Study/The Debate Between Mipham and Pari Rabsel: Difference between revisions
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<h3>Issues of | <h3>Issues of Controversy and Their Development</h3> | ||
The texts exchanged between Mi pham and Rab gsal discuss a wide range | The texts exchanged between Mi pham and Rab gsal discuss a wide range | ||
of topics, from rather trivial issues such as mistakes in spelling or grammar, to the most essential matters like the nature of reality; from mistakes | of topics, from rather trivial issues such as mistakes in spelling or grammar, to the most essential matters like the nature of reality; from mistakes | ||
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of each topic will then tie these various layers together. | of each topic will then tie these various layers together. | ||
<h3>Topic I: | <h3>Topic I: The Interpretation of BCA IX.1</h3> | ||
The first of the four issues is concerned exclusively with problems that arise in the interpretation of BCA IX.1:<ref>The counting of the verses of the BCA follows Oldmeadow 1994.</ref> | The first of the four issues is concerned exclusively with problems that arise in the interpretation of BCA IX.1:<ref>The counting of the verses of the BCA follows Oldmeadow 1994.</ref> | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations of BCA IX.1 in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
In his commentary, Mi pham distinguishes, in general, two different ways | In his commentary, Mi pham distinguishes, in general, two different ways | ||
of explaining the relation between the other five perfections and insight. | of explaining the relation between the other five perfections and insight. | ||
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|quote-text=There is also [the interpretation of] relating 'this whole entourage' to concentration (''bsam gtan'', ''dhyāna'') – explained immediately before this [present] chapter – but it must be related to all perfections [...]. | |quote-text=There is also [the interpretation of] relating 'this whole entourage' to concentration (''bsam gtan'', ''dhyāna'') – explained immediately before this [present] chapter – but it must be related to all perfections [...]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
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the second interpretation was mentioned by Prajñākaramati, the main Indian authority on the BCA.<ref>For Rab gsal's criticism, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.1–5 (JL I.1).</ref> According to this second interpretation, the "aim" (''don'') of ''śamatha'' is to generate insight, an understanding Rab gsal again backs up by quoting the BCAP.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.6.</ref> Here, ''śamatha'' is explained as the cause that brings forth, and thus "aims" at, insight. Both of these issues of literal annotation, viz. to relate ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'' and to relate "aim" to the generation of insight through ''śamatha'', are plausible when the relation between the perfections is seen as one of cause and effect. This is, of course, in contradiction to Mi pham's commentary. He interpreted ''yan lag'' as referring to all perfections as a support in accomplishing the highest goal of insight, awakening. Rab gsal accuses Mi pham of relating the "aim" (''don'') mentioned in the BCA to a (separate) aim gained through insight, while it should be understood as the very generation of insight that is brought about by ''śamatha''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 374.3–4 (JL I.4).</ref> | the second interpretation was mentioned by Prajñākaramati, the main Indian authority on the BCA.<ref>For Rab gsal's criticism, see ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.1–5 (JL I.1).</ref> According to this second interpretation, the "aim" (''don'') of ''śamatha'' is to generate insight, an understanding Rab gsal again backs up by quoting the BCAP.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 373.6.</ref> Here, ''śamatha'' is explained as the cause that brings forth, and thus "aims" at, insight. Both of these issues of literal annotation, viz. to relate ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'' and to relate "aim" to the generation of insight through ''śamatha'', are plausible when the relation between the perfections is seen as one of cause and effect. This is, of course, in contradiction to Mi pham's commentary. He interpreted ''yan lag'' as referring to all perfections as a support in accomplishing the highest goal of insight, awakening. Rab gsal accuses Mi pham of relating the "aim" (''don'') mentioned in the BCA to a (separate) aim gained through insight, while it should be understood as the very generation of insight that is brought about by ''śamatha''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 374.3–4 (JL I.4).</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
Mi pham defends his commentary by pointing out that the two ways of explaining the relationship between the perfections – insight and the other perfections as supported (''grogs can'') and support (''grogs''), or earlier and later perfections as cause and effect (''rgyu 'bras'') – do not conflict with each other; hence, there is no need to exclude either alternative.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 196.1–3 (RL I.1).</ref> A twofold interpretation is also the key to solving the apparent contradictions in understanding the meaning of "aim" (''don''). Both explanations are possible: one can either say that the other perfections aim at or support the achievement of awakening through insight, or the aim can be the generation of insight alone. The BCAP passage that Rab gsal quoted is taken from the specific context where the aim is related to the generation of insight (i.e., the alternative explanation that relates ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') and therefore does not refute the earlier interpretation, Mi pham counters.<ref>''Rab lan'' 196.5–197.2 (RL I.2).</ref> In this interpretation, he explains further, the "aim" is not the separate aim of insight as Rab gsal criticised, but it is the common aim of all perfections.<ref>''Rab lan'' 197.4–5 (RL I.3b)</ref> | Mi pham defends his commentary by pointing out that the two ways of explaining the relationship between the perfections – insight and the other perfections as supported (''grogs can'') and support (''grogs''), or earlier and later perfections as cause and effect (''rgyu 'bras'') – do not conflict with each other; hence, there is no need to exclude either alternative.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 196.1–3 (RL I.1).</ref> A twofold interpretation is also the key to solving the apparent contradictions in understanding the meaning of "aim" (''don''). Both explanations are possible: one can either say that the other perfections aim at or support the achievement of awakening through insight, or the aim can be the generation of insight alone. The BCAP passage that Rab gsal quoted is taken from the specific context where the aim is related to the generation of insight (i.e., the alternative explanation that relates ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') and therefore does not refute the earlier interpretation, Mi pham counters.<ref>''Rab lan'' 196.5–197.2 (RL I.2).</ref> In this interpretation, he explains further, the "aim" is not the separate aim of insight as Rab gsal criticised, but it is the common aim of all perfections.<ref>''Rab lan'' 197.4–5 (RL I.3b)</ref> | ||
Even though Mi pham refers to Prajñākaramati's alternative explanation (of relating ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') in order to point out the different possibilities of understanding the "aim" (''don'') of the "entourage" (''parikara''), he does not answer Rab gsal's accusation that ''parikara'' should be related to ''śamatha''. | Even though Mi pham refers to Prajñākaramati's alternative explanation (of relating ''parikara'' to ''śamatha'') in order to point out the different possibilities of understanding the "aim" (''don'') of the "entourage" (''parikara''), he does not answer Rab gsal's accusation that ''parikara'' should be related to ''śamatha''. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
In Rab gsal's answer to Mi pham's reply, the whole issue is brought quickly to an end. If Mi pham had admitted that ''parikara'' could be also understood as a cause (for the generation of insight) in the first place, runs Rab gsal's accusation of Mi pham, a debate would not have been necessary.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.4 (GC I.2c).</ref> Rab gsal's main concern here seems to be that Mi pham's explanations focussing on the importance of insight play down the role of the other perfections. He refers again to Prajñākaramati's commentary to point out that insight is based on the accumulation of merit, which includes the first three of the perfections.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.5. Here, Rab gsal seems to refer to BCAP 344.14–345.6, where Prajñākaramati describes how the individual perfections act as a cause of the attainment of unexcelled gnosis (''anuttarajñāna''). This passage also explains the division of the perfections among the two kinds of accumulations (''saṃbhāra''): the first three perfections, namely, generosity (''dāna''), discipline (''śīla''), and forbearance (''kṣānti''), are part of the accumulation of merit (''puṇyasaṃbhāra''), while the last two, viz. concentration (''dhyāna'') and insight (''prajñā''), belong to the accumulation of gnosis (''jñānasaṃbhāra''). The fourth perfection, perseverance (''vīrya''), is needed for both accumulations.</ref> With that, the discussion regarding the interpretation of BCA IX.1 come to an end and Mi pham does not mention this topic in his second reply to Rab gsal.<ref>The only issue connected to this chapter that appears in Mi pham's second reply is the polemic about the understanding of the particle ''tsam'' "only/simply." As indicated earlier, it is not of direct relevance for the interpretation of BCA IX.1 and therefore has not been treated in more detail.</ref> | In Rab gsal's answer to Mi pham's reply, the whole issue is brought quickly to an end. If Mi pham had admitted that ''parikara'' could be also understood as a cause (for the generation of insight) in the first place, runs Rab gsal's accusation of Mi pham, a debate would not have been necessary.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.4 (GC I.2c).</ref> Rab gsal's main concern here seems to be that Mi pham's explanations focussing on the importance of insight play down the role of the other perfections. He refers again to Prajñākaramati's commentary to point out that insight is based on the accumulation of merit, which includes the first three of the perfections.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 434.5. Here, Rab gsal seems to refer to BCAP 344.14–345.6, where Prajñākaramati describes how the individual perfections act as a cause of the attainment of unexcelled gnosis (''anuttarajñāna''). This passage also explains the division of the perfections among the two kinds of accumulations (''saṃbhāra''): the first three perfections, namely, generosity (''dāna''), discipline (''śīla''), and forbearance (''kṣānti''), are part of the accumulation of merit (''puṇyasaṃbhāra''), while the last two, viz. concentration (''dhyāna'') and insight (''prajñā''), belong to the accumulation of gnosis (''jñānasaṃbhāra''). The fourth perfection, perseverance (''vīrya''), is needed for both accumulations.</ref> With that, the discussion regarding the interpretation of BCA IX.1 come to an end and Mi pham does not mention this topic in his second reply to Rab gsal.<ref>The only issue connected to this chapter that appears in Mi pham's second reply is the polemic about the understanding of the particle ''tsam'' "only/simply." As indicated earlier, it is not of direct relevance for the interpretation of BCA IX.1 and therefore has not been treated in more detail.</ref> | ||
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All in all, the controversies that developed in relation to this topic appear not to be based on fundamental differences. Rather, Rab gsal's criticism seemed to have been instigated by the phrasing of Mi pham's commentary, a phrasing that sounded unfortunate to his opponent's ears, as it would belittle the importance of the other perfections attested in various scriptures. | All in all, the controversies that developed in relation to this topic appear not to be based on fundamental differences. Rather, Rab gsal's criticism seemed to have been instigated by the phrasing of Mi pham's commentary, a phrasing that sounded unfortunate to his opponent's ears, as it would belittle the importance of the other perfections attested in various scriptures. | ||
<h3>Topic II: | <h3>Topic II: The Interpretation of BCA IX.78</h3> | ||
The second topic deals most prominently with the interpretation of BCA | The second topic deals most prominently with the interpretation of BCA | ||
IX.78, in particular its third verse line, but touches also on problems that | IX.78, in particular its third verse line, but touches also on problems that | ||
