Explore/Chapter 9 - Wisdom: Difference between revisions

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'''Śrāvaka (9.9):''' If all phenomena are unreal and mere illusions, then the Buddha himself is an illusion too. Merit can only be accrued by making offerings to a real Buddha, so how can merit be accumulated by making offerings to an illusory Buddha? And how could beings take rebirth after they die if they are themselves illusions?
'''Śrāvaka (9.9):''' If all phenomena are unreal and mere illusions, then the Buddha himself is an illusion too. Merit can only be accrued by making offerings to a real Buddha, so how can merit be accumulated by making offerings to an illusory Buddha? And how could beings take rebirth after they die if they are themselves illusions?
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'''Śāntideva’s response (9.10):''' Illusory offerings made to the illusory Buddha give rise to illusory merit, just as you Śrāvakas believe that truly existent  merit is accumulated by making truly existent offerings to a truly existent Buddha. The only difference between our systems lies in the respective reality or nonreality of the merit (and of the Buddha); it does not lie in the arising or nonarising of such merit.
'''Śāntideva's response (9.10):''' Illusory offerings made to the illusory Buddha give rise to illusory merit, just as you Śrāvakas believe that truly existent  merit is accumulated by making truly existent offerings to a truly existent Buddha. The only difference between our systems lies in the respective reality or nonreality of the merit (and of the Buddha); it does not lie in the arising or nonarising of such merit.
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All phenomena, whether an illusion or what we call a real phenomena, arise on the basis of causes and conditions. As long as the complete conditions of an illusion are assembled, the illusion will manifest. And as long as the complete conditions of  karma and afflictions are present, beings will continue to experience death and rebirth.
All phenomena, whether an illusion or what we call a real phenomena, arise on the basis of causes and conditions. As long as the complete conditions of an illusion are assembled, the illusion will manifest. And as long as the complete conditions of  karma and afflictions are present, beings will continue to experience death and rebirth.
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Here, Śāntideva is saying that illusions and "real" beings are similar in that they appear but do not exist intrinsically.
Here, Śāntideva is saying that illusions and "real" beings are similar in that they appear but do not exist intrinsically.


'''Śāntideva’s continued response (9.11):''' But with regard to the killing of a real person and the "killing" of an illusory person, there is a difference in the karma accrued, as one has a mind to experience suffering and one does not.
'''Śāntideva's continued response (9.11):''' But with regard to the killing of a real person and the "killing" of an illusory person, there is a difference in the karma accrued, as one has a mind to experience suffering and one does not.
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'''Śāntideva’s response (9.11):'''
'''Śāntideva's response (9.11):'''
   
