par rtogs kyang nyan rang dang thun mong ba'i lam du sgrub la''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=We, the followers of the Snga rabs pa [tradition], maintain that the specific path of seeing the truth, as it is explained in the Abhidharma, counts as the realisation of suchness, whilst you maintain that it does not count [as such]. We maintain that the complete realisation of emptiness is the mode of realisation peculiar to the Mahāyāna, whilst you maintain also complete realisation [of emptiness] as path that is shared in common with Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.
}}
As Mi pham's rhetoric suggests, the diverging approaches to the perception of this specific passage of the BCA are part of fundamental doctrinal differences between Mi pham's Snga rabs pa and Rab gsal's Phyi rabs pa traditions.<ref>For the distinction of Snga rabs pa and Phyi rabs pa scholars among Tibetan Mādhyamika, see earlier, p. f.</ref> The divide between Mi pham's and Rab gsal's interpretations is not the result of personal choice, but is institutionalised, having its basis in the respective religious affiliation of the candidates.

With regard to the literal interpretation of BCA IX.47cd, Mi pham clarifies that his initial criticism in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' was not intended to refute the simultaneous presence of different cognitive modes as Rab gsal had understood Mi pham to be saying.<ref>''Rab lan'' 228.1–229.2 (RL III.4b).</ref> Rather, Mi pham was objecting to the Dge lugs understanding that relates this passage to two different desires that derive from two different types of self-grasping. He emphasises that there is only the desire that arises from the innate view of the transitory [collection to be the self] (''<i>'</i>jig lta lhan skyes''), but no desire that would arise from other types of the view of the transitory [collection to be the self] (''<i>'</i>jig lta'').<ref>''Rab lan'' 228.1–2.</ref> Mi pham then contests Rab gsal's defence of the Dge lugs interpretation, in which Rab gsal pointed out that the two desires are not specified as manifest (''mngon gyur''), implying that the two desires are not actually present as two simultaneous modes. Mi pham argues that this specification is not necessary – it would follow from the context that the BCA speaks about manifest desire. Further, a simultaneous presence of different cognitive modes is not at all contradictory, but is commonly assumed in various contexts, not only with regard to ''ālaya'' and ''kliṣṭamanas'', but also for the group of the six types of consciousness (''tshogs drug'') that are commonly accepted, explains Mi pham in defence of his tradition.<ref>Cf. ''Rab lan'' 228.4–5: ''kun gzhi dang nyon yid du ma zad tshogs drug gi shes pa la'ang 'dzin stangs mi 'dra ba du ma mngon gyur dus mnyam du yod pa sus kyang mi khegs mod bkag don kyang med la''/.</ref>

Mi pham also opposes Rab gsal's later explanations, in which the latter expounded the Dge lugs acceptance of two desires as based on the correlation of the two pronouns "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') and "that" (''de'').<ref>''Rab lan'' 238.4–242.1 (RL III.6c).</ref> He quotes the relevant passage of Rab gsal's text and points out that these explanations do not add any new information to what was said earlier. Rab gsal's elaborations allegedly displayed, however, the fault that desire, specified as "this desire" (BCA IX.47c), is described as being both afflicted and non-afflicted.<ref>''Rab lan'' 241.3–5: ''yang sred 'di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''phyir rgol ba'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas zhes smos pa phyir rgol gyi dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin pa dang min pa gnyis ka yin zer ba 'di spar mar 'dug pas tshig chad pa 'dra min na dngos su bsnyon dor gyi gtam ya mtshan pa dngos so''//.</ref> Mi pham obviously misunderstands the attributes "afflicted" and "non-afflicted" to be related to one single desire, a mistake that – among other issues – will be addressed in Rab gsal's response.

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
As Mi pham before, Rab gsal also gives a summarising answer to the general problem of the context and role of this passage and the question of
whether it refers to Arhats or not. Instead of a detailed treatment of every single line of argument given in the earlier texts, he points to some inconsistencies he finds in Mi pham's writings. One contradiction is that Mi pham explained in the Rab lan that the ''karman'' of the religious adept under consideration is the result of earlier desire, while in other passages he had spoken of desire – even though non-afflicted – that is present now. He reproaches Mi pham, saying that the latter's explanations of the exact understanding of the desire that is mentioned in BCA IX.47c are unclear: do these explanations refer to desire as a part of the twelve links of dependent origination – and as such to afflicted desire – or to non-afflicted desire? According to Mi pham's position, so Rab gsal argues, the abandonment of desire would entail the requirements for complete buddhahood, i.e., the abandonment of obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''), and not only of obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''), which is accepted as sufficient for attaining the state of an Arhat.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 437.1–3: ''sher ṭika tu dgra bcom pa'i rgyud kyi sred pa zhes dang''/ ''sred pa nyon mongs can min pa ci ste med ces bris kyang''/ ''zab snang 'dir'' [B ''<i>'</i>di''] ''da lta'i sred pa med kyang sngar gyi sred pas gsos btab ces kyang bris''/ ''yang 'di ltar'' [C ''star'']/ ''yan lag bcu gnyis kyi sred pa nyon mongs can yin pa bden''/ ''<i>'</i>on kyang sred pa nyon mongs can min pa yod zer''/ ''<i>'</i>o na da lta'i sred pa zhes ci la sbyar''/ ''khyod ltar na sred pa spangs pa la'' [B ''las''] ''sangs rgyas dgos pas''/ [...].</ref>

In contrast, Rab gsal offers a lengthy discussion<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 438.3–439.2.</ref> of the status of ''ālaya'' and ''svasaṃvedana'' ("self-awareness"),<ref>Self-awareness, sometimes also translated as "reflexive awareness," refers to a cognition that is conscious about its content.</ref> an issue that is not connected directly to the present passage of the BCA, but that was introduced by Rab gsal while refuting Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation of BCA IX.47cd. Since this topic is not central to the passage under discussion, we will not deal with it in more detail. Rab gsal's commitment to this problem is, however, easily explained: the rejection of ''ālaya'' and ''svasaṃvedana'' is one of the key doctrines in the Dge lugs understanding of the Prāsaṅgika view, expressed, for example, in the first chapter of the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad''.<ref>See Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 159ff.</ref> Mi pham's position<ref>This position of Mi pham is commonly known, it is also explicitly formulated, for example, in ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 22.2–3: "It must be understood that all existing lines of reasoning that negate ''svasaṃvedana'' negate [it] with regard to the absolute level, similar to the reasoning that negates the ''skandhas'' etc., but it is not the case that is is utterly non-existent in the sense that it is negated with regard to the conventional level. It is said that in this tradition [of the Prāsaṅgika], ''svasaṃvedana'' is also not assumed with regard to the conventional level, but in this [tradition of the Prāsaṅgika, ''svasaṃvedana''] is [actually] neither negated nor established on the conventional level, it is only the case that it is negated with regard to the absolute level." (''rang rig 'gog pa'i rigs pa ji snyed pa thams cad phung sogs 'gog pa'i rigs pa bzhin du don dam par 'gog gi tha snyad du bkag pa'i gtan med ma yin par shes dgos shing''/ ''lugs 'dir tha snyad du’ang rang rig kun gzhi khas mi len zer yang 'dir tha snyad du ni dgag pa'ang med la sgrub pa'ang med kyi'' [C ''kyi'' om.] ''don dam par bkag pa kho na yin no''/)</ref> of accepting ''ālaya'' and ''svasaṃvedana'' with regard to the conventional level must, therefore, have appeared rather offensive to his Dge lugs opponent.

Under the heading "eliminating wrong conceptions" (''log rtog bsal ba''),<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 455.6.</ref> Rab gsal exposes Mi pham's accusation that Rab gsal's earlier explanations assumed the desire mentioned in BCA IX.47c to be both afflicted and non-afflicted as being based on a misunderstanding.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 459.2ff. (GC III.1h).</ref> He makes clear that the attributes "afflicted" and "non-afflicted" refer to two different desires, as indicated by the correlative "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') and "that" (''de''). As this interpretation is – at least for Rab gsal – obvious from his earlier explanations, he mocks Mi pham with irony for having misunderstood his clear descriptions:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 459.3–4: ''pha rol pas 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin min gnyis gzhi tha dad kyang go stobs che bas ma shes par snang la''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The two, [desire] that is afflicted and [desire] that is not-afflicted according to the position of the opponent, have a different basis. It appears, however, that [you] did not understand [this] with [your] great power of comprehension.
}}
Clearly, this last issue is of minor importance, and it is therefore not surprising that Mi pham does not continue this specific discussion in his last answer. But, although the other topics – the general conception of this passage of the BCA and its relation to Arhats, and the status of ''ālaya'' and ''svasaṃvedana'' that appear in the course of the controversies – pertain to fundamental doctrinal questions, none of these issues is taken up in Mi pham's last answer. It seems that, for Mi pham, these differences were established in the doctrines of the respective religious traditions – as he pointed out in his earlier response<ref>See earlier, p.144.</ref> – and hence could not be easily changed even by continued debate.


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<h3>Synopsis</h3>
The central issues in the controversies connected to this topic are the questions of the overall role of the passage BCA IX.41–49 and whether the descriptions of religious adepts lacking a realisation of emptiness found in the later part of this passage, BCA IX.45–49, refer to (true) Arhats or not.

In the Dge lugs tradition, represented by Rgyal tshab's commentary on the BCA, but also by Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'', which discusses the relevant verses of the BCA in detail, this passage was read as a proof that realisation of emptiness is required for attaining the state of an Arhat. As such, this passage became important for key elements in the Dge lugs conception of Prāsaṅgika doctrine, such as the realisation of emptiness of Śrāvaka- and Pratyekabuddha-Arhats and the distinction between obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib'') and obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''), presented systematically in the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', the standard definition of Prāsaṅgika thought as it is conceived in the Dge lugs tradition.

Mi pham, in contrast, read this passage as a proof of the supremacy of the Mahāyāna over the Hīnayāna tradition, whereby the latter's inferiority is established as a lack of (complete) understanding of emptiness. Śāntideva's descriptions of religious adepts that lack this realisation in BCA IX.45–49 must therefore refer to Arhats, an interpretation that is also supported by the Indian commentaries. According to Mi pham, the Dge lugs understanding of this passage is seen as a misinterpretation that neglects the Indian tradition to save its own doctrinal stance:<ref>''Rab lan'' 250.5–6: ''sher le'i tshigs bcad 'di skabs nyan rang la stong nyid rdzogs par rtogs pa med pa'i khungs su che bas rang lugs kyi khas blangs la gnod dogs'' [C ''dwogs''] ''pas don gzhan du 'dren pa'i 'chad tshul gsar pa zhig mdzad pa''.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The section of these verses of the "Chapter of Insight" (i.e., the ninth chapter of the BCA) is important as a source for the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas' lack of complete realisation of emptiness. Therefore, since [you] worried about harm for the position of your own tradition, [you] created a new way of explanation that pulled [the original] to a different meaning.
}}
Mi pham thus attacked the Dge lugs interpretation explicitly in his commentary on the BCA. In so doing, he addressed not only the general issue of whether this passage refers to Arhats or not, but also refuted specific ways of literal interpretation of certain verses that had been chosen in the Dge lugs tradition, most importantly in connection to BCA IX.46 and 47.

Naturally, this disapproval of Mi pham's formed the main subject of Rab gsal's criticism, who had to rebuke Mi pham's remarks in order to defend the tradition of his forebears. In his perception, Mi pham's explanations are merely "a slipping out of harsh words (''brdab tshig'') that – driven by the wind of conceptions and bad ''karman''"<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 384.5: ''rnam rtog las ngan rlung gis bdas'' [AC ''brdas''] ''pa'i brdab tshig shor ba''.</ref> – have pursued a dwelling in the Crushing Hell (''bsdus 'joms dmyal ba''),<ref>This is one of the eight hot hells, see ''Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo'':''bsdus 'joms''. Here, this description simply seems to refer to the most miserable state imaginable.</ref> "aimless gossip,"<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 390.4: ''gtad so med pa'i 'chal gtam''.</ref> "a [piece of] ''Bi sha tsi''<ref>Even though slightly different in spelling, this seems to be identical with ''bi sha tse'', a disease that causes paralysis of the hand; cf. Goldstein: ''bi sha tse''. This might allude to Mi pham's own physical condition; he often complained about being troubled by physical impairment. See, for example, ''Rab lan'' 463.2.</ref> advice that is neither Indian nor Tibetan,"<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 393.4: ''rgya min bod min gyi bi'' [B ''bu''] ''sha tsi'i gdams pa''.</ref> etc. He even extended his criticism to Mi pham as a person, whom he described as a "great drunkard"<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 386.5: ''ra ro ba chen po''.</ref> and "possessed by the demon of terrible hatred."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.5: ''zhe sdang mi bzad pa'i gdon gyis brlam pa''.</ref>

Among the various issues raised in the controversies, Mi pham's argument that the Indian tradition, too, relates this passage to Arhats (as shown in Prajñākaramati's commentary on BCA IX.46) is of particular importance. Rab gsal did not deny that the Indian commentaries related this passage to Arhats, but he confined the role of scriptural authority: all scriptures must be investigated as to whether they have to be understood literally, or whether they point to a meaning that is different from the literal one, a task that can only be accomplished by the use of reasoning. While Mi pham, in turn, accepted Rab gsal’s argument in general, he was doubtful about its
underlying motivation, suggesting that Rab gsal simply wanted to save his own tradition.

All in all, it seems that both parties persistently insisted on their respective points of view, positions, which were – by both parties – not considered a mere personal choice, but as being based on the firm ground of the respective religious traditions. Other than with regard to the earlier topics, Rab gsal classified the aspects he criticised in Mi pham's commentary as "faults that are raised after examination" (''brtag zin bslang ba'i nyes pa''), thus assuming that the criticism that Mi pham stated against the Dge lugs interpretation was preceded by a process of thorough investigation. In his response, Mi pham described the exegetical differences as being based on
the religious affiliations, that to the Snga rabs pa tradition in the case of Mi pham, and that to the Phyi rabs pa tradition in the case of Rab gsal. For both philosophers, understanding the opponent's position as a part of a larger tradition did, however, not imply that this position was acceptable.

While this is the case for the general issue of relating the relevant passage of the BCA to Arhats, it is also true for the question of the status of ''ālaya'' and ''svasaṃvedana'', a topic that is not directly connected to the current passage of the BCA, but that was introduced into the discussion on it and received much attention, owing to its importance in doctrinal terms.


<h3>Topic IV: Issues Related to BCA IX.2</h3>
Unlike the earlier three topics, this section is not committed primarily to the specific interpretation of a certain passage of the BCA. Instead, a passage from Śāntideva's work serves as a departure point for a more general discussion. In his outline, Rab gsal refers to the issues at stake as "[faults] that are connected to the principle (''tshul'') of ''satyadvaya''."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 384.3: ''bden gnyis kyi tshul du 'brel ba''.</ref> The concept of "satyadvaya" is arguably the most central element in Madhyamaka philosophy (as indicated, for example, by the production of secondary literature dealing explicitly with this idea).<ref>For the Dge lugs conception of ''satyadvaya'', Newland 1992 and Tauscher 1995 are most important. Mention must also be made of Sonam Thakchoe's work about the differences of this central idea between the thought of Tsong kha pa and Go rams pa (Thakchoe 2007). Mi pham's approach to ''satyadvaya'' can be found within more general works on his Madhyamaka philosophy, such as Pettit 1999, Phuntsho 2005, Duckworth 2008, and 2011. Further, I have dealt with Mi pham's presentation of ''satyadvaya'' as it is found specifically in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' – although briefly – in two earlier articles, see Viehbeck 2009a and Viehbeck 2012.</ref> In the secondary literature, ''satyadvaya'' is commonly translated as the "two truths" or "two realities," thus emphasising either its epistemological or ontological aspect. Since both aspects are important in the present discussion, I refrain from translating this technical term and will use the Sanskrit term in order to accommodate all possible conceptions associated with it.<ref>Tauscher 1995: 200–214 gives a detailed discussion of these two aspects and of the problem of rendering ''satya''. As I have stated elsewhere (Viehbeck 2012: 301ff.), Mi pham clearly distinguishes two models of establishing ''satyadvaya'': one describes the two ''satyas'' from an ontological perspective, as mode of existence (''gnas tshul'') and mode of appearances (''snang tshul''), the other endorses an epistemological perspective, conceiving the two ''satyas'' as authentic or inauthentic cognition. See also Duckworth 2008: 6ff. and Duckworth 2010c, for further explanation on these two models.</ref> In the BCA, the concept of ''satyadvaya'' is introduced and most concisely formulated in BCA IX.2:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=''saṃvṛti'' (conventional) and ''paramārtha'' (absolute),<ref>See Viehbeck 2012: 298f.), for a discussion of the problems involved in rendering these technical terms. In the following discussion, these two terms are commonly used to denote a certain level of conversation, i.e., they are used to distinguish whether a statement has been made with a view to an ordinary, commonsense way of describing the world, referred to as ''kun rdzob'' (''saṃvṛti'') or, synonymously as ''tha snyad'' (''vyavahāra''), or whether a statement refers to the true nature or reality of things, being then denoted as ''don dam'' (''paramārtha''). In the later discussion, I will use the tentative translation "conventional" for ''saṃvṛti'' or ''vyavahāra'', and "absolute" for ''paramārtha'', even though I am aware that this rendering excludes other meanings of the terms.</ref> these are considered as the two ''satyas''.
Reality (''tattva'') is not the sphere of mind (''buddhi''); mind is said to be ''saṃvṛti''.<ref>There is a slight discrepancy between the Sanskrit version and the Tibetan version. While Sanskrit ''tattva'' is usually rendered in Tibetan as ''de nyid'', the Tibetan text reads ''don dam'' at this point, which is the Tibetan equivalent of Sanskrit ''paramārtha''. The Dunhuang version of the BCA (cf. Saito 1993: 2) also shows ''don dam'' in the respective passage.</ref>
//''saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ matam''/
''buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtir ucyate''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 352.3–4.</ref>
''kun rdzob dang ni don dam ste''// ''<i>'</i>di ni bden pa gnyis su 'dod''//
''don dam blo yi spyod yul min''// ''blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod''//<ref>BCA (D, fol. 31a1; P, fol. 35a4).</ref>
}}
In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Mi pham's commentary on this specific verse is the most detailed among all verses of the BCA. It starts with a succinct explication of Śāntideva's words and proceeds with a more general introduction to the fundamental features of Mi pham's Madhyamaka thought (issue that are, of course, all related to the principle of ''satyadvaya'', discussed in BCA IX.2). Thereby, Mi pham presented his ideas often in sharp contrast to the way these doctrinal issues were accepted in the mainstream Dge lugs tradition, and was therefore attacked by Rab gsal.<ref>Stated succinctly, one can say that Mi pham's principle critique of the (present) Dge lugs stance of Madhyamaka was that the Dge lugs approach is similar to that of the Svātantrika tradition. Certainly, this must have appeared as a very strong accusation to a philosophical tradition, such as the Dge lugs school, that heavily emphasises the superiority of their own Prāsaṅgika tradition to the Svātantrika; cf. Viehbeck 2012: 308.</ref> Considering the importance of Madhyamaka thought as the supreme philosophical system accepted by all Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the extent to which the two adversaries discussed this fourth topic, in particular, is not surprising. Rab gsal devoted nearly half of his first criticism to the discussion of this topic; this is actually exceeded by Mi pham, whose answer to these issues stretches over two hundred pages, three-quarters of his first reply to Rab gsal. The extension of this topic poses – even more than is the case with the earlier topics – the problem of how its content can be summarised in a reasonable way. In order to decide which individual issues form the core elements of the present topic, I have relied upon Rab gsal's treatment of this topic. In his criticism, Rab gsal formulated the "opponent's position" (''phyogs snga''), a position that is drawn from Mi pham's statements in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' and which formed Rab gsal's principal target, in the following fashion:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 396.5–6: ''ṭikkar''/ ''bden med ni rnam grangs pa'i don dam tsam dang''/ ''mtha' kun dang bral ba'i stong nyid ni rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam nyid yin la''/ ''rang rgyud pa'i gzhung du snga ma dang''/ ''thal 'gyur ba'i gzhung du phyi ma nyid rtsal du bton nas bshad la''/ ''dngos po'i gnas lugs don dam pa'i bden pa ni''/ ''yod med sogs kyi mtha' kun dang bral bas blo yi spyod yul min te''/ ''blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro''// ''zhes zlos so''/. Note that Rab gsal's summary of Mi pham's position is a very close paraphrase of statements in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' and also includes literal quotes.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the ''Ṭikka'' (i.e., the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'')<ref>Rab gsal addresses Mi pham's commentary on the BCA consistently as "''ṭikka''" or "''ṭika''," thereby obviously referring to the Sanskrit word ''ṭīkā'', which is commonly used to denote a commentary on another text.</ref> it is stated: non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') is the mere nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute (''don dam''), and emptiness that is free from all extremes is the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute proper. In the Svātantrika scriptures, explanations are given emphasising the former, and in the Prāsaṅgika scriptures, [explanations are given emphasising] the latter. The way of existence of things, ''paramārthasatya'', is free from all extremes of existence, non-existence, etc., and hence not the sphere (''spyod yul'') of mind (''blo''), since mind and words (''sgra'') are conventional (''kun rdzob''), but are not absolute (''don dam pa'').
}}
Among the many explanations that Mi pham gave in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' (and which are also addressed in the following controversies), Rab gsal chose this as expressing the core of his opponent's view. Altogether, it comprises four principal issues.