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Mi pham ends this passage of his commentary by pointing out that the way of explanation he suggested is "my idea alone," but that it is, nevertheless, in accordance with the Indian scriptures. | Mi pham ends this passage of his commentary by pointing out that the way of explanation he suggested is "my idea alone," but that it is, nevertheless, in accordance with the Indian scriptures. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
Clearly, Rab gsal is provoked by Mi pham's critical remarks on other ways of interpreting BCA IX.78c. In his refutation of Mi pham's commentary, Rab gsal quotes exactly this part of Mi pham's explanations as the position of his opponent that is the object of his attack.<ref>The passage that Rab gsal quotes corresponds to ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.1–6.</ref> While there is a clear focus on the interpretation of this particular verse line of the BCA, Rab gsal expands his criticism also to its surrounding commentary. Not only does Rab gsal refute aspects of Mi pham's commentary on the other verse lines of BCA IX.78, but also on its two preceding verses and more general | Clearly, Rab gsal is provoked by Mi pham's critical remarks on other ways of interpreting BCA IX.78c. In his refutation of Mi pham's commentary, Rab gsal quotes exactly this part of Mi pham's explanations as the position of his opponent that is the object of his attack.<ref>The passage that Rab gsal quotes corresponds to ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 61.1–6.</ref> While there is a clear focus on the interpretation of this particular verse line of the BCA, Rab gsal expands his criticism also to its surrounding commentary. Not only does Rab gsal refute aspects of Mi pham's commentary on the other verse lines of BCA IX.78, but also on its two preceding verses and more general | ||
problems that occur in the interpretation of this passage. As shown in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'',<ref>Cf. Chapter Five.</ref> Rab gsal's analysis of this topic can be grouped into nine sections, each of which contains one or more lines of criticism. For the sake of clarity, I will limit myself to the controversies that are directly relevant to the interpretation of BCA IX.78c, which can be seen as the core of this topic.<ref>Of the topics mentioned in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' in Chapter Five, the present discussion includes only JL II.1a, II.2b, II.4, and II.9b. Accordingly, the further development of these controversies in the subsequent texts, i.e., ''Rab lan'', ''Ga bur chu rgyun'', and ''Yang lan'', is also confined to these chosen issues.</ref> | problems that occur in the interpretation of this passage. As shown in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'',<ref>Cf. Chapter Five.</ref> Rab gsal's analysis of this topic can be grouped into nine sections, each of which contains one or more lines of criticism. For the sake of clarity, I will limit myself to the controversies that are directly relevant to the interpretation of BCA IX.78c, which can be seen as the core of this topic.<ref>Of the topics mentioned in the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' in Chapter Five, the present discussion includes only JL II.1a, II.2b, II.4, and II.9b. Accordingly, the further development of these controversies in the subsequent texts, i.e., ''Rab lan'', ''Ga bur chu rgyun'', and ''Yang lan'', is also confined to these chosen issues.</ref> | ||
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|quote-text=If this thought that holds [such an interpretation as] correct is yours alone, then it would not exist in the mind of the commentators of the Noble Land. | |quote-text=If this thought that holds [such an interpretation as] correct is yours alone, then it would not exist in the mind of the commentators of the Noble Land. | ||
}} | }} | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
Describing his specific understanding of the grammatical construction of | Describing his specific understanding of the grammatical construction of | ||
BCA IX.78c as "my idea alone," Mi pham seemed to be fully aware that his | BCA IX.78c as "my idea alone," Mi pham seemed to be fully aware that his | ||
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by Rab gsal, and hence the discussion ends with this reformulation of Mi pham's original intention. | by Rab gsal, and hence the discussion ends with this reformulation of Mi pham's original intention. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
Of the four topics that were regarded as central for the presentation of this topic, only two are further discussed at this stage of the controversies: Mi pham's specific understanding of the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c and Rab gsal's alternative interpretation of the whole verse. In both cases, Rab gsal finds contradictions in Mi pham's explanations. | Of the four topics that were regarded as central for the presentation of this topic, only two are further discussed at this stage of the controversies: Mi pham's specific understanding of the grammatical construction of BCA IX.78c and Rab gsal's alternative interpretation of the whole verse. In both cases, Rab gsal finds contradictions in Mi pham's explanations. | ||
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Vallée Poussin 1991: 305.</ref> if Mi pham's reasoning did indeed apply, then this would also pertain to the mind, which also has its causes, just like self-grasping, and it would lead to the absurd consequence that there would be sentient beings (sems can) who do not have a mind (''sems'').<ref>86</ref> | Vallée Poussin 1991: 305.</ref> if Mi pham's reasoning did indeed apply, then this would also pertain to the mind, which also has its causes, just like self-grasping, and it would lead to the absurd consequence that there would be sentient beings (sems can) who do not have a mind (''sems'').<ref>86</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4> | ||
Of the controversies that were discussed in relation to this topic, it is only | Of the controversies that were discussed in relation to this topic, it is only | ||
the last issue that is taken up again in Mi pham's second answer. Mi pham | the last issue that is taken up again in Mi pham's second answer. Mi pham | ||
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were not intended as strictly as their phrasing might imply, they provided Rab gsal with an opportunity for criticism against which Mi pham could defend himself only with difficulty. | were not intended as strictly as their phrasing might imply, they provided Rab gsal with an opportunity for criticism against which Mi pham could defend himself only with difficulty. | ||
<h3>Topic III: | <h3>Topic III: The Interpretation of BCA IX.41–49</h3> | ||
The question of the general context of this passage of the BCA is already | The question of the general context of this passage of the BCA is already | ||
part of the controversies that developed about its interpretation. In the Dge lugs tradition, as expressed in Rgyal tshab's commentary, the section of the verses BCA IX.41–57 is labelled "proving that even for someone who wishes mere liberation, realisation of emptiness is necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.14–15: ''thar pa tsam thob par 'dod pas kyang stong nyid rtogs dgos par bsgrub pa''. For a translation of the relevant passage of Rgyal tshab's commentary, cf. Sweet 1977: 208ff.</ref> According to this view, the respective verses show that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also need to attain complete understanding of emptiness in order to achieve their desired soteriological goal, which is the state of an Arhat. Yet, in the outline of Rdza Dpal sprul, according to whose explanations Mi pham composed his commentary on the ninth chapter of the BCA, the very same passage "proves that the Mahāyāna is the highest."<ref>''Spyod 'jug sa bcad'' 142.4: ''theg chen mchog tu sgrub pa''. For an edition and translation of Dpal sprul's detailed outline of the BCA, see Viehbeck 2005: 86ff.</ref> As the title indicates, this tradition reads this passage of the BCA as a proof that the Mahāyāna is supreme to the Hīnayāna,<ref>Note that the distinction Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna is not used as a self-evident categorisation, but as a distinction that followers of the Mahāyāna, such as Śāntideva and his Tibetan successors, use to distinguish their specific tradition from other Buddhist traditions. Often, as here in the BCA, it is employed in a polemical context, e.g., to defend Mahāyāna doctrines against possible objections from other Buddhist traditions.</ref> the path of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. As will be shown below, this supremacy is established in one way in terms of the complete realisation of emptiness (the Mahāyāna) as opposed to an incomplete realisation of emptiness (the Hīnayāna). Even though Mi pham uses slightly different titles in his own outline, the content of his commentary follows closely the ideas expressed in the outline of his master.<ref>In Mi pham's outline, BCA IX.41–53, called "abandoning objections with regard to the Mahāyāna, the means of expression" (''rjod byed theg chen la rtsod spong''), belongs together with its preceding passage, BCA IX.6–40, "abandoning objections with regard to emptiness, the object to be expressed" (''brjod bya stong nyid la rtsod spong''), and its subsequent section, BCA IX.54–58, a “summary of their content" (''de dag gi don bsdu ba''), to the overall section "abandoning objections" (''rtsod spong''), i.e., a passage that defends the tenets and scriptural tradition of the Mahāyāna; cf. the sa bcad of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' in Chapter Seven.</ref> | part of the controversies that developed about its interpretation. In the Dge lugs tradition, as expressed in Rgyal tshab's commentary, the section of the verses BCA IX.41–57 is labelled "proving that even for someone who wishes mere liberation, realisation of emptiness is necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.14–15: ''thar pa tsam thob par 'dod pas kyang stong nyid rtogs dgos par bsgrub pa''. For a translation of the relevant passage of Rgyal tshab's commentary, cf. Sweet 1977: 208ff.</ref> According to this view, the respective verses show that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also need to attain complete understanding of emptiness in order to achieve their desired soteriological goal, which is the state of an Arhat. Yet, in the outline of Rdza Dpal sprul, according to whose explanations Mi pham composed his commentary on the ninth chapter of the BCA, the very same passage "proves that the Mahāyāna is the highest."<ref>''Spyod 'jug sa bcad'' 142.4: ''theg chen mchog tu sgrub pa''. For an edition and translation of Dpal sprul's detailed outline of the BCA, see Viehbeck 2005: 86ff.</ref> As the title indicates, this tradition reads this passage of the BCA as a proof that the Mahāyāna is supreme to the Hīnayāna,<ref>Note that the distinction Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna is not used as a self-evident categorisation, but as a distinction that followers of the Mahāyāna, such as Śāntideva and his Tibetan successors, use to distinguish their specific tradition from other Buddhist traditions. Often, as here in the BCA, it is employed in a polemical context, e.g., to defend Mahāyāna doctrines against possible objections from other Buddhist traditions.</ref> the path of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. As will be shown below, this supremacy is established in one way in terms of the complete realisation of emptiness (the Mahāyāna) as opposed to an incomplete realisation of emptiness (the Hīnayāna). Even though Mi pham uses slightly different titles in his own outline, the content of his commentary follows closely the ideas expressed in the outline of his master.<ref>In Mi pham's outline, BCA IX.41–53, called "abandoning objections with regard to the Mahāyāna, the means of expression" (''rjod byed theg chen la rtsod spong''), belongs together with its preceding passage, BCA IX.6–40, "abandoning objections with regard to emptiness, the object to be expressed" (''brjod bya stong nyid la rtsod spong''), and its subsequent section, BCA IX.54–58, a “summary of their content" (''de dag gi don bsdu ba''), to the overall section "abandoning objections" (''rtsod spong''), i.e., a passage that defends the tenets and scriptural tradition of the Mahāyāna; cf. the sa bcad of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' in Chapter Seven.</ref> | ||
