Abstract
For the past few decades, Buddhism has become a trending academic topic in Western departments, in religious studies as well as philosophy. This thesis is concerned with the way in which the domain of Buddhist ethics has been discussed and is developing, particularly in the field of comparative studies. Since one of the core doctrines of Buddhism is
no-self, the "anātman", Western scholars have shied away from making positive claims over the nature of moral agency and ethical reasoning in Buddhism. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and discuss the extent to which we can understand, contextualise and explain Buddhist ethics from the lens of Western philosophical concepts and traditions. Specifically, this thesis parallels Kant's system with Buddhism. This thesis is going to be broadly addressing some thematic aspects in the Buddhist philosophy of Śāntideva and the Mādhyamaka tradition he belongs to, as well as how Buddhist ethics he developed have emerged from the Mādhyamaka theoretical framework. The first chapter will look at the tools of reasoning Mādhyamikas use to justify their metaphysical claims of an ontological dualism, illustrated by the doctrine of conventional and ultimate truths, respectively.[1] Some of the main arguments that defend the
conventional-ultimate distinction shall be placed in a dialogue with Kantian metaphysics.
The basic questions addressed in my thesis are as follows: Is there really a need to create a barrier between what we consider to be the traditional Western philosophical canon, starting
with the ancient Greeks to the contemporary Anglo-European tradition, in contrast to a supposedly independent "Asian tradition"? In the methodological section, I shall discuss the extent to which such categories of philosophical traditions are helpful, for not only understanding the way philosophical concepts are used in their respective tradition, but also how this contextualization of ideas and their application in ethics, can lead to a comparative study. By this I mean that as the status quo, we often use certain conventional linguistic designations in order to attribute them to the philosophical ideas they represent. For example, the school of rationalism includes thinkers such as Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes. In that way, if I were to make a claim that a Buddhist thinker is a rationalist, I would engage with the convention of what rationalism means in the contemporary discourse of philosophy. However, if I would also make the claim that a Buddhist thinker is a rationalist, it would question the extent to which not only the word "rationalism" has been used thus far in the history of philosophy, but it would also open up the discussion of redefining the word "rationalism", in relation to potentially other ideas and philosophies that would have similar types of argumentation and analysis that have been yet to be labelled, or included, under the conventional framework of the previously existing word in the history of philosophy. Given this plastic and contingent relationship between words and meaning, I propose that it is not the content of the definition itself that would change, but perhaps, as Wittgenstein discusses meaning in relation to definitions, some words tend to have similar meanings. This linguistic phenomenon is described by Wittgenstein as a family resemblance.[2][3] Similarly to how the word "rationality" can have a plurality of uses even within philosophical schools, so can we put those systems of linguistic designation in contrast to the Mādhyamaka technique of using reason.[4] This ought to result in a broader context of how we understand rationality, not only for the purpose of comparative philosophy, but a more so for a holistic perspective and academic paradigm that would contribute to the history of philosophy.
Some of the framework discussions will include Śāntideva's affiliation with the Mādhyamaka school of Buddhism, as well as with Kant's unique reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism, in relation to the foundation of his ethical view of deontology. In order to lay some of the groundwork for this comparative study, I'll begin by addressing some of the intricacies in the notion of conventionality, and how both Kant's views as well as the Mādhyamaka philosophy explain conventional truth. One of the most comprehensive works that we currently have in the academia regarding the subject of Śāntideva's ethical philosophy, specifically in comparison to Western ethical traditions, is the work of Charles Goodman.[5] Therefore, a significant part of this thesis will review Goodman's books on Śāntideva, and provide a commentary to Goodman's interpretation of how Śāntideva should be integrated and read in the Western tradition. Goodman's main argument is that Śāntideva should be read as what he calls an act-consequentialist.[6] Since the philosopher I'm comparing Śāntideva with is Kant, I'll examine the extent to which Goodman is correct in asserting Śāntideva's position in the Western canon, as well as provide an interpretive paradigm for understanding Śāntideva as
a deontologist.
Notes
- Vose, Kevin "Resurrecting Candrakīrti, Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prāsangika", Wisdom Publications 2009 p. 66-7.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig "Philosophical Investigations", German text with English translation by G.E.M Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Revised 4th edition by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Blackwell Publishing 2009, page 36e, PI 67.
- Forthcoming: Kuusela, Oskari "Wittgenstein and the unity of good" p's. 6-7.
- Vose Ibid p. 99.
- Goodman, Charles "Consequences of Compassion" An Interpretation & Defence of Buddhist Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Goodman, Ibid p. 29.