Firstly, Mi pham's refutation of a certain conception of emptiness and, secondly, his proposition of an alternative view, both of which issues aim at a correct conception of emptiness. In the summary of his adversary, Mi pham is said to oppose the position that mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') is the ultimate form of emptiness. Instead, he views this non-existence as a provisional conception of emptiness, here denoted as the "nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute." Ultimate emptiness, the "actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute," in contrast, should be free from all proliferations (''spros pa'') and all four extremes, i.e., the extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither.

The third issue discusses how emptiness is conceived of in the two principal traditions of Madhyamaka thought, i.e., the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

The last issue concerns the interpretation of the latter part of BCA IX.2 and the question of whether the absolute can be described as an object of mind (''blo'') and words (''sgra''), or not.

A review of the relevant passages confirms that these four issues can
be seen as the key elements of the controversies, and it is for this reason
that the following presentation of the fourth topic will focus solely on these
selected problems.<ref>This choice, of course, excludes certain topics that are also of importance to the Madhyamaka stance of the two adversaries, and that occur during the development of the controversies; here, mention must be made of the following issues in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'': the "ceasing of mind" (''sems bkag'') at the time of awakening, starting with pp. 406.5–407.2 (JL IV.10); the status of ''svasaṃvedana'' and ''ālaya'', starting with pp. 407.2–408.3 (JL IV.11); the relation between self-grasping (''bdag 'dzin'') with regard to a person and self-grasping with regard to phenomena, starting with p. 408.3–6 (JL IV.12); the difference between the Sūtra and the
Mantra traditions, starting with pp. 408.6–409.6 (JL IV.13).</ref> It will start with an – admittedly brief – glance at the (mainstream) viewpoint on the particular topic in the Dge lugs tradition, and then contrast it with Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', and continue with the development of the debates proper.

<h3>Emptiness as Non-existence of True Establishment (''bden med'')</h3>
Madhyamaka philosophy is intrinsically connected with the idea that all phenomena (''dharma'') are empty (''śūnya''), and hence its proponents are synonymously called Mādhyamika, Śūnya(tā)vādin, or Niḥsvabhāvavādin.<ref>On these terms, see Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 1–3.</ref> There are, however, considerable differences concerning the precise understanding of emptiness. The premise that something is empty leads to the question of what exactly it is empty of or what is negated – or, using the (Tibetan) technical terminology: what is the object of negation/the negandum (''dgag bya'') of Madhyamaka analysis? The specification of, and answer to, this question became a central issue in the Dge lugs school. Its founder, Tsong kha pa, considered the identification (''ngos 'dzin'') of the negandum to be of the utmost importance for the correct understanding of emptiness:<ref>''Lam rim chen mo'' 169.6–9: ''gang zag 'di mi 'dug snyam du nges pa la med rgyu'i gang zag de shes dgos pa ltar''/ ''bdag med pa dang rang bzhin med pa zhes pa'i don nges pa la'ang med rgyu'i bdag dang rang bzhin de legs par ngos zin dgos te''/ ''dgag par bya ba'i spyi legs par ma shar na de bkag pa'ang phyin ci ma log par mi nges pa'i phyir te''/. Translation according to Cutler 2002: 126; see also Wayman 1978: 188f.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In order to be sure that a certain person is not present, you must know the absent person. Likewise, in order to be certain of the meaning of "selflessness" or "the lack of intrinsic existence," you must carefully identify the self, or intrinsic nature, that does not exist. For, if you do not have a clear concept of the object to be negated, you will also not have accurate knowledge of its negation.
}}
According to Tsong kha pa, analytical reasoning and meditative practice in the Madhyamaka tradition must first have a clear understanding of the negandum, that is, an inherent nature or essence (''ngo bo'') that is conceived as "truly established" (''bden grub''), in order to counteract and refute this conception.<ref>For an extensive discussion on the conception of the negandum (''dgag bya'') in Tsong kha pa's writings, see Tauscher 1995: 75ff.</ref> Among the two commonly accepted ways of refutation – a non-implicative negation (''med dgag'') and an implicative negation (''ma yin dgag'') – the Dge lugs tradition accepts the former as corresponding with the highest form of ''paramārtha'' (''satya'').<ref>See Tauscher 1995: 296f. and 308f., for a discussion of these two types of negation in this context. Tauscher 1995: 291–326, especially 323, explains the distinctions of ''paramārtha''(''satya'') in relation to these negations as found in the works of Tsong kha pa.</ref> Emptiness or ''paramārtha'' (''satya'') – as understood in the Dge lugs tradition – can thus be summarised as the "nonexistence of a truly established essence in the form of a non-implicative negation" – or, in the Tibetan terminology, a "''bden med med dgag''."<ref>Newland, in his fundamental study on the concept of ''satyadvaya'' in Dge lugs Madhyamaka, presents this aspect as common to the various types of emptiness that can be distinguished: "All of these emptinesses are non-affirming negatives that are mere absences of inherent existence." (Newland 1992: 160)</ref> This conception of emptiness is also employed by Rgyal tshab in his commentary on BCA IX.2:<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 210.4–6: ''gzhan yang kun rdzob bden pas stong pa yin na bden stong nyid don dam bden par khas blangs pa la gnod pa cung zad kyang med la de min na kun rdzob bden grub tu 'gyur te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Moreover, if the conventional is empty of true [establishment], then the acceptance of this very emptiness of true [establishment] (''bden stong'') as ''paramārthasatya'' can in no way be disproven. If this were not the case, then the conventional would become truly established (''bden grub'').

}}
Again, emptiness as a mere absence of a truly established essence (''bden grub kyi ngo bo'') is described as ''paramārthasatya'', and it is precisely this conception of the ultimate emptiness or absolute as ''bden med med dgag'' that became the object of the controversies between Mi pham and Rab gsal. . . .


<!--
<h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
In his commentary on BCA IX.2,<ref>For a more extensive explanation on this part of Mi pham's commentary, see Viehbeck 2012: 299ff.</ref> Mi pham elaborates on how the absolute in general can be divided into a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the former is only a preparatory step in realising the latter, ultimate form of emptiness:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 4.5–6: ''don dam pa de la'ang skye ba dang gnas pa sogs bkag pa'i skye med dang gnas med sogs med dgag tsam gyi stong pa ni stong nyid chen po mtha' bzhi dang bral ba la 'jug pa'i sgo tsam yin pas rnam grangs pa'i don dam mam''/ ''mthun pa'i don dam zhes brda mdzad de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Also, with regard to the absolute, the emptiness of a mere nonimplicative negation (''med dgag tsam''), i.e., the non-existence of arising and the non-existence of abiding, etc., that negates arising and abiding, etc., is only a door for entering the great emptiness that is free from the four extremes (i.e., existence, nonexistence, both, and neither). That is why the terms "nominal absolute" or "concordant absolute" are used.
}}
This earlier, provisional form of the absolute is emphasised in the Svātantrika tradition, which does not, however, conceive of this "mere nonexistence" as the ultimate absolute:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.1–2: ''rang rgyud pa'i gzhung thams cad du ni''/ ''mdo dang bstan bcos su gzugs sogs med par bkag pa'i rnam pa thams cad''/ ''bden yod tsam 'gog pa'i med rkyang rnam grangs pa'i don du bshad pa mdzad nas''/ ''de las slar med pa nyid kyang gnas lugs mthar thug gi don du mi bzhed de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In all Svātantrika scriptures, all incidences (''rnam pa'') of negating form (''gzugs'') etc. as non-existent in the ''sūtras'' and ''śāstras'' are explained as sheer non-existence, which negates merely the existence of true [establishment], in the sense of the nominal [absolute]. Beyond that, non-existence itself is not assumed in the sense of the ultimate mode of existence.
}}
Even though Mi pham does not formulate his thoughts as a direct criticism of the Dge lugs tradition, his conception of the absolute sharply contrasts with the way in which it is conceived in his opponent's tradition. For Mi pham, emptiness or the absolute in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' refutes only the extreme of existence and corresponds to the merely provisional nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, an absolute that is not accepted as the ultimate absolute in the Svātantrika tradition, let alone in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, which – according to Mi pham – focuses right from the start on the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, refuting all four extremes.

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
Naturally, Mi pham is extensively criticised for his categorisation of emptiness in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' as a provisional concept. Among the many lines of criticism Rab gsal brings forth, I will focus only on five major issues,<ref>In the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'', these topics are JL IV.1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, and 9a.</ref> which include contradictions of various kinds, viz., to the scriptural tradition, to Mi pham's other statements, and to logic, as well as the refutation of possible objections.

Rab gsal starts his criticism by arguing that Mi pham's explanations are not confirmed by the Indian scriptural tradition.<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 396.6–397.3 (JL IV.1a).</ref> He resolutely denies that there could be an absolute that goes beyond the non-existence of true establishment (''bden med''):<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 396.6–397.1: ''bden stong dang bdag med pa las lhag pa'i gnas lugs mthar thug don dam pa ni med de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=An absolute, an ultimate mode of existence (''gnas lugs''), that exceeds emptiness of true [establishment] or selflessness, does not exist.
}}
Such, as Rab gsal elaborates, is proven by the scriptures, which unanimously teach the realisation of selflessness as the ultimate antidote against ''saṃsāra''. This is true not only for the ''sūtra'' and ''śāstra'' literature, such as the Prajñapāramitāsūtras and the corpus of argumentative works on Madhyamaka (''Dbu ma rigs tshogs''), but also for the tantric literature of various kinds, from which Rab gsal quotes short passages in order to prove his point.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.1–3.</ref>

Mi pham's position would further contradict other statements in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', as Rab gsal points out by quoting Mi pham's explanations on BCA IX.45cd:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.3–4: ''khyod kyis'' [...] ''yul stong par mthong ba kho na las gzhan rtsad nas ldog thabs mi srid de zhes dang''/ [...]. Here, Rab gsal quotes ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 35.5.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=You said, "A method for the complete renunciation (from ''saṃsāra'') other than just seeing the object as empty is not possible" [...].
}}
In yet another passage, Mi pham explicitly advocated emptiness in the form of a non-implicative negation (''med dgag'') when emptiness is taught to others:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.1: ''stong pa nyid ston pa'i skabs su gzugs la sogs pa dgag pa ni med dgag kho na yin te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the context of teaching emptiness, the negation of form (''gzugs'') etc. is nothing but a non-implicative negation.
}}
According to Rab gsal, these two passages show a clear contradiction to the position that ''bden med med dgag'' would not be the ultimate form of emptiness.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.3–5 (JL IV.1b)</ref>

Another issue is that Mi pham's position would lead to certain logical contradictions.<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.6–398.1 (JL IV.1d).</ref> If, according to Mi pham, both taking a self to be nonexistent or taking it to be existent led to the respective extremes, then there would be only the option of not grasping anything at all, that is, the nihilistic position that is associated with the character Hwa shang Mahāyāna, as Rab gsal concludes:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.6–398.1: ''de ltar na khyed cag gis bdag med par bzung na med mtha' dang yod par bzung na yod mthar ltung bar bshad pas de lta na gnyis ka min par bzung na gnyis min gyi mthar ltung ba'i phyir''/ ''de'i phyir gang du'ang 'dzin pa med pas ha shang ma hā ya na'i rjes su song ba la the tshom med de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Thus, you explained that one falls into the extreme of nonexistence when one grasps a self as non-existent, and into the extreme of existence when one grasps it as existent. In that way, one falls therefore into the extreme of neither [existence nor non-existence] being the case (''gnyis min'') when one grasps [a self] as neither [existent] nor [non-existent]. For this reason, there is no grasping of anything and hence there is no doubt that [you] follow [the tradition of] Hwa shang Mahāyāna.
}}
A more technical problem with regard to logical issues employed in the discussion is the law of double negation, i.e., the principle that a negation of a negation leads to the positive that was negated in the first place.<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.2–3 (JL IV.2a).</ref> Since Mi pham had accepted this law in another context in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'',<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 23.6.</ref> Rab gsal demands that he should also accept it in the present context. If, however, non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') is seen as an extreme and hence negated, then one would naturally arrive at true establishment (''bden grub''):<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.2–3: ''rang gsod pa'i mtshon cha rang gis brdar ba ste''/ ''bden med du med na bden grub dang''/ ''bden grub ma yin pa min na'ang bden grub tu 'gyur ba'i phyir''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=As [something] would be truly established if it does not exist in the form of the non-existence of true establishment and [something] would also be truly established if it is not not-truly established, you are sharpening the weapon that kills you yourself.
}}
In a later part of his criticism,<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 405.2–5 (JL IV.9a), for the complete argument.</ref> Rab gsal addresses a possible objection to the Dge lugs understanding of emptiness. An opponent might use the famous verse BCA IX.35<ref>According to legend, it was during the recitation of this verse that Śāntideva rose to
the sky, disappearing from the sight of his audience. Thus, the narrative is cosely connected to the philosophical content of the respective verse, which propagates the dissolution of all mental references; cf. Pind 1983: 173f.<br>{{6nbsp}}For a detailed discussion of this verse, including its various Tibetan interpretations, see Williams 2000b: 21ff.</ref> as a counter-argument against the Dge lugs position:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=When neither being (''bhāva'') nor non-being (''abhāva'') abides before the mind
Then, as there is no other possibility, it is without reference, completely pacified.
''yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ''/
''tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati''//<ref>Cf. BCAP 417.13–14.</ref>
''gang tshe dngos dang dngos med dag''/ ''blo yi mdun na mi gnas pa''//
''de tshe rnam pa gzhan med pas''// ''dmigs pa med par rab tu zhi''//<ref>Cf. BCA (D, fol. 32a4; P, fol. 36b3)</ref>
}}
Clearly, this verse negates non-existence as a mental object for someone who has realised emptiness. An opponent might therefore argue that the Dge lugs understanding of emptiness as non-existence (of true establishment) is in contradiction to Śāntideva's explanations. As Rab gsal points out, such an objection is based on a misinterpretation of this verse: in this verse a specific point in time was mentioned, and it would be misleading to think that non-existence was a mental object before this point in time and ceased to be later. Rather, non-existence – or emptiness – appears as a distant object at first – in the context of study and reflection (''thos bsam'') –, whereas later – by means of (''śamatha'' and ''vipaśyanā'') meditative cultivation – dualistic appearances (''gnyis snang'') are gradually cleared away: the
experiencing mind and its object are not separated, but emptiness is experienced in a non-dual (''gnyis su med pa'') and direct way, Rab gsal elaborates, thus explaining his position on the process of realising emptiness.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 405.2–4: ''<i>'</i>o na sngar mdun du gnas la phyis mi gnas pa zhig tu thal''/ ''gang tshe zhes dus ngos bzung ba'i phyir''// ''des na 'di ltar''/ ''sngar thos bsam gyi dus na yul yul can rgyang'' [A ''rgyangs''] ''chad 'brel med pa ltar snang''/ ''de nas zhi lhag gis rim gyis gnyis snang sbyangs te''/ ''sems dang gnyis su med pa lta bu dang gnyis su med pa'i snang ba 'byung ste''/.</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
Mi pham's answers to Rab gsal's criticism concerning this fourth topic tend
to be much more detailed than those concerning the earlier topics; they
often contain lengthy explanations of his stance on a particular problem
of Madhyamaka thought. Naturally, the present summary can only cover
limited aspects of these topics.

Mi pham's first answer<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 254.1–292.6 (RL IV.1a).</ref> counters the first two of Rab gsal’s accusations mentioned above, and his more detailed treatment of it is especially noteworthy: Mi pham devotes almost forty pages especially to showing that his view on emptiness is in accordance with the Indian scriptures. Mi pham agrees with Rab gsal's principle objection, that there is no absolute "that exceeds emptiness of true [establishment] or selflessness." This thought is also expressed in the passages from the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' that Rab gsal quoted in his second objection to show that Mi pham as well propounds emptiness in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' and hence contradicts his later explanations. For Mi pham, this apparent contradiction seems to be based on a misunderstanding of his precise position, which he clarifies in what follows. According to him, it is important to distinguish two different ways of conceiving the absolute: one takes the emptiness of eliminating only limited extremes, namely the conception of true establishment (''bden grub''), as the ultimate absolute, whereas the other takes ultimate emptiness to refer to the elimination of all extremes and proliferations (''spros pa''). According to the latter approach, one understands all phenomena to be devoid of an inherent nature (''rang bzhin''), but then proceeds to a state that is free from references. This kind of absolute is the object of non-conceptual gnosis (''mi rtog pa'i ye shes'') alone. In the former approach, one refutes the extreme of true establishment (''bden grub''), but then remains at a conceptual state, grasping the characteristic (''mtshan ma'') of non-existence.<ref>''Rab lan'' 257.1–2: ''<i>'</i>dus byas 'dus ma byas kyi chos thams cad rang bzhin med par shes nas dmigs pa'i spros pa kun las 'das pa'i de kho na nyid kyi yul can rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes la reg pa dang''/ ''der ma son par bden grub tsam khegs'' [C ''kheg''] ''kyang de nyid la dngos po med pa'i mtshan mar zhen nas spros pa nyi tshe ba bkag tsam gyi stong nyid la'' [C ''stong nyid la'' om.] ''stong nyid mthar thug'' [C ''thug'' om.] ''tu 'dzin pa'i go tshul gnyis yod pas na''/ [...].</ref> Mi pham emphasises that he had thus never opposed the non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') in general, but only a view of ultimate emptiness that involves proliferations:<ref>''Rab lan'' 257.2–4: ''spyir bden med dang stong nyid dang bdag med kyi don gnas lugs ma yin no zhes nam yang mi brjod kyang''/ ''spros pa mtha' dag ma khegs pa'i spros pa can gyi lta ba de dag yum nas bshad pa'i stong pa nyid mthar thug pa ma yin zhes bdag cag gis gsar du smras pa ma yin te''/ ''ston pa bcom ldan 'das rjes 'brangs dang bcas pas gsungs pa yin pas bdag cag ston pa'i rjes su 'brangs nas de ltar smra'o''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=It was never said, in general, that the meaning of non-existence of true [establishment] (''bden med''), emptiness, or selflessness does not refer to the mode of existence (''gnas lugs''). However, we did not proclaim anew that the views that contain proliferations (''spros pa''), that did not refute the entire proliferations, are not the ultimate emptiness that is explained in the Mother (i.e., the ''Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra''), since this was declared by the Teacher, the Bhagavan, together with his followers. Hence, we proclaim such by following the Teacher.
}}
According to Mi pham, this position is also attested in the Indian scriptural tradition. Countering Rab gsal's first objection, in which he claimed that Mi pham would be in contradiction to the scriptures, Mi pham provides an extensive list of altogether more than one hundred and fifty passages from numerous scriptures to prove his understanding of ultimate emptiness or the absolute as being beyond proliferations (''spros pa'') and conceptualisation (''rtog pa''). Following the sequence of Rab gsal's criticism, these passages are listed in the following order: Prajñāpāramitā-literature (pp. 257–259), other ''sūtras'', mainly from the last cycle of teachings, (pp. 259–280), ''śāstra''-literature in its historical order (pp. 280–287), ''tantras'' (pp. 288–291), tantric literature in the form of ''dohās'' (pp. 291–292).

