Translation Memory:006-Tsadra-BCA-Com-WisdomChapter/111
006-Tsadra-BCA-Com-WisdomChapter/111 ID: 006-Tsadra-BCA-Com-WisdomChapter <br> Date: 1 November 2023 <br> Creator: Migmar;Gwen;Marcus;Jeremi <br> Origin: Tsadra Foundation
Segment Data
| English | The example that the Chittamatrins use here is not established. Blue lapis lazuli is not blue without depending on other factors. It has been made blue through the extraneous accumulation of the causes and conditions that make things appear blue. It is not possible for something that was not blue previously to make itself blue without depending on extraneous causes and conditions. Now, to the extent that a thing is not blue, to that extent its being blue in and of itself is undermined. Moreover, if something is blue, it necessarily became blue owing to previous extraneous causes. It is impossible for the color blue to be self-producing.24The thesis of the self-illuminating (self-knowing) mind, as presented in the Cittamātra system, is being placed under the microscope and found wanting. In order to illustrate their theory, the Chittamatrins had compared the self-knowing mind with lapis lazuli. Just as lapis lazuli is naturally, automatically blue, the mind is naturally self-cognizant. The Madhyamaka attack is twofold: first, a demonstration that the careless use of the example of lapis lazuli creates more problems than it solves and, second, a refutation of the notion of self-cognizance that the Chittamatrins propose. A number of subtle points are being made in this passage. First, in order for it to work as an example of the self-knowing mind, which is said to be intrinsically self-cognizant, lapis lazuli would have to be utterly and intrinsically blue, or, to be more exact, it would have to be identical with its own blueness in a perfect and undifferentiable fusion. It is not sufficient simply to say that it is blue in all circumstances as compared with a clear crystal, which changes color depending on its surroundings. The first point that the Madhyamaka makes is that, even though lapis is always blue, its specific color is the result of factors (physical, chemical, and so forth) distinct from the stone itself. As the refutation progresses, however, it becomes about the philosophical conundrum of the relation between things and their properties. Conceptually and linguistically, we habitually and unreflectively divide objects from their characteristics. Despite the fact that they are never encountered in isolation, we think and say things like "this lapis lazuli is blue,” placing "lapis lazuli” and its "blue color” in parallel, so to speak, each on its own side. The reason why we do this is that we cling to things as if they were intrinsically existent, in other words, permanent and unitary entities. This allows us to talk about things as if they were distinct and separate from their properties—as if they possessed them—with the result that these same properties seem, in their turn, separate, or at least separable, from their "owner.” A space is thus created for the discourse about abstract general properties, or universals, which has occupied the philosophical imagination for centuries. The Madhyamaka attack on the Cittamātra tenet is part of its general refutation of the belief in true existence. And the interesting feature of this passage is that it shows how this refutation proceeds through an examination of the relation between things and their characteristics, showing that our usual practice is untenable. If it is argued that, as conceptual patterns and linguistic practice suggest, things are at least logically separate from their properties, it is legitimate then to inquire about the status of things in isolation from those same properties, for example, the lapis lazuli prior to its own blueness. According to the argument used repeatedly by Nāgārjuna in the kārikās, there are two possibilities: the lapis lazuli, distinct from its blue color, is either itself blue or it is not. If it is blue, the superaddition of blueness is otiose and achieves nothing. If it is not blue, then no amount of separable blueness will make it so. The same inquiry can be made with regard to the truly existent self-knowing mind. It too is logically distinct from its quality of auto-cognizance. Therefore it can be asked whether the mind, prior to its being self-knowing, is itself self-knowing or not. If it is, it is useless to add the property of self-cognizance to it by saying that "it is self-knowing.” On the other hand, if it is not self-knowing, the addition of the property will never make it so. The Chittamatrins’ use of the example of lapis lazuli as an illustration of their thesis betrays, from the Madhyamaka point of view, a considerable philosophical naïveté, a theme that is pursued in the following stanzas. |
|---|---|
| RootTextChapterNum | 9 |
| RootTextVerseNum | 20 |
| SegmentFormat | Commentary |
| SegmentOrder | 111 |
| SourcePageNumber | 27 |
| SourceSabcheNumber | 2.1.2.1.1.3.1 |
| Tibetan | དཔེ་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བཻཌཱུཪྻ་སྔོ་བ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་མེད་དུ་སྔོ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་སྔོན་པོར་སྣང་བའི་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གྱི་ཚོགས་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་སྔོན་པོར་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གཞན་ཅི་ལའང་མི་ལྟོས་པར་རང་གིས་རང་ཉིད་སྔར་སྔོན་པོ་མིན་པ་ལ་ཕྱིས་སྔོན་པོར་བྱས་པ་ནི་མི་སྲིད་དེ། ཇི་སྲིད་སྔོན་པོ་མིན་པ་དེ་སྲིད་དེ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྔོ་བ་ཉམས་ལ། སྔོན་པོ་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་རྒྱུ་གཞན་སྔོན་དུ་སོང་བས་ཁྱབ་ཀྱི། སྔོན་པོ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྔོན་པོར་སླར་ཡང་བྱ་བ་མི་སྲིད་དོ།། |
| TranslationChapter | The Ketaka Jewel |
| TranslationChapterSubsection | A refutation of the objections of the True Aspectarians |
| TranslationPageNumber | 99 |
| Wylie | dpe ma grub ste/_baiDUR+Ya sngo ba gzhan la ltos med du sngo ba ma yin te/_de sngon por snang ba'i rgyu rkyen gyi tshogs pa gzhan gyis sngon por byas pa yin gyi/_rgyu rkyen gzhan ci la'ang mi ltos par rang gis rang nyid sngar sngon po min pa la phyis sngon por byas pa ni mi srid de/_ji srid sngon po min pa de srid de rang bzhin gyis sngo ba nyams la/_sngon po yin na de'i rgyu gzhan sngon du song bas khyab kyi/_sngon po rang nyid kyis sngon por slar yang bya ba mi srid do// |
| ChantedAudio |
Alignment info
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| AuthorLabel | Mipam Gyatso 1846 - 1912 |
| DuplicateRootTranslation | true |
| RootSourceTransMem | 001-Tsadra-BCA-Root-Padmakara |
| RootTextWikiPage | Bodhicaryāvatāra |
| ShortTitle | Nor bu ke ta ka (2017) |
| SourceAuthor | People/Mi pham rgya mtsho |
| SourceTitleTibetan | ཤེས་རབ་ལེའུའི་ཚིག་དོན་གོ་སླ་བར་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་ནོར་བུ་ཀེ་ཏ་ཀ། |
| SourceTitleWylie | shes rab le'u'i tshig don go sla bar rnam par bshad pa nor bu ke ta ka |
| SourceVersionLabel | Mipam Gyatso (1846 - 1912) |
| SourceWikiPage | Texts/Nor bu ke ta ka |
| TranslationCitation | Fletcher, Wulstan, and Helena Blankleder (Padmakara Translation Group), trans. The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of "The Way of the Bodhisattva." Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2017. |
| TranslationPublishedYear | 2017 |
| TranslationWikiPage | Books/The Wisdom Chapter |
| Translator | People/Blankleder, H.;People/Fletcher, W.;People/Padmakara Translation Group |
| TransMemCreator | Migmar;Gwen;Marcus;Jeremi |
| TransMemDate | 1 November 2023 |
| TransMemID | 006-Tsadra-BCA-Com-WisdomChapter |
| TransMemNum | 006 |
| TransMemOrigin | Tsadra Foundation |
| TransMemType | Commentary |
