m (AlexC moved page The Docrinal Background of the Debates to Study/The Doctrinal Background of the Debates) |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 531: | Line 531: | ||
Generally, Mipham agrees with the ngarabpa rejection of Tsongkhapa's assessment of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction as a difference of view. Similarly, he takes exception to the eight difficult points, although, at least in the ''Ketaka'', he is concerned with some more than others. This naturally reflects the fact that only some of Tsongkhapa's difficult points pertain to the arguments laid out in the "Wisdom Chapter": the refutation of the Cittamātra doctrine of the self-cognizing mind, for example, or the debate about the realization of the Arhats. On the other hand, he is much less interested in the dialectical question of autonomous versus consequential arguments. Even though, etymologically speaking, this is the basis of the terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika," Mipham considers it to be of only secondary importance in distinguishing the two Madhyamaka approaches.<ref>See Mipham, ''Teaching to Delight'', 133. Further details of Mipham's attitude to other of the eight difficult points can be found in the commentary on the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', including a rather humorous dismissal of the theory of "disintegration as a positive entity." See Mipham, ''Word of Chandra'', 223-25.</ref> | Generally, Mipham agrees with the ngarabpa rejection of Tsongkhapa's assessment of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction as a difference of view. Similarly, he takes exception to the eight difficult points, although, at least in the ''Ketaka'', he is concerned with some more than others. This naturally reflects the fact that only some of Tsongkhapa's difficult points pertain to the arguments laid out in the "Wisdom Chapter": the refutation of the Cittamātra doctrine of the self-cognizing mind, for example, or the debate about the realization of the Arhats. On the other hand, he is much less interested in the dialectical question of autonomous versus consequential arguments. Even though, etymologically speaking, this is the basis of the terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika," Mipham considers it to be of only secondary importance in distinguishing the two Madhyamaka approaches.<ref>See Mipham, ''Teaching to Delight'', 133. Further details of Mipham's attitude to other of the eight difficult points can be found in the commentary on the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', including a rather humorous dismissal of the theory of "disintegration as a positive entity." See Mipham, ''Word of Chandra'', 223-25.</ref> | ||
<h3>The Two Truths</h3> | <h3>''The Two Truths''</h3> | ||
A second important point that divides Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka view | A second important point that divides Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka view | ||
| Line 593: | Line 593: | ||
say that the object of negation is some putative "true existence," and not phenomena themselves, may be a way to preserve one's confidence in the nondeceptive perception of things on the conventional level. In Mipham's view, however, it undermines what for him is the entire soteriological purpose of the teachings on emptiness, which is to free beings from the clinging to phenomena that is the cause of their suffering. Beings perceive phenomena; they do not perceive the true existence of phenomena. And since, on this basis, they are attached to things themselves, not to their true existence, it stands to reason that it is things, and not some putative true existence of things, that must be negated. For Mipham, therefore, to say that phenomena are not empty of themselves but only of their true existence is an important mistake, and he energetically refutes it on many occasions.<ref>See especially his commentary on Chandrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatāra''. See Mipham, ''Word of Chandra'', 165-83</ref> | say that the object of negation is some putative "true existence," and not phenomena themselves, may be a way to preserve one's confidence in the nondeceptive perception of things on the conventional level. In Mipham's view, however, it undermines what for him is the entire soteriological purpose of the teachings on emptiness, which is to free beings from the clinging to phenomena that is the cause of their suffering. Beings perceive phenomena; they do not perceive the true existence of phenomena. And since, on this basis, they are attached to things themselves, not to their true existence, it stands to reason that it is things, and not some putative true existence of things, that must be negated. For Mipham, therefore, to say that phenomena are not empty of themselves but only of their true existence is an important mistake, and he energetically refutes it on many occasions.<ref>See especially his commentary on Chandrakīrti's ''Madhyamakāvatāra''. See Mipham, ''Word of Chandra'', 165-83</ref> | ||
<h3>The Ultimate Truth</h3> | <h3>''The Ultimate Truth''</h3> | ||
A third important difference that divides Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka presentation from that ofthe earlier schools concerns the ultimate truth itself: its nature and the way it is to be realized. This question is articulated specifically in relation to the refutation of the so-called tetralemma, the four ontological extremes spoken of in Nāgārjuna's kārikās. These four extremes may be understood in the following way. Phenomena are not (1) existent; they are not (2) nonexistent; they are not (3) both existent and nonexistent; and they are not (4) neither existent nor nonexistent. Applied practically to the question of causation, that is, as an analysis of the observed "fact" of production, Nāgārjuna says—indeed proves—that "really existent things" are not produced from themselves; they are not produced from something else; they are not produced both from themselves and from something else; and they do not arise uncaused. | A third important difference that divides Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka presentation from that ofthe earlier schools concerns the ultimate truth itself: its nature and the way it is to be realized. This question is articulated specifically in relation to the refutation of the so-called tetralemma, the four ontological extremes spoken of in Nāgārjuna's kārikās. These four extremes may be understood in the following way. Phenomena are not (1) existent; they are not (2) nonexistent; they are not (3) both existent and nonexistent; and they are not (4) neither existent nor nonexistent. Applied practically to the question of causation, that is, as an analysis of the observed "fact" of production, Nāgārjuna says—indeed proves—that "really existent things" are not produced from themselves; they are not produced from something else; they are not produced both from themselves and from something else; and they do not arise uncaused. | ||
The purpose of this website is to provide a resource hub for trustworthy information for learning about and teaching Bodhicitta ("bodhichitta") and Śāntideva's ("Shantideva's") related texts. Unique content will be shared here and the site will act as a broker for other projects and authors that have already created quality materials, which we will curate for a wide range of audiences.
See General disclaimer for more information.