The distinction of two different ways of conceiving the absolute is
also important in Mi pham's response<ref>Cf. ''Rab lan'' 295.4–302.5 (RL IV.1c).</ref> to Rab gsal's accusation that Mi pham's position would equate to the nihilistic position of Hwa shang. As Mi pham points out, there are different approaches to eliminating extreme positions. Among those, the (''Dge lugs'') approach of countering the extremes of permanence and annihilation (''rtag chad'') through the realisation of the non-existence of true establishment (''bden grub pa med pa'') and the existence [of things] on the conventional level (''tha snyad du yod pa''), however, refers to the mere nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, corresponding to the merely conceptual state of post-concentration (''rjes thob''). At this stage, even a proponent of Madhyamaka has to accept claims or assertions (''khas len''),<ref>Here, the debate pertains to another "hot topic" in Madhyamaka philosophy, the question of whether, and when, proponents of Madhyamaka are allowed to, or should, accept claims or assertions (''khas len''). For a general introduction to this problem in Madhyamaka philosophy, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 105ff. The same study discusses also the varying positions that were taken in this regard by different Tibetan philosophers, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 159ff. Cf. also Seyfort Ruegg's earlier article on this topic, Seyfort Ruegg 1983.</ref> and hence the existence of a self is simply negated; it cannot be described as being neither existent nor non-existent.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 294.4–6: ''yang rnam grangs pa'i don dam gyi dbang du byas te''/ ''bden grub med pa dang''/ ''tha snyad du yod pas mtha' gnyis la mi gnas pa'i dbu mar bzhed pa rnams rtag chad kyi mtha' phra ba 'gog tshul la je zab tu song bas lugs gsum po de la des so so'i ngos skal gyi rtag chad kyi mtha' mi sel zhes rnam pa kun tu mi brjod mod''/ ''<i>'</i>on kyang bden med dang tha snyad kyi snang ba zung du sbyar bas mtha' gnyis sel tshul 'di rjes thob shes bya 'byed pa'i shes rab kyis dpyad nas khas len dang bcas pas''/ ''spros'' [A ''sgros''] ''pa dang bcas'' [A ''gcas''] ''pa yin zhing''/ ''de'i ngor bdag yod pa min med pa min zhes rnam pa kun tu'' [AC ''du''] ''mi smra ste bdag med pa 'ba’ zhig tu smra'o''//.</ref> With regard to the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, however, both existence and non-existence are seen as mere imaginations (''btags pa''). This form of the absolute refers to a state that is devoid of any assertions (''khas len''), proliferations (''spros pa''), or references (''dmigs pa''), accessible only to non-conceptual gnosis (''rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes''). Since none of the modes of cognition (''<i>'</i>dzin stangs'') of the four extremes is present at this stage, it can be correctly described as the refutation of all four extremes.<ref>''Rab lan'' 295.1–4: ''gnas lugs don dam pa'i bden pa mthar thug rnam grangs ma yin pa mnyam bzhag rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyi spyod yul ji lta ba bzhin mthar thug dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyis dpyad na''/ ''bdag yod med gnyis ka rtog pas btags pa tsam las rang gi ngo bo nyid ma grub par mtshungs pa'i phyir''/ ''gnyis ka mgo mnyam du dmigs su med par 'gyur te''/ [...] ''spros pa zhi ba'i dbang du byas na bdag yod med kyi khas len gang yang med pas lugs des gnyis ka min par bzung bar 'gyur ro zhes brgal du med de dmigs pa med pa la''/ ''mtha' bzhi'i ’dzin stangs gang yang med par 'dod pa'i phyir tshul des mthar 'dzin phra ba thams cad cig char gcod nus so''//.</ref> Mi pham further points out the logical faults that would occur if the refutation of all extremes were related to a state that contains assertions (''khas len''), and criticises the position of limiting emptiness solely to the refutation of the concept of true establishment (''bden grub''), but leaving other proliferations (in relation to the other extremes) untouched.<ref>''Rab lan'' 296.1–301.2</ref> He concludes his answer by countering that his understanding of the "Great Madhyamaka, that is free from extremes" is "established as the unsurpassed long[-standing] tradition of the Jina" and hence cannot be equated with the supposedly nihilistic tradition of Hwa shang, as Rab gsal had alleged.<ref>''Rab lan'' 302.2–3: ''de ltar gong du lung dang de'i don bzhin rigs pa'i lam nas go bar bshad pa 'di dag gis mtha' bral dbu ma chen po zhes gang smras pa de dag rgyal ba'i ring lugs bla na med par grub pas na''/ ''<i>'</i>di 'dzin pa po thams cad ha shang gi lhwam lus pa'i bgo skal len pa sha stag ma yin te''/.</ref>

Rab gsal's second objection concerning inconsistencies in logical matters is rebutted rather briefly.<ref>''Rab lan'' 303.4–305.2 (RL IV.2a).</ref> As above, Mi pham points to a clarification of the level on which a certain statement is made. For him, the law of double negation is clearly located on the merely conventional level, and cannot be applied to capture ultimate reality: "[Principles like the law of double negation] are taught simply as an introduction to the language of [pointing out] illogical consequences (''thal ngag'') for beginners. [They] are valid [in this context], but if it were easily possible to fathom suchness (''de kho na nyid'') which is beyond being an object of expression (''smra brjod'') and logic (''rtog ge'') merely by something like that [...],"<ref>''Rab lan'' 303.5: ''blo gsar bu ba dag gi thal ngag kha byang gi ched tsam du bstan pa ni bden na yang''/ ''de tsam zhig gis de kho na nyid rtog ge dang smra brjod kyi yul las 'das pa bde blag tu gzhal nus na''/ [...].</ref> then, continues Mi pham, referring to various quotes from Indian treatises, it would not make sense to point out the difficulty of realising the absolute, since it could be easily understood by everyone who knows logic. On the conventional level of the ordinary "ways of the world," however, logical principles have to be accepted and statements made accordingly:<ref>''Rab lan'' 304.5–6: ''<i>'</i>on kyang tha snyad gzhal ba'i skabs su yod pa'ang min med pa'ang min zhes pa lta bu khas len thams cad bral ba smra don med do''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=But, in the context of fathoming the conventional, it does not make sense to propound freedom from all assertions (''khas len''), stating, for example, that [something] is neither existent nor non-existent.
}}
Rab gsal's discussion of the possible objection that may be raised by an opponent to his conception of emptiness is addressed later in the corresponding passage of Mi pham’s reply.<ref>For Mi pham’s discussion of this objection, see ''Rab lan'' 374.5–377.1 (RL IV.10a).</ref> Rab gsal emphasised that BCA IX.35 should not be understood as indicating a general disappearance of non-existence in the process of realising emptiness, but rather that this nonexistence is realised in a non-dualistic (''gnyis med'') way, and hence ceases to be a distant object. Rab gsal's main argument was that it is unreasonable to understand BCA IX.35 in such a way that non-existence was described as abiding before the mind first, but ceases to do so at a certain point. Mi
pham responds by using the very same argumentation against Rab gsal. Also, according to Rab gsal's interpretation, says Mi pham, certain perceptions are accepted as being there first, but as ceasing at a certain point:<ref>''Rab lan'' 374.6–375.1: ''khyod kyis ji ltar 'chad''/ ''khyod kyis kyang gzung 'dzin gnyis su snang ba blo yi mdun du sngar gnas la''/ ''phyis mi snang bar 'dod pa dang''/ ''sngar bden 'dzin can gyi blo'i mdun na bden grub dmigs yul du gnas la''/ ''phyis bden med rtogs tshe mi gnas par khas mi len nam''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=How do you explain it? Do you not also accept that dualistic appearances abide before the mind first, but do not abide later, or claim that true establishment (''bden grub'') abides as the referential object (''dmigs yul'') before a mind that grasps true [establishment] first, but does not abide [there] later, when nonexistence of true [establishment] is realised?
}}
Mi pham then continues this discussion by pointing out various flaws in Rab gsal's conception of realising emptiness.

<h4>Rab gsal's reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
Although Rab gsal continues to criticise Mi pham strongly for his stance on emptiness, substantial arguments about the discussions of the current investigation are rare. Most important is Rab gsal's reply to the first issue, Mi pham's refutation of conceiving emptiness as ''bden med med dgag'', which he also backed up by quoting an enormous corpus of literature. 

According to Rab gsal,<ref>See ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 445.5–446.2 (GC I.6k).</ref> the root of Mi pham's erroneous understanding is to be found in a misinterpretation of a specific passage of Kamalaśīla's ''Madhyamakāloka''. The passage Rab gsal refers to was also quoted by Mi pham, among numerous other textual examples that he provided to support his position. While this passage explains that a certain kind of nonexistence of arising – specified in the text as "this non-existence of arising" (''skye ba med pa 'di'') – is not to be considered as the true absolute, Rab gsal clarifies that this statement of Kamalaśīla does not speak of non-existence in general, but refers only to a particular kind of non-existence, an understanding of non-existence that is brought about by reasoning. The passage must therefore refer to a "conceptual reasoning consciousness" (''rig shes rtog bcas'') and hence is clearly related to the context of the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, but not the ultimate absolute.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 445.5–6: ''da ni khyed rang rnams 'khrul gzhi dbu ma snang ba'i tshig la brtseg par bya ste''/ ''de nyid du''/ ''skye ba med pa 'di yang don dam pa dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa zhes bya'i dngos su ni ma yin te''/ ''don dam pa ni spros pa thams cad las 'das pa'i phyir''/ ''zhes par snang mod de ni rang 'grel du''/ ''gtan tshigs kyis skye ba med pa zhes sogs gsung'' [A ''gsungs''] ''bas rig shes rtog bcas rnam grangs pa'i don dam skabs yin te''/.</ref> For Rab gsal, the important point seems to be that the distinction between the nominal and the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute is established only on the basis of the perceiving mind, and he presents this as the key for understanding all the quotes that Mi pham had mentioned:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 446.1–2: ''spros bral kyang blo de la bltos te spros pa phyogs gcig tsam dang bral ba'i rnam grangs pa'i don dam du byas na gzhung rnams legs par gung 'grig go''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Based on this [conceptual state of] mind, even freedom from proliferations is the nominal absolute, which is only free from one aspect of proliferations. Considering it in this way, the scriptures fit well with each other.
}}
Mi pham would certainly agree that any conceptual notion of nonexistence does not accord fully with the ultimate absolute. For him, however, the distinction of nominal and actual absolute is not limited to the realising subject, but could also be applied to the realised object.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 337.1ff., for Mi pham's explanations on the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute with regard to both subject and object: "In this context, we as well believe that the designation of actual and nominal absolute – in terms of averting or not averting dualistic appearances – is suitable with reference to the subject. Regarding the object, the two, being free from the sphere (''spyod yul'') of limited proliferations (''spros pa'') and being free from all spheres of proliferations, are explained as the difference of the two absolutes [...]." (''<i>'</i>di skabs yul can gyi dbang du byas na gnyis snang log ma log gi sgo nas rnam grangs min pa dang yin pa'i don dam gyi tha snyad'' [B ''snyan''] ''kyang 'thad par bdag cag gis kyang 'dod de yul gyi dbang du byas na spros pa nyi tshe ba'i spyod yul dang bral ba dang''/ ''spros pa'i spyod yul mtha' dag dang bral ba de gnyis la don dam gnyis po'i khyad par du bshad cing''/ [...]).</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4>
While Mi pham gives no direct answer to Rab gsal's stance on the scriptures Mi pham had quoted, he continues his criticism of viewing emptiness as a mere negation in different passages of his reply. At the beginning of "issues of major significance" (''don che ba''),<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 468.1–4 (YL II.a).</ref> for example, he emphasises again that "mere emptiness" cannot account for a unity of the two ''satyas'':<ref>''Yang lan'' 468.2–3: ''bden gnyis ngo bo tha dad du phye ba'i stong rkyang de 'ba' zhig don dam mthar thug yin na''/ ''bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med don dam ma yin par 'gyur la''/ ''kun rdzob kyang min par 'gyur ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=If the mere emptiness among the two ''satyas'' that are distinguished as different in essence were the ultimate absolute, then an indivisible essence of the two ''satyas'' would be neither the absolute nor the conventional.
}}
Rab gsal, too, proclaimed the unity of the two ''satyas'' as the essential principle in understanding emptiness. For Mi pham, on the other hand, this was precisely what could be endangered by stressing the negational aspect of emptiness. As Mi pham further elaborates at the end of his letter,<ref>''Yang lan'' 470.2–4 (YL II.g).</ref> this could lead to a nihilistic understanding of emptiness. He concludes, however, that Rab gsal – in his second letter – also highlighted the unity of the two ''satyas'', an "emptiness that arises as cause and effect" (''stong nyid rgyu 'bras su 'char ba''), and thereby indeed arrived at an understanding of emptiness that could eliminate all extremes.<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 470.3–4: ''a mtshar rtsed mo lags te''/ ''stong nyid rgyu 'bras su 'char yod'' [B ''tshul''] ''go zhing bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med du rtogs na''/ ''de 'dra'i rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyid kyis chad mtha' sel bar the tshom ga la yod''/.</ref> While the issue of varying emphasis on the negational moment in conceiving emptiness remains unresolved, both adversaries could at least agree that the unity of the two ''satyas'' is essential.
-->

<h3>Synopsis</h3>
With its discussion of the concept of ''satyadvaya'', the second verse of the ninth chapter of the BCA became of the utmost importance for understanding the principle issues of Madhyamaka philosophy. Later generations of Indian as well as Tibetan thinkers placed this verse at the centre of their respective interpretation of Madhyamaka thought and used it to argue for their position. It figures prominently in all related philosophical controversies in Tibet, and a major part of the debate between Mi pham and Rab gsal is also connected to this single verse.

The distinction of two "truths" or "realities" – ''saṃvṛtisatya'' and ''paramārthasatya'' – that this verse introduces was understood in various ways. Within the Dge lugs tradition, for example, ''paramārtha'' – the "absolute" – was conceived of as a lack or negation of a truly established essence (''ngo bo bden grub'') of ''saṃvṛti'' – the "conventional." Of the two possible ways of negation, a non-implicative negation (''med dgag'') was seen to correspond to the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') or ultimate (''mthar thug pa'') absolute.

It is precisely this conception of the highest form of emptiness or the absolute as ''bden med med dgag'' that Mi pham criticised in his ''Nor bu ke ta ka''. In this work, he divided the absolute into two kinds, a provisional form of the absolute, termed "nominal" (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, and an "actual" (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute. For him, the conception of emptiness as a "mere non-implicative negation" (''med dgag tsam'') eliminates only the extreme of existence (''yod mtha<i>'</i>'') and conforms to the earlier, provisional form of the absolute, while the actual absolute must go beyond that and transcend all four extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither. Mi pham did not formulate his explications as a direct criticism of the Dge lugs tradition, but it is clear that he was aiming specifically at the established
doctrinal position of this school.

In his attempt to defend the doctrines of his native tradition, Rab gsal accused Mi pham of various contradictions: his position was not in accordance with the authoritative (Indian) scriptures, it contradicted other statements by Mi pham himself, and it deviated from the laws of logic and led to a nihilistic view.

Mi pham's reply to the first accusation is especially remarkable: quoting more than one hundred and fifty passages from numerous scriptures, he tried to prove that in the Indian scriptures too, emptiness was not described as a mere negation. In his later reply, Rab gsal countered this evidence by arguing that all these scriptures refer to a particular context, namely when the absolute is fathomed by an intellectual process of reasoning. Depending on this particular state of mind, only the nominal absolute can be approached. This would, however, not affect the established doctrine of the Dge lugs school that views the absolute in general as a mere absence of an established essence (''ngo bo bden grub'').

In his approach to the other objections made by Rab gsal, Mi pham argued for a distinction of levels. In a certain context, for example, when teaching emptiness, this emptiness may very well be described as a negation and also formulated by closely following logical principles. This form of emptiness pertains to the nominal absolute. Ultimately, however, emptiness goes beyond the limitations of language and logic, and is, as such, not restricted to a mere negation of existence, but is free from all kinds of proliferations.

Both Rab gsal and Mi pham distinguish between nominal and actual absolutes to delineate different levels of the absolute. However, while for Rab gsal this distinction seems important only for distinguishing different modes of cognising emptiness, for Mi pham any cognition that views emptiness as a mere negation is not getting at the ultimate absolute. The main difference between Mi pham and Rab gsal is to be seen in the way they emphasise the negational aspect of emptiness, and as this issue is firmly
established in the respective doctrinal positions, it is not easily resolved.

<h3>Ultimate Emptiness and Freedom from Extremes</h3>
The first issue was mainly concerned with Mi pham's opposition to viewing mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') as the ultimate form of emptiness and the controversies that evolved out of this; the second issue, in contrast, focused on Mi pham's alternative conception of the ultimate absolute as being beyond all extremes.

It is commonly accepted that Madhyamaka philosophy should culminate in a view that neither tends to the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>''), nor to the extreme of eternalism (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>''). This position is expressed by the fundamental Madhyamaka statement that things are "neither existent nor non-existent" (''yod min med min'').<ref>This statement is found in various ''sūtras'', such as the ''Ratnakūṭa'' (cf. Frauwaller 1994: 167) or the ''Śālistambasūtra'' (cf. Cabezón & Dargyay 2007: 80, 287), and the relevant passage of the latter ''sūtra'' is commonly cited in the Madhyamaka-related ''śāstras''. In this regard, Seyfort Ruegg mentions the ''Jñānasārasamuccaya'' ascribed to Āryadeva, Bhāviveka's ''Madhyamakaratnapradīpa'', Jitāri's ''Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā(bhāṣya)'', Advayavajra's ''Tattvaratnāvalī'', and
the ''Subhāṣitasaṃgraha'' ascribed to Sarahapāda (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 143)</ref> Following Tsong kha pa, this formulation is, however, not to be understood literally: applying such contradictory qualities as "existent" and "non-existent" to a single logical subject is not possible, as these qualities are said to be mutually exclusive (''phan tshun gzhan sel ba'').<ref>See, e.g., Tsong kha pa's ''Gser phreng'' as quoted in Tauscher 1995: 60.</ref> Tsong kha pa solves the apparent contradiction by adding a specification: "neither existent nor non-existent" is rightly understood as "neither existent on the absolute level nor non-existent on the conventional level."<ref>Tsong kha pa's general understanding of ''yod min med min'' is discussed extensively in Tauscher 1995: 56ff.</ref> While for Tsong kha pa and his followers this represents a correct concept of the unity of the two ''satyas'', which avoids leaning towards either extreme, Mi pham confronts the Dge lugs tradition with a different
understanding. . . .