   
The intention to kill the illusory person that in reality is not a person still carries with it the fault of intending great harm on someone. But even if we were able to "kill" that  illusory person, because they do not have a mind, no fault of murder would actually be committed.
The intention to kill the illusory person that in reality is not a person still carries with it the fault of intending great harm on someone. But even if we were able to "kill" that  illusory person, because they do not have a mind, no fault of murder would actually be committed.
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And if that first analyzing mind does not require another analyzing consciousness to investigate its nature, then why do other nonmental phenomena require it? There would be no need for any valid cognizer of the lack of inherent existence.
And if that first analyzing mind does not require another analyzing consciousness to investigate its nature, then why do other nonmental phenomena require it? There would be no need for any valid cognizer of the lack of inherent existence.
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'''Śāntideva’s reply (9.110):''' The valid cognition which ascertains that all phenomena lack inherent existence does not need other valid cognitions to ascertain it.  
'''Śāntideva's reply (9.110):''' The valid cognition which ascertains that all phenomena lack inherent existence does not need other valid cognitions to ascertain it.  
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'''Śāntideva continues his reply (9.110):''' Why is that? Because when that initial valid cognition ascertains the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, which is the understanding of their emptiness, then as long as that mind does not wander and decline, then it is not possible for that mind to perceive any phenomena as truly existent.
'''Śāntideva continues his reply (9.110):''' Why is that? Because when that initial valid cognition ascertains the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, which is the understanding of their emptiness, then as long as that mind does not wander and decline, then it is not possible for that mind to perceive any phenomena as truly existent.
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'''Śāntideva's further consequence (9.119ab):''' If you accept that Īśvara is essentially all the different elements, then that kind of Īśvara could not be either permanent or unitary. Instead, it would have to be impermanent, multiple, and could not be inactive, just as is the nature of the elements.  
'''Śāntideva's further consequence (9.119ab):''' If you accept that Īśvara is essentially all the different elements, then that kind of Īśvara could not be either permanent or unitary. Instead, it would have to be impermanent, multiple, and could not be inactive, just as is the nature of the elements.  
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'''Śāntideva’s further argument against divine elements (9.119cd):''' If this divine creator were the elements, then it could not be completely pure as it is believed to be in those philosophies. We see that the elements are easily trampled underfoot. This creator could also be easily trampled underfoot, and therefore how can you consider them to be divine? What kind of God would that be? And further, if the creator can be trampled underfoot, how can they be spoken of as omnipotent?
'''Śāntideva's further argument against divine elements (9.119cd):''' If this divine creator were the elements, then it could not be completely pure as it is believed to be in those philosophies. We see that the elements are easily trampled underfoot. This creator could also be easily trampled underfoot, and therefore how can you consider them to be divine? What kind of God would that be? And further, if the creator can be trampled underfoot, how can they be spoken of as omnipotent?


In his commentary to the ninth chapter entitled ''The Brilliant Torch'', Minyak Kunzang Sönam clearly shows the qualities that these schools attribute to gods such as Īśvara and how it is illogical for them to be the elements.
In his commentary to the ninth chapter entitled ''The Brilliant Torch'', Minyak Kunzang Sönam clearly shows the qualities that these schools attribute to gods such as Īśvara and how it is illogical for them to be the elements.
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'''Śāntideva’s explanation (9.148ab):''' If a nonexistent thing is to become something, it must abandon the condition of nonexistence. It cannot exist as something at the time that it is nonexistent, as existence and nonexistence are contradictory. And at the time when something is nonexistent, the phenomena which would be its result would not have come into being, and therefore a nonexistent thing can never change from being nothing.   
'''Śāntideva's explanation (9.148ab):''' If a nonexistent thing is to become something, it must abandon the condition of nonexistence. It cannot exist as something at the time that it is nonexistent, as existence and nonexistence are contradictory. And at the time when something is nonexistent, the phenomena which would be its result would not have come into being, and therefore a nonexistent thing can never change from being nothing.   


Also, if a nonexistent became an existent by abandoning the state of nonexistence, at the moment that it abandoned the nonexistent state it would then no longer be nonexistent but instead existent. And if the nonexistent had not yet left behind the state of nonexistence, then it would not be able to transform into anything.
Also, if a nonexistent became an existent by abandoning the state of nonexistence, at the moment that it abandoned the nonexistent state it would then no longer be nonexistent but instead existent. And if the nonexistent had not yet left behind the state of nonexistence, then it would not be able to transform into anything.
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{{QuoteCite
{{QuoteCite
|quote-text=When through practice it becomes firm,
|quote-text=When through practice it becomes firm,
Then alarmed by other’s suffering,
Then alarmed by other's suffering,
The [bodhisattvas] renounce the bliss of concentration
The [bodhisattvas] renounce the bliss of concentration
And plunge even to the depths of relentless hells.<ref>Jinpa, ''Commentary on the Awakening Mind'', 9, https://tibetanclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Awakening-Mind-Commentary.pdf.</ref>
And plunge even to the depths of relentless hells.<ref>Jinpa, ''Commentary on the Awakening Mind'', 9, https://tibetanclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Awakening-Mind-Commentary.pdf.</ref>

Revision as of 14:33, 30 October 2024