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The promulgation of emptiness as the only method to achieve liberation that is expressed in this verse can be seen as the culmination and common aim of the preceding verses. Beginning with BCA IX.45, various consequences of lacking the realisation of emptiness are pointed out: inability for monkhood and ''nirvāṇa'', the presence of ''karman'', the presence of desire – although "non-afflicted" –, the presence of feeling (''vedanā''), and a mind that contains references. But to whose state of mind do these descriptions refer exactly? In Prajñākaramati's commentary on BCA IX.46cd, Arhats such as Maudgalyāyana or Aṅgulīmāla are explicitly mentioned as the object of the explanations.<ref>Cf. BCAP 438.15–16.</ref> The question of whether attributes like the presence of karman and desire can be reconciled with the state of a true Arhat – and Śāntideva's intention was thus indeed to relate this whole passage to Arhats – or whether such was not the case, forms the core issue of the controversies that developed between Mi pham and Rab gsal about this passage. | The promulgation of emptiness as the only method to achieve liberation that is expressed in this verse can be seen as the culmination and common aim of the preceding verses. Beginning with BCA IX.45, various consequences of lacking the realisation of emptiness are pointed out: inability for monkhood and ''nirvāṇa'', the presence of ''karman'', the presence of desire – although "non-afflicted" –, the presence of feeling (''vedanā''), and a mind that contains references. But to whose state of mind do these descriptions refer exactly? In Prajñākaramati's commentary on BCA IX.46cd, Arhats such as Maudgalyāyana or Aṅgulīmāla are explicitly mentioned as the object of the explanations.<ref>Cf. BCAP 438.15–16.</ref> The question of whether attributes like the presence of karman and desire can be reconciled with the state of a true Arhat – and Śāntideva's intention was thus indeed to relate this whole passage to Arhats – or whether such was not the case, forms the core issue of the controversies that developed between Mi pham and Rab gsal about this passage. | ||
<h3>Interpreting | <h3>Interpreting This Passage in the Dge lugs School – Scholastic Background</h3> | ||
As indicated above, in the Dge lugs tradition the passage under discussion is read as a proof that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas need to have an understanding of emptiness in order to attain their desired goal, arhatship. The discussion in the BCA, beginning with IX.41, is seen as an argument between a Śrāvaka opponent, who questions the doctrine of emptiness and claims that "liberation, the result of an Arhat, is attained because of cultivating a direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths, such as impermanence etc.,"<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.15–18: ''nyan thos sde pa kha cig na re bden pa bzhi'i rnam pa mi rtag sogs bcu drug mngon sum du mthong ba goms pas grol ba dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob par 'gyur gyi''/ ''chos thams cad bden pas stong pa nyid mthong bas ci zhig bya dgos pa med cing mi rigs so zhe na''/.</ref> and Śāntideva, who, as a proponent of the Mahāyāna, counters that "even for the attainment of the result of a Śrāvaka- or Pratyekabuddha-Arhat the realisation of emptiness is definitely necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 231.9–10: ''nyan rang dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob pa la yang stong nyid rtogs pa nges par dgos par thal''/.</ref> In the Dge lugs interpretation, verses BCA IX.45–49 are therefore related to states that are achieved by the path of the Four Truths, but do not necessitate a realisation of emptiness. That means that the subjects of these descriptions are Śrāvakas who did not attain arhatship, since they did not make use of the path of emptiness.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 233.20–234.1: ''nyan thos 'phags pa chos can''/ ''dgra bcom pa mi thob par thal''/ ''stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab lam du mi byed pa'i phyir''/.</ref> This general view also has consequences with regard to the literal annotation of individual verse lines. Discarding all ''kleśas'' is asserted to result in achieving the state of an Arhat. Since this passage is understood as not referring to Arhats, the ''kleśas'' mentioned in BCA IX.46 must be specified as "manifest (''mngon gyur'') ''kleśas''." According to this reading, Śāntideva is said to refute the assumption that abandoning only manifest ''kleśas'' would result in liberation, since those adepts still have ''karman'' for further rebirth, although they are devoid of manifest ''kleśas''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 234.9ff. or Sweet 1977: 214f., respectively, for a translation of this passage.</ref> At this stage, Rgyal tshab's commentary makes reference to another reading of this passage by "some commentaries and Tibetans" who relate it to Arhats. Although this is also the intention of Prajñākaramati, as was shown earlier, Rgyal tshab vehemently opposes this way of reading.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 235.13–16: ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams nyon mongs med kyang me'u dgal gyi bu dang 'phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bu sdug bsgal 'byin pa mthong bas de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref> | As indicated above, in the Dge lugs tradition the passage under discussion is read as a proof that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas need to have an understanding of emptiness in order to attain their desired goal, arhatship. The discussion in the BCA, beginning with IX.41, is seen as an argument between a Śrāvaka opponent, who questions the doctrine of emptiness and claims that "liberation, the result of an Arhat, is attained because of cultivating a direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths, such as impermanence etc.,"<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 230.15–18: ''nyan thos sde pa kha cig na re bden pa bzhi'i rnam pa mi rtag sogs bcu drug mngon sum du mthong ba goms pas grol ba dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob par 'gyur gyi''/ ''chos thams cad bden pas stong pa nyid mthong bas ci zhig bya dgos pa med cing mi rigs so zhe na''/.</ref> and Śāntideva, who, as a proponent of the Mahāyāna, counters that "even for the attainment of the result of a Śrāvaka- or Pratyekabuddha-Arhat the realisation of emptiness is definitely necessary."<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 231.9–10: ''nyan rang dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob pa la yang stong nyid rtogs pa nges par dgos par thal''/.</ref> In the Dge lugs interpretation, verses BCA IX.45–49 are therefore related to states that are achieved by the path of the Four Truths, but do not necessitate a realisation of emptiness. That means that the subjects of these descriptions are Śrāvakas who did not attain arhatship, since they did not make use of the path of emptiness.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 233.20–234.1: ''nyan thos 'phags pa chos can''/ ''dgra bcom pa mi thob par thal''/ ''stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab lam du mi byed pa'i phyir''/.</ref> This general view also has consequences with regard to the literal annotation of individual verse lines. Discarding all ''kleśas'' is asserted to result in achieving the state of an Arhat. Since this passage is understood as not referring to Arhats, the ''kleśas'' mentioned in BCA IX.46 must be specified as "manifest (''mngon gyur'') ''kleśas''." According to this reading, Śāntideva is said to refute the assumption that abandoning only manifest ''kleśas'' would result in liberation, since those adepts still have ''karman'' for further rebirth, although they are devoid of manifest ''kleśas''.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 234.9ff. or Sweet 1977: 214f., respectively, for a translation of this passage.</ref> At this stage, Rgyal tshab's commentary makes reference to another reading of this passage by "some commentaries and Tibetans" who relate it to Arhats. Although this is also the intention of Prajñākaramati, as was shown earlier, Rgyal tshab vehemently opposes this way of reading.<ref>''<i>'</i>Jug ngogs'' 235.13–16: ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams nyon mongs med kyang me'u dgal gyi bu dang 'phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bu sdug bsgal 'byin pa mthong bas de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref> | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations of BCA IX.41–49 in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, for Mi pham the general purpose of this passage of the BCA is to point out that the spiritual aim of the Hīnayāna tradition, attaining the state of an Arhat, is not ultimate in nature, but is surpassed by the state of a complete Buddha, the spiritual goal that is promoted in the Mahāyāna tradition. Here, the difference between these two states is discussed in terms of a complete realisation of emptiness or the lack thereof. According to Mi pham, Śāntideva's descriptions of religious adepts who have not realised emptiness do indeed refer to true Arhats. These are said to have not abandoned "undefiled ''karman''" | As explained at the beginning of this chapter, for Mi pham the general purpose of this passage of the BCA is to point out that the spiritual aim of the Hīnayāna tradition, attaining the state of an Arhat, is not ultimate in nature, but is surpassed by the state of a complete Buddha, the spiritual goal that is promoted in the Mahāyāna tradition. Here, the difference between these two states is discussed in terms of a complete realisation of emptiness or the lack thereof. According to Mi pham, Śāntideva's descriptions of religious adepts who have not realised emptiness do indeed refer to true Arhats. These are said to have not abandoned "undefiled ''karman''" | ||
(''zag med kyi las'') and rebirth in a "mental body" (''yid kyi lus''). They therefore need to enter the Mahāyāna doctrine to gain a complete understanding of emptiness and achieve ultimate liberation.<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.3–5: ''zag med kyi'' [C ''kyis''] ''las dang''/ ''yid kyi lus bsam mi khyab 'gyur gyi 'chi 'pho ba rnams ma spangs pas grol ba gtan du ba min la''/ ''phung po phra ba rgyun kyang mi 'chad par gdod theg chen du 'jug dgos te''/ ''spang'' [C ''spangs''] ''bya shin tu phra ba mi spong ba'ang chos bdag med rdzogs par rtogs shing bsgom pa med pa des na'o''/.</ref> At the end of his explanations of the crucial passage BCA IX.46–48, Mi pham explicitly opposes the position which denies that Śāntideva's explanations refer to Arhats, a position taken in the Dge lugs tradition. He further criticises certain features of the literal interpretation of this passage, features that go hand in hand with this general stance, and that have already been pointed out in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6: ''<i>'</i>di la nyon mongs mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol na zhes sbyar dgos kyi''/ ''dgra bcom pa la sbyar ba mi 'thad ces dpe la lar bshad kyang rang gi zhe 'dod dang mthun par khrid pa tsam ste''/ ''pha rol pos kyang mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol bar mi 'dod bzhin du thal ba de 'dra 'brel med du 'gyur zhing''/ ''dgra bcom maud'' [B ''mong'', C ''mod''] ''gal lta bu la sbyar te rgya 'grel thams cad zhal 'chams par bkral zhing rigs pas kyang grub pa'i gzhung gi gnad chen po yin pas pra yas par mi bya'o''/.</ref> | (''zag med kyi las'') and rebirth in a "mental body" (''yid kyi lus''). They therefore need to enter the Mahāyāna doctrine to gain a complete understanding of emptiness and achieve ultimate liberation.<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.3–5: ''zag med kyi'' [C ''kyis''] ''las dang''/ ''yid kyi lus bsam mi khyab 'gyur gyi 'chi 'pho ba rnams ma spangs pas grol ba gtan du ba min la''/ ''phung po phra ba rgyun kyang mi 'chad par gdod theg chen du 'jug dgos te''/ ''spang'' [C ''spangs''] ''bya shin tu phra ba mi spong ba'ang chos bdag med rdzogs par rtogs shing bsgom pa med pa des na'o''/.</ref> At the end of his explanations of the crucial passage BCA IX.46–48, Mi pham explicitly opposes the position which denies that Śāntideva's explanations refer to Arhats, a position taken in the Dge lugs tradition. He further criticises certain features of the literal interpretation of this passage, features that go hand in hand with this general stance, and that have already been pointed out in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6: ''<i>'</i>di la nyon mongs mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol na zhes sbyar dgos kyi''/ ''dgra bcom pa la sbyar ba mi 'thad ces dpe la lar bshad kyang rang gi zhe 'dod dang mthun par khrid pa tsam ste''/ ''pha rol pos kyang mngon gyur tsam spangs pas grol bar mi 'dod bzhin du thal ba de 'dra 'brel med du 'gyur zhing''/ ''dgra bcom maud'' [B ''mong'', C ''mod''] ''gal lta bu la sbyar te rgya 'grel thams cad zhal 'chams par bkral zhing rigs pas kyang grub pa'i gzhung gi gnad chen po yin pas pra yas par mi bya'o''/.</ref> | ||
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As shown, Mi pham's commentary explicitly criticises the Dge lugs interpretation of this passage of the BCA in terms of both its general aim and function, and of its resulting literal interpretation, and it is this disapproval of Mi pham's that forms the focal point of Rab gsal's later criticism. | As shown, Mi pham's commentary explicitly criticises the Dge lugs interpretation of this passage of the BCA in terms of both its general aim and function, and of its resulting literal interpretation, and it is this disapproval of Mi pham's that forms the focal point of Rab gsal's later criticism. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