<!--
<h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
As shown earlier, Mi pham distinguishes between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the latter corresponds to the ultimate absolute as it is also conceived of in the Prāsaṅgika tradition. The characteristic approach of the Svātantrika tradition, in contrast, is based on the temporary emphasis on the nominal absolute, and thus on a perception of the two ''satyas'' as separate. Even though there is no arising of appearances on the absolute level, appearances cannot be denied on the conventional level. Appearances are established, since a cognition that investigates the conventional recognises their "own- characteristics" (''rang mtshan''). If appearances are negated, one must then add that this is done with regard to the ultimate level. The approach of the Svātantrika
can thus be summarised in the following terse formula: "non-existent on the absolute level, undeceptively existent on the conventional level."<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.3–5: ''de lta na'ang gnas skabs lam gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su don dam par skye ba med kyang kun rdzob tu skye ba ltar snang ba 'gog mi nus pas chos rnams ni kun rdzob tu rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin par tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad mas grub cing''/ ''de snang ba ltar don dam par ma grub pas dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar te don dam par med la kun rdzob par bslu med du yod do zhes 'chad par byed de''/ ''de ltar bden gnyis so so rang sa na ma nyams par bzhag pa 'di lta bu ni las dang po pa'i blo ngor cis kyang bde ba yin te''/.</ref> Following Mi pham, the "middle of extremes," as posited in the Dge lugs tradition, corresponds only to the provisional approach to the absolute mentioned in the Svātantrika scriptures, an approach that is not tenable with regard to ultimate reality:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.6: ''<i>'</i>on kyang gnas lugs mthar thug pa'i dbang du na kun rdzob tu yod pa dang''/ ''don dam par med pa zhes yod pa dang med pa'i mtshan nyid gnyis so sor phyogs su chad de gnas pa ma yin te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=But, considering the two characteristics of existence and nonexistence separately, in the way that [things] "exist on the conventional level and do not exist on the absolute level," is not established with respect to the ultimate mode of existence.
}}
The Prāsaṅgika tradition with its direct approach to the ultimate absolute therefore refutes the establishment of things by way of their "own-characteristic" – even on the conventional level – and thus argues against a separate conception of the two ''satyas''.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.2: ''<i>'</i>di ltar kun rdzob tu rang mtshan gyis grub pa de'ang bkag pas bden gnyis so sor 'dzin pa khegs te''.</ref> As Mi pham points out, appearances and emptiness can ultimately not be separated from each other:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.6–6.1: ''gang snang ba'i gzugs la sogs pa 'di nyid stong zhing''/ ''gang stong bzhin pa de nyid gzugs sogs su snang ba yin''.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Precisely, the form etc. of whatever appears is empty, and, although it is empty, this itself appears as form etc.
}}
For Mi pham, authentic Prajñāpāramitā culminates in the realisation of the coalescence or unity of appearances and emptiness (''snang stong zung 'jug''). Only a view that unites appearances and emptiness conforms to the absolute mode of existence (''don dam pa'i gnas tshul''). This view must abandon all forms of grasping, that is, negation as well as affirmation (''dgag sgrub''), and thus be free from any assertions (''khas len''). Freedom from proliferations (''spros bral'') means that not only the extreme of eternalism, but all four extremes (''mtha' bzhi''), i.e., existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence, are equally eliminated.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.1–3.</ref>

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
Rab gsal's most important criticism of Mi pham's concept of the absolute and the abandonment of all extremes is found in two sections of his work dealing almost exclusively with this particular issue.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.5–400.1 (JL IV.3) and 403.3–404.3 (JL IV.7).</ref> In addition to the central arguments of these two sections, one passage that exhibits Rab gsal's position on the abandonment of extremes, and another one that refutes possible objections to this position, is included in the current presentation.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 402.2–5 (JL IV.5d) and 404.3–4 (JL IV.8a).</ref>

Rab gsal starts the first section of criticism by briefly pointing out what he regards as the central issue in the understanding of ''satyadvaya''. Most important according to Rab gsal is the "inseparable unity (''<i>'</i>du 'bral med pa'') of the non-existence of an object on the absolute level and its existence on the conventional level," as it is also the "intention of various sūtras and tantras."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.5–6: ''yul don dam par med pa dang''/ ''tha snyad du yod pa 'du 'bral med pa ni''/ [...] ''mdo rgyud du ma'i dgongs pa yin kyang'' [A ''byang'']/. For the complete argument, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.5–6 (JL IV.3a).</ref>

According to Rab gsal, this is not fulfilled by Mi pham's concept of the absolute. He charges that Mi pham's way of refuting the extreme positions would even prevent Mi pham from being a true Mādhyamika:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 399.1: ''khyed cag dbu ma par yang mi 'gyur te''/ ''dbus la gnas pa med pa'i phyir''/ ''der gnas na gnyis min gyi mtha' la gnas par 'dod pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=You will also not be a Mādhyamika, as you do not abide in the middle, since if one abides there, you accept [this] as an abiding in the extreme of neither [existence nor non-existence].
}}
Rab gsal shows that, for Mi pham, the middle between existence and
non-existence would still be an extreme position; for him, any form of
"abiding" (''gnas pa'') must be abandoned, and thus he could also not accept
"abiding in the freedom from the four extremes."<ref>Rab gsal argues that abiding in the freedom from the four extremes would still lead to an abiding in the extreme of non-existence, if one accepted Mi pham's criticism of conceiving emptiness as abiding in freedom from true establishment (''bden grub''). In saying this, Rab gsal implies, of course, that abiding in freedom from true establishment is equivalent to abiding in freedom from all four extremes: see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 399.1–2: ''mtha' bzhi dang bral ba la gnas na'ang med mtha' la gnas par 'gyur te''/ ''bden grub dang bral ba la de'i phyir''/ ''der thal''/ ''bden med la gnas pa bkag pa'i phyir''/. For the complete argument, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.6–399.2 (JL IV.3b).</ref>

This criticism is continued in the next argument,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 399.2–3 (JL IV.3c).</ref> where Mi pham is attacked for his – allegedly – overly broad approach to the abandonment of extremes. Rab gsal says of Mi pham that he does not just refute what actually is an extreme position, but that, according to him, "all statements of existence are accepted as the extreme of existence and all statements of non-existence as the extreme of non-existence."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 399.2: ''yod zer tshad yod mtha' dang''/ ''med zer tshad med mthar khas blangs pa''.</ref> Thus, Mi pham's refutation of extremes would also pertain to what is, according to the Dge lugs tradition, a correct conception of ''satyadvaya''.

Mi pham's concept of the ultimate absolute as the abandonment of all four extremes is also the target of a later section in Rab gsal's work.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 403.3–404.3 (JL IV.7).</ref> Here, Rab gsal uses Candrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya'', one of the most influential works for the Madhyamaka understanding of the Indian tradition, to show contradictions to the position of Mi pham. ''Madhyamakāvatara'' IV.140/141 and its commentary discuss the differences between grasping an imagined self (''btags pa'i bdag''), that is, a self to which are attributed certain qualities, such as being eternal, etc., and innate ego-grasping (''lhan skyes pa'i ngar 'dzin''), which means our automatic conception of "I exist." Candrakīrti explains that both kinds of self-grasping are unconnected and, hence, uprooting the concept of an imagined self would not help to eliminate innate ego-grasping, the cause of suffering, just as much as it would not help a person who is afraid of the presence of a snake in his or her home to know that there is no elephant inside the house.<ref>Cf. MAvBh 264f.</ref> For Rab gsal, the important point in this passage is that Candrakīrti propagated the elimination of the existence of an innate conception of a self as a means to overcome suffering, just as, in the example, conceiving the non-existence of a snake is presented as a means of dispelling the fear of the presence of a snake. With his concept of abandoning all four extremes, Mi pham would, however, cause unnecessary trouble, according to Rab gsal:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 403.5–6: ''sbrul gyi 'jigs pa sel phyir sbrul med par bstan pa nyid legs kyi''/ ''sbrul yod pa dang med pa dang gnyis ka dang gnyis min gang yang min zhes smras na''/ ''kye ma gting nas smyo langs pa drag po zhig dang yang phrad snyam nas ci bya gtol med du phyir zhing 'jigs pas'' [...].</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Explaining that there is no snake there in order to eliminate the fear of a snake is exactly right. But, if one says that not anything, existence of a snake, [its] non-existence, both, and neither, is the case, then – alas! – deep madness arises; thinking that one has fallen again into this severe [form of madness], one does not know what to do, and, hence, is afraid [...].
}}
In the last passage of this section,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 404.2–3 (JL IV.7c).</ref> Rab gsal concludes that, for Mi
pham, any mental activity is seen as a hindrance to awakening and – as
before – accuses him of being a follower of the tradition of Hwa shang:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 404.2–3: ''gang yid la byed kyang bdag 'dzin lam la gegs byed kyi sgrib par 'dod pa'i phyir na khyed rgya nag nas da lta rab byung gi gzugs kyis byon pa gor ma chag go''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Since you accept any mental activity to be self-grasping, an obscuration that hinders the path [to awakening], there is no doubt that you arrived from China in the guise of a present-day monk.
}}
This charge is further backed up by the claim that Mi pham has based
his views on the same scriptures as Hwa shang did, prior to him. With
this allegation of an affinity between Mi pham and Hwa shang, the second
section of Rab gsal's criticism closes.

A concise explanation of Rab gsal's own understanding of the refutation of extremes is found in a passage between the two sections of criticism.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 402.2–5 (JL IV.5d).</ref> As Rab gsal points out, a subject- and an object-based perspective must be distinguished for the refutation of extremes. Thus, he explains:<ref> ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 402.3–4: ''stong nyid chad mtha' dang bral ba yin yang de bkag tsam ma yin''/ ''tha snyad du yod pa''/ ''yod mtha' dang bral ba yin''/ ''de bkag tsam ma yin''/ ''bden med rtogs pa'i blos tha snyad du med pa'i chad mtha' ma khegs''/ ''tha snyad du yod par rtogs pa'i blos chad mtha' dngos dang''/ ''rtag mtha' shugs la khegs pa'i rnam bzhag'' [B ''gzhag''] ''byed dgos la''|.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The following presentation must be made: [with regard to the object,] emptiness is free from the extreme of annihilation, but not a mere refutation of that. Existence on the conventional level is free from the extreme of existence, but not a mere refutation of that. [With regard to the subject,] the mind that realises non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') does not refute the extreme of annihilation of non-existence on the conventional level. The mind that realises [things] to be existent on the conventional level refutes directly (''dngos'') the extreme of annihilation and implicitly (''shugs'') the extreme of permanence.
}}
According to Rab gsal, a combination of two distinctive types of realisations is essential in the process of eliminating extreme positions, a postulation that forms the main target of Mi pham's later criticism

In the later part of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'',<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 404.3–4 (JL IV.8a).</ref> Rab gsal addresses a possible objection to his position and clarifies his own understanding of the process of realising emptiness. An opponent, says Rab gsal, might think that the Dge lugs conception of abandoning extreme positions entails "clinging" (''zhen pa''):<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 404.3: ''kho na re''/ ''bdag med do''// ''tha snyad du yod do snyam du zhen pa'ang mi zlog gam zhe na''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Should not also clinging (''zhen pa'') in the form of the thought "A self does not exist. It exists on the conventional level" be averted?
}}
As Rab gsal points out by referring to passages from Pramāṇa scriptures, such is not the case: direct (''mngon sum'') perception is – per definitionem – free from conceptualisation (''rtog pa''), and hence there is also no "clinging" (''zhen pa''), or – more technically – no determining cognition (''zhen rig'') involved in the direct realisation of emptiness.

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
Mi pham's response to the individual passages varies in length; quite naturally, he particularly emphasises the arguments directly attacking his position. Introducing his criticism, Rab gsal mentioned the "inseparable unity" (''<i>'</i>du 'bral med pa'') of the two ''satyas'' as a key to their correct understanding. While Mi pham agrees on the principle of a unity of the two ''satyas'', he doubts that such could indeed be achieved by the approach of the Dge lugs tradition, which he rebukes with a rather incisive comment:<ref>''Rab lan'' 309.2–3: ''mdo rgyud du ma'i dgongs pa yin par bdag cag gis shin tu yang 'dod de''/ ''bdag cag gis stong rten 'byung zung 'jug ngo bo dbyer med du 'dod kyis''/ ''ri bong gi rwa med pa dang''/ ''glang gi rwa yod pa gnyis zung 'jug tu byed pa lta bur ni mi 'dod pas'' [...]. For the whole response on that issue, see ''Rab lan'' 309.1–5 (RL IV.2e).</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=We believe very much that [this (unity of the two ''satyas'')] is the intention of various ''sūtras'' and ''tantras''; we accept [this unity] in the form of a coalescence (''zung 'jug'') of emptiness and dependent origination, indivisible in nature, and hence do not accept it in such a way as to regard it as the coalescence of a non-existent rabbit's horn and an existent bull's horn [...].
}}
Mi pham's remarks address an issue that can be seen as the heart of his
criticism of the Dge lugs understanding of ''satyadvaya'', which he mentions
repeatedly in various contexts in his letter to Rab gsal.<ref>See, for example, right at the beginning of his work, where this concept is described as a common misunderstanding of later Dge lugs scholars, ''Rab lan'' 194.3–4: ''deng sang rje bdag nyid chen po'i brgyud pa 'dzin par khas 'che ba dag gis kun rdzob rnams rang gi ngo bos mi stong par dgag bya yan gar ba bden grub kyis stong par bzhed pa mang bas stong nyid ma yin dgag tu song zhing''/ [...].</ref>

As shown earlier, the Dge lugs tradition places great emphasis on the delineation of the negandum (''dgag bya'') of Madhyamaka analysis, which it defines as a "truly established essence" (''bden grub kyi ngo bo'') of appearances – something that is completely non-existent, just like (the commonly used example of) a rabbit's horn. This truly established essence is neither perceived by an analysis that investigates the true nature of things, nor by an investigation of the conventional, and can therefore be utterly negated. The appearances themselves, on the other hand, are conceived of by ordinary, conventional perception, and must therefore be regarded as existent.<ref>For a detailed exposition of the concept of the ''dgag bya'' in the Dge lugs tradition, see Tauscher 1995: 73ff.</ref> For Mi pham, this approach entails a concept of the two ''satyas'' as separate, which – according to him – is based on a wrong understanding of emptiness, i.e., that the conventional appearances themselves are not
empty of their respective essence (''rang gi ngo bo''), but what is to be negated is a ''separate'' truly established essence (''bden grub kyi ngo bo'') of these appearances.<ref>Most famous in this regard is the statement "A vase is not empty of a vase, but of true [establishment]," that Tsong kha pa defended against criticism, arguing that a different concept of emptiness would lead to the utter non-existence of appearances. Cf. ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 259.16–260.3: ''bum pa bum pas mi stong par bden pas stong pa ni''/ ''gzhan stong yin pas bum pa bum pas stong pa ni rang stong yin no zhes smra ba ni gtan nas mi rigs te''/ ''bum pa bum pas stong na bum pa la bum pa med dgos na''/ ''rang la rang med na gzhan su la yang med pas bum pa gtan med par 'gyur ro''//. That Tsong kha pa's idea of the negandum (''dgag bya'') would lead to an understanding of emptiness in the form of ''gzhan stong'' was, indeed, one of the charges brought by Mi pham. Karma Phuntsho presents a selective list of these accusations
from a variety of Mi pham's works, which include – most prominently – the conclusions that the Dge lugs understanding of the negandum would result in an emptiness as an
implicative negation (''ma yin dgag''), a ''gzhan stong'' type of emptiness, and an emptiness that is segregated from appearances; cf. Phuntsho 2005: 79–91. For Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs conception of the ''dgag bya'', drawn in particular from Mi pham's commentary on the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', see also Pettit 1999: 146ff.</ref>

Turning to Rab gsal's criticism that Mi pham could not be counted as Mādhyamika and would be unable to achieve abiding in the freedom of the four extremes, Mi pham counters by distinguishing different levels, a strategy we have already encountered in the discussion of ''bden med med dgag''. As Mi pham points out, the emptiness he refers to is located on the level of the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereas his opponent's criticism refers to the level of the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute:<ref>''Rab lan'' 311.1–2: ''rnam grangs pa'i don dam gyi skabs su mtha' gnyis sel tshul de 'dra rang gzhan gnyis kas 'dod mod''/ ''khyod kyis'' [C ''kyi''] ''de tsam gnas lugs mthar thug tu 'dod la''/ ''nged cag gis de tsam gnas lugs mthar thug ma yin kyang de la brten nas mthar thug rnam grangs min pa'i don dam la 'jug par 'dod cing''/ ''rnam grangs min pa'i don dam de nyid gnas lugs mthar thug tu 'dod pa''.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the context of the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, both we and others indeed accept such a way of eliminating the two extremes. You, however, believe merely that to be the ultimate mode of existence, whereas we believe that merely that is not the ultimate mode of existence, but that one enters the ultimate actual (''rnam grangs min pa'') absolute based on that, and we accept precisely this actual absolute as the ultimate mode of existence.
}}
The mere middle between existence and non-existence refers only to
the provisional nominal absolute, while the actual absolute is free from all
extremes and conceptions. Mi pham then clarifies the meaning and usage of the term "abiding" (''gnas pa''). Even with regard to the actual absolute one uses the expression "to abide in the absolute" or "to abide in freedom from extremes." In this case, actual abiding – as a conceptual state of mind – is not involved, as Mi pham explains:<ref>''Rab lan'' 314.5–6: ''de la gnas zhes brjod pa ni mtha' gang du'ang mi gnas pa la gnas zhes brjod kyi dngos su na gnas pa gang yang med pa dang don khyad med par song ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The statement "to abide in this (absolute)" expresses that one abides in not-abiding in any extreme; in actuality, however, it has the same meaning as "there is not any abiding at all."
}}
According to Mi pham, one can hence very well speak of abiding in the absolute; this, however, is a mere linguistic convention, and should be distinguished from abiding as a conceptual grasping of certain characteristics, a state of mind of which he disapproves, and which was the departure point of Rab gsal's criticism.<ref>''Rab lan'' 318.4–5: ''bden med la gnas pa ni bden med med dgag la der zhen pa'i mtshan ma'i rtog pas gnas par smras mod kyi''/ ''mtha' bral la gnas pa'ang de dang 'dra bar med mtha' la gnas par ga la 'gyur te''/ ''spros bral la dgag sgrub kyi mtshan mar 'dzin pa gang yang yod par bsgrub'' [C ''sgrub''] ''tu med do''//. For Mi pham's complete answer, see ''Rab lan'' 311.1–318.5 (RL IV.3a).</ref>

Rab gsal's next objection, viz. that, according to Mi pham, any statement of existence or non-existence would also entail the respective extreme, is countered again with a distinction of levels.<ref>''Rab lan'' 319.2–320.4 (RL IV.3b).</ref> Mi pham points out that he never made the type of general statement that Rab gsal accused him of; he did say, however, that the refutation of extremes in the context of the nominal absolute is not sufficient for the context of the actual absolute that is free from proliferations:<ref>''Rab lan'' 319.3–4: ''tha snyad dpyod pa'i skabs su''/ ''bden grub tu med pa dang''/ ''tha snyad du yod pa mtha' ma yin gyi rang gi ngos skal gyi mtha' sel byed yin mod kyi''/ ''de kho nas rnam par rtog pa'i mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i mtha' thams cad sel mi nus pas''/ ''rnam grangs min pa'i don dam spros bral sgrub pa'i skabs su mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i yod pa dang med pa'i mtha' phra ba'ang spong dgos zhes brjod pa yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=I said: in the context of investigating the conventional, nonexistence on the level of true establishment and existence on the conventional level are not extremes, but indeed eliminate their respective extremes. However, it is not possible to eliminate all extremes of grasping characteristics of conceptualisation by this [means] alone. Hence, in the context of accomplishing the actual (''rnam grangs min pa'') absolute, which is free from proliferations, it is necessary to abandon even the subtle extremes of existence and non-existence of grasping characteristics.
}}
Mi pham continues to maintain his stance he had already explicated in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', namely, that an understanding of the middle between extremes, as emphasised in the Svātantrika scriptures or the Dge lugs tradition, does not apply to the actual absolute.

