Study/The Debate Between Mipham and Pari Rabsel: Difference between revisions
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<h3>Ultimate emptiness and freedom from extremes</h3> | <h3>Ultimate emptiness and freedom from extremes</h3> | ||
The first issue was mainly concerned with Mi pham's opposition to viewing mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') as the ultimate form of emptiness and the controversies that evolved out of this; the second issue, in contrast, focused on Mi pham's alternative conception of the ultimate absolute as being beyond all extremes. | The first issue was mainly concerned with Mi pham's opposition to viewing mere non-existence of true establishment (''bden med'') as the ultimate form of emptiness and the controversies that evolved out of this; the second issue, in contrast, focused on Mi pham's alternative conception of the ultimate absolute as being beyond all extremes. | ||
It is commonly accepted that Madhyamaka philosophy should culminate in a view that neither tends to the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>''), nor to the extreme of eternalism (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>''). This position is expressed by the fundamental Madhyamaka statement that things are "neither existent nor non-existent" (''yod min med min'').<ref>This statement is found in various ''sūtras'', such as the ''Ratnakūṭa'' (cf. Frauwaller 1994: 167) or the ''Śālistambasūtra'' (cf. Cabezón & Dargyay 2007: 80, 287), and the relevant passage of the latter ''sūtra'' is commonly cited in the Madhyamaka-related ''śāstras''. In this regard, Seyfort Ruegg mentions the ''Jñānasārasamuccaya'' ascribed to Āryadeva, Bhāviveka's ''Madhyamakaratnapradīpa'', Jitāri's ''Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā(bhāṣya)'', Advayavajra's ''Tattvaratnāvalī'', and | It is commonly accepted that Madhyamaka philosophy should culminate in a view that neither tends to the extreme of annihilation (''chad mtha<i>'</i>''), nor to the extreme of eternalism (''rtag mtha<i>'</i>''). This position is expressed by the fundamental Madhyamaka statement that things are "neither existent nor non-existent" (''yod min med min'').<ref>This statement is found in various ''sūtras'', such as the ''Ratnakūṭa'' (cf. Frauwaller 1994: 167) or the ''Śālistambasūtra'' (cf. Cabezón & Dargyay 2007: 80, 287), and the relevant passage of the latter ''sūtra'' is commonly cited in the Madhyamaka-related ''śāstras''. In this regard, Seyfort Ruegg mentions the ''Jñānasārasamuccaya'' ascribed to Āryadeva, Bhāviveka's ''Madhyamakaratnapradīpa'', Jitāri's ''Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā(bhāṣya)'', Advayavajra's ''Tattvaratnāvalī'', and | ||
the ''Subhāṣitasaṃgraha'' ascribed to Sarahapāda (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 143)</ref> Following Tsong kha pa, this formulation is, however, not to be understood literally: applying such contradictory qualities as "existent" and "non-existent" to a single logical subject is not possible, as these qualities are said to be mutually exclusive (''phan tshun gzhan sel ba'').<ref>See, e.g., Tsong kha pa's ''Gser phreng'' as quoted in Tauscher 1995: 60.</ref> Tsong kha pa solves the apparent contradiction by adding a specification: "neither existent nor non-existent" is rightly understood as "neither existent on the absolute level nor non-existent on the conventional level."<ref>Tsong kha pa's general understanding of ''yod min med min'' is discussed extensively in Tauscher 1995: 56ff.</ref> While for Tsong kha pa and his followers this represents a correct concept of the unity of the two ''satyas'', which avoids leaning towards either extreme, Mi pham confronts the Dge lugs tradition with a different | the ''Subhāṣitasaṃgraha'' ascribed to Sarahapāda (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 143)</ref> Following Tsong kha pa, this formulation is, however, not to be understood literally: applying such contradictory qualities as "existent" and "non-existent" to a single logical subject is not possible, as these qualities are said to be mutually exclusive (''phan tshun gzhan sel ba'').<ref>See, e.g., Tsong kha pa's ''Gser phreng'' as quoted in Tauscher 1995: 60.</ref> Tsong kha pa solves the apparent contradiction by adding a specification: "neither existent nor non-existent" is rightly understood as "neither existent on the absolute level nor non-existent on the conventional level."<ref>Tsong kha pa's general understanding of ''yod min med min'' is discussed extensively in Tauscher 1995: 56ff.</ref> While for Tsong kha pa and his followers this represents a correct concept of the unity of the two ''satyas'', which avoids leaning towards either extreme, Mi pham confronts the Dge lugs tradition with a different | ||
Revision as of 15:43, 22 April 2024
Viehbeck 2014 p.99-210