Rab gsal begins his criticism with a statement of the "opponent's position" (''phyogs snga''), for which he quotes the passage of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', where Mi pham refuted the general idea that this passage does not refer to Arhats, as well as the specific interpretation of ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest ''kleśas'', as a deviation from the authoritative Indian tradition.<ref>I.e., ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6, see earlier, p.136.</ref> In the course of Rab gsal's refutation, Mi pham's other critical remarks on the Dge lugs interpretation of BCA IX.47 are also addressed. Among the various issues raised in the development of the controversies, we will focus on the following three main aspects: the general problem of the context and aim of this passage, i.e., whether Śāntideva's explanations refer to (true) Arhats or not, and the two problems of literal interpretation that are connected to the general perception of this passage, i.e., Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation of the ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest and the assertion that BCA IX.47cd refers to two kinds of desire (''sred pa''), one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted, which should be accepted in the Abhidharma tradition. | Rab gsal begins his criticism with a statement of the "opponent's position" (''phyogs snga''), for which he quotes the passage of the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', where Mi pham refuted the general idea that this passage does not refer to Arhats, as well as the specific interpretation of ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest ''kleśas'', as a deviation from the authoritative Indian tradition.<ref>I.e., ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 42.4–6, see earlier, p.136.</ref> In the course of Rab gsal's refutation, Mi pham's other critical remarks on the Dge lugs interpretation of BCA IX.47 are also addressed. Among the various issues raised in the development of the controversies, we will focus on the following three main aspects: the general problem of the context and aim of this passage, i.e., whether Śāntideva's explanations refer to (true) Arhats or not, and the two problems of literal interpretation that are connected to the general perception of this passage, i.e., Mi pham's criticism of the Dge lugs interpretation of the ''kleśas'' in BCA IX.46a as manifest and the assertion that BCA IX.47cd refers to two kinds of desire (''sred pa''), one that is afflicted and one that is non-afflicted, which should be accepted in the Abhidharma tradition. | ||
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In his later explanations,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.3–393.2 (JL III.6c).</ref> Rab gsal opposes Mi pham's criticism that BCA IX.47cd teaches only the presence of non-afflicted desire, but not also of afflicted desire, as claimed in the Dge lugs tradition.<ref>See earlier, p.138, and ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 43.3–5.</ref> Rab gsal's argument is that by applying the particle "this" (''<i>'</i>di'')<ref>As explained earlier (see p.129, in particular), Rab gsal, as well as Mi pham, understand the pronoun "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') to be related to "desire."</ref> to "desire," its correlative – "that" (''de'') desire – is also implied, the earlier being non-afflicted and the latter afflicted.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.6–393.1: ''sred 'di zhes bkar'' [? A ''pa gal'', BC ''bkal''] ''te khyod kyis 'dod pa'i nyon mongs can min yang''/ ''kun rmongs bzhin zhes pha rol po la grags pa'i dpe bstan pa'i phyir''/ ''<i>'</i>dir pha rol pos med zer rgyu'i sred pa zhig bstan la''/ ''<i>'</i>di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''kho'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas'' [...].</ref> | In his later explanations,<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.3–393.2 (JL III.6c).</ref> Rab gsal opposes Mi pham's criticism that BCA IX.47cd teaches only the presence of non-afflicted desire, but not also of afflicted desire, as claimed in the Dge lugs tradition.<ref>See earlier, p.138, and ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 43.3–5.</ref> Rab gsal's argument is that by applying the particle "this" (''<i>'</i>di'')<ref>As explained earlier (see p.129, in particular), Rab gsal, as well as Mi pham, understand the pronoun "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') to be related to "desire."</ref> to "desire," its correlative – "that" (''de'') desire – is also implied, the earlier being non-afflicted and the latter afflicted.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 392.6–393.1: ''sred 'di zhes bkar'' [? A ''pa gal'', BC ''bkal''] ''te khyod kyis 'dod pa'i nyon mongs can min yang''/ ''kun rmongs bzhin zhes pha rol po la grags pa'i dpe bstan pa'i phyir''/ ''<i>'</i>dir pha rol pos med zer rgyu'i sred pa zhig bstan la''/ ''<i>'</i>di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''kho'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas'' [...].</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
In his response, Mi pham does not deal with the arguments concerning the | In his response, Mi pham does not deal with the arguments concerning the | ||
general question of relating this passage to (true) Arhats, which Rab gsal | general question of relating this passage to (true) Arhats, which Rab gsal | ||
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Mi pham also opposes Rab gsal's later explanations, in which the latter expounded the Dge lugs acceptance of two desires as based on the correlation of the two pronouns "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') and "that" (''de'').<ref>''Rab lan'' 238.4–242.1 (RL III.6c).</ref> He quotes the relevant passage of Rab gsal's text and points out that these explanations do not add any new information to what was said earlier. Rab gsal's elaborations allegedly displayed, however, the fault that desire, specified as "this desire" (BCA IX.47c), is described as being both afflicted and non-afflicted.<ref>''Rab lan'' 241.3–5: ''yang sred 'di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''phyir rgol ba'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas zhes smos pa phyir rgol gyi dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin pa dang min pa gnyis ka yin zer ba 'di spar mar 'dug pas tshig chad pa 'dra min na dngos su bsnyon dor gyi gtam ya mtshan pa dngos so''//.</ref> Mi pham obviously misunderstands the attributes "afflicted" and "non-afflicted" to be related to one single desire, a mistake that – among other issues – will be addressed in Rab gsal's response. | Mi pham also opposes Rab gsal's later explanations, in which the latter expounded the Dge lugs acceptance of two desires as based on the correlation of the two pronouns "this" (''<i>'</i>di'') and "that" (''de'').<ref>''Rab lan'' 238.4–242.1 (RL III.6c).</ref> He quotes the relevant passage of Rab gsal's text and points out that these explanations do not add any new information to what was said earlier. Rab gsal's elaborations allegedly displayed, however, the fault that desire, specified as "this desire" (BCA IX.47c), is described as being both afflicted and non-afflicted.<ref>''Rab lan'' 241.3–5: ''yang sred 'di zhes pa'i nye tshig gis zlas drangs pa'i sred pa''/ ''phyir rgol ba'i 'dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin par yang bstan pas zhes smos pa phyir rgol gyi dod pa ltar gyi nyon mongs can yin pa dang min pa gnyis ka yin zer ba 'di spar mar 'dug pas tshig chad pa 'dra min na dngos su bsnyon dor gyi gtam ya mtshan pa dngos so''//.</ref> Mi pham obviously misunderstands the attributes "afflicted" and "non-afflicted" to be related to one single desire, a mistake that – among other issues – will be addressed in Rab gsal's response. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
As Mi pham before, Rab gsal also gives a summarising answer to the general problem of the context and role of this passage and the question of | As Mi pham before, Rab gsal also gives a summarising answer to the general problem of the context and role of this passage and the question of | ||
whether it refers to Arhats or not. Instead of a detailed treatment of every single line of argument given in the earlier texts, he points to some inconsistencies he finds in Mi pham's writings. One contradiction is that Mi pham explained in the Rab lan that the ''karman'' of the religious adept under consideration is the result of earlier desire, while in other passages he had spoken of desire – even though non-afflicted – that is present now. He reproaches Mi pham, saying that the latter's explanations of the exact understanding of the desire that is mentioned in BCA IX.47c are unclear: do these explanations refer to desire as a part of the twelve links of dependent origination – and as such to afflicted desire – or to non-afflicted desire? According to Mi pham's position, so Rab gsal argues, the abandonment of desire would entail the requirements for complete buddhahood, i.e., the abandonment of obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''), and not only of obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''), which is accepted as sufficient for attaining the state of an Arhat.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 437.1–3: ''sher ṭika tu dgra bcom pa'i rgyud kyi sred pa zhes dang''/ ''sred pa nyon mongs can min pa ci ste med ces bris kyang''/ ''zab snang 'dir'' [B ''<i>'</i>di''] ''da lta'i sred pa med kyang sngar gyi sred pas gsos btab ces kyang bris''/ ''yang 'di ltar'' [C ''star'']/ ''yan lag bcu gnyis kyi sred pa nyon mongs can yin pa bden''/ ''<i>'</i>on kyang sred pa nyon mongs can min pa yod zer''/ ''<i>'</i>o na da lta'i sred pa zhes ci la sbyar''/ ''khyod ltar na sred pa spangs pa la'' [B ''las''] ''sangs rgyas dgos pas''/ [...].</ref> | whether it refers to Arhats or not. Instead of a detailed treatment of every single line of argument given in the earlier texts, he points to some inconsistencies he finds in Mi pham's writings. One contradiction is that Mi pham explained in the Rab lan that the ''karman'' of the religious adept under consideration is the result of earlier desire, while in other passages he had spoken of desire – even though non-afflicted – that is present now. He reproaches Mi pham, saying that the latter's explanations of the exact understanding of the desire that is mentioned in BCA IX.47c are unclear: do these explanations refer to desire as a part of the twelve links of dependent origination – and as such to afflicted desire – or to non-afflicted desire? According to Mi pham's position, so Rab gsal argues, the abandonment of desire would entail the requirements for complete buddhahood, i.e., the abandonment of obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''), and not only of obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''), which is accepted as sufficient for attaining the state of an Arhat.<ref>Cf. ''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 437.1–3: ''sher ṭika tu dgra bcom pa'i rgyud kyi sred pa zhes dang''/ ''sred pa nyon mongs can min pa ci ste med ces bris kyang''/ ''zab snang 'dir'' [B ''<i>'</i>di''] ''da lta'i sred pa med kyang sngar gyi sred pas gsos btab ces kyang bris''/ ''yang 'di ltar'' [C ''star'']/ ''yan lag bcu gnyis kyi sred pa nyon mongs can yin pa bden''/ ''<i>'</i>on kyang sred pa nyon mongs can min pa yod zer''/ ''<i>'</i>o na da lta'i sred pa zhes ci la sbyar''/ ''khyod ltar na sred pa spangs pa la'' [B ''las''] ''sangs rgyas dgos pas''/ [...].</ref> | ||
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<h3>Topic IV: | <h3>Topic IV: Issues Related to BCA IX.2</h3> | ||