In the next section of criticism against Mi pham's concept of the actual absolute as freedom from all extremes, Rab gsal pointed out that the Indian masters, such as Candrakīrti, had also spoken of emptiness as a negation – in the case of the ''Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya'', the refutation of innate egograsping (''lhan skyes pa'i ngar 'dzin''), likened to the example of the existence of a snake. As earlier, Mi pham's main argument is that Rab gsal's criticism confuses the levels on which these statements are made:<ref>''Rab lan'' 358.6–359.1: ''mnyam bzhag spros bral rnam par mi rtog pa'i spyod yul gtan la 'bebs pa dang rjes thob shes bya rnam 'byed kyi shes rab kyi spyod yul cha ma phyed par de gnyis kyi don 'gal bar bzung nas zab mo'i gnas thams cad mtha' gcig tu spangs te''. See ''Rab lan'' 358.4–360.3 (RL IV.8a), for the complete discussion.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Not distinguishing between the perspective of establishing the sphere (''spyod yul'') of utterly non-conceptual freedom from proliferations, i.e., concentration (''mnyam bzhag''), and the sphere of insight (''shes rab'') that distinguishes the knowables, i.e., postconcentration (''rjes thob''), [you] took those two to preclude each other, and thereby totally forsoak all points of profundity.
}}
According to Mi pham, Candrakīrti's statement refers to the level of post-concentration (''rjes thob''). Here, a conceptual consciousness conceives the absolute as a nominal absolute, i.e., as a mere negation of a self. This corresponds to our ordinary conventions about phenomena – an area where the refutation of the other extremes does not apply:<ref>''Rab lan'' 359.3–5: ''bdag cag gis ni tha snyad du bdag med dang bden med 'ba' zhig tu khas len gyi mu gzhan gsum nam yang mi sbyar ro''// [...] ''der ma zad rnam grangs pa'i don dam bshad pa'i skabs su yang bden med du khas len gyi mu gzhan mi sbyor kyang de dag kun rdzob tu khas len tshul du gtogs pa yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=On the conventional level, we claim only selflessness and nonexistence of true establishment, whereas the other three alternatives are never applied. [...] Furthermore, in the context of explaining the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, too, true [establishment] is accepted as non-existent, whereas the other alternatives are not applied. These [assertions], however, pertain to the manner in which assertions [are accepted] on the conventional level.
}}
The same, then, is true of the example of the existence of the snake
that was mentioned in Candrakīrti's work. According to Mi pham, this
example is located purely on the conventional level, where the question of
existence or non-existence can be answered in a clear and definitive way,
without applying the other alternatives. Mi pham explains:<ref>''Rab lan'' 360.3–4: ''sbrul yod med kyi dpe ni''/ ''tha snyad du yod med dpyad pa yin pas''/ ''phyogs gang du sbrul tshad mas dmigs na yod ces dang''/ ''ma dmigs na med ces mtha' gcig tu brjod rigs kyi mu gzhan sbyar don med do''//. For Mi pham's complete answer, see ''Rab lan'' 360.3–365.4 (RL IV.8b).</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The example of the existence or non-existence of a snake is an investigation of existence or non-existence on the conventional level. Thus, when a snake is perceived by valid cognition (''tshad ma'') at a certain place, then it is correct to say unequivocally "it exists," and "it does not exist" if it is not perceived. There is, however, no point in considering the other alternatives.
}}
Just as assertions are made with regard to our ordinary conventional
way of perceiving the world, claims of existence and non-existence are also
accepted with regard to the nominal absolute. The actual absolute, on the
other hand, is beyond any claims, and it is for this reason that all assertions
and extreme positions must be left behind in this context. As Mi pham
emphasises, this process of refuting the respective extremes does not lead
to the acceptance of its opposite, but simply to a state that is without any
assertions:<ref>''Rab lan'' 365.1–2: ''de lta bu'i phyir na rnam grangs pa'i don dam gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su bdag med khas blang ba''/ ''don dam phyi ma'i skabs su khas ma blang bas snga ma'i khas len pa bzlog nas bdag yod du ldog dgos pa ci zhig yod de''/ ''bdag bdag med gnyis ka mgo mnyam du mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, in the context of establishing the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, selflessness is asserted. In the context of the latter (i.e., the actual) absolute, it is not asserted. Why, then, should averting the earlier assertion (of selflessness) necessarily lead to the opposite, the existence of a self, since both self and selflessness are equally unperceived?

}}
The argument of the distinction between the level of the conventional
– which includes also the nominal absolute – and the level of the absolute
is also applied in the last passage of this section of criticism.<ref>For this passage, ''Rab lan'' 365.4–368.4 (RL IV.8c).</ref> Rab gsal accused Mi pham of viewing any mental activity as a hindrance to awakening, and, hence, of adhering to the nihilistic position of Hwa shang. Mi pham clarifies his position, pointing out that proliferations in the form of a clear distinction of phenomena are accepted on the level of the conventional; only the ultimate absolute is beyond any proliferation. The important point is that these two levels do not contradict each other.<ref>''Rab lan'' 365.4–366.1</ref> Rab gsal's claim of a similarity between the positions of Mi pham and Hwa shang in that both base their view on the same corpus of scriptures is exposed as speculation. As Mi pham explains, no evidence showing which scriptures Hwa shang used remains, nor in which way such might have been interpreted. In view of the lack of any proof, one can simply not tell whether those two traditions are similar or not.<ref>''Rab lan'' 366.1–3.</ref>

While Mi pham gives – at times – very detailed answers to rebutt Rab gsal's objections to the explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Rab gsal's presentation of his own position on the refutation of extremes is treated with less emphasis. In his response,<ref>''Rab lan'' 352.3–354.3 (RL IV.6b).</ref> Mi pham follows the distinction between the perspective of the object and of the subject suggested by Rab gsal earlier. With regard to the object, says Mi pham, Rab gsal's concept of the elimination of extremes through emptiness, on the one hand, and conventional existence, on the other, is deficient, since each of these two elements refutes only one extreme, but not the extremes of annihilation and permanence together.<ref>''Rab lan'' 352.4: ''<i>'</i>on kyang de gnyis re res rtag chad mi khegs par khas blangs pa 'dis chog 'dug gi''.</ref> With regard to the subject, Rab gsal explained that the mind that realises non-existence of true establishment does not refute the extreme of annihilation. It is for this reason, says Mi pham, that the mere refutation of true establishment was not accepted as the "middle" or ultimate emptiness
in his tradition:<ref>''Rab lan'' 352.5–6: ''yul can gyi blo'i ngos nas bden med rtogs pa'i blos chad mtha' ma khegs par khas blangs pa de nyid legs par smras pa ste''/ ''kho bo cag gis kyang des chad mtha' mi khegs pas de tsam zhig tu 'dzin pa'i blo de kho nas dbu ma'i go mi chod par smras pa yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=This very claim that – from the perspective of the mind, i.e., the subject, – a mind that realises non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') does not refute the extreme of annihilation, was well said. We also said that this (mind) does not refute the extreme of annihilation, and thus the middle is not fulfilled solely by a mind that grasps [the middle] as merely that (nonexistence of true establishment).

}}
While Rab gsal described the realisation of existence on the conventional level as being able to refute the extreme of annihilation directly and the extreme of permanence indirectly, Mi pham points out that the realisation of the coalescence of emptiness and appearances or the "realisation that dependently arising phenomena are without an essence (''ngo bo''), like an illusion or a reflection," can refute both extremes together, thus rendering Rab gsal's concept of a direct and indirect refutation of extremes superfluous.<ref>''Rab lan'' 352.6–353.1: ''tha snyad du yod pas chad mtha' dngos su khegs shing''/ ''rtag mtha' shugs la khegs pa spyir'' [AC ''spyin''] ''de ltar yin te''/ ''brten nas ’byung ba'i chos ngo bo nyid med pa sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan lta bur zung 'jug tu rtogs na dngos shugs sbyar kyang rung la ma sbyar kyang mi rung ba med de''/.</ref>

The last issue of the current topic is Rab gsal's refutation of a possible objection to his position.<ref>For Mi pham's complete reply in this matter, see ''Rab lan'' 369.4–371.5 (RL IV.9a).</ref> Rab gsal anticipates that an opponent might criticise the Dge lugs approach of eliminating extremes through "nonexistence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level," since it would appear to involve "clinging" (''zhen pa'') or determining cognition (''zhen rig''), and explained that such is not the case in direct (''mngon sum'') perception of emptiness. Mi pham dismisses this refutation, countering that the absence of determining cognition (''zhen rig'') is not specific to the direct cognition of emptiness, but is common to all kinds of direct cognition:<ref>''Rab lan'' 370.1: ''stong nyid mngon sum rtogs tshe zhen rig dang bral ba tsam 'di'i khyad chos ci yang ma yin te''/ ''mngon sum thams cad de 'dra'i rtog bral yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=There is nothing special about this mere absence of determining cognition when emptiness is realised directly; all [kinds of] direct cognition are, in a similar way, free of conceptualisation.
}}
For Mi pham, the important point in a direct realisation of emptiness – conceived of as free of all proliferations (''spros bral'') – is, however, that it is not only free of determining cognition (''zhen rig''), but from any kind of subject-object dichotomy. This sort of understanding of emptiness must be cultivated already at the stage of conceptual reflection about the absolute, so that what one understands intellectually and what one later realises directly – in a process that is beyond a dualistically operating mind – are the same.<ref>''Rab lan'' 371.3–5: ''bden med spros bral mngon sum rtogs pa'i gnyis su med pa'i blo'am ye shes de la zhen rig gi rtog pa dang bral bar ma zad''/ ''rnam par rtog'' [B ''rtogs''] ''pa'i gzung 'dzin gang yang med pa dang''/ ''dbu ma yin pa dang''/ ''rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi tshad'' [C ''tshan''] ''mas de kho na nyid rtogs pa yin par bsgrub nus te''/ ''thos bsam gyis de gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su'ang de ltar bsgrub pa de mngon sum rtogs pa yin pas thos bsam sgom gsum ya ma bral ba dang''/ ''go don rtogs don mtshungs par gyur pa yin no''//.</ref>

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
Although remarks on the current issue, the correct understanding of emptiness, are found throughout Rab gsal's second criticism, these are often very brief and formulated in such a way that a concrete connection to a specific earlier discussion cannot be established with certainty. Further, Rab gsal's criticism often aims at pointing out inconsistencies between individual statements or positions found in Mi pham's texts, rather than continuing the central theme of the earlier discussions.

In one sentence of his response to the first section of Rab gsal's criticism, for example, Mi pham also made a distinction between the two ''satyas'' similar to the conception of "non-existence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level."<ref>The passage that Rab gsal quotes is ''Rab lan'' 309.4–5: ''don du skye ba med kyang skye ba ltar snang''.</ref> Since he repeatedly disapproved of this position with regard to the Dge lugs stance on understanding ''satyadvaya'', a direct contradiction is laid open, according to Rab gsal. Rab gsal's actual argument is very short, but he added some polemical remarks to it, implying that Mi pham adhered to a nihilistic view.<ref>For Rab gsal's complete criticism, see ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 441.1–3 (GC I.5m).</ref>

At the end of his reply to the second section of criticism, Mi pham countered Rab gsal's accusation of a similarity between his tradition and that of Hwa shang Mahāyāna by arguing that such is – in view of the lack of the latter's scriptures – pure speculation. Rab gsal seems to assume that Mi pham suggested that there are no Hwa shang scriptures in general, and refers to different sources that testify their existence. This criticism is found – formulated in a very similar way – in two separate passages of the ''Ga bur chu rgyun'', once in the first section, which reveals inner contradictions in Mi pham's statements,<ref>See ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 441.6–442.3 (GC I.5o). It is, however, not clear which "inner contradiction" Rab gsal is pointing at.</ref> and once in the third section, which aims at eliminating wrong conceptions.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 460.6–461.3 (GC III.2c).</ref> The content, however, is the same in both sections, and Mi pham answers them together with a brief remark in his later reply.

While the two earlier issues are limited to criticising specific statements by Mi pham, an expression of Rab gsal's understanding of emptiness is found in a passage that is not directly related to the topics discussed earlier.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 441.3–6 (GC I.5n).</ref> Here, Rab gsal emphasises that his view of emptiness, too – different from what Mi pham had assumed – arrives at a true unity of the two ''satyas'':<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 441.4–5: ''kho bo cag dngos po bden grub kyis stong pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis skye ba sogs yod la''/ ''skye 'gag yod pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis bden par med ces smra'o''// ''des na stong nyid dag las rab tu skye ba dang stong pa nyid rgyu 'bras su 'char ba'i don legs par bshad pas bden gnyis zung 'jug gi gnad ma bor la''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=We say: due to the reason that things are empty of true establishment, arising etc. exists; and due to the reason that arising and ceasing exist, [things] are devoid of true [establishment]. Consequently, the meaning that [things] arise out of emptiness and that emptiness appears as cause and effect is well explained; hence, the important point of the coalescence of the two ''satyas'' is not cast away.

}}
<h4>Mi pham's reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4>
Even though the two objections that Rab gsal raised with regard to inner contradictions in Mi pham's writings did not contribute to the clarification of the larger issue at stake in the earlier discussion, Mi pham considered it necessary to reply to them.

The motive behind his answer to Rab gsal's first objection seems obvious. Mi pham does not address the inconsistency between different statements that Rab gsal pointed out, but focuses solely on Rab gsal's polemical remarks accusing Mi pham of nihilism. For Mi pham, Rab gsal's taunting comment is merely a "teasing remark" (''mtshar gtam'') and – taking it that way – he replies by making even harsher comments about doctrines that are accepted in the Dge lugs tradition.<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 468.6–469.2 (YL II.c): ''khong mtshar gtam la dgyes tshul mdzad pas''/ ''don du med pa'i gral mgor bzhugs sogs gsungs pa la mtshar zhus''/ ''khyed ni tshig gi rtog chen mdzad pa 'di 'dra'i thugs dam la sku tshe ril por brtson pa mi lhod pa'i klog pa ba ya mtshan can zhig legs'' [B ''lags''] ''pas''/ ''don du med pa'i tshogs dbus der spyan drangs nas zhig pa dngos por gyur pa'i khri la bzhugs su gsol zhing''/ ''med dgag stong rkyang gi chos 'khor rgya chen po bskor bar mdzad pa la''/ ''ming rkyang btags yod tsam gyi stong 'bul khri 'bul phul bar dgyes par bzhes shig''/.</ref> While this mocking exchange of polemics led away from the original discussion, Mi pham classified it, nevertheless, as one of the "issues of major significance" (''don che ba''). Obviously, even if presented in the form of a joke, the accusation that Mi pham and his Rnying ma tradition adhered to a nihilist view is considered important.

The issue of the existence of Hwa shang's scriptures is considered of "minor significance" (''don chung ba'') and categorised accordingly.<ref>''Yang lan'' 467.1–2 (YL I.j).</ref> Mi pham clarifies that he was simply pointing out that the scriptures of Hwa shang are no longer extant nowadays, and thus it is difficult to determine the exact position taken by Hwa shang. Mi pham says that Rab gsal, in contrast, states repeatedly that the Hwa shang scriptures exist, but is not able to deliver their intention.<ref>''Yang lan'' 467.1: ''ha shang gi gzhung yod ces snga phyir'' [B ''phyi''] ''lan gnyis de'i dgongs rdzogs lta bur ma bskyal kyang''/.</ref>

Mi pham's response to Rab gsal's emphasis on the unity of the two ''satyas'' for a correct understanding of emptiness was already mentioned above.<ref>See above, p.165.</ref> While both adversaries disagree on the role and the emphasis that is placed on the negational moment in understanding emptiness, it is at this point of the unity of the two ''satyas'' that they find common ground, and it is therefore not surprising that Mi pham explicitly quotes Rab gsal's earlier position and asserts that it is fully capable of eliminating not only the extreme of permanence (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>''), but also the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>'').<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 470.3–4: ''stong nyid rgyu 'bras su 'char yod'' [B ''tshul''] ''go zhing bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med du rtogs na''/ ''de 'dra'i rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyid kyis chad mtha' sel bar the tshom ga la yod''/. Here, the first part is a direct quote of ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 441.4.</ref>


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<h3>Synopsis</h3>
As commonly accepted, Madhyamka philosophy culminates in a view that escapes both the extreme of eternalism (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>'') and the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>''). In their precise understanding on how this can be achieved, however, Tibetan philosophers disagreed.

In the Dge lugs tradition, the fundamental Madhyamaka statement that things are "neither existent nor non-existent" was interpreted – in order to follow logical principles – by adding certain specifications: understood correctly, it means that things are "neither existent on the absolute level nor non-existent on the conventional level." For Mi pham, in contrast, this view is based on a conception of the two ''satyas'' as separate, and conforms to the way emptiness is approached in the Svātantrika tradition with a – temporary – emphasis on the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute. A direct approach to the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute – the characteristic of the Prāsaṅgika tradition, as it is seen by Mi pham – goes beyond the dichotomy of existence and non-existence and is free of all modes of grasping (''<i>'</i>dzin stangs''), assertions (''khas len''), proliferations (''spros pa'') with regard to all four extremes, existence, non-existence, both, and neither, and thereby realises the unity or coalescence of the two ''satyas''.

Rab gsal argued that the Dge lugs interpretation of the unity of the two ''satyas'' as non-existence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level is not an invention of his own tradition, but corresponds to the intention of authoritative scriptures. For him, the combination of two types of cognitions is essential: while the realisation of non-existence on the absolute level does not refute the extreme of annihilation, the elimination of this extreme is effectuated by the realisation of existence on the conventional level. Mi pham's demand to go beyond this concept would, according to Rab gsal, inevitably lead to a nihilistic position – similar to that of Hwa shang Mahāyāna – where any mental activity is seen as a hindrance to awakening.

With regard to this issue, too, both positions seem to be firmly established in the doctrinal background of the two adversaries. In its approach to the unity of the two ''satyas'', the Dge lugs tradition emphasised logical principles, while for Mi pham, the absolute is ultimately beyond logic and language. Both, however, agreed that the realisation of a unity of the two ''satyas'' is of the utmost importance; in his last letter, Mi pham made some conciliary remarks to the effect that Rab gsal's concept of the two ''satyas'' would also be capable of refuting both the extreme of permanence (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>'') and the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>'').

<h3>Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika</h3>
The classification of Indian Madhyamaka as Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika is known to be problematic. Ostensibly not an Indian invention, this distinction reflects an attempt to systematise an intricate tradition made by Tibetan doxographers in the eleventh century.<ref>Cf. Dreyfus & McClintock 2003, for discussions of the differentiation of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika traditions from various perspectives, and – more recently – Seyfort Ruegg 2006: 324ff., who lists seven criteria for the distinction of the two Madhyamaka traditions. The question, that of course arises, is to what extent this Tibetan categorisation is useful or harmful when one investigates the Indian tradition. In contrast to more sceptical voices, Seyfort Ruegg has argued in favour of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction as a hermeneutical tool, even for approaching the Indian tradition, provided that its limitations are considered: "Recognition of the constraints and limitations of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction as applied in the sources need not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is arbitrary historically and worthless philosophically, that it has neither descriptive (taxonomic and doxographic) nor analytical and heuristic usefulness. Provided it is handled with due care, and with an appreciation of its historical limits, it can prove interesting even for the study of the Indian sources, in spite of the fact that the distinction as such has not been mentioned there." (Seyfort Ruegg 2006: 345)</ref> While all later Tibetan philosophers readily use this distinction in their categorisation of their Indian predecessors, as well as a means of self-identification and delimitation of their own doctrinal space, the role they ascribe to this distinction varies. Tsong kha pa, the founder of the Dge lugs tradition, is particularly famous for conceiving of a fundamental difference between the two Madhyamaka traditions and emphasising the supremacy of the Prāsaṅgika. This is expressed ''inter alia'' in the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', a work that formulates the "eight difficult points," i.e., the eight core characteristics of the Prāsaṅgika tradition.<ref>As pointed out by Lopez, the establishment of the Prāsaṅgika view as the pivotal system in Tibetan philosophy was, to a large extent, influenced by Tsong kha pa: "The primacy of the Prāsaṅgika view was firmly established for the Tibetan tradition by Tsongkha-pa, the founder of the Ge-luk (''dGe-lugs'') order, in works such as the ''Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path'' (''Lam rim chen mo''), the ''Essence of the Good Explanations'' (''Legs bshad snying po''), and the ''Great Commentary on'' (''Candrakīrti's'') ''<i>'</i>Supplement<i>'</i>'' (''<i>'</i>Jug dik chen mo''). In these works he presents both the central issues and most intricate points of the Prāsaṅgika school with
a precision and style unmatched in Buddhist literature. Thus, it can be said that from the time of Tsong-kha-pa, if not before, the Prāsaṅgika school was the dominant philosophical system in Tibet." (Lopez 1987: 22) However, even though the Dge lugs school achieved a hegemonic status with regard to its politcal power, and thus its philosophical ideas had a great impact on Tibetan philosophy as a whole, there were still philosophers who had a quite different opinion on the nature of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction.</ref> For other Tibetan scholars, such as Rong ston (1367–1449) and Go rams pa (1429–1489), the differences are minor and consist only in methodological issues.<ref>Dreyfus 2003a: 318–328 and Cabezón 2003: 289ff. give an overview of the respective positions.</ref> The exact characterisation of each of these two Madhyamaka traditions, as well as the general problem of the nature of their differences, have been issues of dispute throughout Tibetan history and were naturally also a "hot topic" in the debates between Rab gsal and Mi pham discussed here. . . .


