Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākramas: A Problem of Translation
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Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākramas: A Problem of Translation
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Description
A close reading of the three Bhāvanākramaḥ texts, written by Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE), reveals that their author was aware of two competing concepts of meditation prevalent in Tibet at the time of their composition. The two concepts of meditation, associated with the Sanskrit words bhāvanā and dhyāna, can be related respectively to the Indian and Chinese sides of the well-known debates at bSam yas. The account of the Mahāyāna path outlined in these texts implies an acceptance of the precedence of bhāvanā over dhyāna. In this paper I argue that Kamalaśīla advocated bhāvanā – a conception of meditation which encompasses non-conceptual dhyāna, but which also includes a discernment of reality (bhūta-pratyavekṣā) that is conceptual in nature. Such conceptual discernment should not be understood simply as a process of ordinary rational understanding (cintāmayī prajñā) but rather as constituting a special kind of meditative wisdom (bhāvanāmayī prajñā). A failure to recognize the subtle differences between Kamalaśīla’s employment of the terms dhyāna and bhāvanā, along with his advocacy of the latter, could easily lead to mistranslation and, with this, a basic misunderstanding of his position. In particular, it could lead to a conception of insight (vipaśyanā) that is overly intellectual in nature. Given the historically important role that these texts played in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, the implications of such a misconception could be far-reaching. This paper attempts to clarify the key meditation terminology found in the Bhāvanākramas as well as demonstrate the rationale for using ‘meditation’ as the default translation for bhāvanā. (Source: Buddhist Studies Review)
Citation
Adam, Martin T. "Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākramas: A Problem of Translation." Buddhist Studies Review 23, no. 1 (2006):71-92. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1558/bsrv.v23i1.71
Interconnections
3 Scholarship on
[I]n the first Bhāvanākrama, Kamalaśīla sets forth the three forms of wisdom (prajñā): the wisdom derived from learning (śrutamayīprajñā), the wisdom derived from reflection (cintāmayīprajñā), and the wisdom derived from cultivation (bhāvanāmayīprajñā), explaining that the last of these gradually destroys the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa) and the obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa). (Source: "Bhāvanākrama." In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 113. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.)
The second Bhāvanākrama considers many of [the] same topics [as the first], stressing that the achievement of the fruition of buddhahood requires the necessary causes, in the form of the collection of merit (puṇyasaṃbhāra) and the collection of wisdom (jñānasaṃbhāra). Both the first and second works espouse the doctrine of mind only (cittamātra); it is on the basis of these and other statements that Tibetan doxographers classified Kamalaśīla as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. (Source: "Bhāvanākrama." In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 112–13. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.)
The third and briefest of the Bhāvanākrama is devoted especially to the topics of śamatha and vipaśyanā, how each is cultivated, and how they are ultimately unified. Kamalaśīla argues that analysis (vicāra) into the lack of self (ātman) in both persons (pudgala) and phenomena (dharma) is required to arrive at a nonconceptual state of awareness. The three texts are widely cited in later Tibetan Buddhist literature, especially on the process for developing śamatha and vipaśyanā. (Source: "Bhāvanākrama." In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 112–13. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.)
1 Related
This thesis is composed of two parts, one a translation, the other a commentary on the material that has been translated -- a set of three well known identically entitled works by the famous Indian Buddhist scholar, Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795 C.E.). The Bhāvanākramas are here translated from both Sanskrit and Tibetan sources. The commentary takes the form of an extended critical Prologue to the texts and is centred around an examination of the notions of meditation and insight as found therein. The first chapter of the commentary examines the various terms for meditation found in the texts and argues for a specific way of translating them that regards as normative only one of these, that is, bhāvana. The argument is made that if one is to take the basic Buddhist distinction between intellectual and experiential wisdom seriously, no other concept of meditation will prove satisfactory. The concept of bhāvanā is contrasted with that of dhyāna, and explained in light of other important terms, notably samādhi, śamatha and vipaśyanā. Two different conceptions of samādhi are identified as existing within the texts, one corresponding with dhyāna and one with bhāvanā. The latter is identified as predominant. This conception holds that meditation is not to be principally identified as non-conceptual in nature, but rather encompasses both non-conceptual states and conceptual processes. These latter, however, are not to be identified with
ordinary reasoning processes (cintāmayī prajñā) but rather with a form of experiential knowing (bhāvanāmayī prajñā, vipaśyanā) that is conceptual in nature. It is in accordance with this conception that the actual translation of the texts has been undertaken.
The second chapter of the commentary examines the concept of insight (vipaśyanā) in light of the earlier findings. Here the text is analyzed for its explanations of its insight, understood in terms of the important technical term bhūtapratyavekṣā. Here an argument is made for translating this term in a particular manner consistent with the conception of meditation outlined in Chapter 1. The term is explored in light of key passages containing descriptions of the cultivation of wisdom as well as in light of other important technical terms appearing in the texts, notably dharmapravicaya, smṛti and manasikāra. Chapter 2 closes with a discussion of Kamalaśīla's ideas of śrāvaka insight meditation (vipaśyanā) and how it differs from that of the Mahāyāna. Most notable in this regard is the suggestion that Kamalaśīla may have regarded śrāvaka insight practices (vipaśyanā) as instances of śamatha meditation. In the third chapter the suggestion is made that such considerations could lead to the development of an important area of future research into the differences among diverse Indian Buddhist traditions. The concluding section of Chapter 3 contains a summary of the concrete findings of this analysis.
