Translation Memory:007-Tsadra-BCA-Com-LightDayStar/40
007-Tsadra-BCA-Com-LightDayStar/40 ID: 007-Tsadra-BCA-Com-LightDayStar <br> Date: 22 March 2024 <br> Creator: Migmar;Gwen;Marcus;Jeremi <br> Origin: Tsadra Foundation
Segment Data
| English | Of the three kinds of cognition (rtog pa) (that is, the content of a cognitive act), the cognition of detection and discernment (rtog dpyod kyi rtog pa) is not relevant in the present context.27It should be understood that this is not a reference to discursive thought as such. Detection is the rough awareness of the presence of an object, while discernment is the cognition of the specific features of the object in question. This is the rtsing zhib kyi rtog pa referred to in the Abhidharma. If, however, the imputation is performed by the cognition of phenomenal identity (ngo bo nyid kyi rtog pa),28The translation of this term is not altogether satisfactory. In fact, ngo bo nyid kyi rtog pa refers to all the main minds (gtso sems) and mental factors (sems ’byung) experienced by beings in the three worlds. “The main mind is the consciousness that apprehends the fundamental presence of the object, while the mental factors apprehend, and react to, particular aspects of that object.” See Jigme Lingpa and Kangyur Rinpoche, Treasury of Precious Qualities, book 1, p. 384. Longchenpa says that the mind and mental factors are cognitions that superimpose existence on to the three worlds. See Shing rta chen po, the autocommentary to his Sems nyid ngal gso, 131. and if that which appears to the undamaged senses of worldly beings as a pillar is not imputed by the visual consciousness, then in the place where it appears, there would be no pillar as an extramental object. On the other hand, if the visual consciousness could impute a pillar in the absence of a basis of imputation, it would follow that the mind could impute a pillar in any place where there is no pillar present (just like spots appearing before the eyes of someone suffering from an eye disease), and that this pillar could support the function of supporting beams. Furthermore, extramental objects would not exist even on the conventional level. Therefore, since the nonconceptual consciousness does not arise in the absence of a specifically characterized thing, it is not possible for the kind of imputation in question to be made by such a consciousness.29That is, nonconceptual sense consciousness. It should be remembered that ngo bo nyid kyi rtog pa includes both nonconceptual (sense) and conceptual consciousnesses. And certainly, no one is claiming that it does.30Generally speaking, it is said that the sense consciousnesses detect only what is actually present. In the rope-snake example, the eye consciousness only ever sees the colored rope (or, to be more exact, the color and shape thereof ), however much the conceptual consciousness may be deceived by attendant factors. Hypothetically, Mipham says, there are two possibilities: either the sense consciousness accurately detects things that are actually present (as a basis for imputation), or it is capable of detecting things in the absence of such bases. In the first case, it follows, commonsensically, that if the eye consciousness sees nothing, there is nothing present. In the second case, if the eye consciousness can detect things independently of their physical presence, it follows, absurdly, that it can see things even when they are not present and hallucinatory objects become real and therefore able to perform functions. |
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| RootTextChapterNum | 9 |
| SegmentFormat | Commentary |
| SourcePageNumber | 14-2-8a |
| SourceSegmentOrder | 40 |
| Tibetan | གཞན་ཡང་རྟོག་པ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་གསུམ་ལས་འདི་སྐབས་རྟོག་དཔྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟོག་པ་དོན་མེད་ལ། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་རྟོག་གིས་ཕར་བཏགས་པ་ཡིན་ན་འཇིག་རྟེན་གནོད་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་ངོར་ཀ་བར་སྣང་བ་འདི་མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ཕར་མ་བཏགས་ན་དེར་ཕྱི་དོན་ཀ་བ་མེད་པའམ། དེས་གདགས་གཞི་མེད་བཞིན་བཏགས་ན་ཀ་བས་དབེན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་སུའང་རབ་རིབ་ལྟར་བློས་ཀ་བ་བཏགས་པས་གདུང་འདེགས་ཀྱི་དོན་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་ཐ་སྙད་དུའང་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་མེད་པར་མི་སྐྱེ་བས་དེས་ཕར་བཏགས་པ་མི་སྲིད་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་འདོད་པའང་མེད་མོད། |
| TranslationChapter | LDS - Question 1 |
| TranslationPageNumber | 206 |
| Wylie | gzhan yang rtog pa zhes pa la gsum las 'di skabs rtog dpyod kyi rtog pa don med la/_ngo bo nyid rtog gis phar btags pa yin na 'jig rten gnod med kyi shes ngor ka bar snang ba 'di mig shes kyis phar ma btags na der phyi don ka ba med pa'am/_des gdags gzhi med bzhin btags na ka bas dben pa'i phyogs su'ang rab rib ltar blos ka ba btags pas gdung 'degs kyi don byed par 'gyur zhing tha snyad du'ang phyi don med par yang 'gyur ro/_/de'i phyir rtog med kyi shes pa yul rang mtshan med par mi skye bas des phar btags pa mi srid la de ltar 'dod pa'ang med mod/ |
| ChantedAudio |
Alignment info
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| AuthorLabel | Mipam Gyatso 1846 - 1912 |
| DuplicateRootTranslation | false |
| RootSourceTransMem | 001-Tsadra-BCA-Root-Padmakara |
| RootTextWikiPage | Bodhicaryāvatāra |
| ShortTitle | Light of the Day Star (2017) |
| SourceAuthor | People/Mi pham rgya mtsho |
| SourceTitleTibetan | བརྒལ་ལན་ཉིན་བྱེད་སྣང་བ། |
| SourceTitleWylie | brgal lan nyin byed snang ba |
| SourceVersionLabel | Mipam Gyatso (1846 - 1912) |
| SourceWikiPage | Texts/Brgal lan nyin byed snang ba |
| TranslationCitation | Fletcher, Wulstan, and Helena Blankleder (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of "The Way of the Bodhisattva." Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2017. |
| TranslationPublishedYear | 2017 |
| TranslationWikiPage | Books/The Wisdom Chapter |
| Translator | People/Blankleder, H.;People/Fletcher, W.;People/Padmakara Translation Group |
| TransMemCreator | Migmar;Gwen;Marcus;Jeremi |
| TransMemDate | 22 March 2024 |
| TransMemID | 007-Tsadra-BCA-Com-LightDayStar |
| TransMemNum | 007 |
| TransMemOrigin | Tsadra Foundation |
| TransMemType | Commentary |