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<h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
As has already been explained above in the two sub-sections of the fourth topic, Mi pham distinguished between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute. He characterised the former as a provisional approach to emptiness that conceives of the two ''satyas'' as separate, resolving the statement that things are "neither existent nor nonexistent" by adding specifications, interpreting it as "neither existent on the absolute level, nor non-existent on the conventional level." Mi pham described this approach as the – temporal – focus of the Svātantrika tradition and his explanations further implied a resemblance to the way emptiness is conceived in the Dge lugs tradition. The latter absolute, in contrast, was depicted as a direct approach to the ultimate union of the two ''satyas'' emphasised in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, but also shared – ultimately – by the Svātantrikas. While Mi pham used the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction (a distinction that was commonly accepted in his philosophical milieu) and aligned it with two different approaches to the absolute, he relativised the differences between these traditions by pointing to their common ultimate aim. In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', he explained that:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.3–5: ''mkhas mchog bu ston la sogs pas ni thal rang gi khyad par 'di bod'' [C ''bad''] ''kyi rtog bzor zad de''/ ''rgya gar du ma byung bar mdzad mod''/ ''mthar thug gi don la khyad par ci yang med kyang gzhung 'chad tshul gyi dbang du khyad par yod de''/ [...] ''des na thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med kyang rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa'i don dam rtsal du bton te 'chad tshul tsam yin te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Profound scholars, such as Bu ston and others, indeed proclaimed (mdzad) that the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction is only a personal invention of the Tibetans and that it did not develop in India.<ref>326</ref> Even though there is not any difference with regard to the ultimate meaning, there is a difference owing to ways of explaining the scriptures. [...] Therefore, there is not any difference with regard to the ultimate intention of those great charioteers of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika [traditions], but [these] are merely [different] ways of explanation, insofar as they emphasise the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') or the actual (''rnam grangs min pa'') absolute.
}}
As expected, Mi pham's focus on the common intention of both traditions, but also his depictions of the individual approaches was troublesome for his Dge lugs opponent, whose tradition emphasises more the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika tradition, as well as the supremacy of the latter.

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
In Rab gsal's letter, four passages are found that specifically address the aforementioned topic. The first two criticise Mi pham's explanation of the Svātantrika tradition, the third his depiction of the Prāsaṅgika tradition, while the last one discusses the question of whether both traditions share a common aim or not.<ref>These passages are ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.5–6 (JL IV.1c), 400.6–401.2 (JL IV.4e), 401.2–3 (JL IV.4f), and 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a), respectively.</ref>

In the first argument,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.5–6 (JL IV.1c).</ref> Rab gsal accuses Mi pham of contradicting his own assertions. To prove that also in the Svātantrika tradition "nonexistence itself is not assumed in the sense of the ultimate mode of existence,"<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.2: ''med pa nyid kyang gnas lugs mthar thug gi don du mi bzhed de''/.</ref> Mi pham quoted a certain passage from the ''Madhyamakālaṅkāra'' – a Svātantrika text – where arising, as well as the non-existence of arising, is negated.<ref>I.e., MA 71ab: ''skye ba la sogs med pa'i phyir''// ''skye ba med la sogs mi srid''//.</ref> This passage, according to Rab gsal, points to the elimination of all extremes, and hence contradicts Mi pham's explanation that the Svātantrika emphasises the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute that was said to refer to the refutation of the extreme of existence alone.

This very same argument is brought forth in a later section of the work.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 400.6–401.2 (JL IV.4e).</ref> Again, Rab gsal refers to the relevant passage of the ''Madhyamakālaṅkāra'' to show that the Svātantrikas accept the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, and that such was also claimed by Mi pham. This, says Rab gsal, is in direct contradiction to Mi pham's other statements:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 400.6: ''khyod kyis rang rgyud pas rnam grangs tsam dang''/ ''thal 'gyur bas rnam grangs ma yin pa tsam 'dod zer bas''.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=You said: the Svātantrikas accepts only the nominal [absolute] and the Prāsaṅgikas only the actual.
}}
While one would expect that Rab gsal was mostly offended by Mi pham's equation of the Svātantrika approach with that of the Dge lugs tradition, Rab gsal confines his criticism of Mi pham's exposition to the inconsistencies presented above.

Also with regard to Mi pham's description of the Prāsaṅgika tradition, Rab gsal points out contradictions between earlier and later statements.<ref>This is discussed in ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.2–3 (JL IV.4f).</ref> In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Mi pham stated that the Prāsaṅgikas do not bifurcate the absolute.<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.5–6: ''des na thal 'gyur ba'i skabs 'dir zung 'jug spros pa dang bral ba'i dbu ma chen po nyid rtsal du 'don pas 'di'i lugs la rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa'i don dam gnyis su dbye ba med par shes par bya'o''/.</ref> According to this statement, writes Rab gsal, it would follow that the Prāsaṅgikas accept "non-establishment on the absolute level" (''don dam par ma grub pa'') as ultimate emptiness:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.2–3: ''de'i don dam par ma grub pa mtha' bzhi dang bral ba'i stong nyid chen por 'dod par thal''/ ''rnam grangs par mi 'dod pa de'i phyir''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=It follows that those (Prāsaṅgikas) accept non-establishment on the absolute level as the "Great Emptiness" (''stong nyid chen po''), which is free of the four extremes, since they do not accept it as the nominal (absolute).
}}
Rab gsal's conclusion assumes, of course, that the Prāsaṅgikas accept non-establishment on the absolute level. But if they do accept it, then they have to accept it as ultimate emptiness, since they do not distinguish between provisional and ultimate emptiness. That the Prāsaṅgikas accept non-establishment on the absolute level as ultimate emptiness contradicts, however, another statement of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' (already quoted in the first criticism of this section), where Mi pham pointed out that "non-existence itself is not assumed in the sense of the ultimate mode of existence."<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.2: ''med pa nyid kyang gnas lugs mthar thug gi don du mi bzhed de''/.</ref>

Rab gsal's last criticism<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a).</ref> with regard to the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction attacks Mi pham's statement that "there is not any difference with regard to the ultimate intention of those great charioteers of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika [tradition]."<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.4–5: ''thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med''.</ref> According to Rab gsal, this position obliterates the differences between the two traditions. If one claims that there is a shared ultimate intention of these two, then one could also claim the same for other Buddhist traditions, such as the Cittamātrins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣikas. Further, quarrels between the thought of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti would be meaningless, since their intention would have been the same anyway. A third unwanted consequence of Mi pham's position pointed out by Rab gsal is that a commonly accepted characteristic used to distinguish both traditions, viz. the question of whether the establishment (of appearances) by an "own-characteristic" (''rang mtshan gyis grub pa'') on the conventional level is to be accepted or not, would be irrevelant.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.5: ''mkhas pa'i rjes su zlos te kun rdzob tu rang mtshan gyis grub pa 'dod mi 'dod gyi khyad par smras pa'ang don med du ngal bar zad do''//.</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
In his response to Rab sal's criticism, Mi pham seizes the opportunity to further clarify his own understanding of the respective positions of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika traditions, about which he elaborates at some length. The current presentation will, however, focus on the actual answers to the arguments brought forth by Rab gsal.

In the first criticism, Rab gsal indicated a contradiction between Mi pham's explanations linking the Svātantrika approach to the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute alone, and other explanations pointing to the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute. Mi pham answers by clarifying his position:<ref>For Mi pham's complete answer, see ''Rab lan'' 292.6–293.4 (RL IV.1b).</ref> both traditions, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, arrive at a common intention, the actual absolute, which is free from proliferations. Their approach, however, is different, as the Prāsaṅgika focuses on this ultimate absolute instantly, while the Svātantrika develops this understanding in a gradual way. Mi pham explains that:<ref>''Rab lan'' 293.1–2: ''thal'' [A ''thel''] ''rang gi gzhung du don dam gnyis po rtsal du bton nas spros bral gyi'' [C ''gyis''] ''don rim dang cig car gyi 'chad tshul tsam las mthar thug spros bral nyid du dgongs pa gcig par 'dod pas skyon 'di'' [C ''de''] ''mi 'jug ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika texts both [kinds of] absolute are stressed and the meaning of freedom from proliferations [is explained] instantly or step by step. [Thus, these are] merely [different] ways of explanation, but ultimately they have the same intention in the form of freedom from proliferations itself. As [this is our] belief, the fault [you mentioned] does not apply.
}}
In his response to Rab gsal's second accusation, which was aimed at the very same issue as the first one, Mi pham responds in a slightly different way.<ref>''Rab lan'' 333.6–338.4 (RL IV.4e), q.v. for the complete passage.</ref> In both traditions, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, concepts of existence and non-existence are refuted one after another by applying different lines of reasoning to the phenomena appearing, but the meaning of freedom from proliferations cannot be accomplished in one instant. While both traditions appear to be similar in this regard, one must distinguish between them, since the Svātantrika tradition accepts assertions (''khas len'') with regard to the absolute, while the Prāsaṅgika does not.<ref>''Rab lan'' 333.6–334.1: ''thal rang su'i lugs la'ang ji ltar snang ba'i dngos po rnams la mtha' bzhi skye 'gog dang gcig du bral la sogs pa'i rigs pa'i sgo nas dmigs pa rnams re re nas 'gog pa la spros bral gyi don cig char sgrub ma nus pas thad kar bltas na yul bkag tshul khyad med pa lta bur snang yang''/ ''mthar rang lugs la don dam pa la'' [C ''la'' om.] ''khas len yod med kyi 'jog mtshams 'di la gtugs nas khyad 'byed dgos te''/.</ref> Mi pham's thought here seems to be that any specific process of eliminating extremes must proceed in a gradual manner – also in the Prāsaṅgika tradition. There is, however, a difference in this process between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika insofar as assertions (of any kind) are involved or not. While the Śvātantrikas accept the assertion of non-existence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level with regard to the nominal absolute, they do not accept this absolute to be the actual absolute. Therefore, writes Mi pham, one could say that the Svātantrikas accept both absolutes:<ref>''Rab lan'' 334.6–335.2: ''don dam par med pa dang''/ ''tha snyad du yod pa gnyis 'du 'bral med par bzung nas rnam pa kun tu khas len dang bcas pa rtsal du bton nas bsgrub mod kyi rnam grangs pa'i don dam khas len dang bcas pa de mthar thug gi gnas lugs su ma bzung bar mthar thug spros med du bzhed kyang''/ ''don dam snga ma nyid gtso bor bsgrubs pas rang rgyud pa'i lugs la''/ ''don dam gnyis po gang khas mi len zhes 'dri na''/ ''gnyis ka khas len zhes 'dod de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Taking both, non-existence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level, as an inseparable unity, [the Svātantrikas] focus on [the nominal absolute] that contains assertions (''khas len'') in every aspect and accomplish it. However, they do not take this nominal absolute that contains assertions (''khas len'') to be the ultimate mode of existence, and, ultimately, assert it (i.e., the ultimate mode of existence) to be without proliferations. But, since [the Svātantrikas] accomplish mainly just this earlier absolute, one may ask which of the two absolutes is not accepted in the Svātantrika tradition? [The answer is:] [We] believe that they accept both. 
}}
Following Mi pham, the difference between both traditions thus lies in their pedagogical approach: while the Svātantrikas conceive of the realisation of the nominal absolute as an indispensable step for the realisation of the actual absolute, and in this sense proceed in a gradual way, the Prāsaṅgikas focus on the latter absolute right away. The final aim, however, remains the same for both traditions, and there is thus no contradiction in saying that the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute is accepted equally by the Svātantrikas.

Further, Mi pham deals with the contradictions that Rab gsal mentioned with regard to the earlier's explanations of the Prāsaṅgika tradition in his extensive presentation of his view of the Prāsaṅgika.<ref>''Rab lan'' 338.4–348.5 (RL IV.4f).</ref> In his criticism, Rab gsal established the Prāsaṅgika view of emptiness as "nonestablishment on the absolute level" (''don dam par ma grub pa''). For Mi pham, in contrast, inserting specifications, such as "on the absolute level," corresponds to the approach of the Svātantrika tradition, but not that followed by the Prāsaṅgika:<ref>''Rab lan'' 338.4–5: ''thal 'gyur ba'i gzhung du ni''/ ''<i>'</i>jug par don dam gtan la 'bebs byed mtha' bzhi'i skye ba 'gogs pa'i rigs pa gsungs pa des'' [B ''nges''] ''kyang rang rgyud pa ltar don dam par skye ba bkag nas tha snyad du skye ba yod par 'dod'' [B ''<i>'</i>don''] ''na thal rang gi khyad par phye ba med par 'gyur ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=With regard to the Prāsaṅgika scriptures, the reasoning of the "arising and ceasing according to the four alternatives" (''mtha' bzhi'i skye ba 'gogs pa''), which establishes the absolute, is mentioned in the ''[Madhyamaka]avatāra''. If this also refuted arising on the absolute level and accepted the existence of arising on the conventional level, similar to the Svātantrika [tradition], then there would be no distinction between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika.
}}
As he has already done in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Mi pham accuses the Dge lugs tradition of pursuing a line that does not accord with the procedure of the Prāsaṅgika tradition in its approach to emptiness, but rather corresponds to the way emptiness is established – provisionally – by the Svātantrikas. According to him, the Prāsaṅgikas, in contrast to the Svātantrikas, do not add a specification when they refute arising by various lines of reasoning. By this means, they arrive directly at the unity of the two ''satyas'', which, according to Mi pham, is the essential point in understanding emptiness. Mi pham explains:<ref>''Rab lan'' 339.4–5: ''de ltar mtha' bzhi'i tshul gyis dpyad na skye ba ni don dam par ma zad''/ ''tha snyad du yang med par gtan la phab pa'i rigs pa des 'di ltar rten 'byung gi snang ba bslu med du yod pa 'di rnams ye nas skye ba dang 'gag pa med pa'i rang bzhin du gtan la phab'' [AC ''pheb''] ''pa yin pas''/ ''rnam grangs pa'i bden med tsam las 'das te rnam grangs min pa'i don dam bden gnyis dbyer med spros bral chos kyi dbyings nyid du bstan pa yin no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Thus, if one investigates by way of [the reasoning of] the four alternatives, then arising is established to be non-existent not only on the absolute level, but also on the conventional level. In this way (''<i>'</i>di ltar''), this reasoning establishes these dependently arising appearances which exist undeceptively as having a nature (''rang bzhin'') that has been without arising and ceasing since time without beginning. Hence, [this reasoning] goes beyond the mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') of the nominal [absolute] and teaches the actual absolute, the indivisibility of the two satyas, freedom from proliferations, the ''dharmadhātu'' itself.
}}
In what follows, Mi pham supports his view of the Prāsaṅgika tradition by referring to various passages of Candrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' and its auto-commentary, a text that is also accepted in the Dge lugs tradition as the most important Indian authority on the Prāsaṅgika position. Thus, Mi pham counters Rab gsal's criticism by showing that his argumentation is based on a wrong understanding of the Prāsaṅgika view of emptiness.

Rab gsal's last accusation concerns the question of to what extent Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika can be claimed to be similar. In his answer,<ref>''Rab lan'' 349.2–350.6 (RL IV.5).</ref> Mi pham reiterates his position that both traditions are similar in certain aspects and, most importantly, in their ultimate aim:<ref>''Rab lan'' 349.3–4: ''thal rang gnyis kas phyi nang gi chos thams cad gtan tshigs kyi sgo nas bden med du gtan la phab pa'i dbu ma pa yin par 'dra zhing''/ ''mthar thug spros bral kyang 'dod par 'dra bas''/ ''de gnyis mthar thug gi don la dgongs pa gcig par 'dod de''/ ''zhi sgo gnyis su med pa rten 'byung dang stong pa nyid bstan pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas are equally Mādhyamikas that establish all inner and outer phenomena as lacking true establishment (''bden med'') by means of reasoning, and, on the ultimate level, they also equally accept freedom from proliferations. Hence, it is accepted that the intentions of those two are ultimately identical, since [they both] teach dependent arising and emptiness, the non-dual door to peace.
}}
Mi pham denies Rab gsal's accusation that this position would wipe out the legitimate differences between these and other Buddhist traditions, as well as the differences between the two themselves. According to him, the differences Rab gsal saw jeopardised by Mi pham's position are well established. This, however, does not change his opinion that the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika aim at a common goal and, in this regard, are similar. Using the phrasing of Rab gsal's earlier criticism, Mi pham turns the former's words against him:<ref>''Rab lan'' 350.1: ''des na de 'dra'i thal ba 'phen'' [A ''<i>'</i>phan''] ''pa ni lugs med pa'i smra ba tsam las rten gzhan tshad mas dngos su bsal lo''//. As often, Mi pham uses expressions from Rab gsal's criticism in his response. This phrase, for example, is found in ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.4: ''lugs med pa las rten gzhan tshad mas gsal lo''//</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, pointing out (''<i>'</i>phen pa'') such a consequence (''thal ba'') is merely to state without [any established] tradition. A basis other than that is directly discarded by valid cognition (''tshad ma'').
}}
As Rab gsal had done, Mi pham also attacks his opponent by arguing that his accusations are without any basis.

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
Again, the issues at stake pertain to several objections raised in Rab gsal's response. There is, however, no substantial continuation of the earlier discussion.

It seems that the assessment of the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is firmly established in the doctrinal background of the respective traditions. While the Dge lugs school claims that there is a major difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, Mi pham – with Go rams pa ''et al''. – views these differences as superficial and concerning mainly pedagogical matters. In view of these fundamental differences, there is no common ground.


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<h3>Synopsis</h3>
Since the eleventh century, Tibetan philosophers have been using the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika to systematise the Indian Madhyamaka tradition, and also to demarcate their own doctrinal space. The role they ascribe to this distinction, however, varies. While earlier Sa skya scholars, such as Rong ston and Go rams pa, perceived it as concerning mainly methodological issues, the Dge lugs tradition, beginning with its founder Tsong kha pa, emphasised a fundamental difference between both traditions and established the supremacy of the Prāsaṅgika.

While Mi pham uses this distinction to delineate two different approaches to the absolute, he followed his intellectual predecessors by emphasising their common ultimate aim. For Mi pham, the Svātantrika is characterised by a – temporary – focus on the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute that entails a separation of the two ''satyas'', conceiving of things as "neither existent on the absolute level, nor non-existent on the conventional level." In so doing, Mi pham ascribed to the Dge lugs stance on ''satyadvaya'' a close connection to the way emptiness is approached through the methodology of the Svātantrika tradition, a tradition from which the Dge lugs school tries hard to distance itself. For Mi pham, however, this approach is only of provisional importance. Ultimately, the Svātantrika, too, arrives at understanding emptiness or the absolute to be free from all proliferations and extremes, a realisation, which the Prāsaṅgika tradition aims at from the very beginning.