Unlike the earlier three topics, this section is not committed primarily to the specific interpretation of a certain passage of the BCA. Instead, a passage from Śāntideva's work serves as a departure point for a more general discussion. In his outline, Rab gsal refers to the issues at stake as "[faults] that are connected to the principle (''tshul'') of ''satyadvaya''."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 384.3: ''bden gnyis kyi tshul du 'brel ba''.</ref> The concept of "satyadvaya" is arguably the most central element in Madhyamaka philosophy (as indicated, for example, by the production of secondary literature dealing explicitly with this idea).<ref>For the Dge lugs conception of ''satyadvaya'', Newland 1992 and Tauscher 1995 are most important. Mention must also be made of Sonam Thakchoe's work about the differences of this central idea between the thought of Tsong kha pa and Go rams pa (Thakchoe 2007). Mi pham's approach to ''satyadvaya'' can be found within more general works on his Madhyamaka philosophy, such as Pettit 1999, Phuntsho 2005, Duckworth 2008, and 2011. Further, I have dealt with Mi pham's presentation of ''satyadvaya'' as it is found specifically in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' – although briefly – in two earlier articles, see Viehbeck 2009a and Viehbeck 2012.</ref> In the secondary literature, ''satyadvaya'' is commonly translated as the "two truths" or "two realities," thus emphasising either its epistemological or ontological aspect. Since both aspects are important in the present discussion, I refrain from translating this technical term and will use the Sanskrit term in order to accommodate all possible conceptions associated with it.<ref>Tauscher 1995: 200–214 gives a detailed discussion of these two aspects and of the problem of rendering ''satya''. As I have stated elsewhere (Viehbeck 2012: 301ff.), Mi pham clearly distinguishes two models of establishing ''satyadvaya'': one describes the two ''satyas'' from an ontological perspective, as mode of existence (''gnas tshul'') and mode of appearances (''snang tshul''), the other endorses an epistemological perspective, conceiving the two ''satyas'' as authentic or inauthentic cognition. See also Duckworth 2008: 6ff. and Duckworth 2010c, for further explanation on these two models.</ref> In the BCA, the concept of ''satyadvaya'' is introduced and most concisely formulated in BCA IX.2: | Unlike the earlier three topics, this section is not committed primarily to the specific interpretation of a certain passage of the BCA. Instead, a passage from Śāntideva's work serves as a departure point for a more general discussion. In his outline, Rab gsal refers to the issues at stake as "[faults] that are connected to the principle (''tshul'') of ''satyadvaya''."<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 384.3: ''bden gnyis kyi tshul du 'brel ba''.</ref> The concept of "satyadvaya" is arguably the most central element in Madhyamaka philosophy (as indicated, for example, by the production of secondary literature dealing explicitly with this idea).<ref>For the Dge lugs conception of ''satyadvaya'', Newland 1992 and Tauscher 1995 are most important. Mention must also be made of Sonam Thakchoe's work about the differences of this central idea between the thought of Tsong kha pa and Go rams pa (Thakchoe 2007). Mi pham's approach to ''satyadvaya'' can be found within more general works on his Madhyamaka philosophy, such as Pettit 1999, Phuntsho 2005, Duckworth 2008, and 2011. Further, I have dealt with Mi pham's presentation of ''satyadvaya'' as it is found specifically in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' – although briefly – in two earlier articles, see Viehbeck 2009a and Viehbeck 2012.</ref> In the secondary literature, ''satyadvaya'' is commonly translated as the "two truths" or "two realities," thus emphasising either its epistemological or ontological aspect. Since both aspects are important in the present discussion, I refrain from translating this technical term and will use the Sanskrit term in order to accommodate all possible conceptions associated with it.<ref>Tauscher 1995: 200–214 gives a detailed discussion of these two aspects and of the problem of rendering ''satya''. As I have stated elsewhere (Viehbeck 2012: 301ff.), Mi pham clearly distinguishes two models of establishing ''satyadvaya'': one describes the two ''satyas'' from an ontological perspective, as mode of existence (''gnas tshul'') and mode of appearances (''snang tshul''), the other endorses an epistemological perspective, conceiving the two ''satyas'' as authentic or inauthentic cognition. See also Duckworth 2008: 6ff. and Duckworth 2010c, for further explanation on these two models.</ref> In the BCA, the concept of ''satyadvaya'' is introduced and most concisely formulated in BCA IX.2: | ||
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Mantra traditions, starting with pp. 408.6–409.6 (JL IV.13).</ref> It will start with an – admittedly brief – glance at the (mainstream) viewpoint on the particular topic in the Dge lugs tradition, and then contrast it with Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', and continue with the development of the debates proper. | Mantra traditions, starting with pp. 408.6–409.6 (JL IV.13).</ref> It will start with an – admittedly brief – glance at the (mainstream) viewpoint on the particular topic in the Dge lugs tradition, and then contrast it with Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', and continue with the development of the debates proper. | ||
<h3>Emptiness as | <h3>Emptiness as Non-existence of True Establishment (''bden med'')</h3> | ||
Madhyamaka philosophy is intrinsically connected with the idea that all phenomena (''dharma'') are empty (''śūnya''), and hence its proponents are synonymously called Mādhyamika, Śūnya(tā)vādin, or Niḥsvabhāvavādin.<ref>On these terms, see Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 1–3.</ref> There are, however, considerable differences concerning the precise understanding of emptiness. The premise that something is empty leads to the question of what exactly it is empty of or what is negated – or, using the (Tibetan) technical terminology: what is the object of negation/the negandum (''dgag bya'') of Madhyamaka analysis? The specification of, and answer to, this question became a central issue in the Dge lugs school. Its founder, Tsong kha pa, considered the identification (''ngos 'dzin'') of the negandum to be of the utmost importance for the correct understanding of emptiness:<ref>''Lam rim chen mo'' 169.6–9: ''gang zag 'di mi 'dug snyam du nges pa la med rgyu'i gang zag de shes dgos pa ltar''/ ''bdag med pa dang rang bzhin med pa zhes pa'i don nges pa la'ang med rgyu'i bdag dang rang bzhin de legs par ngos zin dgos te''/ ''dgag par bya ba'i spyi legs par ma shar na de bkag pa'ang phyin ci ma log par mi nges pa'i phyir te''/. Translation according to Cutler 2002: 126; see also Wayman 1978: 188f.</ref> | Madhyamaka philosophy is intrinsically connected with the idea that all phenomena (''dharma'') are empty (''śūnya''), and hence its proponents are synonymously called Mādhyamika, Śūnya(tā)vādin, or Niḥsvabhāvavādin.<ref>On these terms, see Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 1–3.</ref> There are, however, considerable differences concerning the precise understanding of emptiness. The premise that something is empty leads to the question of what exactly it is empty of or what is negated – or, using the (Tibetan) technical terminology: what is the object of negation/the negandum (''dgag bya'') of Madhyamaka analysis? The specification of, and answer to, this question became a central issue in the Dge lugs school. Its founder, Tsong kha pa, considered the identification (''ngos 'dzin'') of the negandum to be of the utmost importance for the correct understanding of emptiness:<ref>''Lam rim chen mo'' 169.6–9: ''gang zag 'di mi 'dug snyam du nges pa la med rgyu'i gang zag de shes dgos pa ltar''/ ''bdag med pa dang rang bzhin med pa zhes pa'i don nges pa la'ang med rgyu'i bdag dang rang bzhin de legs par ngos zin dgos te''/ ''dgag par bya ba'i spyi legs par ma shar na de bkag pa'ang phyin ci ma log par mi nges pa'i phyir te''/. Translation according to Cutler 2002: 126; see also Wayman 1978: 188f.</ref> | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
In his commentary on BCA IX.2,<ref>For a more extensive explanation on this part of Mi pham's commentary, see Viehbeck 2012: 299ff.</ref> Mi pham elaborates on how the absolute in general can be divided into a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the former is only a preparatory step in realising the latter, ultimate form of emptiness:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 4.5–6: ''don dam pa de la'ang skye ba dang gnas pa sogs bkag pa'i skye med dang gnas med sogs med dgag tsam gyi stong pa ni stong nyid chen po mtha' bzhi dang bral ba la 'jug pa'i sgo tsam yin pas rnam grangs pa'i don dam mam''/ ''mthun pa'i don dam zhes brda mdzad de''/.</ref> | In his commentary on BCA IX.2,<ref>For a more extensive explanation on this part of Mi pham's commentary, see Viehbeck 2012: 299ff.</ref> Mi pham elaborates on how the absolute in general can be divided into a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the former is only a preparatory step in realising the latter, ultimate form of emptiness:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 4.5–6: ''don dam pa de la'ang skye ba dang gnas pa sogs bkag pa'i skye med dang gnas med sogs med dgag tsam gyi stong pa ni stong nyid chen po mtha' bzhi dang bral ba la 'jug pa'i sgo tsam yin pas rnam grangs pa'i don dam mam''/ ''mthun pa'i don dam zhes brda mdzad de''/.</ref> | ||
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Even though Mi pham does not formulate his thoughts as a direct criticism of the Dge lugs tradition, his conception of the absolute sharply contrasts with the way in which it is conceived in his opponent's tradition. For Mi pham, emptiness or the absolute in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' refutes only the extreme of existence and corresponds to the merely provisional nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, an absolute that is not accepted as the ultimate absolute in the Svātantrika tradition, let alone in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, which – according to Mi pham – focuses right from the start on the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, refuting all four extremes. | Even though Mi pham does not formulate his thoughts as a direct criticism of the Dge lugs tradition, his conception of the absolute sharply contrasts with the way in which it is conceived in his opponent's tradition. For Mi pham, emptiness or the absolute in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' refutes only the extreme of existence and corresponds to the merely provisional nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') absolute, an absolute that is not accepted as the ultimate absolute in the Svātantrika tradition, let alone in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, which – according to Mi pham – focuses right from the start on the actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, refuting all four extremes. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
Naturally, Mi pham is extensively criticised for his categorisation of emptiness in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' as a provisional concept. Among the many lines of criticism Rab gsal brings forth, I will focus only on five major issues,<ref>In the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'', these topics are JL IV.1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, and 9a.</ref> which include contradictions of various kinds, viz., to the scriptural tradition, to Mi pham's other statements, and to logic, as well as the refutation of possible objections. | Naturally, Mi pham is extensively criticised for his categorisation of emptiness in the form of ''bden med med dgag'' as a provisional concept. Among the many lines of criticism Rab gsal brings forth, I will focus only on five major issues,<ref>In the summary of the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'', these topics are JL IV.1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, and 9a.</ref> which include contradictions of various kinds, viz., to the scriptural tradition, to Mi pham's other statements, and to logic, as well as the refutation of possible objections. | ||
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experiencing mind and its object are not separated, but emptiness is experienced in a non-dual (''gnyis su med pa'') and direct way, Rab gsal elaborates, thus explaining his position on the process of realising emptiness.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 405.2–4: ''<i>'</i>o na sngar mdun du gnas la phyis mi gnas pa zhig tu thal''/ ''gang tshe zhes dus ngos bzung ba'i phyir''// ''des na 'di ltar''/ ''sngar thos bsam gyi dus na yul yul can rgyang'' [A ''rgyangs''] ''chad 'brel med pa ltar snang''/ ''de nas zhi lhag gis rim gyis gnyis snang sbyangs te''/ ''sems dang gnyis su med pa lta bu dang gnyis su med pa'i snang ba 'byung ste''/.</ref> | experiencing mind and its object are not separated, but emptiness is experienced in a non-dual (''gnyis su med pa'') and direct way, Rab gsal elaborates, thus explaining his position on the process of realising emptiness.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 405.2–4: ''<i>'</i>o na sngar mdun du gnas la phyis mi gnas pa zhig tu thal''/ ''gang tshe zhes dus ngos bzung ba'i phyir''// ''des na 'di ltar''/ ''sngar thos bsam gyi dus na yul yul can rgyang'' [A ''rgyangs''] ''chad 'brel med pa ltar snang''/ ''de nas zhi lhag gis rim gyis gnyis snang sbyangs te''/ ''sems dang gnyis su med pa lta bu dang gnyis su med pa'i snang ba 'byung ste''/.</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
Mi pham's answers to Rab gsal's criticism concerning this fourth topic tend | Mi pham's answers to Rab gsal's criticism concerning this fourth topic tend | ||
to be much more detailed than those concerning the earlier topics; they | to be much more detailed than those concerning the earlier topics; they | ||
