Study/The Debate Between Mipham and Pari Rabsel: Difference between revisions

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Viehbeck 2014 p.99-210

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 Proving that the realisation or "mental power" of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and of Bodhisattvas is the same prior to the seventh ''bhūmi'' implies that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also have an understanding of emptiness. Tsong kha pa further points out that the Prāsaṅgika system classifies grasping as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') as obscuration of afflictions and accepts that this kind of grasping, together with its seeds, is abandoned by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, too.<ref>''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 52.10–13: ''lugs 'dis ni''/ ''gang zag bden 'dzin thams cad nyon mong can gyi ma rig par bzhed la''/ ''de slar mi skye ba'i tshul gyis spong ba la''/ ''de dag gi sa bon zad dgos shing''/''spangs pa de yang dgra bcom pa gnyis dang thun mong ba yin pas''/ ''bden 'dzin gyi sa bon spong ba ni shes sgrib spong ba min no''//.</ref> In the Dge lugs tradition, the question of the realisation of emptiness by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and the distinction between obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib'') and obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib'') are key issues for their understanding of the Prāsaṅgika approach, a philosophical view that the Dge lugs school, in particular, emphasises as the highest among the various Buddhist systems. The most prominent manifestation of the Dge lugs appreciation of the Prāsaṅgika approach is a work called ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', a text that defines the eight characteristics of the Prāsaṅgika approach from a Dge lugs viewpoint.<ref>This work (of which different versions exist) consists of Tsong kha pa's oral instructions, that were written down by his disciple Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. For an introduction and translation of this text, see Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 139ff.</ref> In the sixth chapter of this work, the Prasaṅgika tradition is distinguished by its assertion that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas' realisation of emptiness extends to phenomena (''dharma'') and is not to be limited to persons, as the Svātantrika tradition claims.<ref>See Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 227, for a detailed annotated translation of this chapter. Further, Lopez 1988 deals with the different stances taken by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti on
-the question of the realisation of emptiness by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.</ref> There, understanding the emptiness of phenomena is described as a prerequisite for attaining the state of an Arhat,<ref>Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 230: "If dharmas having no self-nature are not understood, it is not possible either to maintain that ''nirvāṇa'' will be achieved." See also Seyfort Ruegg's explanation of this in n.137</ref> the issue that is debated in the controversies concerning the present passage of the BCA. In chapter seven,<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 234ff.</ref> the Svātantrika approach is characterised as one that accepts grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') and the seed of this grasping as obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''/''jñeyāvaraṇa''), while the Prāsaṅgika tradition asserts the very same to be obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''/''kleśāvaraṇa''). Since Arhats are held to have abandoned obscuration of afflictions, this classification implies that Arhats have also abandoned grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin''), and hence have understood emptiness.<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 247, in particular.</ref> While these characteristics are presented in a systematic way in the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', they also appear in Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal''. Here, Tsong kha pa refers to the present passage of the BCA as a proof of his own position in the interpretation of Madhyamakāvatāra I 8d, which argues that Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha-Arhats do indeed realise emptiness. While explaining BCA IX.41–48 in detail, Tsong kha pa opposes the position of "some commentators and Tibetans," which relates this passage to Arhats who have abandoned all kleśas.<ref>Cf. ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 60.1–4: ''gzhung de rnams ni de ltar bshad dgos kyi''/ ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams''/ ''nyon mongs med kyang mau gal gyi bu dang''/ ''<i>'</i>phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bus sdug bsngal 'byin pa mthong bas''/ ''de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no''// ''zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref> If one understood this passage as referring to Arhats, it would not only deprive Tsong kha pa of an argument in favour of his interpretation of the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', but it would also criticise two of the cornerstones of the Dge lugs understanding of the Prāsaṅgika tradition. There is no need to investigate Tsong kha pa's explanation of this passage in more detail, as the important aspects have already been discussed in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary, which follows the model of his master very closely, at times even literally. It is, however, important to consider the immense doctrinal background that is connected to this specific passage of the BCA.
+the question of the realisation of emptiness by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.</ref> There, understanding the emptiness of phenomena is described as a prerequisite for attaining the state of an Arhat,<ref>Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 230: "If dharmas having no self-nature are not understood, it is not possible either to maintain that ''nirvāṇa'' will be achieved." See also Seyfort Ruegg's explanation of this in n.137</ref> the issue that is debated in the controversies concerning the present passage of the BCA. In chapter seven,<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 234ff.</ref> the Svātantrika approach is characterised as one that accepts grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin'') and the seed of this grasping as obscuration of knowables (''shes sgrib''/''jñeyāvaraṇa''), while the Prāsaṅgika tradition asserts the very same to be obscuration of afflictions (''nyon sgrib''/''kleśāvaraṇa''). Since Arhats are held to have abandoned obscuration of afflictions, this classification implies that Arhats have also abandoned grasping [things] as truly established (''bden 'dzin''), and hence have understood emptiness.<ref>Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 247, in particular.</ref> While these characteristics are presented in a systematic way in the ''Dka' gnad''/''gnas brgyad'', they also appear in Tsong kha pa's ''Dgongs pa rab gsal''. Here, Tsong kha pa refers to the present passage of the BCA as a proof of his own position in the interpretation of Madhyamakāvatāra I 8d, which argues that Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha-Arhats do indeed realise emptiness. While explaining BCA IX.41–48 in detail, Tsong kha pa opposes the position of "some commentators and Tibetans," which relates this passage to Arhats who have abandoned all kleśas.<ref>Cf. ''Dgongs pa rab gsal'' 60.1–4: ''gzhung de rnams ni de ltar bshad dgos kyi''/ ''<i>'</i>grel pa 'ga' zhig dang bod rnams''/ ''nyon mongs med kyang mau gal gyi bu dang''/ ''<i>'</i>phags pa sor 'phreng can la sogs pa la sngon so skye'i dus su bsags pa'i las kyi 'bras bus sdug bsngal 'byin pa mthong bas''/ ''de ma thag tu grol ba ma yin no''// ''zhes pa ltar mi bya ste''/.</ref> If one understood this passage as referring to Arhats, it would not only deprive Tsong kha pa of an argument in favour of his interpretation of the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'', but it would also criticise two of the cornerstones of the Dge lugs understanding of the Prāsaṅgika tradition. There is no need to investigate Tsong kha pa's explanation of this passage in more detail, as the important aspects have already been discussed in the presentation of Rgyal tshab's commentary, which follows the model of his master very closely, at times even literally. It is, however, important to consider the immense doctrinal background that is connected to this specific passage of the BCA. . . .