While Mi pham ascribed to the Dge lugs school a close resemblance to the Svātantrika tradition, this specific aspect, did not figure prominently in the later discussions. Instead, Rab gsal decided to directly criticise Mi pham's explanations of the two approaches, often by pointing out contradictions between individual statements. He also attacked Mi pham for playing down the fundamental difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika that is accounted for in his school.

In his answer, Mi pham seized the opportunity to further clarify his understanding of the two traditions, giving lengthy explanations of this matter. As before, he pointed out that a difference between them is legitimate, but only of a superficial nature; their ultimate aim is the same.

It seems that, owing to the heavy doctrinal weight that is connected with this issue, progress in the sense of an approximation of claims was not possible; instead, the debate remained restricted, for the most part, to the repetition of established doctrinal positions.

<h3>The Absolute as An Object of Mind (''blo'') and Words (''sgra'')</h3>
Until now, we have discussed the different concepts of the absolute set forth by Mi pham and Rab gsal, as well as the perspectives of the two Mādhyamika traditions, the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, in this matter. The last of the four issues of this fourth topic pertains to another "hot topic" in Madhyamaka philosophy specifically, but also in the Buddhist tradition as a whole. Buddhist scriptures, especially of the Prajñāpāramitā genre, describe the absolute (''paramārtha'') as inconceivable and beyond the scope of linguistic expression. On the other hand, it is commonly accepted, and also communicated in the literary corpus of Buddhism, that the Buddhist path leads to a realisation of the absolute and that this path uses oral or written instructions as guidance. In his seminal paper on this problem, Seyfort Ruegg summarised this tension in the following way:<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 1971: 494.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In other words, if the ''paramārtha'' is altogether unthinkable and unknowable, is not absolute reality in its function as the base or ground of spiritual practice – i.e. the ''prakṛtisthagotra'' or ''tathāgatagarbha'' – cognitively quite inaccessible also? And in this case are we not faced with a curios and rather paradoxical situation in which an absolute that is immanent in all beings from the soteriological point of view would nonetheless be altogether transcendent from the gnoseological point of view?
}}
As Buddhism developed, different scholars took diverging stances on this matter, especially in the Tibetan tradition. In arguing for the respective positions, the second half of BCA IX.2 was frequently mentioned, which was translated above as follows:
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Reality (''tattva'') is not the sphere of mind (''buddhi''); mind is said to be ''saṃvṛti''.<ref>Note again, that the Sanskrit text reads ''tattva'' (reality), while the Tibetan translation reads ''don dam'' (''paramārtha''/absolute). Both words, however, are used synonymously, denoting absolute/ultimate/true reality.</ref>
}}
This passage seems to state clearly that the absolute or reality as such is beyond cognition and hence it was used by Tibetan philosophers – in particular by those belonging to other schools than the Dge lugs – as an argument for the inconceivable and inexpressible nature of the absolute. Scholars from the Dge lugs tradition, in contrast, objected to this, insisting that this passage should not be interpreted in a literal way, as Sweet explains:<ref>Sweet 1979: 79–80.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The Geluk view, exemplified by Gyaltshap (''Rgyal Tshab'') and Tsgonkhapa [sic], holds that the second half of this stanza should not be taken in its literal sense, because if ultimate truth were not the object of some type of intellectual understanding, it would be unknowable, and it would therefore follow that all religious practice aiming at the realization of the ultimate would be in vain. The earlier Sakya and later Nyingma commentators dissented from this line of interpretation, arguing that ultimate truth "cannot be objectified by the mind because it transcends all discursiveness (''prapañca'')," although these commentators do affirm a non-intellectual intuition of the ultimate.
}}
The passage Sweet quoted as representative for the view of the Sa skya and Rnying ma commentators stems from Mi pham's ''Nor bu ke ta ka''<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 8.4–5.</ref> and, as expected, this position was sharply criticised by Rab gsal. As noted by Sweet, the Dge lugs tradition opted against a literal understanding of this passage. In his commentary, Rgyal tshab clearly refutes the position that the absolute is not a knowable (''shes bya''). As he points out, the basis of dividing (''dbye gzhi'') the two ''satyas'' is knowables.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 208.14–17: ''shes par bya ba yang zhes pas shes bya dbye gzhi'' [...] ''bstan to''//.</ref> Following this definition, both ''satyas'' are knowables and hence a literal interpretation of the BCA is contradictory:<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 208.17–18: ''des na don dam pa'i bden pa shes bya ma yin pa dang blo gang gis kyang ma rtogs pa spyod 'jug gi dgongs par 'chad pa ni log par 'chad pa'o''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, explaining the intention of the ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' to be that ''paramārthasatya'' is not a knowable (''shes bya'') and is not realised by any [kind of] mind is explaining wrongly.
}}
Understanding the BCA in a literal way, according to Rgyal tshab, would mean that no mind whatsoever could realise the absolute. This interpretation would lead to certain unwanted consequences, such as that a mind would not be present when one meditates on the absolute.<ref>For Rgyal tshab's criticism of his opponent's position, see ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 209.9–210.7, or, respectively, Sweet 1977: 173f., for a translation.</ref> Following Rgyal tshab's view, the absolute is only excluded as an object for a dualistic (''gnyis su snang ba'') mind; it is, however, known by direct valid cognition (''mngon sum tshad ma''). . . .<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 210.12–14: ''rang nyid dngos su rtogs pa'i blo mngon sum tshad ma de la rang nyid gnyis su snang ba'i sgo nas de'i spyod yul du 'gyur ba min pa gang zhig rang 'jal ba'i mngon sum tshad ma des shes par bya ba yin pa'o''//. A similar description of the process of realising emptiness was also given by Rab gsal in the earlier discussions, see p.159 and p.172.</ref>

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<h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4>
In contrast, Mi pham favoured a literal interpretation of this passage. As the absolute is utterly beyond the limitations of ordinary language and mind, it is rightly described as not being the object of mind, thus Mi pham in his commentary on BCA IX.2cd:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.6: ''de phyir dngos po'i gnas tshul don dam pa ni yod pa dang''/ ''med pa dang''/ ''gnyis ka dang''/ ''gnyis min gyi mtha' kun dang bral bas na blo yi spyod yul min te''/ ''blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Therefore, the absolute, the mode of existence, is free from all extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither, and hence is not the sphere (''spyod yul'') of mind (''blo''), since mind and words (''sgra'') are conventional (''kun rdzob''), but are not absolute (''don dam pa'').
}}
Mi pham is well aware of the controversies that developed regarding the interpretation of this passage. He knows the objections raised by Dge lugs scholars against the position of their opponents, as well as their specific solution to understanding this passage. For him, the issue between both parties is simply a matter of "mere designation" (''ming tsam''), and hence only superficial in nature:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.1–2: ''gzhan yang bden gnyis kyi dbye gzhi shes bya min par 'gyur ba sogs kyis gnod pas blo gnyis snang gi spyod yul min zhes khyad par mdzad na'ang''/ ''<i>'</i>di ni ming tsam gyis ngal ba ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Moreover, one may apply a specification [interpreting this passage] as "[the absolute] is not the sphere of a dualistic mind" since [a literal interpretation] is invalidated by [arguments] such as that the basis of dividing the two ''satyas'' would not be knowables (''shes bya''), but this is a difficulty of mere designation.
}}
Whether the absolute can be called a "knowable" (''shes bya'') depends on how one uses this designation, and what is implied by this usage. On the level of ordinary conventions (tha snyad), one could also say that the absolute is a knowable, given that the subject of the process of knowing to which one is referring is non-dualistic gnosis (''ye shes'') and its object the ''dharmadhātu''. In an absolute sense, however, such an interpretation is misleading, since this type of understanding does not operate within the dichotomy of subject and object. Mi pham explains:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.3–4: ''tha snyad du ni 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yul can dang''/ ''chos kyi dbyings yul du byas pa la brten nas shes bya yin no'' [C ''no'' om.] ''zhes brjod rung gi''/ ''don dam par gzung 'dzin med pa'i mnyam bzhag gis 'di gzung bya'am shes bya yin zer na tshig de dngos shugs'' [C ''shug sa''] ''mi 'gal lam''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=On the conventional level, taking the concentration (''mnyam bzhag'') of the Āryas as the subject and ''dharmadhātu'' as the object, it is possible to say that [the absolute] is an object of cognition/a knowable (''shes bya''). On the absolute level, however, are the words not directly and indirectly contradictory if one says that this (i.e., the absolute) is an object of grasping (''gzung bya'') or an object of cognition (''shes bya'') for the concentration that is without grasped [object] and grasping [subject]?
}}
For Mi pham, the solution to this problem lies in the usage of the designation "object of cognition/knowable" (''shes bya''). Describing the absolute as knowable in terms of a negative determination (''rnam gcod''), that is, in a mere apophatic way, is possible, and does not contradict a positive determination (''yongs gcod'') that conceives the absolute as not being a knowable.<ref>Using Mi pham's definition from his commentary on the ''Madhyamakālaṅkāra'', Karma Phuntsho explains these two kinds of determination in the following way (Phuntsho 2005: 170): "Negative determination is a process where 'the nature of a thing is known [indirectly] through the elimination of what are not the thing' and positive determination is where 'the nature of a thing is [directly] affirmed and by doing so, what are not the thing are eliminated'." See also Mi pham's ''Rgyan 'grel'' 229.3–5: ''de la rnam bcad yongs gcod kyi tshul mdor bsdus su brjod na''/ ''de min bsal ba'am gzhan sel ba'i tshul gyis 'di dag gi tha snyad byed ste''/ ''sel tshul la bum med lta bu med dgag gi gzhan sel dang''/ ''bum min lta bu ma yin dgag gi gzhan sel gnyis yod la''/ ''de'ang rang min pa bsal ba'i tshul gyis de'i ngo bo shes par bya ba rnam bcad dang''/ ''rang gi ngo bo sgrub pa'i tshul gyis rang min mtha' dag bsal ba yongs gcod de''/.</ref> Claiming that the absolute could be established as a knowable in a positive sense, i.e., in the form of a positive determination, however, would reduce the absolute to an ordinary thing (''dngos po'').<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.4–5: ''yang bden gnyis kyi dbye gzhi shes bya yin pas don dam shes byar khas blangs pa de yang rnam gcod du yin la''/ ''<i>'</i>dir shes bya min pa ni yongs gcod du yin pas mi 'gal te''/ ''yongs gcod du'ang shes byar khas len na stong nyid dngos por zhal gyis bzhes par 'gyur bas''/ [...].</ref> Thus, for Mi pham both ways of describing the absolute are possible, and a debate between the two parties, in which one claims the absolute is not a knowable (''shes bya''), while the other refutes this position, is unnecessary:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.5: ''phyogs smra ba gnyis so so nas kyang ming la ngal bas ci bya ste don la rton par bya'o''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Why do the two proponents of the [respective] position trouble about the designation each from their own [position] (''so so nas'')? They should rely on the meaning!
}}
While Mi pham here appears as a mediator between the two extreme positions that developed in this regard in the history of Tibetan scholastics, he was harshly attacked for his statements by Rab gsal, who read Mi pham's explanations as a refutation of his (Dge lugs) tradition.

<h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4>
Among the various issues raised in the fourth topic of the debate, the discussion of the present question seemed to be particularly important to Rab gsal. In the overall outline of his work he mentioned this issue as a separate sub-item, which he subdivided further into two aspects: According to Rab gsal, Mi pham's – alleged – position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words contradicts, firstly, other statements within his work, and, secondly, the authoritative Indian scriptures (''lung'').<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 409.6: ''da ni don dam sgra dang blo'i yul min zer ba la''/ ''rang tshig dang''/ ''lung tshig dang 'gal ba'i tshul lo''//.</ref>

Obviously, the departure point of this discussion is not formed by the differentiated explanations given by Mi pham on this issue as we have seen earlier; rather, Rab gsal reduces Mi pham's position to the plain statement that the absolute is not an object of mind (''blo'') and words (''sgra'').<ref>As noted earlier in Rab gsal's presentation of the "opponent's position" (''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 396.5–6), Rab gsal solely refers to Mi pham's explanations given in ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.6.</ref>

Rab gsal starts by pointing out the contradictions between this position and several other statements found in Mi pham's ''Nor bu ke ta ka''. Of those, a closer look at a few selected discussions will be sufficient to understand Rab gsal's principal method of argumentation, as well as Mi pham's response to it.

In one passage of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'',<ref>I.e., ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 3.6.</ref> Mi pham mentioned "insight that realises suchness" (''de kho na nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab''). Therefore, Rab gsal concludes, a mind (''blo'') that realises the absolute does exist, which in turn is in direct contradiction to the position that the absolute is not a knowable (''shes bya'').<ref>For this particular argument, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 409.6–410.1 (JL IV.14a).</ref>

Mi pham further proposed that not just the Āryas, but also ordinary beings have to meditate on the ultimate actual absolute (and not only on the nominal absolute).<ref> Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.4–6.</ref> Rab gsal argues that this statement clearly shows that the absolute is accepted as an object for both Āryas and ordinary beings, and therefore must be acknowledged to be an object of mind (''blo''), too.<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 411.1–4 (JL IV.16a)</ref> As before, Rab gsal's point is that any mention of the realisation of the absolute contradicts the claim that the absolute is not a knowable (''shes bya'') or an object of mind.

Rab gsal then turns to the question of whether or not the absolute is an object of words (''sgra''). His accuses Mi pham:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 412.1–3: ''blo'i yul du khas ma blang ba'i'' [B ''blangs pa'i''] ''<i>'</i>gal khur ma bzod pa'i steng du''/ ''slar yang sgra'i yul du khas ma blang ba'i'' [B ''blangs pa'i''] ''<i>'</i>gal 'du spos kyi glang pos theg tshad cig kyang 'gel te''/ [...] ''khyod kyis stong nyid chen po zhes brjod pa'i sgra de gang gi ming yin pa smros dang''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=On top of the unbearable load of not accepting [the absolute] to be an object of mind, the contradiction of not accepting [the absolute] to be an object of words, [heavy like] the weight carried by a Gandhahastin,<ref>A Ghandahastin, literally "fragrant elephant," seems to denote an elephant of special qualities, in particular, an enormous strength. In the ''Abhidharmakośabhāṣya'' (VII.31), such an elephant is said to have ten times the strength of an ordinary elephant.</ref> is also added. [...] Tell [me], this sound of your statement "Great Emptiness" (''stong nyid chen po''), the designation of what is it?
}}
According to Rab gsal, using an epithet for the absolute, such as "Great Emptiness," involves capturing the absolute with a linguistic expression and, hence, the absolute must also be accepted as an object of words.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 412.1–3 (JL IV.17b).</ref>

At another stage, Mi pham stated that emptiness was explained in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras.<ref>I.e., ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 33.</ref> Given Mi pham's position that the absolute is not an object of words, it would absurdly follow that the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are not words, Rab gsal reproaches his opponent.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 412.6 (JL IV.19a).</ref> As above, Rab gsal argues that emptiness or the absolute is described in Buddhist literature and hence must be accepted to be an object of words.

With regard to the second subject, that is, the contradictions between Mi pham's (alleged) position and the scriptures (''lung''), Rab gsal continues with his principal line of argumentation.

In the first unit of this discussion,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 413.2–414.3 (JL IV.20).</ref> Rab gsal mentions various cases where a teaching of the absolute is mentioned explicitly in certain scriptures, or where such is accepted implicitly. According to him, this is enough to prove that the scriptures present the absolute as an object of mind and words.

The same reasoning is applied at the very end of this section.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 415.5–416.4 (JL IV.23).</ref> Here, Rab gsal quotes various passages from Candrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', a work that is – as was pointed out before – commonly used as the major authority on understanding Madhyamaka philosophy. The passages cited by Rab gsal mention a mind or intellect that realises the absolute, as well as a (written or oral) teaching of emptiness or the absolute, and are therefore presented as a proof that even the most authoritative scriptures accept the absolute as an object of mind and words.

Similarly to the earlier discussions, Rab gsal also addresses a possible objection that an opponent might make against the charges he directs at Mi pham. He relates this objection to the arguments of the first unit, which concerns the contradictions between Mi pham and the scriptural tradition. However, as it applies also to Rab gsal's other lines of reasoning, it is discussed in more detail at the very end of this presentation.<ref>In Rab gsal's work, this passage is found between the two discussions presented above, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 414.3–4 (JL IV.21a).</ref> Typically for his style, he presents both objection and answer in a very terse manner:<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 414.3–4: ''kho na re''/ ''rnam bzhag de rnams kun rdzob tu yin pas ji skad bshad pa'i skyon du mi 'gyur ro zhe na''/ ''kun rdzob tu yod pas yod par mi 'gyur zhes khyed cag gis smras pas''/ ''de lta na des skyon spong mi nus so zhes kho bo cag smra'o''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Objection: Those presentations [that describe the teaching and realising of the absolute] are on the conventional level, hence, they will not give rise to a fault in the way it has been explained.

Response: You said that existence on the conventional level does not constitute existence (in general). Hence, we say that in this case, [you] are not able to avert the fault by this [argument].
}}
Earlier, Rab gsal used the fact that the scriptures mention the realisation of the absolute and also teach emptiness as a proof against the position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words. A (fictive) opponent now might counter this argument – as implied by Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''<ref>In his explanations on this matter, Mi pham also distinguished between the conventional and absolute levels: while one can call the absolute an object with regard to the earlier level, it would be contradictory to do so on the latter level. Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.3–4: ''tha snyad du ni 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yul can dang''/ ''chos kyi dbyings yul du byas pa la brten nas shes bya yin no'' [C ''no'' om.] ''zhes brjod rung gi''/ ''don dam par gzung 'dzin med pa'i mnyam bzhag gis 'di gzung bya'am shes bya yin zer na tshig de dngos shugs'' [C ''shug sa''] ''mi 'gal lam''/.</ref> – by distinguishing between the level of ordinary conventional ways of communication and the absolute level. The scriptures talk about the absolute and its realisation in a merely commonsense way; this does, however, not imply that they can truly express the absolute in an ultimative and definitive way. Rab gsal counters that such a response will only create other problems: in the tradition of Mi pham – Rab gsal assumes – existence on the conventional level is not accepted as existence ''per se''. Therefore, Mi pham would not be able to give the response mentioned above in the first place. Here, Rab gsal's reasoning depends on certain assumptions about his opponent's position, a move that will be sharply attacked in Mi pham's answer.

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4>
Among the responses to Rab gsal's various points of criticism, Mi pham's answer to Rab gsal's first criticism, presented earlier, already shows the essential issue that Mi pham repeatedly emphasises in his other answers.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 396.5–387.3 (RL IV.15a).</ref> According to Mi pham, Rab gsal's accusations are based on a lack of differentiation between the level of ordinary conventions and the absolute level of true investigation, a fault for which Mi pham offers pointed words:<ref>''Rab lan'' 396.5–6: ''de yang khyod ni don dam pa ni dmigs pa'i spyod yul can du rtogs bya min pa dang kun rdzob tha snyad kyi dbang du byas te rtogs pa yod pa'i don gnyis kyi dbang du byas pa'i khas len tshul shan ma phyed par bab col du rgol ba'i tshig gis rang mtshangs'' [B ''mtshang''] ''ston pa la mkhas pa zhig ste''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Further, you are someone who is skilled in showing his own hidden fault (''rang mtshangs'') by words that dispute in a careless manner without distinguishing the way of accepting [a certain position] in terms of the two [different] senses: that the absolute is not an object of realisation for a referential (''dmigs pa'') subject (''spyod yul can'') and that a realisation [of the absolute] exists with regard to the level of ''saṃvṛti'', the conventional (''tha snyad'').
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As already mentioned in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', Mi pham explains that, on the level of ordinary conventions, one can very well say that the absolute is realised. The important point is, however, that it is not realised by a referential or dualistic mind. Clarifying these issues effectively solves the present debate, a dispute, says Mi pham, that is based solely on a differing usage of the term "mind" (''blo''):<ref>''Rab lan'' 397.1–2: ''sgra blo'i yul min par bsgrub'' [C ''sgrub''] ''pa'i blo de dmigs pa can yin la''/ ''don dam bden pa rtogs pa'i blo de dmigs pa med pa can yin pas blo'i ming tsam la brten nas don gyi gnad ma go ba tshig gi rtsod pa tsam du zad do''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The mind for which it is established that [the absolute] is not an object of words and mind is referential (''dmigs pa can''), whereas the mind that realises ''paramārthasatya'' is non-referential (''dmigs pa med pa can''). Therefore, this is merely a dispute about words, based merely on the designation of "mind" (''blo''), without understanding the essential issue (''don gyi gnad'').
}}
This clear differentiation between a non-referential mind that realises the absolute and a referential mind that does not is pointed out at various stages in Mi pham's response.