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Mi pham would certainly agree that any conceptual notion of nonexistence does not accord fully with the ultimate absolute. For him, however, the distinction of nominal and actual absolute is not limited to the realising subject, but could also be applied to the realised object.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 337.1ff., for Mi pham's explanations on the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute with regard to both subject and object: "In this context, we as well believe that the designation of actual and nominal absolute – in terms of averting or not averting dualistic appearances – is suitable with reference to the subject. Regarding the object, the two, being free from the sphere (''spyod yul'') of limited proliferations (''spros pa'') and being free from all spheres of proliferations, are explained as the difference of the two absolutes [...]." (''<i>'</i>di skabs yul can gyi dbang du byas na gnyis snang log ma log gi sgo nas rnam grangs min pa dang yin pa'i don dam gyi tha snyad'' [B ''snyan''] ''kyang 'thad par bdag cag gis kyang 'dod de yul gyi dbang du byas na spros pa nyi tshe ba'i spyod yul dang bral ba dang''/ ''spros pa'i spyod yul mtha' dag dang bral ba de gnyis la don dam gnyis po'i khyad par du bshad cing''/ [...]).</ref> | Mi pham would certainly agree that any conceptual notion of nonexistence does not accord fully with the ultimate absolute. For him, however, the distinction of nominal and actual absolute is not limited to the realising subject, but could also be applied to the realised object.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 337.1ff., for Mi pham's explanations on the nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute with regard to both subject and object: "In this context, we as well believe that the designation of actual and nominal absolute – in terms of averting or not averting dualistic appearances – is suitable with reference to the subject. Regarding the object, the two, being free from the sphere (''spyod yul'') of limited proliferations (''spros pa'') and being free from all spheres of proliferations, are explained as the difference of the two absolutes [...]." (''<i>'</i>di skabs yul can gyi dbang du byas na gnyis snang log ma log gi sgo nas rnam grangs min pa dang yin pa'i don dam gyi tha snyad'' [B ''snyan''] ''kyang 'thad par bdag cag gis kyang 'dod de yul gyi dbang du byas na spros pa nyi tshe ba'i spyod yul dang bral ba dang''/ ''spros pa'i spyod yul mtha' dag dang bral ba de gnyis la don dam gnyis po'i khyad par du bshad cing''/ [...]).</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4> | ||
While Mi pham gives no direct answer to Rab gsal's stance on the scriptures Mi pham had quoted, he continues his criticism of viewing emptiness as a mere negation in different passages of his reply. At the beginning of "issues of major significance" (''don che ba''),<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 468.1–4 (YL II.a).</ref> for example, he emphasises again that "mere emptiness" cannot account for a unity of the two ''satyas'':<ref>''Yang lan'' 468.2–3: ''bden gnyis ngo bo tha dad du phye ba'i stong rkyang de 'ba' zhig don dam mthar thug yin na''/ ''bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med don dam ma yin par 'gyur la''/ ''kun rdzob kyang min par 'gyur ro''//.</ref> | While Mi pham gives no direct answer to Rab gsal's stance on the scriptures Mi pham had quoted, he continues his criticism of viewing emptiness as a mere negation in different passages of his reply. At the beginning of "issues of major significance" (''don che ba''),<ref>See ''Yang lan'' 468.1–4 (YL II.a).</ref> for example, he emphasises again that "mere emptiness" cannot account for a unity of the two ''satyas'':<ref>''Yang lan'' 468.2–3: ''bden gnyis ngo bo tha dad du phye ba'i stong rkyang de 'ba' zhig don dam mthar thug yin na''/ ''bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med don dam ma yin par 'gyur la''/ ''kun rdzob kyang min par 'gyur ro''//.</ref> | ||
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established in the respective doctrinal positions, it is not easily resolved. | established in the respective doctrinal positions, it is not easily resolved. | ||
<h3>Ultimate | <h3>Ultimate Emptiness and Freedom from Extremes</h3> | ||
The first issue was mainly concerned with Mi pham's opposition to viewing mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') as the ultimate form of emptiness and the controversies that evolved out of this; the second issue, in contrast, focused on Mi pham's alternative conception of the ultimate absolute as being beyond all extremes. | The first issue was mainly concerned with Mi pham's opposition to viewing mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') as the ultimate form of emptiness and the controversies that evolved out of this; the second issue, in contrast, focused on Mi pham's alternative conception of the ultimate absolute as being beyond all extremes. | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
As shown earlier, Mi pham distinguishes between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the latter corresponds to the ultimate absolute as it is also conceived of in the Prāsaṅgika tradition. The characteristic approach of the Svātantrika tradition, in contrast, is based on the temporary emphasis on the nominal absolute, and thus on a perception of the two ''satyas'' as separate. Even though there is no arising of appearances on the absolute level, appearances cannot be denied on the conventional level. Appearances are established, since a cognition that investigates the conventional recognises their "own- characteristics" (''rang mtshan''). If appearances are negated, one must then add that this is done with regard to the ultimate level. The approach of the Svātantrika | As shown earlier, Mi pham distinguishes between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute, whereby the latter corresponds to the ultimate absolute as it is also conceived of in the Prāsaṅgika tradition. The characteristic approach of the Svātantrika tradition, in contrast, is based on the temporary emphasis on the nominal absolute, and thus on a perception of the two ''satyas'' as separate. Even though there is no arising of appearances on the absolute level, appearances cannot be denied on the conventional level. Appearances are established, since a cognition that investigates the conventional recognises their "own- characteristics" (''rang mtshan''). If appearances are negated, one must then add that this is done with regard to the ultimate level. The approach of the Svātantrika | ||
can thus be summarised in the following terse formula: "non-existent on the absolute level, undeceptively existent on the conventional level."<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.3–5: ''de lta na'ang gnas skabs lam gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su don dam par skye ba med kyang kun rdzob tu skye ba ltar snang ba 'gog mi nus pas chos rnams ni kun rdzob tu rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin par tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad mas grub cing''/ ''de snang ba ltar don dam par ma grub pas dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar te don dam par med la kun rdzob par bslu med du yod do zhes 'chad par byed de''/ ''de ltar bden gnyis so so rang sa na ma nyams par bzhag pa 'di lta bu ni las dang po pa'i blo ngor cis kyang bde ba yin te''/.</ref> Following Mi pham, the "middle of extremes," as posited in the Dge lugs tradition, corresponds only to the provisional approach to the absolute mentioned in the Svātantrika scriptures, an approach that is not tenable with regard to ultimate reality:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.6: ''<i>'</i>on kyang gnas lugs mthar thug pa'i dbang du na kun rdzob tu yod pa dang''/ ''don dam par med pa zhes yod pa dang med pa'i mtshan nyid gnyis so sor phyogs su chad de gnas pa ma yin te''/.</ref> | can thus be summarised in the following terse formula: "non-existent on the absolute level, undeceptively existent on the conventional level."<ref>Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.3–5: ''de lta na'ang gnas skabs lam gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su don dam par skye ba med kyang kun rdzob tu skye ba ltar snang ba 'gog mi nus pas chos rnams ni kun rdzob tu rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin par tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad mas grub cing''/ ''de snang ba ltar don dam par ma grub pas dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar te don dam par med la kun rdzob par bslu med du yod do zhes 'chad par byed de''/ ''de ltar bden gnyis so so rang sa na ma nyams par bzhag pa 'di lta bu ni las dang po pa'i blo ngor cis kyang bde ba yin te''/.</ref> Following Mi pham, the "middle of extremes," as posited in the Dge lugs tradition, corresponds only to the provisional approach to the absolute mentioned in the Svātantrika scriptures, an approach that is not tenable with regard to ultimate reality:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 5.6: ''<i>'</i>on kyang gnas lugs mthar thug pa'i dbang du na kun rdzob tu yod pa dang''/ ''don dam par med pa zhes yod pa dang med pa'i mtshan nyid gnyis so sor phyogs su chad de gnas pa ma yin te''/.</ref> | ||
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For Mi pham, authentic Prajñāpāramitā culminates in the realisation of the coalescence or unity of appearances and emptiness (''snang stong zung 'jug''). Only a view that unites appearances and emptiness conforms to the absolute mode of existence (''don dam pa'i gnas tshul''). This view must abandon all forms of grasping, that is, negation as well as affirmation (''dgag sgrub''), and thus be free from any assertions (''khas len''). Freedom from proliferations (''spros bral'') means that not only the extreme of eternalism, but all four extremes (''mtha' bzhi''), i.e., existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence, are equally eliminated.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.1–3.</ref> | For Mi pham, authentic Prajñāpāramitā culminates in the realisation of the coalescence or unity of appearances and emptiness (''snang stong zung 'jug''). Only a view that unites appearances and emptiness conforms to the absolute mode of existence (''don dam pa'i gnas tshul''). This view must abandon all forms of grasping, that is, negation as well as affirmation (''dgag sgrub''), and thus be free from any assertions (''khas len''). Freedom from proliferations (''spros bral'') means that not only the extreme of eternalism, but all four extremes (''mtha' bzhi''), i.e., existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence, are equally eliminated.<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.1–3.</ref> | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
Rab gsal's most important criticism of Mi pham's concept of the absolute and the abandonment of all extremes is found in two sections of his work dealing almost exclusively with this particular issue.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.5–400.1 (JL IV.3) and 403.3–404.3 (JL IV.7).</ref> In addition to the central arguments of these two sections, one passage that exhibits Rab gsal's position on the abandonment of extremes, and another one that refutes possible objections to this position, is included in the current presentation.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 402.2–5 (JL IV.5d) and 404.3–4 (JL IV.8a).</ref> | Rab gsal's most important criticism of Mi pham's concept of the absolute and the abandonment of all extremes is found in two sections of his work dealing almost exclusively with this particular issue.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 398.5–400.1 (JL IV.3) and 403.3–404.3 (JL IV.7).</ref> In addition to the central arguments of these two sections, one passage that exhibits Rab gsal's position on the abandonment of extremes, and another one that refutes possible objections to this position, is included in the current presentation.<ref>''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 402.2–5 (JL IV.5d) and 404.3–4 (JL IV.8a).</ref> | ||
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As Rab gsal points out by referring to passages from Pramāṇa scriptures, such is not the case: direct (''mngon sum'') perception is – per definitionem – free from conceptualisation (''rtog pa''), and hence there is also no "clinging" (''zhen pa''), or – more technically – no determining cognition (''zhen rig'') involved in the direct realisation of emptiness. | As Rab gsal points out by referring to passages from Pramāṇa scriptures, such is not the case: direct (''mngon sum'') perception is – per definitionem – free from conceptualisation (''rtog pa''), and hence there is also no "clinging" (''zhen pa''), or – more technically – no determining cognition (''zhen rig'') involved in the direct realisation of emptiness. | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
Mi pham's response to the individual passages varies in length; quite naturally, he particularly emphasises the arguments directly attacking his position. Introducing his criticism, Rab gsal mentioned the "inseparable unity" (''<i>'</i>du 'bral med pa'') of the two ''satyas'' as a key to their correct understanding. While Mi pham agrees on the principle of a unity of the two ''satyas'', he doubts that such could indeed be achieved by the approach of the Dge lugs tradition, which he rebukes with a rather incisive comment:<ref>''Rab lan'' 309.2–3: ''mdo rgyud du ma'i dgongs pa yin par bdag cag gis shin tu yang 'dod de''/ ''bdag cag gis stong rten 'byung zung 'jug ngo bo dbyer med du 'dod kyis''/ ''ri bong gi rwa med pa dang''/ ''glang gi rwa yod pa gnyis zung 'jug tu byed pa lta bur ni mi 'dod pas'' [...]. For the whole response on that issue, see ''Rab lan'' 309.1–5 (RL IV.2e).</ref> | Mi pham's response to the individual passages varies in length; quite naturally, he particularly emphasises the arguments directly attacking his position. Introducing his criticism, Rab gsal mentioned the "inseparable unity" (''<i>'</i>du 'bral med pa'') of the two ''satyas'' as a key to their correct understanding. While Mi pham agrees on the principle of a unity of the two ''satyas'', he doubts that such could indeed be achieved by the approach of the Dge lugs tradition, which he rebukes with a rather incisive comment:<ref>''Rab lan'' 309.2–3: ''mdo rgyud du ma'i dgongs pa yin par bdag cag gis shin tu yang 'dod de''/ ''bdag cag gis stong rten 'byung zung 'jug ngo bo dbyer med du 'dod kyis''/ ''ri bong gi rwa med pa dang''/ ''glang gi rwa yod pa gnyis zung 'jug tu byed pa lta bur ni mi 'dod pas'' [...]. For the whole response on that issue, see ''Rab lan'' 309.1–5 (RL IV.2e).</ref> | ||
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For Mi pham, the important point in a direct realisation of emptiness – conceived of as free of all proliferations (''spros bral'') – is, however, that it is not only free of determining cognition (''zhen rig''), but from any kind of subject-object dichotomy. This sort of understanding of emptiness must be cultivated already at the stage of conceptual reflection about the absolute, so that what one understands intellectually and what one later realises directly – in a process that is beyond a dualistically operating mind – are the same.<ref>''Rab lan'' 371.3–5: ''bden med spros bral mngon sum rtogs pa'i gnyis su med pa'i blo'am ye shes de la zhen rig gi rtog pa dang bral bar ma zad''/ ''rnam par rtog'' [B ''rtogs''] ''pa'i gzung 'dzin gang yang med pa dang''/ ''dbu ma yin pa dang''/ ''rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi tshad'' [C ''tshan''] ''mas de kho na nyid rtogs pa yin par bsgrub nus te''/ ''thos bsam gyis de gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su'ang de ltar bsgrub pa de mngon sum rtogs pa yin pas thos bsam sgom gsum ya ma bral ba dang''/ ''go don rtogs don mtshungs par gyur pa yin no''//.</ref> | For Mi pham, the important point in a direct realisation of emptiness – conceived of as free of all proliferations (''spros bral'') – is, however, that it is not only free of determining cognition (''zhen rig''), but from any kind of subject-object dichotomy. This sort of understanding of emptiness must be cultivated already at the stage of conceptual reflection about the absolute, so that what one understands intellectually and what one later realises directly – in a process that is beyond a dualistically operating mind – are the same.<ref>''Rab lan'' 371.3–5: ''bden med spros bral mngon sum rtogs pa'i gnyis su med pa'i blo'am ye shes de la zhen rig gi rtog pa dang bral bar ma zad''/ ''rnam par rtog'' [B ''rtogs''] ''pa'i gzung 'dzin gang yang med pa dang''/ ''dbu ma yin pa dang''/ ''rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi tshad'' [C ''tshan''] ''mas de kho na nyid rtogs pa yin par bsgrub nus te''/ ''thos bsam gyis de gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su'ang de ltar bsgrub pa de mngon sum rtogs pa yin pas thos bsam sgom gsum ya ma bral ba dang''/ ''go don rtogs don mtshungs par gyur pa yin no''//.</ref> | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
Although remarks on the current issue, the correct understanding of emptiness, are found throughout Rab gsal's second criticism, these are often very brief and formulated in such a way that a concrete connection to a specific earlier discussion cannot be established with certainty. Further, Rab gsal's criticism often aims at pointing out inconsistencies between individual statements or positions found in Mi pham's texts, rather than continuing the central theme of the earlier discussions. | Although remarks on the current issue, the correct understanding of emptiness, are found throughout Rab gsal's second criticism, these are often very brief and formulated in such a way that a concrete connection to a specific earlier discussion cannot be established with certainty. Further, Rab gsal's criticism often aims at pointing out inconsistencies between individual statements or positions found in Mi pham's texts, rather than continuing the central theme of the earlier discussions. | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
As has already been explained above in the two sub-sections of the fourth topic, Mi pham distinguished between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute. He characterised the former as a provisional approach to emptiness that conceives of the two ''satyas'' as separate, resolving the statement that things are "neither existent nor nonexistent" by adding specifications, interpreting it as "neither existent on the absolute level, nor non-existent on the conventional level." Mi pham described this approach as the – temporal – focus of the Svātantrika tradition and his explanations further implied a resemblance to the way emptiness is conceived in the Dge lugs tradition. The latter absolute, in contrast, was depicted as a direct approach to the ultimate union of the two ''satyas'' emphasised in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, but also shared – ultimately – by the Svātantrikas. While Mi pham used the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction (a distinction that was commonly accepted in his philosophical milieu) and aligned it with two different approaches to the absolute, he relativised the differences between these traditions by pointing to their common ultimate aim. In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', he explained that:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.3–5: ''mkhas mchog bu ston la sogs pas ni thal rang gi khyad par 'di bod'' [C ''bad''] ''kyi rtog bzor zad de''/ ''rgya gar du ma byung bar mdzad mod''/ ''mthar thug gi don la khyad par ci yang med kyang gzhung 'chad tshul gyi dbang du khyad par yod de''/ [...] ''des na thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med kyang rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa'i don dam rtsal du bton te 'chad tshul tsam yin te''/.</ref> | As has already been explained above in the two sub-sections of the fourth topic, Mi pham distinguished between a nominal (''rnam grangs pa'') and an actual (''rnam grangs ma yin pa'') absolute. He characterised the former as a provisional approach to emptiness that conceives of the two ''satyas'' as separate, resolving the statement that things are "neither existent nor nonexistent" by adding specifications, interpreting it as "neither existent on the absolute level, nor non-existent on the conventional level." Mi pham described this approach as the – temporal – focus of the Svātantrika tradition and his explanations further implied a resemblance to the way emptiness is conceived in the Dge lugs tradition. The latter absolute, in contrast, was depicted as a direct approach to the ultimate union of the two ''satyas'' emphasised in the Prāsaṅgika tradition, but also shared – ultimately – by the Svātantrikas. While Mi pham used the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction (a distinction that was commonly accepted in his philosophical milieu) and aligned it with two different approaches to the absolute, he relativised the differences between these traditions by pointing to their common ultimate aim. In the ''Nor bu ke ta ka'', he explained that:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.3–5: ''mkhas mchog bu ston la sogs pas ni thal rang gi khyad par 'di bod'' [C ''bad''] ''kyi rtog bzor zad de''/ ''rgya gar du ma byung bar mdzad mod''/ ''mthar thug gi don la khyad par ci yang med kyang gzhung 'chad tshul gyi dbang du khyad par yod de''/ [...] ''des na thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med kyang rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa'i don dam rtsal du bton te 'chad tshul tsam yin te''/.</ref> | ||
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As expected, Mi pham's focus on the common intention of both traditions, but also his depictions of the individual approaches was troublesome for his Dge lugs opponent, whose tradition emphasises more the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika tradition, as well as the supremacy of the latter. | As expected, Mi pham's focus on the common intention of both traditions, but also his depictions of the individual approaches was troublesome for his Dge lugs opponent, whose tradition emphasises more the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika tradition, as well as the supremacy of the latter. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
In Rab gsal's letter, four passages are found that specifically address the aforementioned topic. The first two criticise Mi pham's explanation of the Svātantrika tradition, the third his depiction of the Prāsaṅgika tradition, while the last one discusses the question of whether both traditions share a common aim or not.<ref>These passages are ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.5–6 (JL IV.1c), 400.6–401.2 (JL IV.4e), 401.2–3 (JL IV.4f), and 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a), respectively.</ref> | In Rab gsal's letter, four passages are found that specifically address the aforementioned topic. The first two criticise Mi pham's explanation of the Svātantrika tradition, the third his depiction of the Prāsaṅgika tradition, while the last one discusses the question of whether both traditions share a common aim or not.<ref>These passages are ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 397.5–6 (JL IV.1c), 400.6–401.2 (JL IV.4e), 401.2–3 (JL IV.4f), and 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a), respectively.</ref> | ||
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Rab gsal's last criticism<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a).</ref> with regard to the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction attacks Mi pham's statement that "there is not any difference with regard to the ultimate intention of those great charioteers of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika [tradition]."<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.4–5: ''thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med''.</ref> According to Rab gsal, this position obliterates the differences between the two traditions. If one claims that there is a shared ultimate intention of these two, then one could also claim the same for other Buddhist traditions, such as the Cittamātrins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣikas. Further, quarrels between the thought of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti would be meaningless, since their intention would have been the same anyway. A third unwanted consequence of Mi pham's position pointed out by Rab gsal is that a commonly accepted characteristic used to distinguish both traditions, viz. the question of whether the establishment (of appearances) by an "own-characteristic" (''rang mtshan gyis grub pa'') on the conventional level is to be accepted or not, would be irrevelant.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.5: ''mkhas pa'i rjes su zlos te kun rdzob tu rang mtshan gyis grub pa 'dod mi 'dod gyi khyad par smras pa'ang don med du ngal bar zad do''//.</ref> | Rab gsal's last criticism<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.3–5 (JL IV.5a).</ref> with regard to the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction attacks Mi pham's statement that "there is not any difference with regard to the ultimate intention of those great charioteers of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika [tradition]."<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 6.4–5: ''thal rang gi shing rta chen po de dag mthar thug gi dgongs pa'i gnad la khyad par ci yang med''.</ref> According to Rab gsal, this position obliterates the differences between the two traditions. If one claims that there is a shared ultimate intention of these two, then one could also claim the same for other Buddhist traditions, such as the Cittamātrins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣikas. Further, quarrels between the thought of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti would be meaningless, since their intention would have been the same anyway. A third unwanted consequence of Mi pham's position pointed out by Rab gsal is that a commonly accepted characteristic used to distinguish both traditions, viz. the question of whether the establishment (of appearances) by an "own-characteristic" (''rang mtshan gyis grub pa'') on the conventional level is to be accepted or not, would be irrevelant.<ref>Cf. ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 401.5: ''mkhas pa'i rjes su zlos te kun rdzob tu rang mtshan gyis grub pa 'dod mi 'dod gyi khyad par smras pa'ang don med du ngal bar zad do''//.</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
In his response to Rab sal's criticism, Mi pham seizes the opportunity to further clarify his own understanding of the respective positions of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika traditions, about which he elaborates at some length. The current presentation will, however, focus on the actual answers to the arguments brought forth by Rab gsal. | In his response to Rab sal's criticism, Mi pham seizes the opportunity to further clarify his own understanding of the respective positions of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika traditions, about which he elaborates at some length. The current presentation will, however, focus on the actual answers to the arguments brought forth by Rab gsal. | ||