In his second criticism, Rab gsal mentioned that Mi pham's statement that the absolute is realised by ordinary people and Āryas contradicts the position that the absolute is not a knowable (''shes bya''). As above, Mi pham answers by blaming Rab gsal for not being able to distinguish correctly between the conventional and the absolute levels, for having "a hidden fault (''mtshangs'') of not knowing the distinction of the two ''satyas''."<ref>''Rab lan'' 408.4: ''bden gnyis kyi rnam dbye la mi mkhas pa'i mtshangs shig''. See ''Rab lan'' 408.2–409.4 (RL IV.18), for the complete answer.</ref> He clarifies his position, according to which the absolute can be described as an object of both ordinary people and Āryas, and explains the two different ways in which these beings know the absolute:<ref>''Rab lan'' 408.5–6: ''don dam bden med spros bral de skye 'phags gnyis ka'i blo'i yul du bdag cag gis khas blangs te''/ ''so skye dbu ma pa rnams kyis don'' [B ''don'' om.] ''spyi'i tshul gyis nyams su myong''/ ''<i>'</i>phags pa rnams kyis de'i ngo bo mngon sum rtogs par 'dod de''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=We accept this absolute, non-existence of true establishment, freedom from proliferations, as an object of the minds of both ordinary people and the Āryas, and believe that ordinary Mādhyamikas experience [the absolute] in the manner of a general object (''don spyi'') [and] the Āryas realise its essence (''ngo bo'') directly.
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The important point is, however, that the absolute cannot be experienced by a referential mind, only by the highest gnosis (''ye shes'') that is beyond references, according to Mi pham.<ref>''Rab lan'' 409.2–3: ''gong du bshad zin pa ltar dmigs med spros bral de nyid dmigs pa can gyi blo'i yul min pa'i don yin pas''/ ''dmigs pa'i mtha' dang bral ba'i ye shes dngos sam rjes mthun pa'i yul du cis mi 'gyur''/.</ref>

As to whether the absolute is an object of words, Rab gsal said of Mi pham that, while the latter uses phrases like "Great Emptiness," he is not even aware that these make the absolute an object of linguistic expression. Mi pham responds to this criticism with an extensive description of his understanding of the absolute as the coalescence of appearances and emptiness that is free of assertions (''khas len'') and proliferations (''spros pa''). According to Mi pham, it is important that those descriptions of the absolute are limited to develop a certain understanding (''nges shes'') of the absolute, whereas a direct understanding of freedom from proliferations cannot be framed in dualistic language:<ref>''Rab lan'' 419.5: ''<i>'</i>di tsam zhig myong ba de'' [C ''de'i''] ''tshig gi lam nas mtshon nus kyi''/ ''spros bral rjes mthun pa myong tshul ni tshig gis mtshon nas bstan mi nus te''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=The experience of only this much can be indicated by the path of words; the way of experience that conforms to freedom from proliferations, however, cannot be indicated and taught by words.
}}
Thus, words can very well point the way leading to an understanding of the absolute, but they cannot substitute the direct experience of it. Further, Mi pham uses this answer as an opportunity to show that his understanding of the absolute is in accordance with the position of the Dge lugs founder Tsong kha pa and refers to various texts to prove this point.<ref>For the complete response, see ''Rab lan'' 418.6–427.2 (RL IV.20b)</ref>

Rab gsal's next criticism in this regard argued that the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are accepted as teaching the absolute, and hence prove it as an object of words. At this stage of the dispute, Mi pham obviously assumed that his earlier responses could also answer this accusation, and therefore he did not engage in an extensive reply. He simply repeats succinctly the essence of his earlier answers:<ref>''Rab lan'' 430.3–4: ''sher mdo sgra yin kyang des mi dmigs pa'i stong nyid bstan gyi''/ ''dmigs pa can gyi stong nyid sgo du ma nas rigs pa'i rnam grangs du mas 'gog par mdzad pas'' [...].</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Even though the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are words, they teach a non-referential emptiness, but refute a referential emptiness in different ways with various kinds of reasoning [...].
}}
As earlier, Mi pham certainly agrees that there are texts that teach the absolute, but, Mi pham emphasises (alluding to the conception of emptiness of his opponent), they do not teach a referential emptiness.<ref>''Rab lan'' 430.3–4 (RL IV.21c).</ref>

This general response by Mi pham is also continued with regard to the objections that Rab gsal made concerning the second issue, the contradictions between Mi pham's position and the scriptures (''lung'').<ref>For Mi pham's reply, see ''Rab lan'' 433.2–442.2 (RL IV.22).</ref> While Mi pham gave individual answers to each of the references to the scriptures mentioned by Rab gsal, he essentially repeats what he already stated:<ref>''Rab lan'' 435.4: ''kho bo cag gis dmigs pa med pa'i stong nyid bstan pa yod par 'dod kyi''/ ''stong nyid bstan pa med ces ma smras so''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=We accept that a teaching of emptiness that is devoid of references exists, but we did not say that there is no teaching of emptiness.
}}
Even though there is a teaching of the absolute, the absolute can only be indicated, but not shown directly by the usage of words. In its essence, the absolute is beyond the limitations of logic and linguistic conventions, and for this very reason it is described as being indescribable. Mi pham explains:<ref>''Rab lan'' 438.4–5: ''nges don gnas lugs stong pa nyid ni''/ ''dngos dngos med dam dgag sgrub kyi mtha' gang rung ngam''/ ''gnyis yin gnyis min gang du'ang brtag pa dang brjod par mi nus pa'i phyir brjod du med pa dang rnam par rtog pa'i yul ma yin pa nyid du brjod pa yin'' [C ''yid''] ''no''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=One cannot express or conceptualise (''brtag pa'') emptiness, the mode of existence, the definitive meaning, in the form of being (''dngos'') or non-being (''dngos med''), any [alternative] of the extremes of affirmation and negation, or of both and neither; hence, it is said to be, in fact, inexpressible and not the object of conceptualisation.
}}
Describing the absolute as indescribable is still a description, albeit a negative one, and so it might be used as an argument against the position that the absolute is not an object of words. Mi pham addresses this possible objection and points out that such a negative determination (''rnam bcad'') is not problematic, as he had also explained earlier.<ref>See above, p.196.</ref> The important point is that one comes to an understanding of the meaning that is indicated by those – limited – expressions.<ref>Cf. ''Rab lan'' 439.6–440.2: ''de'i phyir brjod med bsam med rtog med'' [C ''ces'' add.] ''spros med ces'' [C ''ces'' om.] ''bstan pa'i tshe''/ ''brjod med ma yin te brjod med ces kha nas brjod du yod pa'i phyir dang''/ ''bsam med ma yin te''/ ''bsam du yod pa'i phyir dang''/ ''rtog med ma yin te''/ ''rtog med du rtog pa'i phyir dang''/ ''spros med ma yin te''/ ''spros med du spros pa'i phyir zhes pa lta bur go na''/ ''brjod med sogs kyi sgras rnam bcad dang gzhan sel la yang go ba tshul bzhin mi skye na''/ ''tshig de dag gis bstan don go ba ga la srid de''/.</ref>

As Rab gsal's quotes from the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' in the next criticism aimed at the same issue, Mi pham does not repeat his explanations once again. According to Mi pham, he has sufficiently defended his position against Rab gsal's attacks and – considering the lack of any new evidence for Rab gsal's point – does not see any need for an elaborate answer:<ref>''Rab lan'' 452.4–5: ''gong du bshad pa de dag gis 'di skabs su gang bshad pa dag la lan gyi rnam pa rdul tsam zhig bstan ma dgos pas mtha' bral stong chen gyi dbyings su rang yal rang grol du gyur pa'i phyir 'bad pa ci yang brten ma dgos pa ni ya mtshan no''''. Cf. Rab lan 452.4–5 (RL IV.26a), for the complete discussion.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Because of the earlier explanations (i.e., Mi pham's earlier answers), there is no need to give even a tiny bit of an answer to what was explained in this context. Therefore, [Rab gsal's accusations] will fade away by themselves, will dissolve by themselves, in the sphere of the Great Emptiness<ref>Note that this mention of "Great Emptiness" (''stong chen'') is certainly also a hint at the earlier discussion. While Mi pham had used this expression in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' to describe his view of emptiness (see earlier, p.155), Rab gsal also referred to it in his later criticism (see earlier, p.198).</ref> that is free from extremes. Hence, there is no need to make any effort [for an answer]; how wonderful!
}}
When Rab gsal countered a possible objection to his arguments in the last discussion presented above, he assumed that, according to Mi pham, existence in general is not established by existence on the conventional level. Now, Mi pham clarifies that such a position is indeed held by other Snga rabs pa philosophers, the tradition Mi pham is generally associated with,<ref>For the distinction of Snga rabs pa and Phyi rabs pa scholars among Tibetan Mādhyamika, see earlier, p.56.</ref> but that he differs from the opinions of his comrades on this specific issue:<ref>''Rab lan'' 442.4–6: ''snga rabs pa phal mo'' [B ''mo'' om.] ''ches tha snyad du yod pas yod go mi chod la''/ ''don dam par med pas med go chod ces 'dzer''/ ''phyi rabs pa phal gyis kun rdzob tu yod pas yod go chod la''/ ''don dam par med pas med go mi chod zer''/ ''bdag cag gis ni de gnyis ka ltar mi smra ste''/ ''tha snyad du yod pas tha snyad du yod pa'i go chod la don dam par yod pa'i go mi chod''/ ''don dam par med pas don dam par med pa'i go chod la tha snyad du med pa'i go mi chod''/ ''don dam par med pa dang tha snyad du yod pa gnyis dngos po rnams kyi steng na 'gal med don gcig tu 'char ba'i go tshul yod par smra'o''//. See ''Rab lan'' 442.3–443.3 (RL IV.23), for Mi pham's complete answer on this issue.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=Most Snga rabs pa say that existence on the conventional level does not count as existence and that non-existence on the absolute level does count as non-existence; most of the Phyi rabs pa say that existence on the conventional level does count as existence, and that non-existence on the absolute level does not count as non-existence. We do not propound according to either of them: existence on the conventional level counts as existence on the conventional level, but does not count as existence on the absolute level; and non-existence on the absolute level counts as non-existence on the absolute level, but does not count as non-existence on the conventional level. [Thus,] we say that there is a way of understanding that both nonexistence on the absolute level and existence on the conventional level appear with regard to things as a single meaning that is without contradiction.
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As Mi pham clarifies, Rab gsal's refutation of the objections against his accusations was based on a wrong assumption. Given that Mi pham's actual position on this matter differs from what Rab gsal proposed, the former concludes that he could effectively refute Rab gsal's criticism by means of the very objection that Rab gsal mentioned – and that Mi pham had indicated already in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'':<ref>''Rab lan'' 442.6: ''de'i phyir kun rdzob tu yod pas yod par mi 'gyur zhes nam yang ma smras pas skyon spang ci ste mi nus''/.</ref>
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		|quote-text=Henceforth, I never said that conventional existence does not constitute existence (in general). Why should I therefore not be able to abandon the fault [that you mentioned]?
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Although it would appear that Rab gsal’s specific argument in this discussion is invalidated, the issue of whether existence and non-existence on the conventional and absolute levels count as existence and non-existence in general will be disputed ''in extensio'' in the following controversies.

<h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4>
As shown in Rab gsal's earlier criticism, the issue whether the absolute should be regarded as an object of mind and words or not is of particular importance to Rab gsal. It is therefore not surprising that he also continues to discuss this issue in his second critical treatise, even though Mi pham had made clear that – under certain premises – he, too, accepts that the absolute can be described as an object of mind and words. Rab gsal's further critique pertains to all three principal subjects that were discussed earlier: contradictions between different statements of Mi pham, contradictions to the scriptures, and the refutation of objections.

One passage in Rab gsal's reply is particularly important, as it touches the general purport of all of Mi pham's answers on this issue.<ref>401</ref> In his literal interpretation of BCA IX.2cd in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'',<ref>See ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.6.</ref> Mi pham had stated that the absolute is not an object of mind and words. In his reply to Rab gsal, however, he stated the opposite and hence must be accused of a direct contradiction. Further, Mi pham's explication that this passage of the BCA should be read in such a way that it negates the absolute as the object of a dualistic mind, is, according to Rab gsal, a deviation from the principal stance on this matter of Mi pham's own Snga rabs pa tradition:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 448.4–5: ''sher ṭika tu don dam bden pa sgra dang blo'i yul min par bshad''/ ''<i>'</i>dir sgra dang blo'i yul yin zhes dngos 'gal du bud''/ ''<i>'</i>bad 'bad nas bod snga ma'i grub mtha' bskyangs ma nus''/ ''gnyis snang can gyi blo'i yul min zhes bod phyi ma'i rjes su 'brang ngo''//.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=In the ''Sher ṭika'' [you] had explained that ''paramārthasatya'' is not the object of words and mind. Here (in the ''Rab lan'') [you] said that it is an object of words and mind. Thus, a direct contradiction is laid open. Being unable to maintain the tenets of earlier Tibetans (''bod snga ma'') by continuous effort, [you] follow the later Tibetans (''bod phyi ma''), saying that [''paramārthasatya''] is not the object of a dualistic mind (''gnyis snang can gyi blo'').
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While Mi pham tried to mediate between the different doctrinal positions on interpreting BCA IX.2cd and explained them as a dispute of words alone, this very attempt is attacked by Rab gsal. For him, Mi pham not only contradicted himself, but also betrayed his doctrinal roots. Rab gsal concludes this line of argumentation by emphasising that the authoritative scriptures also support his way of reading this particular verse of the BCA and thus offers a general criticism of Mi pham's answers on the second subject, the contradictions between his position and scriptural authority.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 448.5: ''spyir blo'i yul yin pa rigs par ma zad'' [A ''brad''] ''lung shin tu gsal ba''/ ''rgyan las''/ ''rnam par mi rtog blo can gyi''// ''zhes dang''/ ''stong pa nyid dga' mchog gi blo''// ''zhes sogs shin tu mang ba yig tshogs che bas su zhig dbri''/.</ref>

By far the most extensive response in Rab gsal's ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' is devoted to the third subject of the present discussion, the refutation of a possible objection to Rab gsal's first criticism: From Rab gsal's concrete rebuttal of the objection that the descriptions of the absolute are only made on the conventional level (and hence do not establish the absolute as an object of words on the absolute level), the discussion had developed towards principal doctrinal positions on the question of whether existence and non-existence on the conventional and absolute levels count as existence and non-existence in general. In his answer,<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 464.2–465.4 (GC III.3b).</ref> Rab gsal clarifies that such was not his intention. Instead, he wanted to point out that, if one accepts emptiness to be free from proliferations and to be an object of words and thoughts on the conventional level – as Mi pham does – then such should also be accepted in general:<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 464.2–3: ''kho bos'' [A ''<i>'</i>os'']/ ''stong nyid kun rdzob tu spros bral dang''/ ''sgra rtog gi yul yin pa mi 'gal na'' [A ''na'' om.]/ ''spyir yang de gnyis mi 'gal bar rung ngo zhes smras pa la lan rnal ma zhig ma byung mod''/.</ref>
{{QuoteCite
		|quote-text=I said: "If it is not contradictory that emptiness is – on the conventional level – free from proliferations and that it is an object of words and conceptualisation (''sgra rtog''), then it is also possible that those two [qualities] (i.e., being free from proliferations and being an object of words and conceptualisation) are not contradictory in general." A true answer to that never appeared.
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The principal issue Rab gsal is aiming at, namely whether the acceptance of something on a certain level also implies its acceptance in general, pertains also to the answer Mi pham had given on the specific issue of existence on a certain level. Mi pham's response further touched general doctrinal positions in this regard, and Rab gsal therefore continues to discuss Mi pham’s answer by pointing out five logical faults that would follow from Mi pham's position that existence on a certain level does not imply general existence.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 464.6ff.</ref>

<h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4>
Of the two issues under discussion, Mi pham considers only the latter one. While he tried to mediate between the established positions on the interpretation of BCA IX.2cd, Rab gsal accused him – again – of contradicting himself and of betraying his own Snga rabs pa tradition. It is therefore not surprising that Mi pham refused to add further explanations on this particular topic.

As in Rab gsal's response, the issue of accepting existence on a certain level and its general implication is given particular attention, and Mi pham discusses this at the very end of his short answer under "issues of major significance" (''don che ba'').<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 470.4–471.1 (YL II.h).</ref>

Just as Rab gsal earlier defended his position that existence on the conventional level implies existence in general by attacking Mi pham, Mi pham defends his position, which sharply distinguishes between the levels on which a certain assertion is made, and attacks Rab gsal in return. Obviously, the issue is important not only for the concrete discussion of the refutation of a particular objection to Rab gsal's position, but also since it concerns established doctrinal positions. These, however, cannot be easily changed and, like other, similar issues, this particular question remains unresolved.


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<h3>Synopsis</h3>
The tension between descriptions of the absolute (''paramārtha'') being inconceivable and beyond the scope of linguistic expression on the one hand, and, on the other, the principal claim that the absolute can be realised by following the Buddhist path, using oral or written instructions as guidance, is fundamental in Buddhist scholasticism. In the doctrinal positions that developed concerning this problem, the second half of BCA IX.2 was of particular importance. Understood literally, this verse clearly stated that the absolute is not an object of mind, and it is this position that was taken in the Snga rabs pa tradition of Tibetan Madhyamaka philosophy, to which Mi pham belongs. In the Phyi rabs pa tradition, headed by Tsong kha pa and his Dge lugs school, such an interpretation was strongly refused; instead, this tradition argued that both ''satyas'' must be knowables (''shes bya''). The passage of the BCA must be interpreted so that the absolute is only excluded as an object for a dualistic (''gnyis snang'') mind.

In his commentary, Mi pham clearly followed in the footsteps of his predecessors and opted for a literal interpretation of the respective verse line. However, he also declared that – on the level of ordinary conventions – it is possible to describe the absolute as a knowable (''shes bya''), and hence as an object of mind. For him, the controversy is only superficial and merely a matter of designation.

Rab gsal's criticism seemed to aim only at a simplified version of Mi pham's complex explanations, namely, the plain interpretation that the absolute is not a knowable. Viewing it as a direct attack on the doctrines of his own school, Rab gsal objected to Mi pham's position by pointing out contradictions between this position and the authoritative Indian scriptures, and also other statements of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''. In his reply, Mi pham pleaded again for a more nuanced picture. On the level of ordinary conventions, the absolute can indeed be described as a knowable (''shes bya''); however, it is not the object of a referential (''dmigs can'') or dualistic (''gnyis snang'') mind. For Rab gsal, these concessions exhibit again the contradictory nature of Mi pham's explanations; furthermore, he also interpreted them as a betrayal of Mi pham's own doctrinal background. In view of these entrenched positions, Mi pham did not take up this particular issue in his last letter.

While it seems that Mi pham tried from the very beginning to mediate between the traditional positions on this important question, stances taken in the Snga rabs pa and the Phyi rabs pa traditions, Rab gsal was not willing to take a step in this direction. In view of this situation, both parties stuck to their original positions without modifying these in any substantial way in the ongoing discussion.
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