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As Rab gsal had done, Mi pham also attacks his opponent by arguing that his accusations are without any basis. | As Rab gsal had done, Mi pham also attacks his opponent by arguing that his accusations are without any basis. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
Again, the issues at stake pertain to several objections raised in Rab gsal's response. There is, however, no substantial continuation of the earlier discussion. | Again, the issues at stake pertain to several objections raised in Rab gsal's response. There is, however, no substantial continuation of the earlier discussion. | ||
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<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''</h4> | ||
In contrast, Mi pham favoured a literal interpretation of this passage. As the absolute is utterly beyond the limitations of ordinary language and mind, it is rightly described as not being the object of mind, thus Mi pham in his commentary on BCA IX.2cd:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.6: ''de phyir dngos po'i gnas tshul don dam pa ni yod pa dang''/ ''med pa dang''/ ''gnyis ka dang''/ ''gnyis min gyi mtha' kun dang bral bas na blo yi spyod yul min te''/ ''blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref> | In contrast, Mi pham favoured a literal interpretation of this passage. As the absolute is utterly beyond the limitations of ordinary language and mind, it is rightly described as not being the object of mind, thus Mi pham in his commentary on BCA IX.2cd:<ref>''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 7.6: ''de phyir dngos po'i gnas tshul don dam pa ni yod pa dang''/ ''med pa dang''/ ''gnyis ka dang''/ ''gnyis min gyi mtha' kun dang bral bas na blo yi spyod yul min te''/ ''blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro''//.</ref> | ||
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While Mi pham here appears as a mediator between the two extreme positions that developed in this regard in the history of Tibetan scholastics, he was harshly attacked for his statements by Rab gsal, who read Mi pham's explanations as a refutation of his (Dge lugs) tradition. | While Mi pham here appears as a mediator between the two extreme positions that developed in this regard in the history of Tibetan scholastics, he was harshly attacked for his statements by Rab gsal, who read Mi pham's explanations as a refutation of his (Dge lugs) tradition. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Criticism in the ''<i>'</i>Ju lan''</h4> | ||
Among the various issues raised in the fourth topic of the debate, the discussion of the present question seemed to be particularly important to Rab gsal. In the overall outline of his work he mentioned this issue as a separate sub-item, which he subdivided further into two aspects: According to Rab gsal, Mi pham's – alleged – position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words contradicts, firstly, other statements within his work, and, secondly, the authoritative Indian scriptures (''lung'').<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 409.6: ''da ni don dam sgra dang blo'i yul min zer ba la''/ ''rang tshig dang''/ ''lung tshig dang 'gal ba'i tshul lo''//.</ref> | Among the various issues raised in the fourth topic of the debate, the discussion of the present question seemed to be particularly important to Rab gsal. In the overall outline of his work he mentioned this issue as a separate sub-item, which he subdivided further into two aspects: According to Rab gsal, Mi pham's – alleged – position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words contradicts, firstly, other statements within his work, and, secondly, the authoritative Indian scriptures (''lung'').<ref>See ''<i>'</i>Ju lan'' 409.6: ''da ni don dam sgra dang blo'i yul min zer ba la''/ ''rang tshig dang''/ ''lung tshig dang 'gal ba'i tshul lo''//.</ref> | ||
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Earlier, Rab gsal used the fact that the scriptures mention the realisation of the absolute and also teach emptiness as a proof against the position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words. A (fictive) opponent now might counter this argument – as implied by Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''<ref>In his explanations on this matter, Mi pham also distinguished between the conventional and absolute levels: while one can call the absolute an object with regard to the earlier level, it would be contradictory to do so on the latter level. Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.3–4: ''tha snyad du ni 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yul can dang''/ ''chos kyi dbyings yul du byas pa la brten nas shes bya yin no'' [C ''no'' om.] ''zhes brjod rung gi''/ ''don dam par gzung 'dzin med pa'i mnyam bzhag gis 'di gzung bya'am shes bya yin zer na tshig de dngos shugs'' [C ''shug sa''] ''mi 'gal lam''/.</ref> – by distinguishing between the level of ordinary conventional ways of communication and the absolute level. The scriptures talk about the absolute and its realisation in a merely commonsense way; this does, however, not imply that they can truly express the absolute in an ultimative and definitive way. Rab gsal counters that such a response will only create other problems: in the tradition of Mi pham – Rab gsal assumes – existence on the conventional level is not accepted as existence ''per se''. Therefore, Mi pham would not be able to give the response mentioned above in the first place. Here, Rab gsal's reasoning depends on certain assumptions about his opponent's position, a move that will be sharply attacked in Mi pham's answer. | Earlier, Rab gsal used the fact that the scriptures mention the realisation of the absolute and also teach emptiness as a proof against the position that the absolute is not an object of mind and words. A (fictive) opponent now might counter this argument – as implied by Mi pham's explanations in the ''Nor bu ke ta ka''<ref>In his explanations on this matter, Mi pham also distinguished between the conventional and absolute levels: while one can call the absolute an object with regard to the earlier level, it would be contradictory to do so on the latter level. Cf. ''Nor bu ke ta ka'' 9.3–4: ''tha snyad du ni 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yul can dang''/ ''chos kyi dbyings yul du byas pa la brten nas shes bya yin no'' [C ''no'' om.] ''zhes brjod rung gi''/ ''don dam par gzung 'dzin med pa'i mnyam bzhag gis 'di gzung bya'am shes bya yin zer na tshig de dngos shugs'' [C ''shug sa''] ''mi 'gal lam''/.</ref> – by distinguishing between the level of ordinary conventional ways of communication and the absolute level. The scriptures talk about the absolute and its realisation in a merely commonsense way; this does, however, not imply that they can truly express the absolute in an ultimative and definitive way. Rab gsal counters that such a response will only create other problems: in the tradition of Mi pham – Rab gsal assumes – existence on the conventional level is not accepted as existence ''per se''. Therefore, Mi pham would not be able to give the response mentioned above in the first place. Here, Rab gsal's reasoning depends on certain assumptions about his opponent's position, a move that will be sharply attacked in Mi pham's answer. | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Rab lan''</h4> | ||
Among the responses to Rab gsal's various points of criticism, Mi pham's answer to Rab gsal's first criticism, presented earlier, already shows the essential issue that Mi pham repeatedly emphasises in his other answers.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 396.5–387.3 (RL IV.15a).</ref> According to Mi pham, Rab gsal's accusations are based on a lack of differentiation between the level of ordinary conventions and the absolute level of true investigation, a fault for which Mi pham offers pointed words:<ref>''Rab lan'' 396.5–6: ''de yang khyod ni don dam pa ni dmigs pa'i spyod yul can du rtogs bya min pa dang kun rdzob tha snyad kyi dbang du byas te rtogs pa yod pa'i don gnyis kyi dbang du byas pa'i khas len tshul shan ma phyed par bab col du rgol ba'i tshig gis rang mtshangs'' [B ''mtshang''] ''ston pa la mkhas pa zhig ste''/.</ref> | Among the responses to Rab gsal's various points of criticism, Mi pham's answer to Rab gsal's first criticism, presented earlier, already shows the essential issue that Mi pham repeatedly emphasises in his other answers.<ref>See ''Rab lan'' 396.5–387.3 (RL IV.15a).</ref> According to Mi pham, Rab gsal's accusations are based on a lack of differentiation between the level of ordinary conventions and the absolute level of true investigation, a fault for which Mi pham offers pointed words:<ref>''Rab lan'' 396.5–6: ''de yang khyod ni don dam pa ni dmigs pa'i spyod yul can du rtogs bya min pa dang kun rdzob tha snyad kyi dbang du byas te rtogs pa yod pa'i don gnyis kyi dbang du byas pa'i khas len tshul shan ma phyed par bab col du rgol ba'i tshig gis rang mtshangs'' [B ''mtshang''] ''ston pa la mkhas pa zhig ste''/.</ref> | ||
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Although it would appear that Rab gsal’s specific argument in this discussion is invalidated, the issue of whether existence and non-existence on the conventional and absolute levels count as existence and non-existence in general will be disputed ''in extensio'' in the following controversies. | Although it would appear that Rab gsal’s specific argument in this discussion is invalidated, the issue of whether existence and non-existence on the conventional and absolute levels count as existence and non-existence in general will be disputed ''in extensio'' in the following controversies. | ||
<h4>Rab gsal's | <h4>Rab gsal's Reply in the ''Ga bur chu rgyun''</h4> | ||
As shown in Rab gsal's earlier criticism, the issue whether the absolute should be regarded as an object of mind and words or not is of particular importance to Rab gsal. It is therefore not surprising that he also continues to discuss this issue in his second critical treatise, even though Mi pham had made clear that – under certain premises – he, too, accepts that the absolute can be described as an object of mind and words. Rab gsal's further critique pertains to all three principal subjects that were discussed earlier: contradictions between different statements of Mi pham, contradictions to the scriptures, and the refutation of objections. | As shown in Rab gsal's earlier criticism, the issue whether the absolute should be regarded as an object of mind and words or not is of particular importance to Rab gsal. It is therefore not surprising that he also continues to discuss this issue in his second critical treatise, even though Mi pham had made clear that – under certain premises – he, too, accepts that the absolute can be described as an object of mind and words. Rab gsal's further critique pertains to all three principal subjects that were discussed earlier: contradictions between different statements of Mi pham, contradictions to the scriptures, and the refutation of objections. | ||
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The principal issue Rab gsal is aiming at, namely whether the acceptance of something on a certain level also implies its acceptance in general, pertains also to the answer Mi pham had given on the specific issue of existence on a certain level. Mi pham's response further touched general doctrinal positions in this regard, and Rab gsal therefore continues to discuss Mi pham’s answer by pointing out five logical faults that would follow from Mi pham's position that existence on a certain level does not imply general existence.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 464.6ff.</ref> | The principal issue Rab gsal is aiming at, namely whether the acceptance of something on a certain level also implies its acceptance in general, pertains also to the answer Mi pham had given on the specific issue of existence on a certain level. Mi pham's response further touched general doctrinal positions in this regard, and Rab gsal therefore continues to discuss Mi pham’s answer by pointing out five logical faults that would follow from Mi pham's position that existence on a certain level does not imply general existence.<ref>''Ga bur chu rgyun'' 464.6ff.</ref> | ||
<h4>Mi pham's | <h4>Mi pham's Reply in the ''Yang lan''</h4> | ||
Of the two issues under discussion, Mi pham considers only the latter one. While he tried to mediate between the established positions on the interpretation of BCA IX.2cd, Rab gsal accused him – again – of contradicting himself and of betraying his own Snga rabs pa tradition. It is therefore not surprising that Mi pham refused to add further explanations on this particular topic. | Of the two issues under discussion, Mi pham considers only the latter one. While he tried to mediate between the established positions on the interpretation of BCA IX.2cd, Rab gsal accused him – again – of contradicting himself and of betraying his own Snga rabs pa tradition. It is therefore not surprising that Mi pham refused to add further explanations on this particular topic. | ||
Revision as of 15:35, 22 October 2024
Viehbeck 2014 p.99-210
